Synopsis of an M.A. Thesis to be submitted by Suzanne Doyle.

"The Significance of British Policy Towards Spain, 1859-68"

This thesis falls into two distinct sections. The first deals with British policy towards Spain as an Iberian power. This study confirms the impression that Britain's policy of non-intervention was still primarily a means of maintaining Spanish independence. Between 1856 and 1863 this policy lost the constitutionalist implications given it by Palmerston. The consequent withdrawal of Great Britain from all part in Spanish politics reflects her general withdrawal from European affairs. With regard to Spanish-Portuguese relations, Britain's policy of non-intervention was applied to maintain the territorial and dynastic status quo in the Peninsula.

In the second section Spain is considered as a Mediterranean and World power. Great Britain wished to see her no weaker than she was in 1859. An examination of her policy confirms the consistancy with which, in this period of expanding markets, Britain was concerned with the security of her Trade Routes, and with preventing any power from gaining a monopoly over such strategic areas as the Straits of Gibraltar,

the Isthmus of Suez, and the Caribbean Sea. Her policy of trying to prevent interruptions of her trade, of maintaining the 'open door', and advocating free trade, governed her attidude to such Spanish enterprises as the wars against Morocco and the South American Republics, the annexation of San Domingo and Spanish activities on the West Coast of Africa; while her policy towards Cuba reveals the strength and limitations of her policy of suppressing the Slave Trade.

The material has been found in the Foreign Office records, in the private papers of Russell, Hammond and Clarendon in the Public Record Office, and of Gladstone and Layard in the British Museum.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN 1859 - 1868

Thesis submitted for M. A. by Suzanne Doyle

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

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List of Abbreviations

Accounts and Papers	A & P
British & Foreign State Papers	B.F.S.P.
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates	Hansard
Gifts and Deposits - Public Record Office	G. & D.
Foreign Office Correspondence Public Record Office.	FO.

The Significance of Britain's Policy towards Spain 1859-68.

Introduction

In the first half of the nineteenth century events in Spain occasioned more general statements of the nature of British Foreign Policy by British Ministers than events in any other single part of the globe. A rising of the Spanish people against Napoleon in 1808 provided the occasion for Canning to state that Britain would recognise the rights of a nation to rise against its government. A revolution in Spain brought forth Castlereagh's statement of the principle of non-intervention in 1820. Canning's theory of recognition was formulated to deal with the situation arising from the successful revolt of the Spanish-American colonies. The suggestion that he should guarantee the restoration of the Spanish Constitution in 1823, caused him to expound his doctrine of guarantee. Civil war in Spain forced Palmerston to voice his liberal and constitutionalist leanings and to make clear the conditions under which Britain would abandon the principle of non-intergention.

In this period, too, the practical application of Britain's policy towards Spain had important repercussions on her relations with other powers. It widened the breach with the "Holy Allies" in 1820. It caused the virtual isolation of Britain during the French invasion of the Peninsula in 1823. In the Carlist war it resulted in an uneasy alliance with France in opposition to the

three eastern powers. Aberdeen found that one of the main obstacles to his 'Entente Cordiale' lay in the instability of Spain. Finally in 1846 the affair of the Spanish Marriages caused a serious rupture between Britain and France. Across the Atlantic Britain's policy towards the Spanish colonies had important repercussions on Anglo- American relations. Canning's ~~policy~~ recognition of ~~recognising~~ South American independence while acceptable to the United States, had the effect of delaying at least temporarily, American leadership of the Western Hemisphere and the working out of the Monroe Doctrine. British interest in Cuba aroused the fears and jealousies of the Americans and similarly Britain suspected American designs upon this island.

It is evident therefore that Spanish affairs played an important part in the formulation of British Foreign Policy in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century. It is equally obvious that Britain considered that her interests in the Peninsula were sufficiently great for her to risk disputes with other powers.

In the second half of the century Spain appears to lose her importance in the British scheme of things. No Histories of British Foreign Policy in the preceding fifty years would be complete without a study of Anglo-Spanish relations. After 1846 Spain is barely mentioned in such general accounts. Britain apparently ceased to pursue an active policy in the Peninsula and Spanish affairs no longer contributed to the formulation of important principles of policy.

This thesis attempts to raise Anglo-Spanish relations out of the obscurity into which they have been relegated, and to estimate the significance of this apparent change in the position of Spain in Britain's foreign policy. The relations of the two countries have an intrinsic interest. Britain's interests in Spain and her colonies were political, strategic and commercial. Her policy towards Spain therefore throws light on the practical application of almost all the so-called principles of British policy in the mid-nineteenth century. The problem of the decline of British activity in the Peninsula raises a number of questions: was it the result of a change in Britain's conception of her interests, and consequently in the principles evolved to defend these interests, or did a change in the general European situation make it unnecessary for her to defend them; or was the apparent change one of method rather than of policy? Finally, does it reflect a change in British Foreign Policy as a whole, or is it confined to her policy towards Spain? In other words does its significance lie in the light which it throws upon British Foreign Policy, or upon the history of Anglo-Spanish relations?

In an attempt to answer these problems Britain's interest in and policy towards Spanish and Iberian politics are examined in the first two chapters. In the third and fourth chapters the factors governing Britain's policy towards the Spanish colonies and foreign enterprises are considered, both to establish their importance in Anglo-Spanish relations and for the illustration

which they afford of British policy generally. The commercial relations of the two countries have not been considered in detail since they were not of prime importance in the formulation of British policy.

Spanish affairs caused major European crises in 1846, and again in 1870. The period which lies between is of interest in Anglo-Spanish relations because Britain's active participation in the Spanish Marriages negotiations in 1841-46 stands in marked contrast to her complete neutrality towards the Spanish Succession question of 1869-70. This thesis attempts to deal with that part of the period not already covered. Britain's policy towards Spain as a colonial power came the full circle between 1852 when she was willing to guarantee Spanish possession of Cuba, and 1898 when she watched with equanimity the loss of the remnants of the Spanish Colonial Empire. This period, however, is too long to come within the scope of the thesis.

It will be shown that the dates chosen, from the beginning of Palmerston's last administration to the formation of the first Gladstone government, cover crucial years in the development of British policy. A series of coincidental events in 1858-9 and 1868-9 gives these dates an added merit. Thus in 1858 O'Donnell came to power in Spain. With one exception it was the longest and most stable of Spanish governments of the nineteenth century. The following year he was able to launch Spain on an active foreign policy. In 1858 Lord Howden was recalled from the Madrid Legation.

In 1859 Palmerston was again Prime Minister. The year 1868 saw the fall of Isabella II in September and the return of Clarendon to the Foreign Office in December; while Sir John Crampton the British Minister in Spain retired in the summer of 1869, at the same time as Spain inaugurated her search for a king. All of these events had, as will be seen, their repercussions upon British policy. It has, however, been found quite impossible to adhere to these dates with any degree of rigidity. The change in British policy in the sixties cannot be explained or pointed out without reference to the fifties. The decisive character of that change was manifested by the complete non-intervention of Britain in the Spanish Candidature question of 1868 to 1870.

CHAPTER I

The Meaning and Application of Great Britain's Policy of Non-Intervention in Spain.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign States is generally accepted as a principle of British foreign policy in the nineteenth century. Castlereagh is often said to have laid down the doctrine in his State Paper of May 5th 1820.[1] He was not initiating a new policy, but stating general principles already established. His successors followed these principles with such consistency, that later generations came to regard 'non-intervention' as a fundamental and inalienable factor in the policy of their country. Ministers who departed from it were invariably at pains to prove that such lapses were temporary and were necessitated by the actions of other powers.

Castlereagh's declaration was occasioned by a revolution in Spain, and this was the first country to which the principle was applied after the British government had formally committed themselves to it. For the next half century there was not a British Foreign Secretary who did not claim that it was the basis of his policy towards this European storm-centre. A close study of Anglo-Spanish relations in this period, however, leads to the conclusion that the principle of non-intervention as applied by Great Britain meant different things at different times.

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1 Temperley and Penson Foundations of British Foreign Policy 1938. Document 6. pp. 48.

Castlereagh defined his policy in the famous State Paper of 1820 with the specific object of preventing the four great Continental powers from interfering to suppress the Spanish revolution in the name of the European Alliance. England could be no party to such an extension of the original intention of that alliance. No British interest, could, in fact, be served by armed interference in Spain, and Castlereagh did not want to see any other power broaden her sphere of influence by an invasion of the Peninsula, or the alliance shattered by any such attempt to distort its aim. Britain was willing to make separate representations at Madrid if the King's person were endangered, or if Portugal were threatened with a Spanish invasion. In the latter case, Castlereagh would be acting in defence of a long acknowledged British interest - the maintenance of Portuguese integrity and independence, and in accordance with ancient treaty engagements. [2] The policy of non-intervention in the hands of the author of the State Paper of 1820 was primarily a means of preventing other powers from weakening a country in whose form of government England had no specific interest, but which she wished to see strong enough to protect herself against foreign attack.

Canning's policy towards Spain, did not materially differ from that of his predecessor. Unable to prevent the French invasion of 1823, he voiced his disapproval, and, by recognising the independence of the Spanish South American Colonies, limited its repercussions to Europe.

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2 See Chapter II for Britain's interests in Portugal and their effect upon Anglo-Spanish Relations.

Palmerston frankly abandoned the policy of non-intervention when he concluded the Quadruple Alliance of 1834.[3] He justified this Treaty under the additional articles of which England furnished material aid to the government of Isabella II, on the grounds that once a civil war had broken out it was permissible for other powers to treat the combatants as independent nations and to take sides.[4] In this case the three Eastern powers forced England's hand by sending aid to Don Carlos. Palmerston also feared that France was about to help Isabella, and the extension of French influence in Spain was as much against the interests of Britain as the victory of a prince under the auspices of the Holy Alliance. In default therefore of a strong and independent Spain, England had to abandon her declared principles and attempt by force to exclude the Satellite of Russia, Austria and Prussia, and by allying with France to limit the extent of French action. In this policy, Palmerston was eventually successful, in spite of the contention of the Spanish, supported by the British minister to Madrid, George Villiers, later Earl of Clarendon, that the aid was inadequate and his policy vascillating.[5] Don Carlos was defeated and driven out of Spain and the part played by France in the struggle was comparatively small.

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3 Treaty for the Pacification of the Peninsula Signed London 22nd April 1834 by Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. Additional article 18th August, 1834. Hertslet The Map of Europe by Treaty Vol. II. pp. 941, 949.

4 Palmerston to Howden 31st May 1851. F O. 72/780

5 H. Maxwell Life and Letters of the Fourth Earl of Clarendon. 1913. pp. 98. Buchanan to Russell. Confidential. 12th December 1859. FO. 72/961. Enclosure. Article from "España" 9th December, 1859 complains of the quality of the arms furnished to Spain.

The results of Palmerston's interference in the Carlist war were far reaching. He had found Spain the battleground of the struggle between the 'Holy Allies' and the forces of revolution, and he had intervened to expel foreign influences. In fact, he had interfered in the cause of 'non-intervention'. His object, like Castlereagh's, was to secure the independence of Spain. So close were the aims of these two Statesmen in Spain, that it is difficult not to agree with Talleyrand's cynical remark that non-intervention was: "a metaphysical and political term that means almost the same thing as intervention".[6] The difference in their methods was, however, to prove vital. Theoretically on the expulsion of Don Carlos, England reverted to her policy of non-intervention. This was the only departure after 1820 from that policy in the sense that no further British men, money or arms were used in a Spanish war for the remainder of the century. Non-intervention by force became a reality once more. The Quadruple Alliance, however, opened the way for a different form of intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. A form as far removed from the principles of Castlereagh as was the use of armed force in the civil war.

The Alliance, formed to limit French action in Spain, initiated a period of Anglo-French mistrust and suspicion. Each power suspected the other of intriguing to gain influence in the Peninsula. Faced with such declarations as Thiers' statement that: "la tutêle de l'Espagne nous appartient",[7] the British Government

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6 B. Wertheim - The Last British Policy 1938. p. IX.

7 F. Balfour Life of the Fourth Earl of Aberdeen 1922. Vol. II. p. 139.

was afraid to withdraw from Spanish affairs and leave the field clear for her rival. This situation was made more dangerous by the ranging of Spaniards into two parties, the more conservative, or 'Moderado', looking for support to France, the more liberal, or 'Progressista' , to England. The influence of the two countries varied according to which party was in power, and there developed between them a struggle for ascendancy in the Peninsula. This rivalry was both reflected and intensified by the bitter animosity of the British and French representatives in Madrid.

The relations which grew up between these ministers and successive Spanish Governments were hardly in accord with the professed policy of non-intervention pursued by Britain. Arthur Aston, the Minister to Spain from 1840 to 1843 was the acknowledged adviser of Baldomero Espartero the liberal Regent of Spain.[8] So close was this association that on the Regent's fall he was recalled, for it was considered unlikely that he would be able to work with another Government.[9] He was, however, commended for his services. His successor, Henry Bulwer, found to his chagrin that when the pro-French general Narvaez became Prime Minister in May 1844, he had not the same influence as Count Bresson - his French colleague. [10.] [11.]

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8 Baldomero Espartero. 1792 - 1868. Duke of Victory. Was Commander-in-Chief of the Queen's forces in the Carlist war, and later the head of the Spanish Liberals. Regent of Spain 1840-3. Prime minister 1854-6.

9 Aberdeen to Aston. Private 12th August 1843. ADD. MSS. Aberdeen Papers.

10 (Sir) Henry Bulwer. Later Baron Dalling and Bulwer. British Minister to Madrid. November 1843 to May 1848.

11 Ramon Narvaez 1800-1868. Duke of Valencia. Field Marshal. Moderado Prime Minister 1844-6, 1847-8, 1856-7, 1864-5, 1866-8.

Thus the allies who had fought Don Carlos became engaged in a dangerous and bitter, but bloodless struggle in the Peninsula.

Lord Aberdeen succeeded Palmerston in 1841. He wished to pursue a policy of complete non-intervention and to maintain friendly relations with France. He had criticised his predecessor's policy in the Carlist war with great feeling, and if it had been thought compatible with British interests, he was the foreign secretary least likely to interfere in the politics of Spain. But the seeds of Anglo-French conflict there were already well sewn. French intrigues were suspected, and he was, ironically, forced to adopt and continue the policy inaugurated by Palmerston. At this period the question of Isabella's marriage presented the powers with a unique opportunity for extending their influence over Spain through the Sovereign. The French were suspected of wishing to increase their power and prospects in Spain by the marriage of the Queen to one of the sons of Louis Philippe. Fear of such a renewal of the family compact was a factor in Britain's policy towards this question from the beginning, but it was not until 1843 that Aberdeen was induced to depart from his policy of non-intervention. By that time he reluctantly concluded that the instability in Spain, and the rivalry of the powers there, was a threat to Anglo-French relations and European peace. Aberdeen thus entered into the negotiations leading to the weddings of the Queen and Infanta in 1846.[12] Britain objected strongly to the French prince marrying

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12 E. Jones Parry - The Spanish Marriages 1841-46. 1936. Gives a detailed study of these negotiations.

the Queen, or the Infanta before the succession was assured. She acknowledged a preference for a Coburg King-consort, but she agreed to press only Bourbon candidates. This was a far cry from treating the question as a purely Spanish one as Britain had wished to do. The marriages became an international issue. When Palmerston, who succeeded Aberdeen in 1846, instructed Bulwer to "try for" the marriage of the Queen to the supposedly radical Duke of Seville, and the Infanta to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg Kohary,[13] he committed a tactical error of the first magnitude. By frightening Spain with the project of a consort of radical sympathies, and France with the spectre of another throne under Saxe-Coburg influence he caused the two courts to draw together and cement their relations by the marriage of Montpensier to the Infanta, simultaneously with that of the Queen and the Duke of Cadiz. For the moment the Spanish question was settled in favour of France, and Bulwer found himself ousted from his position of influence. The fall of Louis Philippe in 1848, however, and the birth of heirs to Isabella, II, rendered British anxiety as to the renewal of the 'family compact' needless. But fear of the Montpensier succession was to play an important part in determining Britain's attitude to Spain in the next decade. Suspicion of France lingered on after the provisional Government of 1848 had renounced the policy of the Orleans Monarchy, and persisted even after Napoleon III proved his good faith by close co-operation during the Crimean war. The whole episode illustrates the extreme importance attached at this time both to the influences around a Sovereign, and to dynastic questions.

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13 Lytton Bulwer - Life of Palmerston 1874. Vol. III p. 274.

Great Britain's participation in the Carlist war not only caused the struggle with France for influence over the Spanish court and statesmen, but it also left her with a direct interest in the form of Government in Spain. Palmerston had sent aid to Isabella II because she represented the Spanish Liberals and constitutionalists. He supported constitutional government as a means of keeping foreign influence out of the Peninsula. Such influence he said was most easily exerted over a despotic monarchy, it is far more difficult to exercise it over the "constitutional representatives of a free people".[14] Thus by fostering liberal institutions Britain was serving her own interests for she was ensuring the independence of Spain.

In taking up the constitutionalist cause Palmerston, while retaining the aims of Castlereagh, wandered far from his methods. The latter had considered the form of Government in Spain a matter of indifference. The revolutionaries were as abhorrent to him as the despotic Ferdinand VII. Canning had sympathised with the liberals, but his policy had been one of strict non-intervention in internal politics. Lord Fitzroy Somerset's mission to Madrid in 1823, advising modification of the Constitution of 1812 was quite unofficial. Canning gave it full moral support, but, as he was at pains to show, this was because he hoped that if the advice were followed, French interference might be avoided.

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14 Palmerston to Bulwer. Separate. July 19th, 1846. FO. 72/694. See The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy - 1923. Vol. II. Appendix C.

Palmerston in giving active support to Isabella II in the name of Constitutionalism, assumed a certain responsibility for her actions. As long as the Quadruple Alliance remained in force she could call upon England for aid against Don Carlos. Since there was no time limit on this treaty, and Carlist Pretenders continued to have adherents in Spain throughout the reign of Isabella II, there was always the fear that if the Queen herself became more despotic, England might be placed in the false and embarrassing position of having to fight Don Carlos on behalf of an equally autocratic Queen. Palmerston had no intention of being placed in such a dilemma, and as the Queen's proceedings in 1848 grew more reactionary he felt it necessary to state clearly that : "Her Majesty's Ministers will never be a party to proceedings, treaty or no treaty, which shall have for their object to enslave any nation whatever on the face of the earth." [15]

This tendency to minimise treaty obligations, however, did not provide a solution to the question - for Palmerston believed that consitutional government was necessary in Spain as a safeguard against French tutelage. He believed, too, in spite of the denials of such acute and well informed observers as Clarendon and Lord Howden, that such a system could work in Spain. [16] Clarendon considered, during

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15 Hansard Ser: III XCIX Col. 1217. June 26th, 1848.

16 Sir John Hobart Caradoc. 2nd. Baron Howden. 1799-1873. British Minister to Spain 1850 - 1858. See letters.

his mission to Madrid, that the mass of the Spanish people were Carlist and hated liberal institutions.[17] In 1854 Howden, who compared Spanish constitutionalism to a "bad watch" which would never run better,[18] was inclined to agree with Pacheco, the Spanish Foreign Minister, when he said that universal suffrage would show that half the population of Spain was Carlist, a quarter moderate, and a quarter socialist.[19] Such reports had no effect on Palmerston, for as he somewhat naively wrote to Howden : "Constitutional Government means ..... the practice of justice and right, and the enjoyment of every degree of liberty by each individual, consistent with the general interests and good of the community;" and the benefits of such a system must be apparent to all peoples of the world.[20] It was more in keeping therefore with British interests and objectives to acknowledge the obligations of the Quadruple Alliance, to support Isabella upon her throne, but to attempt by advice and admonition to the Queen and her ministers to keep her on the path of liberal Constitutional Government. This was the policy of Palmerston and his successors.

The policy of giving advice on internal matters to the Spanish Government was pursued by all British Ministers prior to 1859. It had originated during the Carlist war, when Villiers had been consulted by the Queen Regent and her ministers. This seeking of advice during a common war was natural enough, but the Regent Espartero continued the practice and consulted Aston on all important problems of government.[21] This practice was established, and pursued with impunity

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17 H. Maxwell - Life and Letters of the Fourth Earl of Clarendon 1913. p. 102-3.
18 Howden to Clarendon. 7th May 1856. FO. 72/893.
19 Howden to Clarendon. 13th September 1854. FO. 72/846.
20 Palmerston to Howden. 29th October 1851. FO. 72/781.
21 See above.

while the pro-British party was in power in Madrid, and the British Minister was 'persona grata' at the Spanish court. When, however, in 1848 Palmerston tried giving unsolicited advice to the moderado government of Marshal Narvaez, his policy met with a severe rebuff on the expulsion from Spain of his ambassador.

This incident, however, caused no change in British policy. Indeed British statesmen had come to assume that because they had supported Isabella II against Don Carlos - the constitutionalists against the absolutists - they had, as Bulwer said: "a sort of right to speak in favour of constitutionalist principles."[22] They lost sight of the fact that they had admittedly used Spanish constitutionalism as an instrument to defend British interests in the Peninsula. So strong was their belief in the righteousness of their cause that they failed to comprehend that even Spanish liberals might resent their attitude,[23] and regard the rivalry of Britain and France for influence as one cause of the disorders of the country and the miserable marriage of their Queen. In fact Marshal Narvaez gained some popularity from his expulsion of Bulwer, though the charges against the ambassador of provoking insurrection were probably unjustified. Palmerston might with reason have taken the incident as proof that Spain was at last about to assert her own independence. In fact, his policy was bearing fruit, and, since the February Revolution had rid Spain of French influence, the situation was not dangerous.

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22 Lytton Bulwer Life of Lord Palmerston 1874. Vol III p. 246.

23 Otway (Madrid) to Clarendon. 17th August 1856. FO. 72/985, describes the resentment of the Liberal Foreign Minister Pastor Diaz on being read a despatch advising the summoning of Cortes.

When diplomatic relations were restored after an interruption of two years, British Foreign Secretaries resumed the practice of giving advice, unasked, to Spanish Ministers, on the government of Spain. Their object was consistent - the maintenance in Spain of a liberal constitutional monarchy under Isabella II. To this end the Spanish Ministers were advised time and again to pursue a more liberal course. They were advised to allow free expression of opinion, to extinguish corruption, to hold free elections, and even to summon Cortes. [24] Such counsels were frequently reinforced by the reminder that no help could be expected under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance if the Queen should adopt the despotic policy of Don Carlos. They were invariably accompanied by the statement that England claimed no right to interfere in Spanish internal politics. Indeed to British statesmen of this period the giving of advice on all the main problems which beset Spanish Governments was not inconsistent with their policy of non-intervention.[25] Even Granville, who disclaimed any intention of 'lecturing' in the Palmerston style in principle, nevertheless used exactly the same language in regard to Spain; while Malmesbury stated that it was the "duty" of the British Government to deprecate "a return to despotism" in that country.[26] The policies pursued towards Spain by Malmesbury, Clarendon and Russell are indistinguishable.

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24 Clarendon to Howden, 24th February 1854. FO. 72/840. Clarendon to Otway (Madrid) 5th August 1856. FO. 72/890. The despatches of 1850-1856 contain many examples of such advice - the two cited are, however, outstanding for their comprehensiveness.

25 Russell stated that the giving of advice to foreign governments was not incompatible with a policy of non-intervention. Hansard - Ser. III XCIX 5th June 1848.

26 Malmesbury to Howden. 31st May, 1852. FO. 72/801.

Together with the desire to maintain constitutional government in Spain, and indeed sometimes in opposition to it, went the policy of securing Isabella II upon her throne. The open attempts of British Ministers to further Liberalism made them to some extent the confidantes of Spanish revolutionaries.[27] They had developed a close relationship with Spanish Liberals during and immediately after the Carlist war. As the century advanced the Queen demonstrated both her incapacity and the impossibility of running a constitutional monarchy while she remained at its head. England in supporting her, lost the leadership of the Progressista party. Indeed Howden reported in 1851 that this party was now split into two factions - the smaller was "English in tendencies, sympathies and recollections", the larger was verging on republicanism.[28] This element thinking that England was now "effete and unequal to the necessities of an enlightened age", looked to the French Republic for their pattern.[29] At the same time France and Prussia were said to be urging "reactionary counsels" upon Queen Isabella, who was thought to be modelling her conduct on that of Napoleon III, and becoming more despotic.[30] To increase the dangers inherent in this situation, Spaniards spoke openly during the 'fifties' of a change of dynasty,[31] and even a statesman of the calibre and loyalty of Narvaez was said to be disgusted by the proceedings of the Queen and finding it increasingly difficult to work with her.[32] In 1854

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27 Vide Infra.
28 Howden to Malmesbury. 21st February 1851. FO. 72/803.
29 Ibid.
30 Malmesbury to Howden. 31st May 1852. FO. 72/801.
31 Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.
32. Howden to Clarendon. Most Confidential. 4th January 1854. FO 72/845.

Espartero was thought to be aiming at the Presidency of a republican Spain.[33] Two years later Howden reported that the famous Spanish Liberal, Salustiano de Olozaga, had told him the dynasty must be expelled,[34] and there were rumours that Prim was engaged in a revolutionary plot.[35] Owing to Howden's unique position at Madrid and his great popularity the British Government received prompt information of such movements. They were well aware of Isabella's shortcomings.[36] In fact Clarendon went so far as to express his sympathy with the Spanish people, and his admiration for their forbearance.[37] He had "little confidence in her promised reform", but the interests of Great Britain required her to continue on her throne.[38] The finding of a successor would raise numerous complications. The British consulted the French Government on the matter and both powers agreed that the worst evil would be a Republic.[39] Neither country wished to see the Duchess of Montpensier on the throne.[40] France was not adverse to the pretensions of the Carlist Pretender,[41] but Clarendon considered his accession inadmissible.[42] Great Britain, therefore, refused to lend any countenance to such revolutionary schemes.

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33 Howden to Clarendon. 13th September 1854. FO. 72/846.

34 Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.
Salustiano de Olozaga 1803 - 1873. Prime Minister 1843, Ambassador to Paris 1840-3, 1854, and for the Provisional Government and Regency.

35 Howden to Clarendon. 25th December, 1856. FO. 72/897.
Don Juan Prim. 1814-1880. Marquis de Castillejos Conde de Reus. Prime Minister 1868-70.

36 Clarendon to Howden. 14th January 1854. FO. 72/840.
Clarendon to Howden. 15th August 1854. FO. 72/841.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid. Clarendon to Howden. 13th June 1855. FO. 72/862.

39 Clarendon to Howden. 13th June 1855. FO. 72/862.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

She even refused to discuss an agreement with France as to a successor to the throne - a suggestion made to Howden by Napoleon III in Paris in October 1856.[43] Clarendon thought the situation dangerous and the Queen's behaviour reprehensible but he had no desire to see the status quo in any way disturbed. England by offering advice where possible to the Queen , and by the activities of her Minister did her best in this period to keep Isabella in possession of her crown.[44]

The fifties witnessed a new departure at Madrid - the close co-operation of England and France. This grew out of the Alliance of the Crimean war. Acting on instructions from their respective Governments the French and British representatives in Spain consulted each other on all major matters of policy. They both deprecated the Queen's absolutist tendencies, and they agreed that any crisis should find them using identical language. The task was not an easy one for the personal inclinations of the two men were very different, Howden's sympathies were with the liberals, and the Marquis de Turgot's with the conservatives.[45] Howden thought French views on Spanish affairs generally incorrect, France, he said, suffered from "inextinguishable ignorance" on everything regarding Spain.[46] However, the determination not to revive the

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43 Howden to Clarendon. Separate and Confidential. 16th October, 1856. FO. 72/897. At this time Napoleon III suggested the Duke of Modena might succeed Isabella, but Olozaga said an Italian prince would be unpopular and one need only add the word 'Macaroni' to their title to destroy all personal prestige. Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 7th November, 1856. FO. 72/897.

44 For Howden's methods see below.

45 Howden to Clarendon. Separate and Confidential. 16th October 1856. FO. 72/897.

46 Howden to Clarendon. 7th May 1856. FO. 72/893.
Howden to Clarendon. 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.

disastrous struggles of the preceding decade was strong. To achieve greater co-operation Howden visited Napoleon III, together with Turgot in October 1856, with the object of getting the Emperor to inaugurate a joint policy for which Howden would "lop off (a) portion of liberalism" and Turgot might reduce his absolutist tendencies.[47] The suggestion was Turgot's. The result was a gentlemen's agreement not to interfere in Spanish affairs unless the throne should be in imminent peril. In this period therefore Angb-French rivalry in Madrid disappeared. Mutual distrust, however, continued to be an underlying factor in the relations of the powers. British statesmen could never quite forget the trickery of 1846, and it was a case where the sins of one government were visited upon the next. Malmesbury stated in 1852 his belief that the objects of France with regard to Spain were the same whether ruled by Bourbon or Republican.[48] The persistence of such fears was shown in the British admonitions when it was proposed to omit from a draft constitution the article which required the assent of Cortes to the introduction of foreign troops.[49] Russell said that the worst evil to which Spain was exposed was, in the opinion of the British Government, foreign intervention to suppress her constitution,[50] Reference to the "experience of 1808",[51] and to the influence of Napoleon's coup d'etat on Isabella[52] showed the quarter from which such action

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47 Howden to Clarendon. Separate and Confidential. 16th October, 1856. FO. 72/897.
48 Malmesbury to Howden. 31st May, 1852. FO. 72/801.
49 Russell to Howden. 31st January, 1853. FO. 72/819.
50 Russell to Howden. 1st January 1853. FO. 72/819
51 Russell to Howden. 31st January, 1853. FO. 72/819.
52 Malmesbury to Howden. 3rd March 1852. FO. 72/801.

was anticipated. During the Crimean war British anxiety was temporarily eclipsed, but in 1856, when French troops massed on the frontier there were fears that a French army might enter Spain at the request of the Spanish Government.[53] The latter denied any intention of asking for such aid, but British anxiety is significant.

The decade after 1859 saw a change in Great Britain's policy towards Spain. Where in the 1850's she took action to further the satisfactory working of constitutional government to ensure that Isabella II retained her throne,[54] she made no corresponding moves in the sixties when the constitution was reduced to a farce and the Queen fled. The foreign office despatches of this period cease to contain remarks on the state of Spanish politics and good advice for the benefit and guidance of Isabella and her Ministers. The change is particularly significant as Spain ran through the same gamut of crises, reactionary governments, unconstitutional measures and military revolts as she had done in the preceding quarter century; and England's policy continued to be, as Russell stated one of supporting the Bourbon dynasty, and desiring the success of any ministry "which has the support of the country, and will maintain the independence of Spain."[55] The Carlist danger still existed - there was an abortive rising in 1860 - and therefore presumably Spain could still ask for aid under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. British statesmen continued to fear French influence over the Spanish Government.[56] In fact all those factors which had

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53 Clarendon to Otway. 14th August 1856. FO. 72/890.
Clarendon to Otway. 18th August 1856. FO. 72/890.
54 For Great Britain's methods see below.
55 Russell to Buchanan. 18th December 1860. FO. 72/976.
56 Russell to Buchanan. 26th July 1859. FO. 72/952.

caused Britain to take such an active interest in Spanish affairs in the preceding decade were still in existence.

Russell retained sufficient interest to follow the gradual withdrawal of the Progressista party from constitutional activities. He inquired what their position was vis a vis the dynasty,[57] and commented on the foolishness of their Manifesto of 1863 which put them beyond the pale of the constitution.[58] He requested information on the changes in the Electoral Laws of 1865.[59] Such questions show that Spanish affairs were not considered to be without interest, but so far as taking action was concerned the British Government was reverting once again to the policy they had pursued before the Carlist wars.

In attempting to analyse this change and to estimate its causes it is necessary to consider the character of the Government of Spain, a factor which perhaps obscured the issue slightly in these years.

When Palmerston returned to power in 1859, O'Donnell was Prime Minister of Spain.[60] He had been in the same position in 1856 when Clarendon delivered one of his usual pieces of advice on the necessity of summoning a freely elected Cortes, and the Foreign Minister Pastor Diaz took offence.[61] The matter had been satisfactorily smoothed

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57 Russell to West. 4th August 1865. FO. 72/1096.
58 Russell to Crampton. 2nd October 1863. FO. 72/1054.
59 Russell to Crampton. 3rd July 1865. FO. 72/1096.
60 Leopold O'Donnell 1809-1867. Duke of Tetuan (1860). Spanish General. Captain-General of Cuba 1844-8. Minister of War 1854-6. Prime Minister July-October 1856, July 1858 - February 1863. June 1865 - 1866.
61 Clarendon to Otway (Chargé d'affaires. Madrid) 5th August 1856. FO. 72/890.
Clarendon to Otway. 29th August 1856. FO. 72/890.

over, but Clarendon had stated then that "the Spanish Government need be under no apprehensions of again being placed in possession of any views which Her Majesty's Government may entertain upon the affairs of Spain". Indeed such advice virtually ceased from 1856. Clarendon agreed with Howden and Napoleon III later in the same year that any attempt to advise O'Donnell's successor Marshal Narvaez would be equally useless, profiting perhaps by the experience of 1848.[62] This to some extent explains Clarendon's failure to comment on such a serious event as Prim's revolt of 1866 which took place when O'Donnell was in power. Though Narvaez and O'Donnell were ministers for the greater part of the period 1859 - 68, this does not fully explain Britain's failure to give advice, for even other Governments were immune; while Clarendon himself had not completely renounced the policy in 1856 for he had approved Howden's plan to warn the Queen of her danger should she adopt a more reactionary policy in 1857.[63] There is also not much likelihood of Palmerston not expressing his opinions owing to the susceptibilities of Spanish statesmen.

During the greater part of Palmerston's administration, however, the conduct of the Government of Spain was not openly unconstitutional. Marshal O'Donnell was Prime Minister from June 1858 to February 1863. His Government of the 'Union Liberal' maintained all the appearances of constitutional rule. Its tone was moderately liberal and it attempted to conciliate and include people of as many shades of opinion as possible. Since O'Donnell managed to maintain

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62 Clarendon to Howden. Separate. 18th October 1856. FO. 72/890.
63 Clarendon to Howden. 3rd March 1857. FO. 72/911.

order, was not likely to submit to French interference, and was one of the mainstays of the dynasty - he and Narvaez kept the army loyal to the Queen - there was little reason for Palmerston to object to his internal government or to resume ~~the policy of~~ his former policy, ~~administrations~~. This accounts for the silence on such questions between 1858 and 1863, but before Palmerston died O'Donnell was succeeded by a series of short-lived Governments. The British attitude to these is illuminating. Russell commented that what was needed in Spain was a "strong ministry" but meanwhile he would support the Marquis of Miraflores.[64] Later he expressed the hope that a reactionary government would not be formed as it might be fatal to both constitutionalism and the dynasty.[65] But these views were merely for Crampton's information and were not communicated to the Spanish court or government as similar ones were ten years before. The following year Russell welcomed the restoration to power of Marshal Narvaez.[66] The Marshal was strong but ruthless and unpopular. In the past he had always eventually resorted to reactionary measures which had caused disturbances and his own dismissal by a frightened Queen. In welcoming such a Government Russell was adopting the counsel of despair where Spain was concerned. It is possible however that Russell believed that Narvaez had grown less ruthless for he was described by the Times in 1862 as a "respectable old fogey",[67] now affable and less energetic. This policy was no new development.

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64 Russell to Crampton. 2nd October 1863. FO. 72/1054.
65 The Marquis of Miraflores was Prime Minister of Spain from March 1863 - January 1864.
65 Russell to Crampton. 26th October 1863. FO. 72/1054.
66 Russell to Crampton. 24th December 1864. FO. 72/1077.
67 "Times" of 10th September 1862. Page 7. col. (a)

Howden had informed the Marshal in 1856 that the British Government was not hostile to him, and wished him success,[68] but this was because in the scare of that year that the Queen was about to be de-throned only Narvaez stood between Spain and despotism or anarchy. Russell was probably taking the same view, but his equanimity shows a lack of grasp of realities since Narvaez had always provoked disturbances and brought the Government into greater odium.

Before Russell left the Foreign Office O'Donnell was again Prime Minister of Spain. Under the guise of liberal constitutional government he, in fact, took clandestine action to muzzle the press and introduce repressive measures.[69] Russell made no comment on this report nor did he express an opinion on receiving the information that the majority of the Progressistas were talking openly of overthrowing the dynasty.[70] Neither he nor his successor Clarendon took any steps to warn Queen Isabella of her danger during the period of revolts and unrest in 1865-6. In contrast to their earlier policy, the fact that the Cortes was not summoned from the summer of 1865 to the winter of 1866 was passed over without comment. The significance of this lies in the fact that it demonstrates that British policy towards Spain had changed completely in the ten years between 1856 and 1866.

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68 Howden to Clarendon. 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.
69 West (Madrid) to Russell. 17th August 1865. FO. 72/1100.
70 West (Madrid) to Russell. 26th August 1865. FO. 72/1100.

From 1856 to 1858 no advice was in fact offered to the Government of Spain as it was felt that such counsels would cause irritation without remedying the situation. Between 1858 and 1863 the policy of O'Donnell rendered such advice unnecessary. When a period of short Governments from February 1863 to the recall of Narvaez in September, presented an opportunity for proffering advice once more, no advantage was taken of the situation. From Russell's welcome of Narvaez in December, 1864 till the fall of the Russell administration in June 1866, the complete lack of comment on an increasingly grave situation in Spain is evidence of the entire withdrawal of Great Britain from all part in the affairs of that country. That this change was accomplished some eighteen months before Lord Stanley, afterwards fifteenth Earl of Derby, became Foreign Minister is of primary importance.

Stanley came to office in June 1866. That he pursued the same policy of non-interference laid down by his predecessors is not surprising for Stanley belonged to the school which, in the words of Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador,: "make a dogma of the most complete non-intervention and the most absolute abstention of Great Britain from the affairs and quarrels of Europe." [71] His policy towards Spain was exactly what might have been forecast. He received in silence news of the growing reactionary policy of the Spanish Government, and of the

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71 Temperley and Penson. Foundations of British Foreign Policy. 1938 p. 306. No. 48 quoting from Apponyi. 3rd July, 1866.

mounting unrest in the country. Crampton's and West's reports of the virtual breakdown of Constitutional Government in 1867 - 8 and disturbances all over Spain were seen by Stanley and the Queen but provoked no comment or action. [72]

Stanley was not uninterested in Spanish affairs. He requested further information from Crampton on Montpensier's arrest in July 1868. [73] While later in the year Lytton was instructed to visit the most important provinces of Spain to ascertain the state of public feeling, and a similar report from Walsham was read with interest. [74]

Revolution broke out in Spain on 19th September 1868 and in a despatch written one week later Stanley explained that he did not consider the British Government competent to form an opinion or to pass judgement on the "social questions" which had brought about the revolt. [75] Their duty was discharged, he stated, on the 31st of October: "When they express,.. their earnest hope for the prosperity of Spain, and their anxious desire to maintain the most friendly relations with those who may for the time being be invested with authority in that country." [76] The matter concerned Spaniards alone and any interference

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72 West to Stanley. 20th October 1867. ~~FO. 72/1149~~ and enclosure memorandum by West on Constitutional Government in Spain. F.O 72/1149.
Crampton to Stanley. 28th February 1868. FO. 72/1178.
Crampton to Stanley. 2nd March 1868. FO. 72/1178.
Crampton to Stanley. 14th July 1868. FO. 72/1179.
Crampton to Stanley. 9th July 1868. FO. 72/1179.

73 Stanley to Crampton. 12th July 1868. FO. 72/1177.

74 Stanley to Crampton. 19th November 1868. FO. 72/1177.
Stanley to Crampton 25th November 1868. FO. 72/1177.
Edward Lytton - 1st Earl of Lytton - 1831-91. Attached to Madrid Embassy 1868.

75 Stanley to Crampton. Secret and Confidential. 26th September 1868. FO. 72/1177.

76 Stanley to Crampton. 31st October 1868. FO. 72/1177.

he felt would raise "distrust and suspicion" and endanger Anglo-Spanish relations in the future.[77] By refraining from any expression of opinion Disraeli and Stanley considered they were giving proof of their respect for Spanish independence. The tone of their despatches was most friendly to Spain, however, and they were ready at once to enter into cordial, if unofficial, relations with any government established de facto in a friendly State,[78] and in this category they placed the Provisional Government of Spain, formed in October, 1868. In December Disraeli resigned and it was left to Clarendon and Gladstone to restore full diplomatic relations between the two countries and to formulate British policy towards the Spanish succession question.

The new government pursued the policy of its predecessor. It took the line that Spain alone was competent to decide who should be her King and what form of Government was best suited to her. Its views were carefully formulated in the General Instructions to Sir Henry Layard who was appointed ambassador to Madrid on November 8th 1869.[79] He was instructed to abstain from all interference in Spanish politics - this was no new departure. He was to express satisfaction at the liberal policy being pursued by the Provisional Government; this was occasioned by the religious toleration and commersial reforms introduced by that Government. These instructions, however, contain one which is far from the Palmerstonian tradition. Layard was not even to urge the "blessing of a constitutional

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77 Stanley to Crampton. 26th September 1868. FO. 72/1177.

78 Stanley to Crampton. 31st October 1868. FO. 72/1177. Draft initialled by Disraeli and Stanley.

79 Clarendon to Layard. 8th November 1869. FO. 72/1206. These instructions were drawn up by Clarendon and altered by Gladstone.

monarchy" upon the Spanish people, and he was not to "thwart or criticize" any other government which they might adopt. It thus appears that once again as in the days of Castlereagh the form of government in Spain was a matter of indifference to Great Britain.

The same official indifference appears in regard to the Spanish Crown. Privately Clarendon wrote to Layard that on this point he wished to know the wishes to France and to act in accordance with her, and that he had "no predilection" for the candidature of the Duc de Montpensier.[80] He considered that he would be inacceptable to France and would not be a good sovereign for Spain. No official representations were made to Spain upon this subject however. Indeed the behaviour of the British Government could hardly have been more circumspect. There was a hint of a preference for a Coburg Prince,[81] interesting in view of the repercussions in 1846 resulting from a similar suggestion. In 1869 however, the matter was dropped as soon as it was found that the Spanish ambassador disapproved of it, it was also thought that the Prince's Orleanist connections might be displeasing to France. Apart from this the only British action was the well known attempt by Granville to prevent the Franco-Prussian war by securing the

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80 Clarendon to Layard. Private. 14th November 1869. ADD. MSS. Layard Papers. 38,997, LXVII.

81 Clarendon to Hammon. 29th August 1869. FO. 391/4.
Clarendon to Hammond. 4th September 1869. FO. 391/4.
Clarendon to Hammond. 11th September 1869. FO. 391/4.
The Coburg Prince suggested was Philippe of Saxe-Coburg Kohary, Duc de Saxe, a nephew of the Prince Leopold, who figured in the Spanish Marriage negotiations on 1841-6. He was suggested by G. B. Mathew (Brazil) in a private letter to Layard of 1st December 1869. Layard Papers. (ADD. MSS. 38,997. LXVII

withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature. For a brief period in July 1870 Layard was suggesting to Granville who succeeded Clarendon on his death, that British Good Offices should be used to secure the acceptance by the Duke of Aosta of the throne.[82] Once war was inevitable however, Layard was instructed not to interfere further.[83] By 1870 therefore it was clear that, both as regards the Spanish throne and the internal politics of Spain, Great Britain's policy had come the complete circle and was once again that of 1820-34.

The British withdrawal from Spanish affairs may be partially ascribed to the changes in ambassadors in this period. Great Britain was able between 1850 and 1856 to exert an influence on the internal politics of Spain largely owing to the personal qualities of her Minister to Madrid. Lord Howden was sent to Spain on the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1850. The expulsion of Bulwer in 1848 had shown the dangers of offering unwelcome advice to the Spanish Government. The fact that Howden was able to read despatches as unpalatable as any communicated by his predecessor to successive Spanish ministers may be partly attributed to his ability to make himself persona grata in Madrid, and partly to the fact that Spain had no wish to quarrel with Britain while the ambitions of Napoleon III were still an unknown quantity. Howden was able to play an

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82 Layard to Granville. 10th July 1870. FO. 72/1234.
Layard to Granville. 11th July, 1870. FO. 72/1234.
Layard to Granville. Confidential. 10th July 1870. FO. 72/1234.

83 Granville to Layard. Confidential Telegram. 18th July 1870. FO. 72/1231.

influential role during this difficult period owing to his power of inspiring confidence and respect among Spanish Statesmen and their Queen. He had been attached to the Christianist army during the Carlist wars. He was, therefore, already well known and popular in Madrid when he returned as Minister. He played an important role in the social life of the capital, entertaining at his home men of all shades of opinion.[84] His circle of friends and acquaintances included politicians of all parties. Through them he exerted his influence, attempting, often with success, to "guide events".[85] He gained the respect of patriotic Spaniards by discountenancing all plots and intrigues. He never hesitated to give his advice, which even when unsolicited does not appear to have been resented. His methods were to avoid "importunate counsels which indispose, and injudicious threats which irritate", but to exercise an indirect influence by making clear the policy and wishes of Great Britain.[86] His popularity and success were such that his recall was generally lamented by all sections of the Madrid press. Some journals went so far as to say they hoped for the return of a Liberal government in England which might bring about his reinstatement.[87] When the

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84 Howden to Malmesbury. 1st April 1858. FO. 72/864. Enclosure. Extract from Novedades. Howden's social influence was demonstrated in 1854 when he was able to end the estracism of Pierre Soule by inviting him to dine. Soule the American Minister was a social outcast in Madrid after his duel with the Marquis de Turgot, a duel in which Howden acted as Turgot's second. See. A. A. Ettinger. The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé. 1853-5. 1932 p.250. p.230

85 Howden to Clarendon. 28th November 1854. FO. 72/847.

86 Howden to Clarendon. 18th November 1854. FO. 72/847.

87 Howden to Malmesbury. 1st April 1858. FO. 72/864. Enclosures from Espana Novedades and Iberia Epoca.

Palmerston administration did not fulfil these hopes, Spaniards expressed the conviction that Anglo-Spanish relations would have been more amicable had Clarendon remained at the Foreign Office and Howden in Madrid.[88] Howden attached such importance to Spanish friendship that he deplored Russell's strong protests at the non-fulfilment of the Treaties for the suppression of the Slave Trade.[89] His avowed sympathy for Spain when she went to war with Morocco was an embarassment to the British Government.[90]

Howden was allowed a great deal of discretion in Spain. Only the broad outlines of policy were laid down by Foreign Ministers, with the result that the activities of Howden are often hard to reconcile with their statements that they had no wish to participate in the internal affairs of Spain. A particularly close relationship existed between Clarendon and Howden.[91] Clarendon placed great reliance on his judgement and Howden tended to act without reference to the Foreign Secretary. For instance Clarendon was faced with a 'fait accompli' during the Spanish constitutional crises of 1854.

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88 Buchanan to Russell. Private 22nd December 1859. G & D 22/86.

89 Brackenbury (Madrid) to Buchanan. Confidential memorandum of conversation with Howden in Paris. 15th October 1860. G & D 22/86.

90 Howden sent 1,000 francs for the Spanish War Fund - a gesture noted in the Spanish press. Buchanan to Russell. Private. 22nd December 1859. G and D 22/86. In a reply to a rebuke from Russell, Howden denied that he wished to embarass British Foreign Policy. Howden to Russell. Private. 7th January 1860. G and D 22/86.

91 Clarendon described him in 1869 as one of his "oldest and dearest friends". Clarendon to Gladstone. Private 20th May 1869. Gladstone Papers. ADD. MSS. 44133.

During this crisis Howden's influence reached its height. He achieved a unique position. He was consulted by the Queen, who on his advice, unwillingly accepted Espartero as the head of her government. [92] He served as a go-between among Spanish statesmen - finding out for instance whether O'Donnell was willing to serve under the Duke of San Miguel, the Spanish Liberal General. [93] He tried to persuade Espartero to retain power, and when he failed he visited Olozago and arranged that he should get a vote of confidence in Espartero passed in the Chamber of Deputies. [94] These are examples of Howden's activities at Madrid. His influence however, could only be exerted over a liberal government. He made no attempt for instance to advise Marshal Narvaez on how to govern Spain in 1856, but he was ready to warn the Queen of the danger which would arise should she send for a more reactionary ministry in 1857. [95] His avowed intention of influencing private friends and public men to maintain the monarchy, and his desire to see Spain under a stable government naturally earned him the confidence of those in power. [96] It is curious that Howden also had the ear of revolutionaries. [97]

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92 Howden to Clarendon. 20th November 1854. FO. 72/847.
Howden to Clarendon. 28th November 1854. FO. 72/847.
Howden to Clarendon. 29th November 1854. FO. 72/847.

93 Howden to Clarendon. 20th November 1854. FO. 72/847.
Evaristo San Miguel y Valledor 1785 - 1862.

94 Howden to Clarendon. 4th December 1854. FO. 72/848.

95 Howden to Clarendon. 25th February 1857. FO. 72/913.

96 Howden to Clarendon 1st December 1854. FO. 72/848.

97 See Chapter II
Howden to Clarendon. 4th January 1854. FO. 72/842.
Howden to Clarendon. Confidential 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.
Howden to Clarendon. 25th December 1856. FO. 72/897. and see footnote 125.

Lord Howden acquired a remarkable position in Madrid, and though he often exceeded his instructions approval of his actions was never withheld. Clarendon's confidence in him was such that he wanted to send him back to Spain in 1869. [98] As a medium for the exerting of influence and the giving of unofficial advice he was unsurpassed, and Clarendon thought both the Spanish Government and the Liberals of Spain would have petitioned the British Government to send him.[99] Malmesbury had not the same personal connections with Howden. He had been able, however, to work with him in 1852. Howden's sudden dismissal, therefore, in the spring of 1858 caused great surprise. The reasons for this step are not clear. [100] Turgot with whom Howden had worked in close co-operation for sometime was also recalled. The government denied that there was any connection between the two dismissals but gave no satisfactory explanations. [101] The available evidence is inconclusive. In 1870 Clarendon attributed it to Howden's "Liberal opinions". [102] Howden himself said that it was because he was "no friend" to Napoleon III. [103] He had certainly made no secret

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98 Clarendon to Gladstone. 8th September 1869. Gladstone Papers ADD. MSS. 44134.
Clarendon to Gladstone. 21st September 1869. Gladstone Papers ADD. MSS. 44134.

99 Clarendon to Gladstone 21st September 1869. Gladstone Papers ADD.MSS.44134 Clarendon did not press the point as he felt it difficult to re-introduce him to the diplomatic service after 12 years' absence.

100 Howden was dismissed by telegram. 30th March 1858. The reasons were explained in a private letter of this same date, not found in the archives.

101 Seymour Fitzgerald speaking in the House of Commons 19th April, 1858 Hansard. Ser. II. Vol. CXLIX Col. 1332-7.

102 Clarendon to Gladstone. Private. 21st September 1869. Gladstone Papers ADD. MSS. 44134.

103 Howden to ~~Granville~~ Meade. Private, 4th October, 1870. FO. 362/5.

of his "Anti-Gallican" sentiments [104] but he had worked in harmony with Turgot. In fact he took credit for the destruction of the rivalry between the British and French Ambassadors which had developed after the Carlist war. [105] He claimed that he had persuaded Turgot to adopt a common policy. [106] In view of the Government's denial that there was any connection between the recalls of the two ministers, it is curious that in February, 1858, Howden informed Clarendon that his colleague had been instructed to change his language and not to assist him, as he had been doing. [107] In March he reported that Turgot would be recalled because of his intimacy with Howden "and the liberal, though in no way democratic sentiments and ~~cause~~ which that intimacy has produced." [108] The French Government, he thought, wished its representative to lead and not follow the British Minister. [109] At this time Anglo-French relations were strained after the Orsini plot - but by the end of March fear of war had died down.

The removal of Howden and Turgot caused much speculation. Spaniards feared it meant a change of Anglo-French policy in Spain. [110]

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104 Howden to Clarendon. 7th February, 1855. FO. 72/864.
105 Howden to Malmesbury. Confidential. 21st April 1858. FO. 72/864.
106 Ibid
107 Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 22nd February 1858. FO. 185/338.
108 Howden to Malmesbury. Confidential. 26th March, 1858. FO. 185/338.
109 Ibid
110 Howden to Malmesbury. 1st April 1858. FO. 72/936. Enclosure Article in Iberia

In England the Government was accused of recalling Howden at the request of France.[111] Howden forwarded to Malmesbury a letter to himself from Turgot saying that their departure would end the good understanding of the two countries in the Peninsula.[112] He referred to "l'alteration" in the alliance, and said that Carlists and absolutists would be encouraged by the departure of Howden. Malmesbury was warned in April 1858 that a French newspaper was being started in Spain.[113] Howden said that such papers had appeared before, that they were secretly subsidised by France and that their object was to diminish British and raise French prestige in Spain.

These fears however appear to have been exaggerated. No evidence has been found that either British or French policy in Spain underwent any radical alterations when Howden and Turgot disappeared from the scene. Buchanan called on the French minister to maintain the appearance of cordiality.[114] The accendancy of

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111 Sir De Lacy Evans in the House of Commons. 19th April 1858. Hansard Ser: III CXLIX Col. 1331-4.

112 Howden to Malmesbury. Confidential 23rd April, 1858. FO. 72/936. Enclosing Turgot to Howden. 8th April, 1858.

113 Howden to Malmesbury. Confidential 21st April, 1858. FO. 72/936.

114 Buchanan to Malmesbury. 30th May, 1858. F.O. 72/936.

the British Minister over the French was ended,[115] but the old rivalry did not reappear. The removal of Howden's personal influence however, contributed to Britain's withdrawal from participation in Spanish affairs.

Andrew Buchanan was appointed to Madrid in March 1858.[116] His mission was short and he had had no previous connections with Spain. He had not, therefore, the same advantage of personal friendship with leading Spaniards. He was unfortunate to be minister at a time when British policy towards the Spanish Moroccan war made his country particularly unpopular even with Liberals.[117] The pressure for payment of the debt incurred by Spain during the Carlist wars caused anti-English feeling to run high. Buchanan came to Madrid almost at the same time as Marshal O'Donnell came to power. The language of British statesmen concerning the Slave Trade,[118] their lack of sympathy with Spanish aspirations and their pressing of all claims of British subjects were particularly galling to a

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115 Howden appears to have occupied an unusual position in the diplomatic body at Madrid. Howden's influence was not exerted only over Turgot. He reported in 1858 that the United States minister, General Dodge had modified his conduct in accordance with his (Howden's) advice and was submitting draft despatches to him for correction. His moderation was, Howden reported, the reason for his recall.
Howden to Malmesbury. Confidential. 1st May 1858. FO. 72/936.
Howden to Malmesbury Confidential. 23rd May 1858. FO. 72/938.
In 1854 in the absence of Soule, Howden had been shown the correspondence with the State Department by Mrs. Perry, wife of the Legation Secretary. See. A.A. Ettinger. The Mission in Spain of Pierre Soule 1853-55 1932 quoting Howden to Clarendon. Most Confidential. 15th September 1854. FO. 72/

116 Andrew Buchanan. Minister at Madrid. 31st March 1858 - 11th December 1860. K C B 25th February 1860.

117 Buchanan to Russell. Confidential. 12th December 1859. FO. 72/981
Brackenbury (Madrid) to Buchanan. Confidential. 15th October 1860. G and D 22/86. 118 See Chapter III

government and people anxious to assert their independence and to regain their lost prestige. Buchanan's task was therefore a hard one. Spaniards complained of the lack of respect shown them by Great Britain,[119] and Buchanan reported that the Papal Nuncio had stated with sarcasm the hope that he might see the Spanish Foreign Minister before the British Ambassador "as England had always so many 'avertissements et conseils' to give to the Spanish Government."[120]

While Great Britain's policy alienated most patriotic Spaniards, Buchanan's scrupulous abstention from party politics and his instructions to discourage "as far as language can go" all intrigues whether Carlist or Democratic, precluded his wielding influence over any section of the population.[121] Howden had been given similar instructions but in spite of them his intimate friendships with Spaniards of all shades of opinion had enabled him to enter into the political life of the country.

Apart from the external difficulties Buchanan had not the same strong personality as his predecessor. Disraeli called him a "hopeless mediocrity".[122] In Spain, however, he appears to have carried

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119 Buchanan to Russell. Private. 17th August 1859. G and D 22/86.

120 Ibid
Buchanan added that the Nuncio had probably heard complaints from the Spanish Foreign Minister on the subject.

121 Russell to Buchanan. 18th July 1859. FO. 72/952.

122 G. E. Buckle. Life of Benjamin Disraeli 1920. Vol. VI Ch.II. p.49.

~~122 Buchanan to Russell. 10th December, 1860. G and D 22/86.~~

out his mission adequately, and his negotiations for settlement of the Spanish debt earned him the praise of his government. Nevertheless it was thought necessary to remove him to the Hague in December 1860 against his wishes, [123] because of the many unpleasant matters which he had been compelled to discuss with the Government of Spain. It was hoped that a change of ambassadors would clear the air. This would hardly have been necessary with a minister of Howden's calibre. It is, however, fairest to say of Buchanan that his task was immeasurably complicated by circumstances beyond his control. Sir John Crampton was Minister to Madrid from December, 1860, to July 1869.[124] He had the advantage of long residence, and of a period of Anglo-Spanish co-operation in Mexico. He was not, however, able to exert any influence at Madrid. By contrast with Howden Crampton rarely initiated any policy and his advice was not sought by court, cabinet or opposition. Where Howden had taken an active part in trying to prevent revolutionary outbreaks,[125] Crampton merely reported the existence of revolts, or plots, ro his government. Evidence of his inadequacy is supplied by Clarendon, who wrote to his successor, Layard, that his letters had left him

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123 Buchanan to Russell. 10th Dec. 1860 G & D 22/86

124 Sir John Crampton. 1805-86. Minister at Madrid from 11th December 1860 to his retirement on 1st July, 1869.

~~124--See Chapter IV.~~

125 See Chapter II.
On hearing that Prim was planning a revolt in 1856, Howden got a friend to call on him and dissuade him. Howden to Clarendon 25th December 1856. FO. 72/897. When José Olozago (brother of Salustiano) told him of liberal plans for revolt, Howden advised them to keep quiet but to secure seats in the next Cortes. Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 7th November 1856. FO. 72/897.

"entirely au courant of the cosas de Espana which has been a novelty for Crampton never could discover any to narrate".[126] His shortcomings perhaps hampered the working out of British policy. When revolution broke out in Spain in 1868, Clarendon felt that English advice "given with tact" might prevent blunders, but Crampton was not the man to give such counsels "for he does not know twenty people at Madrid."[127]

Crampton's inadequacy, however, does not explain the change in British policy. His despatches gave an adequate picture of the breakdown of constitutional Government in Spain, and contained hints of the extreme gravity of the situation and of the likelihood of revolt,[128] yet they provoked no action by the British Government and no comment after 1864. Crampton unlike Howden was not the confidant of revolutionaries, but he was an acute observer of the Spanish turmoil and he was obeying the letter of his instructions when he took no part in the internal politics of Spain. The fact that he remained at Madrid is evidence that in spite of Clarendon's condemnation neither he nor Russell, nor Stanley could have thought him an obstruction

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126 Clarendon to Layard. Private 15th March 1870. Layard Papers 38, 997 Vol. LXVII

127 Clarendon to Hammond. 8th October 1868. FO. 391/4.
Clarendon did not take office until December 1868 ~~but he knew that he would become Foreign Secretary if the Liberals won the General Election~~.

128 Crampton to Russell. 21st November 1864. FO. 72/1082.
Crampton to Russell. 20th November 1865. FO. 72/1102.
Crampton to Stanley. 25th March, 1867. FO. 72/1146.
Crampton to Stanley. 20th August 1867. FO. 72/1148.
Crampton to ~~Russell~~ STANLEY. Confidential. 11th January 1868. FO. 72/1178.

to their policy. When Henry Layard succeeded Crampton in November 1869[129] he, too, though an infinitely stronger and more able man, maintained a policy of non-intervention.

Layard had distinct advantages over Crampton. He had the prestige of an ex member of the British Government. His appointment was flattering to Spaniards. He arrived at a time when British friendship was particularly important to the Provisional Government of Spain, and when their liberal policy was exciting sympathetic interest in Britain. Layard was well received and entered into cordial relations with all leading Spaniards.[130] But in 1870 his activities were curtailed by instructions from home. Thus his efforts to further the candidature of Aosta were arrested by Granville.[131] The policy of the British Government was one of strict non-intervention, and Layard had not the same scope for personal influence allowed to Aston and Howden.

The character of the Government of O'Donnell, and the personalities of the British ministers are important contributory factors to the change in Britain's policy towards Spain. They are by no means the causes of it. The alteration in British policy can only be explained by reference to the European situation. The policy of non-intervention had been evolved as a method of protecting Spanish independence against both France and the Holy Allies. British interests in 1870, as in 1820, demanded a strong and independent Spain, but the

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129 Austen Henry Layard. 1817-1894. Madrid 1869-77.

130 Clarendon to Layard. 20th December 1869. Layard Papers ADD.MSS. 38,997.

131 Granville to Layard. Confidential Telegram. 18th July 1870. FO.72/1231

threat of foreign interference no longer existed. Clarendon stated on 20th May 1870 his satisfaction at the "complete and unmistakeable absence of all foreign intervention in Spain's internal affairs.[132] Layard was informed that he need not watch the activities of his colleagues at Madrid.[133] There had in fact been little danger of such intervention since the Crimean War. Spain however had had the misfortune to be the testing ground of Anglo-French relations. In the thirties she was the scene of uneasy co-operations - in the forties of definite rivalry and in the fifties the French alliance was cemented in Spain.[134] A common policy allowed each power to prove its good faith. The necessity of a stable government in Spain while British and French armies were fighting in the Crimea prevented the withdrawal of Britain from Spanish politics, during the war, although the French danger had ended. Suspicion of France died hard but constant denials of French influence and complicity by Spanish statesmen reinforced by the opinion of the British Ambassador,[135] and the diversion of French interest to the eastern and northern frontiers between 1859 and 1868 had allayed British fears by 1870.

Great Britain's interest in the form of government in Spain arose from the need to secure Spanish independence. Aberdeen, the

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132 Clarendon to Layard. 20th May 1870. Private. Layard Papers. 38997 LXVII

133 General Instructions to Layard and Clarendon to Layard. 8th November 1869. FO. 72/1206.

134 Clarendon to Howden. 15th August 1854. FO. 72/841.

135 See Chapter II.
Crampton to Russell. 20th January 1863. FO. 72/1055. Crampton stated that he did not believe reports that the changes in O'Donnell's cabinet at this time were the result of French influence.
Crampton to Stanley. 14th July 1868. FO. 72/1179. Crampton stated that he had no evidence that France was implicated in revolts in nothern Spain.

most pacific of British Foreign Secretaries, stated with some asperity that "if Spain should be entirely revolutioned and monarchy overthrown, I will do my best to support the independence of Spain against all Europe, whatever may be the form of government established."[136] To Palmerston the establishment of constitutional government was a means of securing the independence and of enlisting the support of Spain in Europe. He visualised Spain as "an integral part of a western confederation of constitutionalist governments in opposition" to the three eastern powers.[137] He was sincere in his belief in the benefits of constitutional government. It would secure stability and independence. British statesmen, however, were ready to defend it actively only when the European situation demanded it. They gave the advice in the fifties because of the danger to Europe of Spanish instability. Thus Malmesbury instructed Howden to advise against reactionary measures in Spain, for every such step would endanger European tranquility as it would be "a wanton provocation" to "the violent partisans of licentious liberty."[138] Clarendon gave particularly strong advice to the Spanish Government on the eve of the Crimean War because he feared that war might be the signal for a repetition of the revolutions of 1848.[139] He was emphatic, however, as to the need for keeping

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136 H. Jones-Parry. The Spanish Marriages 1841-6 p. 46 quoting Aberdeen to Gordon 7th May 1842. Aberdeen Papers ADD. MSS.

137 Maxwell - Life and Letters of the 4th Earl of Clarendon 1913 Vol. I p. 98.

138 Malmesbury to Howden. 31st May 1852. FO. 72/801.

139. Clarendon to Howden. 24th February 1854. FO. 72/840.

Isabella II upon her throne in spite of her despotic tendencies and unconstitutional measures, because her downfall would reopen the difficult question of the Spanish Succession. The relations of the powers and the stability of the Peninsula was more important to him than the application of Liberal principles. The Liberals of Spain lost the support of the British Government when they became 'democrats' and republicans engaged in planning revolutions.

By 1870 there was no threat to Spanish independence from foreign powers, and constitutionalism was no longer an issue which divided Europe. It therefore was not necessary for England to attempt to secure a working constitutional system in Spain. The experience of over thirty years had made it clear that such a system contributed nothing to either the strength or the stability of Spain. Neither did it necessarily ensure her friendship to Britain. Spaniards appeared incapable of running such a government for any length of time. The indifference with which England watched the fall of the Queen in whose cause they had expended men, money and materials, can be perhaps partly attributed to the fact that she had, in the opinion of West, the British charge d'affairs in Madrid in 1867, done more than any other modern sovereign to bring constitutional monarchy into disrepute.[140] Clarendon rejoiced "at the revolution and the sweeping away of that abominable Queen and Court". It would be a good lesson for sovereigns who, he thought, "require ever and anon to be reminded that they are made for peoples and not peoples for them."[141] He feared however, that Spain

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140 West (Madrid) to Stanley. 20th October 1867. FO. 72/1149.
141 Clarendon to Hammond. Private. 8th October, 1868. FO. 391/4.

might come under the sway of some unprincipled demagogue but the absence of foreign intervention had shown the situation of danger: and it was generally considered that revolution in Spain was unlikely to spread into other countries.[142] The fall of Isabella released Great Britain from all obligations under the treaty of 1834, though the alliance had long since ceased to be a reality.

The complete equanimity with which the British Government watched the various attempts to find a king for Spain, was a sympton of the change in the position of the sovereigns of Europe. The days of dynastic politics and family compacts were now over. Ffrench who was charge d'affairs in Madrid in 1869, thought that kings were "little more than prefects" unable to pursue a policy not in keeping with the wishes of their peoples.[143] Lyons, the British ambassador to Paris, stated that the indifference of the powers of Europe while the Spanish Crown went 'begging' was a sympton of a recent change.[144] He also considered that any French Government would continue the policy of non-intervention in Spain. Since Great Britain had only been drawn into the Spanish Marriages negotiations of 1846 because of fears of French ambitions, it was natural that when they no longer existed in 1870, she could regard the various candidates with indifference.

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142 Clarendon thought Europe unlikely to be disturbed by the "coses de Espana."
West had expressed the same opinion to Stanley (a year before the outbreak) on 20th October 1867. FO. 72/1149.

143 Ffrench to Layard. Undated (probably July) 1870. Layard Papers. 38,998. LXVIII.

144 Lyons to Layard (Paris) 21st December 1869. Layard Papers. ADD.MSS. 38,997. Vol. LXVII

She had her preferences but she was not likely to play an active part in the negotiations. The British Government considered the French fears of the Hohenzollern candidature greatly exaggerated. The general reluctance of the Princes of Europe to undertake the task of governing Spain provides a striking contrast to the number of willing candidates for the infinitely less satisfactory position of King Consort in 1846. It illuminates too, the general impression which existed in Europe that the Spanish Crown was precarious, and would entail many difficulties, without offering the chance of any lasting power.

Great Britain's withdrawal from participation in the internal politics of Spain before 1870 was the result of altered conditions in Europe. That no advice was offered to Spain from 1856 to 1868 was probably at first due to the characters of Narvaez and O'Donnell. But that the Spanish crises of 1863-1866 provoked neither action nor comment from Russell was a British phenomenon also. They coincided with a change in Britain's foreign policy, a general withdrawal from European affairs. In these years the Schleswig-Holstein and Polish questions occupied the full attention of Palmerston and Russell. Their humiliation over these questions caused a decline in British prestige, and a subsequent reluctance to enter into European affairs in the old way. The preoccupation with, and failure in the major European events of the period made it inevitable that Great Britain should not take the same interest in the less important sphere of the Iberian Peninsula; or risk rejection of her advice in an area where it had never been either acceptable or useful.

On the death of Palmerston Clarendon initiated a cautious policy. He was mainly concerned with central and northern European problems, and by comparison with the Austro-Prussian quarrel Prim's abortive military revolt was of little importance. The appointment of Stanley to the Foreign Office made a return to the policy of non-intervention in its original sense a certainty. Spain was left to work out her own salvation. Gladstone continued, in 1870, the policy towards Spain established in 1863. He wished to maintain peace in Europe, and had no desire to be drawn into any European entanglements - hence the refusal to continue to press for Aosta's acceptance of the Spanish Crown after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war.

Great Britain was to attempt to apply her policy of non-intervention upon Europe again during the Spanish civil war of 1936. The policy was never abandoned. Gladstone's non-interference in 1870 was possible since Spain was not threatened. The contrast between the policy of 1850-6 and that of 1863-70 was not due to any change in Britain's interests and principles. It was a change of method resulting from an altered European situation in which these interests were no longer threatened. Spanish independence remained profoundly important to Great Britain. In defence of it she went the full circle from non-intervention to intervention and back. She passed from active interference in 1834-9, to the giving of advice from 1840-56 to complete refusal even to voice an opinion on Spanish questions in 1868. But from 1820 to the present day, while her power and her methods have varied, her aims have been completely consistent.

Chapter II.

Britain's Interests in the Iberian Peninsula And their Effect Upon Her Relations with Spain 1859-68.

Britain's interest in the independence of Spain rested on strategic and political considerations. Spain lay astride England's imperial communications and trade routes. From her north-western ports she could threaten shipping in the Atlantic, while from the Straits of Gibraltar she could impede the passage of vessels into the Mediterranean. Her strategic importance to Britain was enhanced with the development of the Mediterranean route to India in 1830. In the event of war the policy of Spain would be an important factor. In the case of hostilities between France and England it could be vital. The territorial or political domination of Spain by France would add materially to French power in Europe, and would give her obvious strategic advantages. If on the other hand Spain was neutral, France would be handicapped. Napoleon III is said to have estimated that in such a contingency he would have to keep 80,000 men on the Pyrenees. If she were hostile he thought 120,000 would be needed to defend the frontier.[1] Howden estimated

1. Brackenbury (Madrid) to Buchanan Confidential {15 Oct 1860} G. & D. 22/86. Memorandum of a conversation with Howden in Paris on 11 Oct 1860.

that since Spain could bring 80,000 troops into the field, a Spanish alliance in the event of war was worth some 160,000 soldiers in France.

It was a major British interest, therefore, to prevent Spain from being dominated by any foreign power. To avoid such a disaster Castlereagh had stated his policy of non-intervention and Palmerston had interfered in the Carlist War. By 1859 Spain was politically independent, and her military strength was growing. She was, however, still a second-rate power, her entire army including the reserve and colonial forces amounted to some 200,000 men.[2] Her chances of withstanding an invasion from France were slender, and from such an invasion British Sea power could not protect her. Between 1859 and 1868 there was probably no danger of French attack, or penetration into Spain, but the European atmosphere was uneasy. Britain was alarmed by the construction of ironclads in France. Napoleon's proceedings in Moldavia and Wallachia, in Savoy, Nice, Rome and Mexico made her suspicious of his ambitions. Memories of the Peninsular War and the invasion of 1823 were still too vivid for England to disregard the possibilities of France attempting once more to gain control of Spain.

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2. Buchanan to Malmesbury [23 Jan 1859] FO. 72/954.

British opposition to the improvement of communications between France and Spain testifies to the persistence of such fears. French plans to build an electric telegraph across Spain, though apparently harmless, were opposed by both Malmesbury and Clarendon, on the grounds that control of the telegraph line would provide an excuse for French interference in Spain.[3] In the late fifties the more dangerous proposal of direct railway communication was discussed. The various schemes suggested caused disputes between France and Spain, and were anxiously followed by the British Foreign Office. The line desired by Spain passed by the harbours of San Sebastian and Pasages and then went across Castille.[4] Howden pointed out that this would enable men and materials from England to land at points on the line.[5] France on the other hand wished to connect Bayonne to Spain through the Aldudides Pass. This route, if adopted, would bring French railways to within a few miles of Pamplona. Pamplona lay on the direct road to Madrid and was the most important fortress in Northern Spain.

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3. Malmesbury to Otway (15 Oct. 1852) FO. 72/802. Clarendon to Otway (11 June 1853) FO. 72/819.
4. Howden to Clarendon (25 Jan. 1857) FO. 72/913.
5. This line was also more favourable to British commerce than the French scheme, which would connect French and not Spanish Atlantic ports with the Mediterranean lines. To prevent the shift of trade to Bayonne the Spanish proposed to maintain the differential duties which Britain wished abolished. Howden to Malmesbury (5 May 1858) FO.72/936.

It commanded all the country North of the Ebro, and Howden thought the French would probably be able to take possession of the whole area before the Spanish could concentrate their troops at any point in Spain.[6] Clarendon thought the matter serious enough to instruct Howden to give his advice against the plan should his opinion be sought.[7] The next year Malmesbury was more definite. Buchanan was told to take every opportunity of opposing the Scheme privately.[8] The Coast line was eventually constructed, though as a precaution French and Spanish railways were built on different guages. When schemes for a line through the Aldaides were revived in 1862, Crampton thought them of interest to the British Government.[9] The project did not at this time cause concern for it was dropped, as it had been earlier, owing to the outcry in the Spanish press, Cortes, and Army.[10].

Such precautions, however, could not prevent a French attack. Great Britain, unable to defend Spain against France, had other means of protecting her

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6. Howden to Malmesbury (2 May 1858) FO. 72/936.
7. Clarendon to Howden (16 Feb. 1857) FO. 72/911.
8. Malmesbury to Buchanan (13 May 1858) FO. 72/933.
9. Crampton to Russell (8 March 1862) FO. 72/1032.
   Crampton to Russell Private (8 March 1862) G.D.22/86.
10. In 1933 no line over the Central Pyrenees had been completed, though one through Jaca had been under construction for many years.

interests in the Iberian Peninsula, namely by retaining Gibraltar and preserving her traditional alliance with Portugal. Since Portugal possessed ports on the Atlantic, and commanded the approaches to Gibraltar, her co-operation would go far to counteract the dangers of Spanish hostility. Britain's policy towards Portugal and her hold on Gibraltar dated from the period of Anglo- Spanish hostility. In the nineteenth century they gave rise to an insoluble problem. The best safeguards of England's peninsular interests would have been Spanish friendship, but relations with Spain could not be really cordial as long as the British flag flew over Gibraltar and Portugal was looked on by Spaniards as a British "protectorate". Similarly Britain could not withdraw from Gibraltar, or abandon Portugal to French or Spanish domination as long as there was any fear of Spanish hostility.

Castlereagh made it clear that Britain was determined to protect Portugal from the armed interference of other powers. Canning and Palmerston sent troops to her assistance. In 1847 a British naval force co-operated with the Portuguese Government to suppress a rebellion.[11] On this occasion Spain also intervened under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Britain would only allow French or Spanish intervention in co-operation with herself. The policy of non-intervention was a means of protecting

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11. The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. XI Chapter XX. p.572. H.V.Livermore. A History of Portugal (1947) p.431.

Portugal, just as it was a method of defending Spanish independence. It was, however, pursued with greater vigour and consistency where Portugal was concerned for her long sea-coast made it possible for Britain to defend her against any power but Spain.

Britain never hesitated to interfere when she suspected that Spain had desires upon Portuguese independence. Such suspicions were voiced frequently by Count Lavradio - the over-anxious Portuguese Minister to London. In the first half of the nineteenth century Britain had made it clear that she regarded the independence and integrity of Portugal as a principle of her foreign policy. Palmerston re-affirmed this principle of policy in 1851 when he warned Spain to consult Britain before interfering in disturbances in Portugal,[12] and Granville repeated it in 1852.[13] Malmesbury in the same year directed Howden to watch and counteract any Spanish designs against Portuguese independence.[14] Britain's policy was the same twenty years later. The General Instructions to Layard of 8th November 1869 described the treaties with Portugal as

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12 Palmerston to Howden. 20th February 1851. FO. 72/779.

13 Temperley & Penson. Foundations of British Foreign Policy. p. 186 quoting Granville to Howden. 31st January 1852 FO. 72/801.

14 Malmesbury to Howden. Confidential. 23rd April 1852. FO. 72/801.

"unquestionably onerous" but "not the less manifestly in force", and stated that Great Britain could not see with indifference any attack upon Portuguese independence. They contain, also, the statement that England would object to ~~be~~ the in corporation under a foreign Sovereign of the "territorial possessions of the Portuguese Crown".[15] Since this was before the colonial rivalry of the later nineteenth century, Gladstone and Clarendon were probably not consciously undertaking to defend the Portuguese Colonies. It has been pointed out that Granville was not clear on this point in 1873, when he acknowledged Treaty obligations to Portugal.[16] As the century advanced, however, the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns would have meant a substantial change in the Colonial balance of power. In 1869 and 1870, Clarendon, while

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15. Clarendon to Layard. (8 Nov. 1869) FO. 72/1206. (Seen and altered by Gladstone).

16. Foundations p. 342-3
~~16.~~ ~~Canning had~~ denied England's obligation to defend the Portuguese Colonies, Palmerston had admitted that England had obligations towards them but had not defined these obligations. The matter was not clarified until the Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration of 14. Oct. 1899 guaranteed the Colonies to Portugal. For a full discussion of the question see I. Bains. British Policy in Relation to Portuguese Claims in West Africa 1876-84. Unpublished Thesis 1940.

refusing to give Portugal positive assurances of assistance,[17] instructed Layard to watch for any signs of intended Spanish aggression and if necessary to warn the Spanish Government of Britain's interest.[18]

The policy of Britain was quite clear and consistent as long as it was a question of preventing direct aggression by Spain. She did her best to keep the two countries on good terms. Derby considered that she was 'bound to' do this in 1852[19] and in 1873 Granville reserved the right to judge whether or not England would be justified by circumstances in aiding Portugal should her help be sought.[20] Portugal was never given 'carte blanche' to provoke bad relations, but in case of open aggression she could rely on England's support. Though there was no question of Spanish aggression between 1859 and 1868, the fact that it had been made quite clear to Spain that Britain considered the independence of Portugal essential to her interests was a constant source of irritation to most patriotic

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17. Clarendon to Gladstone 14 April 1869 Gladstone Papers Add. MSS. 44133 and Clarendon to Layard 17 May 1870 FO. 72/1230.
18. Clarendon to Layard Private 20 Dec. 1869. Layard Papers 38997 Vol.LXVII Add. MSS.
Clarendon to Layard 17 May 1870 FO. 72/1230.
19. Derby to Otway 9 July 1852 FO. 72/802.
20. Foundations p.343. Op.Cit.

Spaniards. They accused her of having established a 'Protectorate' over Portugal,[21] an allegation which Russell indignantly denied.[22] Spaniards considered Britain's influence in Portugal incompatible with the dignity of Spain particularly during O'Donnell's Government of 1859-63 when the reviving power of Spain raised her hopes of altering the situation[23] and made her more susceptible than ever to any outward humiliations. It was thought in Spain that if any foreign influence was tolerated in Portugal, it should be Spanish and articles to this effect appeared in the press.[24] The British Governmemt considered that the forcible annexation of Portugal would be disastrous to Spain,[25] and in this opinion more tham one leading Spaniard concurred, for a hostile Portugal would fast become a centre of French intrigue against Spain.[26] Such rational considerations

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21. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 20. May 1860. FO. 72/981.
22. Russell to Edwardes Confidential 18. June 1860. FO. 72/976.
23. Buchanan to Russell 20 May 1860. FO. 72/981 (Confidential) Buchanan reported a 'Spanish writer' in contact with the Governmemt, as saying that Spain might in a few years attain her object, for a nation of 16,000,000 could not long submit to the existing state of affairs. This he thought represented the views of many Spaniards.
24. Ibid. Enclosure from "Novedades".
25. Minute of Clarendon's 3 Sept. 1853 FO. 72/820.
26. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Nov. 1860 FO. 72/985. Reporting the views of the Marquis of Duero - President of the Senate and Layard to Clarendon Confidential 26 May 1870. FO. 72/1233 Reporting Prim's views.

did not however, put an end to Spanish irritation at Britain's Portuguese policy.

In the decade before 1860 fears of direct Spanish aggression in Portugal were replaced by anxiety lest the union of the Peninsula should be attempted by other methods. Parties agitating for Iberian Union appeared in both countries. The idea was by no means new, but it gained force in the fifties from the misrule of Isabella II. The scandalous conduct of the Queen, and the lack of talent, and suitability of the Bourbon family led to widespread disaffection in Spain. [27] Howden reported a number of plans to upset the dynasty associated with such names as Prim and Olozaga, [28] The project of Union took various forms. The death of Maria II in November 1853 and the accession of a young King Pedro V in Portugal, led a number of prominent Spaniards to favour union of the Peninsula under his rule. British support for this plan was sought by Dusro in 1854. [29] His arguments were interesting. Isabella II he said was determined to destroy the

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27 See Chapter I.

28 Ibid.

29 Manuel de la Concha, Marquis del Duero, 1808-74. Spanish General. Considered to be head of the Moderado party at this time in the absence of Narvaez. Howden to Clarendon. Most Confidential. 4th January, 1854. FO. 72/842.

constitution, there could be no tranquility while she remained upon the throne. The Bourbon dynasty gave France an obnoxious influence in the Peninsula. The House of Braganza on the other hand were pro-British. England could further her own interest by using her moral influence at Lisbon to support Concha's plan to unite the two countries under Pedro V. Duero throught the Carlists and the Progressistas would accept him as their Sovereign. The Liberal General Infante spoke in the same sense to Howden.[30] The fact that these two spokesmen were leading members of opposing parties gave weight to their arguments. Two years later Olozaga assured Howden that he had discussed the Spanish succession with Napoleon III, who had agreed that the Duke of Oporto was the only suitable candidate for the Spanish throne should it become vacant, though it is not clear that Iberian Union itself was mentioned.[31]

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30 Facundo Infante. Spanish General, 1786 - 1873.
Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 6th Jan.1854. FO.72/842.

31 Olozaga was a strong supporter in 1870 of the Spanish efforts to secure ex-King Ferdinand of Portugal for the Spanish throne. Probably in 1856 Iberian Union was not mentioned as Olozaga states that he had told Napoleon that no Bonaparte or Italian prince would be acceptable to Spain. Napoleon at this time was also discussing possible candidates for the Spanish throne with Howden, (see above) but not plans of Iberian Union.
Howden to Clarendon. Confidential. 7th Nov. 1856. FO.72/897.

These conspiracies were no secret. In 1861 Edwardes reported that they had existed for years and were talked about in every public house in Madrid.[32] He thought that most of the foreign missions had been canvassed for their views at one time or another.[33] It was also common knowledge in 1863 that Concha had been involved in such plots.[34] In 1860 Buchanan reported that even Spanish Army officers advocated these schemes and that the Liberal press was keeping the question before the public in both Spain and Portugal.[35] The next year a weekly newspaper was founded for propaganda purposes.[36] The project of uniting the Peninsula under Pedro V and then his successor Luis I (1861) was openly advocated in both countries. It gained ground as King Luis made the monarchy more popular in Portugal. He was held up as a model King, in contrast to Isabella II[37]. The extreme Liberals were supposed to be particularly favourable to

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32. Edwardes to Russell 28 April 1861 FO. 72/1005.
33. Ibid.
34. Crampton to Russell. 29. Dec. 1863 Private G.D.22/87. Concha had by this time become a supporter of the Court of Spain. Crampton to Russell 18. Dec 1863. G.D. 22/87.
35. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 20 May 1860. F.O. 72/981.
Buchanan to Russell 2 Jan 1861 FO. 72/1003. The "Iberia" was one of the papers cited.
36. Buchanan to Russell 30 March 1861 FO. 72/1004.
37. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 22 Oct. 1860. Enclosure from "Novedades" 6 Oct. 1860 FO. 72/985.

these schemes.[38] A variation on the theme came from Lavradio, who went down to Broadlands to tell Palmerston of a plot to dethrone Isabella, annex Portugal, and place Don Juan de Bourbon on the Iberian throne.[39] Don Juan was the third son of Don Carlos, who became ~~the~~ Pretender upon the renunciation of their claims by his brothers, captured in Spain in April 1860. His liberal sympathies made him acceptable to the Liberals but not to the Carlists. There were allegations at this time that Great Britain was supporting him. This was vigourously denied by Russell.[40] Palmerston, in fact, depreciated Lavradio's fears, though Napoleon was said to be a party to the plan.[41] Buchanan reported that many Spaniards thought French agents were employed to overthrow the Bourbons and annex Portugal to Spain, but such rumours were probably put out by the Pan-Iberianists to encourage adherents.[42] The names associated with these plots were too prominent to be

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38. Buchanam to Russell. 22 Oct 1860. FO. 72/985. (Confidential)
Crampton to Russell 21 July 1862 G.D. 22/86.
39. Palmerston to Russell 16 Oct 1860 G.D. 22/21.
Palmerston to Hammond 12 Oct. 1860 FO. 391/7.
40. Edwardes to Russell 28 April 1861 FO. 72/1005.
Russell to Buchanan 18 Dec. 1860 FO. ~~XXXXX~~ 72/976.
41. Palmerston to Hammond 12 Oct. 1860 FO. 391/7.
42. Buchanan to Russell 2 Jan. 1861 FO. 72/1003.

ignored; they included Olozaga, Gonzalez Bravo and the Financier Salamanca.[43] But at the same time they were not such as to inspire confidence. The name of Olozaga was rarely mentioned in Foreign Office despatches of this period without some comment on his dishonesty and his love of intrigue,[44] While all three were described by Buchanan as "traders in politics".[45] Before 1868 Unionist schemes were the work of revolutionaries and intriguers, though many prominent names were associated with them.

With all these plots the British Government flatly refused to be connected. Clarendon expressed his views in a Minute of 1853 when he stated that the British Government would "view with extreme displeasure and would not sanction the union of Spain and Portugal".[46] Duero's proposal he rejected as "unjust" to Isabella, "injurious" to Portugal, and "offensive" to France.[47] It was clear by the sixties that England would not participate and she was no longer informed of the schemes. British action in the matter was limited to requests for

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43. Luiz Gonzalez Bravo 1811-71 - became Prime Minister on the death of Narvaez in 1868, and was a moderado. He had been Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon. José de Salamanca y Mayol 1811-83. Moderado.
44. Palmerston to Russell. 16 Oct. 1860 G.D. 22/21 and Clarendon to Layard 14 Nov. 1869. Private. Layard Papers 38,997 LXVII Add. MSS.
45. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 22 Oct. 1860 FO.72/985.
46. Clarendon Minute 3 Sept. 1853 FO. 72/820.
47. Clarendon to Howden 14 Jan. 1854 FO. 72/840.

information[48] and to denying her complicity.[49] Great Britain, Clarendon ~~had~~ explained, could never be a party to revolution in a country "in the internal affairs of which they have no pretension to interfere". To do so would be a sacrifice of principle.[50] Faced, however, with the suggestion that that Union might be achieved by a spontaneous movement of the peoples of the two countries, Howden was forced to admit that Great Britain never opposed such expressions of popular will.[51]

By 1860 Britain's opposition to the Union of the Peninsula seemed to be in contrast to the active sympathy shown by Palmerston, Russell and Gladstone to the aspirations of Italian revolutionaries. One reason for the attitude of British Statesmen towards the Pan-Iberians was that they considered that Portugal did not wish for such a union. Russell said that every Portuguese knew that it would meam subjection to a Spanish Viceroy.[52] It was in fact considered unlikely that either Pedro V

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48. Palmerston to Hammond ~~illegible~~ 12 Oct. 1860. FO. 391/7.
Russell to Buchanan 12 Oct. 1860. FO. 72/976.
Russell to Edwardes 18 April 1861. FO. 72/1001.
49. Russell to Buchanan 10 Oct. FO. 72/976. (1860).
Russell to Buchanan 18 Dec. 1860 FO. 72/976.
50. Clarendon to Howden 14 Jan. 1854 FO. 72/840.
51. Howden to Clarendon 1. Dec. 1856 FO. 72/897.
52. Russell to Edwardes Confidential 18 June 1860 FO. 72/976.

or Luis I would accept the throne - though their father King Ferdinand in 1857 was reported to have replied to the proposal "Je verrais".[53] Charles Murray described the Portuguese in 1870 as "divided and lukewarm on almost every other subject, but universally opposed to Iberian Union."[54] The Portuguese Minister in Madrid said that the question was always raised by the opposition to embarrass the Government.[55] There were Portuguese Liberals who were unionists, and the support of the veteran statesman, Marshal Saldanha, added to their importance.[56] On the whole, however, the attitude of Portugal justified the policy of Great Britain.

Pan-Iberian plots were in the realm of revolutionary politics between 1859 and 1868, and could be officially dismissed as such. The opposition of Portugal saved England from the kind of 'fait accompli' which had joined Moldavia and Wallachia in spite of her objections. While Britain's own interests prevented her lending the same support that she gave to the Italian revolutionaries. Britain wished to see Spain strong enough to defend herself,

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53 Howden to Clarendon. 7th March 1857. FO. 72/914.
54 Murray (Lisbon) to Layard Private. 20th Jan. 1870. Layard Papers. 38,997. Vol. LXVII. ADD. MSS.
55 Edwardes to Russell. Confidential. 23rd July 1880. FO.72/983.
56 Russell Note 5th May 1860. C.D.22/14 - States that the Duke of Saldanha advocated union. His biographer denies that he wished to see Spain and Portugal united under one King - Memoirs of the Duke of Saldanha. by the Conde da Carnota 1860. p. 404. Vol. II.

but not strong enough to attack Gibraltar, or to disturb the status quo any where else in the world. Union with a hostile Portugal would weaken Spain, a more successful union might raise her ambitions.

The Pan-Iberian project was dear to many Spaniards. The conspiracy was widespread and included too many prominent names to be ignored. Buchanan considered that it was not merely visionary in a land where there was no faith in whatever in the stability of the dynasty.[57] In an age which witnessed the unification of Italy and the consolidation of Germany it might have appeared feasible, particularly when Napoleon suggested it to Prince Albert after meeting the young King of Portugal in 1854. The Prince replied that Britain would oppose it.[58] Britain's policy in Portugal was regarded as a serious obstacle to the achievement of union,[59] and it cost her the friendship of many Spanish Liberals. Side by side with these revolutionary schemes went the plans of more moderate Spaniards to unite the two countries by slower and more pacific means. Serrano, speaking in the Senate in 1859, suggested that the Spanish-Portuguese frontier should be an open one, the interests of the two countries would eventually be the same, and he thought the

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57. Buchanan to Russell 20 May 1860 Confidential FO.72/981
58. Theodore Martin - Life of the Prince Consort. Vol.III p.118-9.
59. Howden to Clarendon 4 Jan 1854 Most Confidential FO. 72/842.

building of railways and increased intercourse would unite them.[60] A Society in Madrid agitated for a customs union.[61] In 1870 both Prim and Republican speakers in Cortes said that they hoped the frontiers would be broken between the two countries,[62] but they had no intention of attacking Portugal.

Such long term planning was not alarming. It was merely of interest. Still it showed the desire of the most reputable Spaniards for closer relations with Portugal. The revolutionary schemes on the other hand created anxiety in Portugal. British statesmen considered that Portuguese fears were much exaggerated. Indeed there was really little chance of success before 1868. In 1861 even the conspirators admitted that the time had not come for realising their plans.[63] While Narvolz and O'Donnell kept the army loyal the Bourbons were safe in Spain.[64] With the more oppresive regime of the late sixties the Spanish revolutionaries were forced underground and less was heard of Iberian union in London. The existence however of a Pan-Iberian party of many years standing, and with a well-known programme, was an added reason for

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60. Buchanan to Malmesbury 25 March 1859 FO. 72/955.
61. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 22 Oct 1860 FO.72/985.
62. Layard to Clarendon 25 May 1870 FO. 72/1233.
63. Edwardes to Russell 28 April 1861 FO. 72/1005.
64. O'Donnell died in 1867 - Narvaez in April 1868.

the vigilance exercised by the British Government towards Hispano-Portuguese relations between 1868 and 1870.

The fall of Isabella II in 1868 brought the project into the realm of practical politics. The Pan-Iberianists agitated for the offer of the Spanish Crown to King Luis of Portugal. The King's declaration that he would not accept was a humiliating blow, it ended all hopes of carrying through union in the teeth of British or other foreign opposition. The Unionists transferred their attentions to his father, the Ex-King Ferdinand. Ferdinand proved equally obdurate. Saldanha tried to persuade him to accept[65] but without success.[65] Olozaga clung to the scheme long after it became clear that the King was determined not to change his mind.[66] He appeared to Clarendon to be infatuated with the idea.[67] As late as May 1870 he claimed that Saldanha's pronunciamento in Portugal was in the cause of Iberian union.[68] The views of Olozaga would have mattered little had not the Spanish Government also pressed Ferdinand to accept the crown of Spain. They were so persistent that Clarendon feared they

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65. Granville to Gladstone 5 Oct. 1870 Add MSS Gladstone Papers 44,167 Vol. LXXXII
66. Clarendon to Layard Private 20 Dec 1869 - Layard Papers Add MSS 38,997 Vol. LXVII
Clarendon to Layard Private 10 Jan.1870 - Layard Papers Add MSS 38,997 Vol. LXVII.
67. Ibid.
68. Ffrench to Layard May 1870 (no date) - Layard Papers Add MSS 38,997 Vol. LXVII.

were trying to pick a quarrel with Portugal[69] and indeed refusal was followed by an outburst of ill-feeling in Spain against her neighbour.

Ferdinand was an acceptable candidate as far as Great Britain was concerned. Clarendon thought that his acceptance of the crown in the Spring of 1869 would have been convenient.[70] The Queen regarded him as the most suitable of the possible Kings for Spain.[71] But Clarendon thought him wise in refusing the throne[72] and had no intention of allowing Spain to pick a quarrel with Portugal on that score. With the failure of the Iberian project England made it clear that she had not shifted her ground in the preceeding twenty years. There was a sense of inevitability in Clarendon's remark in 1869 that "a storm is brewing in Spain against Portugal, and I suppose there will be a demand for strong language again".[73] The over anxious Portuguese put out feelers for British assurances of protection.[74] Soldanha came himself from Paris to make these enquiries.[75] At the end of the year Layard was told to take any opportunity that arose to

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69. Clarendon to Layard 20 Dec. 1869 Private. Layard Papers 38,997 Vol. LXVII Add MSS.
70. Clarendon to Layard 10 Jan. 1870 Private. L ayard Papers Add MSS. 38,997 Vol. LXVII.
71. Clarendon to Gladstone. Private. 10 Jan 1869, Gladstone Papers. 44,133 Add. MSS.
72. Clarendon to Layard 10 Jan. 1870 Private. Layard Papers Add. MSS. 38,997 Vol. LXVII.
73. Clarendon to Gladstone 22 May 1869. PRIVATE. Gladstone Papers 44,133. ADD. MSS.
74. See p. 81
75. Ibid. See Note 17.

advise Spain to "let Don Fernando alone"[76] The assurances of the Spanish Government that they had no aggressive designs on Portugal were, however, satisfactory.[77] The so called British 'hegemony' of Portugal remained a cause of Anglo-Spanish discontent and an incitement to the more hot-headed Spanish patriots. The Pan-Iberianists were to come to the fore once more in the next decade, with plans for an Iberian Republic. Their schemes, however, were not again to come so close to realisation.

While Britain's policy in Portugal irritated most Spaniards and put her in opposition to the ambitions of a section of the population, her possession of Gibraltar was universally regarded as an insult to Spanish dignity. Gibraltar was a visible proof of Spanish decline. She was a constant reminder of the enmity of Britain and Spain in past centuries. The possession of Gibraltar made Great Britain a Peninsula power. With a colony and a fortress to defend she could not be indifferent to the course of Spanish politics. A government might attempt to gain popularity and support in Spain by an attack upon Gibraltar. The more democratic the form of government the greater the danger. Excuses for such an attack were never lacking. There were certain chronic causes of friction which might

76. Clarendon to Layard Private 20 Dec 1869. Layard Papers 38,997 Vol. LXVII Add. MSS.

77. Layard to Clarendon 25 May 1870 FO. 72/1233. Layard to Clarendon Confidential 26 May 1870 FO. 72/1233.

lead to serious trouble whenever either Britain or Spain desired it. The boundaries of Gibraltar were still disputed after over one hundred and fifty years of British occupation. Spain proposed in December 1858 that the question be submitted to a mixed commission for settlement.[78] This was refused by Malmesbury on the grounds that discussion would compromise the rights claimed by England - rights insisted upon by Canning in 1826 and subsequently in 1851 and 1852.[79] The difficulties arose out of a difference of interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht. England claimed and Spain denied that the land within canon shot was ceeded with the fortress.[80] The result was a constant series of complaints from each country that the other was infringing its rights and trying to encroach upon its land. When Malmesbury refused the mixed commission he was perpetuating these difficulties. The Foreign Office considered that British claims were indisputable and hence preferred to leave the matter as it was, rather than embark on discussions which might imply doubt as to the justice of these claims. Russell took the same view. The Governor

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78 Memorandum Relative to the Land and Sea Boundaries of the Fortress of Gibraltar. (Collantes to Isturiz). Communicated by Isturiz to Malmesbury 15 Dec.1858. FO 72/1094

79 Malmesbury to Isturiz 15 March 1859 FO. 72/1094.

80 Herbert (War Office) to Russell 2 Aug. 1859. FO.72/1094. Enclosure - Codrington to Herbert. 8 July 1859.

of Gibraltar, Sir William Codrington, suffering from all the local difficulties which the lack of a clear definition of boundaries entailed, urged a final agreement.[81] Russell replied that it was undesirable to re-open the question between the two Government. Codrington was told to settle locally all questions arising from boundary disputes.[82] The War Office suggested that future Governors of the Colony be warned to continue this policy.[82 a] Buchanan was instructed not to invite discussion of the point[83] and cases arising out of these difficulties were not included among those presented for settlement by mixed commission in 1861. As a result, the period 1859-68 saw continual local friction and recriminations on both sides.

The question of maritime limits was the most galling to Spain. By the enforcement of her claims to jurisdiction over waters behind the Spanish Coast line, Britain was able to assist ships driven aground behind Spanish lines, but on British waters, without hindrance.[84] On the other hand Spanish ships carrying materials across

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81 Ibid

82 Russell to Herbert 22 Aug. 1859 FO. 72/1094.

82a Luggard (War Office) to Spring-Rice (F.O.) 22 Aug.1859. FO. 72/1094.

83 Russell to Buchanan 23 Aug. 1859. FO. 72/1094.

84 Herbert to Russell 23 Jan. 1860. FO. 72/1094.

the bay to their own lines were forced to carry passes issued under protest by the Governor of Algeciras, or to submit to British interference.[85] Since Gibraltar was a smuggler's paradise, the presence of British ships behind Spanish lines might well cause alarm and irritation to Spaniards trying to maintain their protectionist tariff, quite apart from the fact that their position was humiliating. The smuggling trade was, it is true, dying out by this time, but it was still sufficient for the Spaniards to protest in 1859 against the ease with which Spanish ships could get British nationality at Gibraltar and carry on their smuggling activities under the protection of the Union Jack,[86] and for Clarendon to call Gibraltar a "smuggling depot" in 1870.[87] The British Government clung to its claims over these waters, as it considered that to allow Spain to exercise a joint jusrisdiction would enable Spanish warships to enter the anchorage of Gibraltar and come close to the

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85 Somerset (Admiralty) to Russell 29 March 1860. Enclosing Correspondence from Codrington and Vice-Admiral Fanshawe. FO. 72/1094.

86 Isturiz to Russell 20 Oct. 1859. FO. 72/969.

87 Clarendon to Layard. Private. 15 March 1870. Layard Papers 38,997 Vol. LVVII. ADD. MSS. & FO. 361/1.

walls of the fortress in peace time.[88]

The question of the land frontier was in an equally unsatisfactory state. The Spanish had been able to settle their other two boundaries by mixed commission,[89] and France had shown an unexpected willingness to compromise in the course of the negotiations which defined the Pyrenean border.[90] England's refusal to consider this method of delimitation therefore appeared particularly unreasonable. Even the question of jurisdiction over neutral ground was unsettled. It appeared from a decision of the Law Officers of the Crown in 1850 that crimes committed in this area must go unpunished for the Courts of Gibraltar could not take cognizance of them when; as in 1864 the victim of such a crime was a Spaniard assaulted by two British subjects, Hard feeling was inevitable.[90] The Foreign Office was not willing at this time to re-open negotiations since it was felt that Spain would not agree to a definition of the limits of this neutral area.[91] In this position of uncertainty, frontier incidents were

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88. ~~Lugard~~ Herbert (War Office) to Russell 31 Dec. 1863 FO.72/1094.
89. Comyn (London) to Russell 13 Nov. 1863 FO. 72/1094 Enclosure
90. Codrington (Gibraltar) to De Grey (War Office) Separate 7 June 1864 FO. 72/1094.
Reports this Case - Law Officers' decision of 30 Aug. 1850.
91. FO. Minute on letter of De Grey to Russell 2 July 1864. FO. 72/1094.

inevitable and frequent. Spain accused the Governors of Gibraltar of systematically trying to enlarge the boundaries of the Colony and protested strongly against their conduct and their pretensions.[92] Russell denied the charges on the grounds that Great Britain had not exceeded the limits, as she had laid them down in 1851.[93] The impasse was therefore complete.

Britain also had causes of complaint. Numerous cases arose out of the Spanish practice of firing at Merchant ships approaching Tarifa, before it was agreed to abolish the practice in March 1865.[94] Further trouble was caused by the Spanish system of rigorously enforcing her trade regulations, which the British Government claimed was interrupting the trade between Gibraltar and Tangier.[95] The Spanish denied that they had any desire to interfere with trade.[96] They claimed jurisdiction over waters up to two leagues of the coast and were in the habit of molesting British Ships suspected of smuggling although their papers were found

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92. Comyn (London) to Russell 13 Nov 1863 FO. 72/1094.
93. Russell to Comyn 26 Jan. 1864 FO. 72/1094. This decision is to be found in Palmerston to Howden 3 April 1851.
94. Declaration of the British and Spanish Governments to abolish the practice of firing on Merchant Ships from British and Spanish forts in the Straits of Gibraltar. 2 March 1865 A. & P.(1865) LVII p.759.
95. Russell to Buchanan 10 Aug 1860 FO. 72/976. Russell to Buchanan 9 Oct. 1860 FO. 72/976.
96. Edwardes to Russell 21 Aug 1860 FO. 72/983.

to be in order and they were bound for foreign ports.[97] This vexatious enforcement of law gave rise to a constant succession of ship cases.

In July 1860 Codrington reported that the Spanish intended to reconstruct their fortified lines around Gibraltar.[98] Such action in the past had been prevented by intimations from the British Government.[99] On this occasion Edwardes was instructed to state that it would be regarded as "an act of incipient hostility",[100] though Sir John Burgoyne, the Inspector General of Fortifications, pointed out that these works were no longer of any use, as they were overlooked by the guns of Gibraltar.[101] Since, however, the move appeared to be hostile he thought it best not to undeceive the Spaniards as to their value - in case they should make improvements.[102] The Spanish denied any hostile intentions or any plan to rebuild these works.[103] The episode, however, was indicative of the general spirit of distrust and unrest which existed at this time between the two countries.

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97 Memorandum from Buchanan to O'Donnell.
Buchanan to Russell 12 Nov. 1860 FO. 72/985.
98 Herbert to Russell. 4 July 1860. FO. 72/1094.
Enclosure Codrington to Herbert Confidential 26 June 1860.
99 Ibid. Russell to Edwardes 11 July 1860 FO. 72/1094.
100 Russell to Edwardes 11 July 1860. FO. 72/1094.
101 Memorandum by Sir J. Burgoyne 10 July 1860 FO. 72/1094.
102 Ibid
103 Edwardes to Russell - Telegram - 17 July 1860 FO. 72/1094.

Where Britain kept a vigilant watch for signs of Spanish aggression, Spain regarded Gibraltar as a seat of sedition. The Colony not only harboured alien troops, but also an alien church. Spain looked upon it as a centre of Protestant propaganda.[104] Spaniards such as Matamores, Alhama and Trigo, arrested for religious offences, were said to be in close touch with Protestant Societies in Gibraltar.[105] The Spanish suspicions were strengthened by such cases as that of Escalante, a native of the Colony, arrested in Andalucia in May 1859. He was employed by the British and Foreign Bible Society to distribute the Scriptures in Gibraltar, and accused by the Spaniards of distributing them in Spain.[106] Such cases led to irritated discussions between the two Governments, and outraged the feelings of both peoples. In England, it led to meetings of the Evangelical Alliance and the Committee of the Protestant Alliance. The language of these bodies merely confirmed Spaniards in their opinion that religious toleration was dangerous.[107]

The dissenssions arising from the British occupation of Gibraltar, certainly irritated the two Governments

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104. Crampton to Russell 13 May 1862 FO. 72/1034. Enclosure
105. Crampton to Russell 6 Jan 1862 FO. 72/1030
Crampton to Russell 20 Jan. 1862 FO. 72/1030
Crampton to Russell 18 Oct. 1862 FO. 72/1036
These 3 men were arrested and sentenced in Spain in 1862. They were later banished and left by way of Gibraltar
106 Memorial of the Committee of the Protestant Alliance 5 July 1859. FO. 72/971.
107 Crampton to Russell 20 Jan. 1862 FO. 72/1030
Crampton to Russell 13 May 1862 FO. 72/1034 Enclosure
Crampton to Russell 18 Oct. 1862 FO. 72/1036

and kept the question of Gibraltar before the public. Between 1859 and 1863 Britain's policy in the war between Spain and Morocco brought the question to the fore and caused intense irritation to Spain.[108] The danger of the presence of a permanent British naval force able to interfere with her policy was made clear to Spain, at a time when her power and consequently her ambitions were reviving. Speeches in the Spanish Senate and articles in the press showed Englishmen the depths of Spanish bitterness and hostility over Gibraltar.[109] All Spaniards looked forward to the day when they could retake the fortress and in debates on Spanish armaments the question inevitably came up as a reason for strengthening the navy or fortifications. Even prominent members of the 'Union Liberal', such as Serrano, spoke in this sense.[110]

In the unsettled European situation of the eighteen-sixties, the hostility of Spain - never far below the surface while England was "a disagreeable guest

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108 Vide Infra.

109 Buchanan to Malmesbury 25 March 1859 FO. 72/955.
Crampton to Russell 7 Feb. 1862. FO. 72/1031.
Crampton to Russell 22 Feb. 1862. FO. 72/1031.
Edwardes to Russell. 16 Aug. 1860. FO. 72/983.
Enclosure from "España" of Aug. 12 1860.
Crampton to Russell Confidential. 18 Nov. 1862.
FO. 72/1037. Enclosures from "El Diario Español" 30 Oct. 1862 and "Epoca" 4 Nov. 1862.

110 Buchanan to Malmesbury 25 March 1859. FO. 72/955.

on the Rock of Gibraltar"[111] was considered by a number of prominent Englishmen to be dangerous enough to require some sacrifice on England's part. It is interesting to note that proposals for the cession of Gibraltar to Spain were made to the British Government twice in the decade after 1860, by Sir John Drummond-Hay in 1863[112] and by the Spanish Government in 1870.[113] In 1862 and 1863 the matter was discussed in the press of both countries. In England there were various schools of thought on the question of the retention of Gibraltar. The Manchester School represented by Cobden and Bright considered in words of the latter that the fortress had been "kept in defiance of every principle of honour and morality".[114] Bright thought it reasonable that Spain should ask for its surrender.[115] He stated that possession of Gibraltar gave not the slightest advantage to England, it was in fact merely a financial liability, and that its sole purpose, as he had heard distinguished Government officers

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111. Crampton to Russell Confidential 18 Nov.1862 FO. 72/1037.
112. Sir John Drummond-Hay 1816 to 1893 - British Representative at Tangier, 1845-86.
113. See below.
114. Bright. Speech at Birmingham quoted in "[illegible] Times" 19 Dec. 1862 p.9. col. 5.
J. Morley The Life of Richard Cobden Vol. I p. 10 6.
115. Bright to Villiers - (No date - probably 1863) G.D. 22/16.

say was to embitter the relations of England and Spain.[116] These views were held by a vocal but apparently small section of the public.

The question, as considered by the Government took a different form. A simple surrender of Gibraltar was not discussed, but Drummond-Hay's proposal that Gibraltar should be exchanged for Ceuta was given some attention. Hay explained his views in a memorandum of October 13 1863.[117] He considered that the retention of Gibraltar would eventually lead to war with Spain. British possession of Ceuta, on the other hand would not cause such resentment in Morocco for it would be regarded as protection against further European encroachments. It would prevent a French advance along the Mediterranean Coast. The powers could be pacified by the assurance that Britain would take no more Moroccan territory. Hay outlined at some length the advantages of Ceuta as a base in case of war. She had fresh food supplies readily at hand, and was a safer refuge than Gibraltar. The harbour was more exposed but could be made as good - the defences could be strengthened and Spain might bear

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116. Speech of Dec. 18 1862 (See Note 114)

117. Hay to Russell - Private - 13 Oct. 1863 Enclosing Memorandum G.D. 22/87.

the cost.[118] Hay thought she would accept the proposal and that the fact that the matter was already under public discussion made the moment opportune. That British interests demanded the possession of some port on the Straits of Gibraltar was not questioned by Hay, by the Cabinet, or by the majority of the military and naval men and civilians who carried on the discussion in the press, when the subject was re-opened in 1868.[119]

Palmerston thought that exchange would be favourable to Britain, as owing to improvements in artillery, and to extension of Spanish possessions in Morocco, Gibraltar no longer held a commanding position over the Straits; on the other hand Ceuta did and he agreed with Hay's arguments.[120] Russell, Gladstone and Somerset, the First Lord of the Admiralty, did not think that the proposal should be considered, as the cession of Gibraltar would be a blow to national pride which public opinion would not stand. Palmerston agreed but nevertheless

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118. When the question was raised again in 1868 Hay argued also that possession of Ceuta would enable England to press reforms upon the Sultan of Morocco. E.A. Brooks and L. Drummond-Hay. A Memoir of Sir John Drummond-Hay 1896.

119. 'The Times' Letter from Admiral Grey 21 Dec. 1868.
Letter from General Walpole 28 Dec. 1868
Leading Article of 21 Dec.
Other letters appeared Dec. 23, 25, 30 and 31st.

120. These views are to be found in Minutes on Hay's Memorandum 13 Oct. 1863 G.D. 22/87.

thought exchange worth considering in case it should ever become possible. The hostility of public opinion was clearly demonstrated by the reception given to Sayer's History of Gibraltar which appeared in 1862.[121] It was to be apparent again in the correspondence of 1868.[122] The arguments advanced in 1862 were that increases in the French fleet, French possession of Algeria, Spanish conquests in Morocco, and the suspected subservience of Spain to France made it impossible for England to consider ceeding Gibraltar. It was feared that France would attempt to gain possession of the fortress the moment England relinquished it. In 1870 Prim proposed the exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta to the Gladstone Government. It was declined on the grounds that public opinion would not allow it.[123] The opening of the Suez Canal made the British people particularly hostile to any weakening of their position in the Mediterranean, and Ceuta would require great outlay to make it a fortress comparable in value to Gibraltar. The GovernmenT's programme was one of economy. Clarendon himself was in favour of the

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121. G.H.Sayer. A History of Gibraltar 1862. Reviews in Times 20 Aug 1862. Westminster Review 78. London Quarterly Review 22.

122. See Note 120.

123. Clarendon to Layard 15 March 1870. British Documents on the Origins of the War of 1914-18 Vol. VIII p.48 and Layard Papers Add. MSS 38,997. F.284 and FO. 361/1.

exchange. He did not think England would suffer from the loss of Gibraltar, and his answer was framed in such a way as to leave Spain some hope that exchange might one day be entertained.[124] The strength of Spanish feeling on the subject was always clear. Spanish hopes were stimulated by the cession of the Ionian Islands in 1863, by Bright's speech of 19 December 1862, by the discussions in the English press, and the general trend of England's colonial and liberal policy. Together with pleas for the restitution of the fortress, went curious suggestions of concessions which England might secure in return. These were discussed in Cortes, in the press and in pamphlets. It was suggested that England might secure the right for her subjects to exercise their religion in Spain.[125] In 1862 an indemnity was suggested.[126] After the revolution, when Spain was weaker, came the more lavish proposal that Spain should surrender all her African strongholds and abolish her protectionist tariff;[127] and the British Agent in Manilla suggested exchanging Gibraltar for the Philippine Islands.[128] A menacing tone

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124. Clarendon to Layard Private 15 May 1870. Layard Papers Add. MSS. 38997. + FO. 36/
125. Gibraltar to Spain 1863. N. Diaz de Benjumea.
126. Crampton to Russell 23 Jan 1863 FO. 72/1055 - with enclosures from press.
127. Gibraltar to Bourbonless Spain 1869 Victoriano C arrias Bright had suggested a commercial Treaty might be obtained in return in 1862. See Note 114.
128. Ricketts to Layard Private - 22 Feb. 1870. 38,997 Vol. LXVII Layard Papers Add. MSS. -

had been adopted in the Cortes, where it was proposed that the claims of the English certificate holders, now long overdue, should not be settled while England held Gibraltar. [129]

In spite of Spain's apparent willingness to make good terms, of the clearly diminishing value of Gibraltar in the face of naval and military technical improvements, and of the willingness of Palmerston and Clarendon to consider exchange for Ceuta, no headway was made. The discussions had shown that the general public considered the possession of Gibraltar to be a major British interest. The necessity for a British post at the entrance to the Mediterranean was denied only by the followers of Cobden and Bright. Gibraltar was bound up with national sentiment to too great an extent for logical consideration of its value as opposed to Ceuta. The maintenance of British naval power in the Mediterranean by every possible means was regarded as more important than a shift in the European balance of power which might result from a

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129. Crampton to Russell 23 Jan. 1863. FO. 72/1055
For a history of these claims see letter from J. D. Powles (Chairman of the Committee of Spanish Certificate Holders) to Russell. Enclosure. 29 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/973.

Franco-Spanish Alliance. Gibraltar was not considered as a Colony, entitled to Self Government, or as a Spanish ~~city~~ town, which, in the Spirit of the age should be returned to Spain, as the Ionian Isles were re-united with Greece. Where British interests were so vitally concerned neither Liberalism nor Nationalism were encouraged.

The hostility of Spain, inevitable while England held Gibraltar and protected Portugal, was not in itself dangerous. The real difficulty which faced England was that Spain might be induced to join an enemy power or alliance in the hope of regaining Gibraltar, and of establishing either her rule or her influence over Portugal. The Spanish were only too eager to foster English fears of such an eventuality. They tried to play England off against France for their own advantage. They compared the courteous tone and friendly attitude of France with the dictatorial policy of England.[130] Napoleon appeared to be flattering Spanish vanity in 1860. He suggested that she should be

130. Edwardes to Russell 28 May 1861 FO. 72/1006.
Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961. (Confidential)
Buchanan to Russell Confidential. 12 Nov. 1860 FO. 72/985.
Edwardes to Russell Confidential. 9 Aug. 1860 FO. 72/983.

recognised as a great power and invited to join in the settlement of all European questions.[131] He did not raise the same objections as England to her war with

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131. Wodehouse to Edwardes 8 August 1860 FO. 185/364. Enclosures.
This proposal was made by France to Austria, who was willing to accept Spain as a great power, but feared that it might establish a precedent and other powers might claim similar recognition. Russia opposed the suggestion fearing that Sweden might advance claims to an equal position. England regarded the scheme as impractical. The Spanish erroneously thought that England alone had objected to it. They blamed her accordingly. They were flattered by the French suggestion but skeptical of the quarter from whence it came. They had hoped as a result of it to be invited to co-operate with the powers in Syria. England's opposition was put down to her fears that if Spain grew stronger she would attempt to reconquer Gibraltar.

Edwardes to Russell Confidential 9 Aug. 1860 FO. 72/983.
Edwardes to Russell 24 Aug. 1860 FO. 72/983.
Edwardes to Russell 16 Aug. 1860. Enclosure Article in "Espana" 12 Aug. 1860. FO. 72/983.

Morocco. He gave up arrears of interest on the debt due to France since 1823 and adopted a conciliatory policy in settling frontier disagreements. In all these matters his policy was the opposite of that pursued by Britain. The Spanish Foreign Secretary told Buchanan that England was driving Spain towards the Pyrenees.[132] Duero accused Britain of provoking Spain,[133] while Edwardes reported that when England was courteous Spain automatically believed that it was because her help was needed against France.[134]

Spaniards tended to over-estimate the value of their alliance to Britain. Believing in 1859-60 that a European crisis was at hand, they considered offering their friendship to her in return for the sacrifice of Gibraltar and Portugal. Such suggestions were always unofficial but Buchanan thought them worthy of note since they indicated the feelings and desires of many Spaniards.[135] He had serious doubts as to Spain's ability to resist French bribery, and he thought she might risk the loss of Cuba for the sake of recovering Gibraltar or conquering Portugal.[136] Napoleon III was suspected of harbouring

132. Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961. (Confidential)
133. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Nov. 1860. FO. 72/985.
134. Edwardes to Russell 28 May 1860 FO. 72/1006.
135. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 20 May 1860 FO. 72/981.
136. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 16 Aug. 1859 FO. 72/957.
Buchanan to Russell 27 May 1860 FO. 72/981.

designs on both the Balearic Islands and the territory North of the Ebro.[137] In the autumn of 1859 he was reported to have spoken in glowing terms of the port of Pasages and said that no price was too high to pay for it.[138] Spain had been nervous for some time of his desire to conquer her Northern Provinces. Calderon Collantes the Foreign Secretary expressed his fears to Buchanan.[139] Such suspicions led naturally to the conclusion that France might strike a bargain with Spain, receiving the Balearic Islands or the North bank of the Ebro, in return for enabling Spain to capture Gibraltar or Portugal, or both. The Foreign Office enquired of Edwardes whether he thought such a plan likely.[140] The language of responsible members of the Spanish Government, however,

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137. Howden had expressed fears that Napoleon intended to take the Islands. Howden to Clarendon 15 March 1854. FO. 72/843. Clarendon replied that satisfactory French assurances had been received on this point. Clarendon to Howden Confidemtial 30 April 1854 FO. 72/840. In 1860 Clarendon wrote to Hammond that he had heard that the Empress had said that it was impossible for Napoleon to be much longer without the Balearic Islands. 11 April 1860 FO. 391/3

138. Buchanan to Russell Secret and Confidemtial 21 April 1860 FO. 72/ 980. reporting the words of the Prussian Minister to Madrid.

139. Ibid - and Buchanan to Russell 3 Sept. 1850 FO.72/951 in which he states that Spain had settled the debt of 1823 due to France so that Napoleon would have no excuse to occupy her territory. These fears were rife in Spain - Buchanan reported that a Spanish General proposed as a toast at a dinner in Madrid "The Ebro, may both its banks be for ever Spanish territory" Buchanan to Russell Confidemtial 27 May 1860 FO.72/981.

140. Russell to Edwardes Confidential 18 June 1860 FO. 72/976.

was uniformly reassuring on this point.[141] There was also no evidence that Napoleon was involved in the Carlist plot of 1860, in spite of rumours that the Pretender had agreed to cede him the Balearics should he succeed.[142]

The fact that such schemes were sufficiently serious to appear in the official correspondence, is evidence of the uneasiness underlying the Franco-British Alliance at this period. It shows, too, the awareness of the Foreign Office of the inherent danger of its policy in the Iberian Peninsula. Such plans were no doubt greatly exaggerated by Spaniards. But at a time when memories of the first Napoleon were still vivid, and to a generation which witnessed the attempt to place Maximilian upon the Mexican throne the idea was perhaps not so far fetched, particularly in a land, where as British Ministers often reported, only the unexpected could be relied upon to happen. Two considerations rendered these suspected designs less serious to Great Britain - the fact that hostility to France was deeply rooted in Spain, and the

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141. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 22 Oct 1860 FO.72/985. Reporting language of Negrete (Minister of Grace and Justice) and of Marshal Concha (Duero).
Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Nov. 1860 FO. 72/985. Reporting language of Duero.
Edwardes to Russell 28 May 1861 FO. 72/1006 Reporting O'Donnell's desire for English friendship.

142. Buchanan to Russell Secret and Confidential 21 April 1860. FO. 72/980.

memory that England had been able to retain Gibraltar against France and Spain combined at the beginning of the century. Britain limited her action in the face of rumours of a Franco-Spanish rapproachment and possible co-operation to pointing out with some asperity the dangers to Spain of a French Alliance and the benefits of friendly relations with Great Britain.[143] As the decade wore on events in Northern and Central Europe absorbed the attentions of France, and the Mexican expedition impaired her cordial relations with Spain.[144]

Britain's policy in the Iberian Peninsula can be described as ~~only~~ one of maintaining the territorial status quo. The policy of non-intervention was the same when applied to either Portugal or Spain. It meant in fact the protection of their independence. Britain's fears of Spanish aggression against both Portugal and Gibraltar varied in the period 1859-68 with her relations with France.

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143. Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961. (Confidential)
Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Nov. 1860 FO. 72/985. Enclosures.
Memorandum read sent to O'Donnell on the subject of relations between England and Spain.
Edwardes to Russell 28 May 1861 FO. 72/1006.
Palmerston expressed his views in a Minute of 25 Nov. 1860. FO. 391/7.

144. Crampton to Russell 16 Sept. 1862 G. & D. 22/86.

Before 1863 Spain had a relatively strong Government, and at this time Palmerston entertained some suspicions of France. The rumours which centred around the Peninsula - rumours of plans for Iberian Union and attacks upon Gibraltar in return for territorial concessions to France, were always too vague and wild to be credible by themselves. Their importance however, lies in the fact that they reflected an uneasiness created by French policy elsewhere. They appear in perspective only against a background of general Anglo-French suspicion - reflected also in the policy of the British in Syria. Such schemes could only be given credence if it was thought that France really intended to remodel Europe. This did not seem to be impossible. Napoleon was known in 1854 to have favoured the union of Spain and Portugal under Pedro V. He had gone so far as to tell Prince Albert that he was trying to persuade Clarendon of the merits of the plan.[145]
By itself this incident would have been insignificant, but when taken together with his annexation of Savoy and Nice, the French occupation of Rome, and his connivance in such an unpractical Scheme as the setting up of a monarchy in Mexico, it appeared possible that it might be attempted.

145. See page 60

Britain's policy in the Peninsula must be viewed in the light of Anglo-French relations. She was on the defensive. The friendship of Spain was desirable but while she held Gibraltar and secured Portuguese independence and friendship it was not essential for her defence. Anything which might effect her naval power in the Mediterranean was viewed with grave concern. Thus the opening of the Suez Canal as a French project was opposed by Palmerston, and the King of Spain was warned by Malmesbury not to assume the title of 'Protector' of De Lessep's canal plan.[146] The nervousness of Britain over any extension of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean was demonstrated in January 1859 when it was feared that Russia would induce Spain, Turkey or Naples to lease her a port where she might accumulate ships of war and thus shift her fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.[147] Buchanan was instructed to prevent the lease of such a port - which would necessitate the maintenance of an increased British naval force in the Mediterranean and might in the event of war between

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146. Malmesbury to Buchanan 18 March 1859 FO 72/952
Malmesbury to Buchanan 3 May 1859 FO 72/952

147. Malmesbury to Buchanan Confidential 12 Jan 1859 and Telegram 11 Jan 1859 FO. 72/952.
Villa Franca was already leased by Sardinia to Russia.

Britain and Russia render the position of Spain embarrassing.[148] Spain denied that Russia had made such a proposal.[149] Palmerston thought that the policy of France would always be to draw away from England the smaller naval powers and Russia and Spain were the two with constant sources of greivance against Great Britain.[150] Any tendency of the three powers to draw together was immediately a matter for British concern.

After 1863, Spain was once again plunged into a period of crises and short lived Governments and her attention was too fully occupied at home for her to consider challenging Britain. This co-incided with events in Northern Europe which were sufficient to check any schemes Napoleon III may have entertained, and to drive France into a defensive position. There was consequently less need for Britain to take any active interest in the politics and events of the Peninsula. The protection of Portugal and the retention of Gibraltar, however, remained fundamental factors in her policy.

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148. Ibid.
149. Buchanan to Malmesbury 24 Jan 1859 FO. 72/954.
150. Palmerston to Russell 2 Sept. 1861 G.D. 22/21.

CHAPTER III.

Great Britain's Policy towards Spain as a Colonial Power.

"... The possibility of Spain being engaged in a conflict which... might be in the end injurious to her rule over her ancient possessions, would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government with lively apprehension and sincere regret" [1]

This concern for the future of the Spanish Colonies, expressed by Russell in 1861, was not the result of any particular feeling of cordiality for Spain herself. Russell would have been equally loathe to see any extension of Spanish rule, as his policy in the next few years clearly showed. Spain, at this period, retained but a few and widely scattered remnants of her once vast empire.[2] Cuba and Porto Rico alone were prosperous and valuable. The potemtial importance of the Philippine Islands was not yet generally recognised

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1. Russell to Edwardes (Madrid) 14 May 1861 FO 72/1001 Published in extract A & P LXV (1861) p. 526.

2. Much of the general information on the Spanish Colonies & Colonial policy has been found in the Foreign Office despatches & in P, Leroy - Beaulieu - De la Colonisation Chez les Peuples Modernes. 1891 & J.M.Callahan - Cuba & International Relations. 1899.

and they were never fully conquered or developed by the Spanish. The Island of Fernando Po off the West Coast of Africa was a drain on the treasury of the Mother Country. Nearer home, the Canary Isles were of little value, while Mellila & Ceuta were but strongholds and penal settlements. Rio de Oro, Rio Muni and the Caroline Islands were as yet unsettled, and the various islets off the African Coast were of negligible importance.

If Spain retained little of her former empire, she perpetuated most of her disastrous Colonial policy. Her remaining Colonies suffered from the same kind of disturbed, and more or less oppressive regimes, as did Spain herself. In addition they were unrepresented in the Spanish Cortes, and all opposition was forced underground. The Colonies were governed by Captains-General sent out from Madrid with arbitrary powers, such as banishment. These officials were frequently embarrassed by the lack of support from home. They had not the power to take important decisions, and were allowed small scope to formulate or pursue any policy of their own. All important posts were held by Spaniards, Creoles were debarred from office in the West Indies. In fact the Colonies were largely valued for the power of patronage which they afforded to the Crown & Government. Services rendered in the Peninsula were rewarded by appointments in the Colonies from which it was expected that large fortunes would be amassed. The result was the notorious

corruption of the entire Spanish Colonial administration. It was said that at this time "the standard of official probity is still so low in Spain that anything short of embezzlement is considered fair in public men."[3] Appointments in distant Colonies therefore provided golden opportunities for enrichment. An American, speaking of Cuba, said that one could not get "the dead body of a friend without bribing the priest, the Captain-General, the judge and the customs officials."[4]

Spain valued her dominions as a means of increasing her own pecuniary resources. The colonies were burdened by an oppressive tariff, almost prohibitive to any but Spanish goods. Heavy dues caused large scale smuggling and much discontent & enabled corrupt customs officials to make high profits by defrauding the Country.[5] The revenue was used for Spanish purposes. The income from Cuba, for instance, was used to prolong a useless war against the insurgents of San Domingo. Cuba was the richest of the Spanish colonies, but so great was this needless drain upon her resources that all public works were brought to a standstill.[6] The strict religious laws of Spain, which forbade the public exercise of amy but the Roman Catholic religion were imposed in the Colonies as in the Mother country.

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3. March (Santander) to Russell 9 Dec. 1859 FO 84/1080.
4. J.M.Callahan. Cuba & International Relations 1899. p. 320 quoting Senator Chandler. (without reference).
5. Crawford (Havana) to Russell/6 March 1864 FO 84/1218. Private
6. Ibid.

This illiberal & intolerant policy of Spain towards her overseas dominions had repercussions on her dealings with foreign powers. From 1859, until the revolution of 1868 returned a Liberal Government to power in the Peninsula , there were certain chronic causes of irritation between Great Britain and Spain. The Tariff differentiated against British goods. British vessels trading with Spanish Colonies suffered from the same vexatious regulations as they did off the Coast of Spain.[7] Spanish officials tended to be, as Clarendon brutally described tham : "arrogant and overbearing without much care for truth or justice."[8] They enforced their commercial and religious regulations against foreigners in a manner that caused bad feeling. In the colonies the difficulty of obtaining redress or clearing up disputes was greatly increased by the need to refer all matters of importance to Madrid. Consuls were treated by the Captains-General as commercial agemts only and communications on all other subjects were sent to Spain. The result was interminable delay. Cases which could have been settled locally acquired an added importance, when they became the subject of diplomatic discussions between the two powers. The great danger of such a system had

7. See Chapter II. Russell to Buchanan 9 Oct.1860 FO 72/976

8. Clarendon to Layard. Private 20 Dec. 1869. Layard Papers. ADD. MSS. 38,997 Vol. LXVII.

been amply demonstrated in 1854 when the case of the "Black Warrior" in the hands of the American Minister to Madrid Pierre Soulé, brought Spain and the United States to the brink of war.[9] Nothing quite so dramatic resulted from the relations between Great Britain and the Cuban authorities, but in 1869 Clarendon appealed in vain for direct communication on all subjects between British Consuls and Spanish Colonial Governors.[10] He asked for this modification of the Spanish system as he was anxious to limit the range of discussions on irritating matters between England and Spain. The fall of the Bourbons brought little alleviation in the constant succession of minor difficulties, for the revolution which broke out in Cuba in 1868, brought with it its own trail of claims for compensation for British lives lost and property damaged.[11]

The religious policy of Spain was a chronic cause of irritation between the two Governments. Public opinion in England was roused when the Spanish Government ordered the Baptists to cease religious observances on the Island of Fernando Po in 1858. The Baptist Mission had been founded in 1842 when there were no Spanish

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9. A.A.Ettinger - The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé 1853-1855. (1932). This case could have been settled at Havana - it also showed the difficulty of dealing with Cuban officials. pp 250.
10. Clarendon to Ffrench 29 June 1869 FO.72/1205.
11. Clarendon to Ffrench 31 Aug. 1869 FO.72/1206
Clarendon to Layard 8 Nov 1869 FO. 72/1206

settlements on the Island. In fact there was no Spanish occupation of Fernando Po until 1858, when transports arrived with immigrants, troops, priests and convicts. Not until August 1859 did a Governor and his staff take up residence. The result of the proclamation that only the Roman Catholic religion might be celebrated on the Island, was the abandonment of the Mission by the Baptists and their native proteges. The inevitable claims and protests followed. Buchanan was instructed to support the Baptist claims for compensation,[12] and in 1861 the Baptist Mission Society received £1,500 of its original £3,493. 3s. 3d. claim.[13] The incident was small enough to have no severe repercussions and was settled to the satisfaction of all but the missionaries, whose sixteen years of labour on the Island were wasted. It furnished, however, still another proof of the impossibility of securing religious toleration from Spain. More serious discussions arose out of the closing of the British Chapel in the Bay of Samana on the Island of Hispaniola. By a treaty with the Dominican Republic of 1850, Great Britain had secured freedom of worship and the right to build Chapels for her subjects.[14] Shortly after the Spanish

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12. F.O. letter to the Baptist Missionary Society 20. Jan. 1859 FO. 72/970.
13. F.O. letter to the Baptist Missionary Society Feb.26 1859 FO.72/970, & Russell to Edwardes 7 May 1861 FO 72/1001
14. Treaty between Great Britain and the Dominican Republic 6. Mar. 1850 - Article VIII ; Hertslet. Commercial Treaties Vol. 10 p.79.

annexation of the Republic, Russell had instructed Edwardes to inform the Spanish Government that Britain would expect the Treaty to be observed.[15] The Spanish took no immediate action but in 1863 a Royal decree forbade Protestant worship, and the Chapel was again closed. Russell protested in strong terms, saying that if Spain intended to abrogate all treaties and confiscate property in San Domingo, her ownership of the country would not be recognised by Great Britain as lawful.[16] The sting was however taken out of this document by the statement that he did not intend to dispute the de facto possession of San Domingo by Spain.[17] Clearly it was not worth pushing matters to extremes for the British Protestants of a small Spanish Colony. The Spanish occupation was short-lived and the incident soon over. The fact that Russell had protested more than once and even found it worth while to write personally to the Spanish Prime Minister, Miraflores, on the subject gives it some significance. He pointed out that Britain maintained Catholic Churches at Malta and in Canada, and added that the prohibition of Protestant worship in San Domingo would prevent the kindly feeling which he wished to

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15. Russell to Edwardes 25 June 1861 FO. 72/1001.
16. Russell to Edwardes 20 June 1863 FO. 72/1054.
17. Ibid.

exist between Britain and Spain.[18]

The fact was that no such 'kin dly' feeling existed between the two nations. Spain's commercial and religious policy, her corrupt administration and her arbitrary and centralised Colonial Government, were the complete antithesis of the English system. The Spanish policy was abhorrent to most British people of the Victorian age, and it was infuriating to those who suffered from it, knowing that Great Britain granted both toleration and free trade to the citizens of Spain. There existed instead of cordiality, an inevitable antagonism between them, which was expressed in the press, in Parliament, in Cortes, and in petitions and memorials presented to British Ministers.

This divergence of outlook and principles between the two peoples was reflected in the relations of their Governments. British policy towards the Spanish Colonies was one of protecting her interests by advocating reforms, trying to secure toleration, advocating free trade, and where necessary enforcing the principle later called the 'open door' against Spanish encroachments. On all these matters the British were outspoken. In 1851, at the time of the threat to Cuba from internal unrest aided by filibustering expeditions from the Southern States, Palmerston advised Spain to change her Colonial System.[19]

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18. Russell to Miraflores 8 July 1863. G.D. 22/87.
19. Palmerston to Howden 17 Sept. 1851 FO. 72/781.
Palmerston to Howden 29 Oct. 1851 FO. 72/781.

Representative institutions such as existed in Spain, should, he thought, be adopted in the Spanish Colonies. The question of religious toleration was raised frequently at Madrid during the fifties and sixties in relation to the Mother country. The British Government were constantly urged to protest by such bodies as the Evangelical Alliance, and the various Missionary Societies. It was all to no purpose, the Spanish attitude was that of Miraflores when he replied to Russell's letter in July 1863, that the British Government was perfectly free to enforce any religious laws it wished, and Spain did not object.[20]

Equally vain were appeals against the Spanish tariff. Every extension of Spanish rule brought new difficulties. After the occupation of San Domingo, for instance, the Governor of Jamaica protested against the increased charges on shipping to that Colony, which were almost prohibitive to commercial intercourse between the Dominicans and the Turks & Caicos Islands.[21] The position was particularly bad in the Philippines. The Spanish contended that existing commercial treaties between England & Spain did not apply to those rich and almost undeveloped Islamds. As late as 1870, the British Consul

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20. Miraflores to Russell 12. July 1863. G.D.22/87
21. Russell to Crampton 8 Nov. 1862 FO. 72/1029.

in Manilla, George Ricketts informed Layard that British subjects trading in the Philippines were there by favour, and only four ports were open to foreign commerce.[22] English traders were by special grant, allowed to engage in the timber trade between China and Tayabas on Luzon, but Leyte with its produce of hemp was closed to them. Throughout the period 1859-68 differential duties operated against British commerce and a vexatious passport system was in force. Britain had perforce to accept this system in the areas already acknowledged to be under Spanish rule, but the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the great increase in trade with the Far East, heralded the end of the era when Spain could enforce her monopoly and prevent the exploitation of the Islands and their inhabitants for the enrichment of foreign peoples. In her defence it may be said that the Islands were only partially conquered. There was no effective Spanish occupation of the outlying areas, and commercial agreements between foreign powers and local rulers, far from Manilla, might lead to infringements of Spanish sovereignty. To add to the dangers, these waters

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22. Ricketts (Manilla) to Layard. Private. 22 Feb. 1870. ADD. MSS. 38,997 Vol. LXVII. Layard Papers.

and islands were infested by pirates who threatened shipping in the Malay Seas, and thus furnished a constant excuse for punitive attacks by foreign powers. Spain steadfastly refused in this period to co-operate with England and the Netherlands to extirpate the pirates, saying that she was able to suppress them herself in her own dominions.[23] In the light of these considerations the relations of the two powers in the Sulu Archipelago are of particular interest.

The Sultan of Sulu ruled over the Islands of the Sulu Seas in the Southern Philippines and an area on the North Coast of Borneo. British interests in this area developed in the decade before 1849, when Sir James Brooke was establishing his rule in Sarawak. In 1848 the British took over the Island of Labuan as a Crown Colony. The following year, Brooke, acting as the representative of the British Government negotiated a Treaty with the Sultan of Sulu.[24] By this Treaty British Subjects were allowed to settle in, and trade freely with Sulu, the Sultan undertook to protect them against pirates, and to grant them

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23. Russell to Crampton 9 June 1862 FO. 72/1029
Crampton to Russell 26 Aug. 1862 FO 72/1036
Russell to Crampton 1 Sept 1862 FO. 72/1029

24. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the Sultan of Sulu and Great Britain. May 29 1849 FO.71/1.

'most favoured nation' terms of trade, and British warships were allowed to enter Sulu waters. Article VII provided that the Sultan should not cede any part of his territory to, or acknowledge the suzerainty of, any other nation, without the consent of the British Government. From this treaty it seems that Britain considered the Sultan to be an independent ruler, and that she wished for the future to establish a close relationship between Sulu and herself. This treaty should have been ratified on May 29 1851, but in July 1851, St. John, the British Agent in Sarawak was still waiting for a ship to take him to Sulu, to ratify it. By this time the situation was greatly complicated, for the Captain-General of the Philippines was them attacking Sulu, to punish the inhabitants for their piratical activities. As early as December 1848, Farren, the British Consul in Manilla, had reported thatthis officer had said that Spain regarded herself as Protectress of Sulu.[25] In 1851 when he was informed by Farren of the British Treaty he said that Spain had had relations and Treaties with Sulu for centuries,[26] and Miraflores told Howden that Spain considered Sulu to be part of the Philippines,

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25. Murray. Minute of 30 Sept. 1851 FO. 71/1.
26. Farren to Palmerston 4 May 1851 FO. 71/1.

and that France had recognised her claim in 1845.[27] There were weaknesses in the Spanish case. Spain had herself signed a Treaty of peace, commerce and protection with the Sulus in 1836, therefore she must at that date have recognised their independence. The Sultan had conducted his foreign relations as an independent Sovereign. Britain could cite treaties made with the East India Company in the Eighteenth century.[28] In October 1851 the Sultan of Sulu refused to hoist the Spanish flag.[29] In 1852 he was a refugee in the mountains and the question of the sovereignty of the Archipelago was under discussion in London and Madrid.

Great Britain's only interest in the matter, was a commercial one. The dominions of the Sultan extended to within a hundred miles of her Colony of Labuan.[30] Spanish suzerainty would close to that Colony and British commerce generally the trade of the rich Islands in the Sulu Sea and the dependencies on the mainland of Borneo.[31] Since

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27. Clarendon to Palmerston 24 Dec. 1851 FO. 71/1
Enclosing Miraflores to Clarendon 21 Dec 1851
28. Confidential Print 189 B & C. 1 Feb. 1879 FO. 71/1.
29. St. John (Sarawak) to Palmerston. 14 Oct 1851 FO. 71/1.
30. The extent of this territory was not clear to the British Agents. St. John said it came to within 70 or 80 miles of Labuan, on July 12, and on July 18, to within 35 miles. St. John to Palmerston July 12 1851 & July 18 1851. Confidential. FO. 71/1.
31. St. John to Palmerston. Confidential 18 July 1851 FO.71/1

St. John reported that except for "Borneo proper and insignificant portions of other Islands there is not a foot of territory from Borneo to New Guinea that is not publicly claimed by Holland or by Spain",[32] it was the more important for Great Britain not to allow such claims; She therefore protested against them and announced that she would ratify the Treaty signed with the Sultan in 1849.[33] The matter stood thus in the summer of 1852, when Howden wrote privately to Malmesbury, explaining Spanish sensitivity on the question.[34] Spain, he wrote, was extremely proud of her successful expedition against the pirates, the Spanish assured him that British trade in the area had not been interfered with, the islands had not been colonized, but now that the introduction of steam boats made it possible, Spain would have to protest against the British Treaty.[35] She would have French support, for France had recognised her Sovereignty, and Spain was prepared to press her claim. Malmesbury agreed with Howden that the question should be allowed "to sleep". It was of importance to Spain, and so long as her trade was not interfered

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32. St. John (Sarawak) to Palmerston. Confidential 18 July 1851 FO. 71/1.
33. Malmesbury to Howden 11 May 1852 FO. 71/1.
34. Howden to Malmesbury. Private 15 June 1852 FO 71/1.
35. Spanish Foreign Under-Secretary to Howden. 10 June 1852. Enclosed in Howden to Malmesbury. Private 15 June 1852 FO. 71/1.

with, Britain had little interest in the independence of the Sulus, Farren had called them a worthless race, best left to their fate. [36]

In 1860 Isturitz, the Spanish Minister in London rashly reopemed the discussion by asking the British Government to make it known that direct commerce with Sulu was forbidden. [37] The only ports open to foreign trade in the Philippines, were Manilla, Sual, Lloilo and Zamboango. All trade with Sulu must go through the latter. A Minute written by Wodehouse gives the British reaction to this request. [38] They had little interest in the question of Sulu independence, but as Spain used colonial supremacy to shut out foreign trade, there was good reason for not acknowledging her pretensions. Spain reaffirmed her rights the following year and her determination to retain her sovereignty, [39] but the matter was again allowed to lapse. It remained unsettled for the next sixteen years. In 1864 the British Consul in Manilla reported that Sulu had been for more than a decade under

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36. Farrem to Palmerston. 4 May 1851 FO. 71/1.
37. Isturitz to Russell. 17 July 1860 FO. 71/1.
38. Wodehouse Minute 27 July 1860 FO. 71/1.
39. Isturitz to Russell. 9 April 1861 FO 71/1.

the rule of Spain and that the rich trade of the early fifties had now sunk to an insignificant traffic with Zamboanga.[40] The Sulu Archipelago was not the only bone of contention between England and Spain in this area. The British also claimed that Spanish seizure of the Island of Balabac was unjustifiable, and they protested against any extension of Spanish Settlememts onto the North Coast of Borneo as a violation of their Treaty engagements with the Sultan of Borneo.[41] This Sovereign, like his counterpart in Sulu, had agreed in 1847, not to cede territory to any foreign nations or subjects without the consent of the British Governmemt.[42] Yet in this same treaty certain lands around Labuan were ceeded to Britain. It was a curious viewpoint that enabled the British to feel justified in objecting to any extensions of Spanish dominions while they were assuming virtual protectorates over native rulers, whom they insisted in correspondence with Spain were independent agents. Britain, however, had

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40. Webb (Manilla) to Russell 19 Sept. 1864 FO 71/1.
41. Malmesbury to Buchanan 2 April 1859 FO. 72/952.
    Buchanan to Malmesbury 23 April 1859 FO 72/955.
42. Treaty of Commerce & Friendship between Great Britain & the Sultan of Borneo. 27 May 1847. Article X
    Hertsler. Commercial Treaties Vol. 8 p. 86.

at this time no desire to extend her own territories, her activities in the China Sea were primarily commercial, and she did not wish to carry matters to extremes. Her alliance was not adequate protection and the Sultan of Sulu appealed to her for aid[43] in vain, and the Spanish established unhindered a military colony in Balabac.[44] In the final settlement by Protocol of 1885 Spain secured recognition of her sovereignty over the Islands of the Archipelago and Balabac, but Britain gained her point in so far as Spain renounced all claims on the mainland of Borneo and confirmed the right of free trade with Sulu which had been conferred in 1877.[45]

Britain's policy of preventing restrictions on her trade with lands under native rulers was world-wide. Since Spain was one of the worst sinners among the monopoly seekers, disagreements were bound to occur whereever Spain tried to extend her rule. Thus Spanish activities around her two bases in the Gulf of Guinea were closely watched. The Islands of Fernando Po and Annabon were of negligible value, but they were of great potemtial importamce, for

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43. St. John to Admiral Austen 22 June 1851 FO. 71/1. Enclosing letter from the Sultan of Sulu 2 Feb 1851.
44. Webb (Manilla) to Russell 19 Sept. 1864 FO. 71/1.
45. Protocol of March 11 1877 signed by Britain, Spain & Germany established freedom of commerce in the Archipelago. Hertslet Commercial Treaties Vol.14 p.513. Protocol of March 7 1885 signed by Britain, Spain & Germany. Hertslet Commercial Treaties. Vol. 17 p.1016

they commanded the mouths of the 'Oil Rivers'.[46] British trade in this region was estimated in 1867 to be worth £500,000 a year.[47] She therefore considered it essential to her interests to keep the trade of the area out of the hands of any other power. The early sixties were a critical period in England's position on the West Coast of Africa. By 1861 British Consuls were interfering in native affairs to protect British Subjects and commerce. They were exceeding consular functions, but the Colonial Office was opposed to annexations.[48] The policy was, however, changing at this time and in 1861, one anomaly was ended by the annexation of Lagos. Britain feared French and Spanish rivalry and she was determined to force the principle of the 'open door' for her trade. Thus when Consul Burton reported in March 1862 that the Spanish Governor of Fernando Po had concluded a Treaty with King William of Bimbia in which he agreed to "prefer in commerce Spanish ships and traders to those of all other nations" British protests were inevitable.[49] The King who had

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46. The Rivers Benin, Bonny, Gaboon & New and Old Callabar.
47. FO. Minute FO.84/1277.
48. W.H.Scotter. International Rivalry in the Bights of Benin and Biafra 1815-85. Thesis 1933 (unpublished).
49. Burton (Fernando Po) to Russell 1 March 1862. A & P. (1863) LXXI p. 267. Treaty enclosed.

already signed a treaty with Great Britain, was informed that England required that her subjects should be placed upon the same footing as the Spaniards.[50] Britain sought no exclusive privileges in her treaties with native Chiefs and she was not prepared to allow Spain to do so.[51] The Spanish gave no further trouble at this time. Indeed Fernando Po was unhealthy, and they made poor use of it as a trading base. Commerce with neighbouring lands was small and the Spanish Islands had little influence in the Bights of Benin and Biafra. As the situation in Spain became increasingly serious in the course of the decade, there was opposition to the retention of islands which had cost the country some seventy million reals without bringing any appreciable returns.[52]

During the O'Donnell administration, however, Spain had enjoyed a brief period of recovery, and her ambitions revived. There was some British anxiety, therefore, when a Spanish vessel violated Liberian territory in 1861. Britain was the self appointed

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50. Russell to Burton 23 April 1862 A.& P. (1863) LXXI p.269.
The Treaty between Great Britain & Bimbia was signed 17 Feb. 1844 & Art. V ensured free trade for British subjects who were to share privileges granted to amy other nation. Hertslet. Commercial Treaties Vol.VII. p.54.

51. Ibid & FO. Minute by Wylde (senior Clerk Slave Trade Department) 16 April 1862 F.O. 84/1176.

52. West to Russell 11 Aug. 1865 FO. 84/1239.

policeman of the coast, for all her interests demanded peace in the region. She therefore followed developments with concern. The incident grew out of the capture of a suspected Spanish slaver by the Liberian gunboat 'Quail'. The slaver was subsequently illegally destroyed by a British warship. The Spanish unable to retaliate upon the British entered Liberian waters and sank the 'Quail'. Britain expressed her hope that the action would be disavowed, and warned Spain against attacking Monrovia.[53] She received Spanish denials of any such intention.[54]

Of all the questions at issue between Britain and Spain from 1859 to 1868, the most damaging was the Slave Trade. The other irritants - Spain's commercial and religious policy were of long-standing, but the conflict over the Slave Trade was a nineteenth century development. The last Palmerston administration witnessed a recrudescence in, and the final decline of the trade between the West Coast of Africa and the Island of Cuba. Cuba was the last of the old slave markets. By 1859 Spain

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53. Russell to Crampton. Telegram 22 Oct 1861. FO 84/1139. Russell to Crampton 28 Nov 1861 FO 84/1139.

54. Crampton to Russell/22 Dec. 1861 FO 84/1139. Telegram

had been bound by treaty with Britain, to suppress the trade for over forty years,[55] yet in that year 30,000 slaves were said to have been smuggled into the Island.[56] As so large an influx was only possible owing to the connivance of the Spanish authorities, it was found to have repercussions on the relations of Britain and Spain. Britain's policy of suppression and the various fluctuations in the trade are too well known to bear more than passing reference.[57] Suffice it to say that from the day when British cruisers were withdrawn from the coast of Cuba, after Malmesbury gave up the claim to search American Ships in 1858,[58] to the conclusion of the Anglo-American Treaty granting mutual right of search on April 7 1862,[59] the only sincere efforts to suppress the trade were made by the British. The trade was carried on under the protection of the flag of the United States, or by ships flying no colours; it was possible because the corruption and laxity of the Cuban officials enabled slaves to land almost unhindered and the penal laws

55. Treaties for the suppression of the Slave Trade were signed by Great Britain & Spain on 23 Sept. 1817. (Hertslet - Commercial Treaties Vol II p.273) and on 28 June 1835 (Ibid Vol. IV p.440).

56. R. Coupland. The British Anti-Slavery Movement 1933 Chapter VI p. 185

57. See L.H.Cawte Great Britain & the Suppression of the Cuban Slave Trade - Unpublished Thesis 1934. H.S.S.Aimes Slavery in Cuba 1511-1868. 1907

58. W. L. MATHIESON GreatBritain and the Slave Trade 1839-65 1929 p. 155-6.

59. Lyons-Seward Treaty of April 7 1862. Hertslet. Commercial Treaties - Vol. 11 p. 621

of Spain prevented the estates of Planters from being searched for new arrivals.[60] In this period the only risk involved was that of meeting British cruisers on the West Coast of Africa, and since Slavers were generally the faster ships, the danger of capture was comparatively small and the profit of a successful expedition was enormous.

The Slave Trade was a cause of chronic irritation between the two countries. It was a ready made and constant cource of greivance. Other complaints were raised at various times against Spain, but the Slave Trade was always present as a ground for protest. Thus in 1860 Russell coupled it with Spanish non-payment of her debts as an obstacle to good relations. Two years later the difficulties cited were the Slave Trade and religious persecutions.[61] British complaints and protests were too frequent to be enumerated. Malmesbury said in Parliament that woven together "they would reach from here to Cuba itself".[62] The system which allowed the Slave Trade was called "a disgrace to a Christian Country",[63] and year after year it was pointed out to Spain that :

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60. The 9th Article of the Penal Law of 1845 - forbade the searching of Estates in Cuba.

61. Russell to Buchanan Private 1 Nov.1860 G & D 22/115.
Russell to Crampton Private 12 June 1862 G & D 22/115
Russell to Crampton Private 23 Jan.1863 G & D 22/115

62. Hansard Ser III vol. CL. col 2208 June 17 1858.

63. Russell to Buchanan 30 June 1859 FO 72/952.

"the reason why no cordial or intimate relations can be established or maintained with Spain is her persevering and constant violation of Treaties with Great Britain regarding the Slave Trade".[64] Spain was reminded that Britain was spending something like a million pounds a year on preventive measures off the African Coast,[65] and that it was believed in England that Spain could shut off the Cuban market if she devoted her energies to it. Crawford, the very active British Consul General at The Havana reported the glaring corruption of the Cuban officials, who made fortunes conniving at the trade,[66]

The Spanish squadron which should have been patrolling the coasts of the Island was lying idle in the harbour.[67] Strong language was used in Parliament, Palmerston called Cuba "that centre of abominations" and spoke of the : "profiglate, shameless and disgraceful bad faith with which the Spanish nation have acted with reference to the treaties concluded with England".[68]

Such language caused great indignation in Spain.

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64. Russell to Edwardes 10 Aug 1860 FO. 72/976.
65. Memorandum addressed to O'Donnell by Buchanan. Enclosed in Buchanan to Russell 12. Nov. 1860. FO. 72/985.
66. Crawford to Russell 25 Jan. 1859. FO. 84/1080 - Extract in A & P (1860) LXX. p.15.
67. Crawford (Acting Consul General Havana) to Russell 17 Sept. 1860. FO. 84/1109.
68. Hansard Ser.III CLXI 26 Feb. 1861. col.

The Spanish Government maintained that they were doing all that was possible to suppress the trade. The facts do not bear them out, but they were certainly in an extremely difficult position. The white population of Cuba was behind the Slave Traders, labour was essential to the prosperity of the Island, and the creoles considered the anti-slave trade treaties detrimental to their interests. Spain feared open revolt should she suppress the trade. When slave dealers were arrested it was impossible to procure witnesses against them, so they walked freely in the streets of Havana though their nefarious occupation was known to all. The Captains-General of this period were usually credited with good faith, by such critical observers as the British Consuls and Commissioners, but faced with the universal corruption of their assistants they were able to achieve little before 1863. They were hampered, too, by the frequent reversals of their decisions by the home Government. In Spain itself, though many individuals opposed the Trade, there was nothing like the same feeling as existed in England. Buchanan even suggested hiring a newspaper to impress on the Spanish population the iniquities of the Slave Trade.[69] Cuba was the most valuable of the remnants of the once fabulous Spanish Empire, and Spain was not prepared to risk losing it to please England.

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69. Buchanan to Russell. Private 9 Jan. 1860 G & D. 22/86.

Many Spaniards considered the Treaty of 1835 was a mistake, among them the Prime Minister Miraflores, and General Cotoner who proved his integrity, as an opponent of the Slave Trade while Captain-General of Porto Rico.[70] Where the British regarded the treaty as their only reward for the help given to Spain in the Carlist War, the Spanish resented it as a concession forced from them at a moment when they desparately needed the help of England. In self-defence they accused Britain of wishing to suppress the trade because she was jealous of the prosperity of Cuba as opposed to the sad state of her own West Indian Islands.[71]

Certainly in the long run Britain gained from her policy. Much of her supremacy on the West Coast of Africa grew out of her practice of concluding treaties with Native Chiefs which provided not merely for the suppression of the Slave Trade, but also for free trade for British subjects. Her policy was to replace the Slave Trade by legitimate commerce. This was a laudable aim, but the legal trade in these areas was predominantly British. There is, however, nothing in the relations of England and Spain, in this period to show that England used the powers of search to hinder Spanish Merchant

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70. Crampton to Russell 7 March 1863 FO. 72/1057. Foreign Office Minute (by Wylde Senior Clerk Slave Trade department) 28 Aug. 1862 FO. 84/1109.

71. Buchanan to Russell 22 Nov. 1860 FO. 84/1108. Enclosing Article from "Novedades" 22 Nov. 1860.

Shipping. There was some interference with the first ships bearing immigrants to Fernando Po, but this was soon remedied.

As regards Cuba, her sugar competed on the English market with that grown in British Islands by free labour. All suggestions that duties should be imposed upon Cuban sugar as a weapon against the Slave Trade were resisted. Russell thought such retaliatory duties would fail,[72] but it is interesting to note that the Under Secretary, Murray, wondered whether the Tariff rules of England were not of greater importance than the suppression of the Slave Trade.[73] Crawford, however, gave some signs of having an ulterior motive when he advised that a British squadron should be sent to Cuba in 1860, pointing out that Jamaica would then gain labour from captured slavers.[74] It is, however, difficult to doubt the sincerity of British Statesmen when they expressed their abhorence of the trade. The humanitarian influence over the Government was strong. Palmerston wrote to Russell that suppression during his tenure of the Foreign Office would be a "great glory".[75] The amount of time and money expended in measures against

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72. Russell Minute on Crawford to Russell 16 July 1864. FO. 84/1218. A & P. (1865) LVI. p.463.
73. Murray (Under Secretary) Minute 8 July 1864. FO. 84/1218.
74. Crawford to Russell 4 Aug. 1860 FO. 84/1109.
75. Palmerston to Russell Private 1862 G & D. 22/21.

the trade are significant of the importance attached to its suppression. British agents in the West Indies, in Africa, in the Canary Isles and in Spain herself used all possible means of procuring information about the activities of Slavers. Sometimes they ran serious risk of retaliations at the hands of unscrupulous dealers.[76] Crawford, at Havana was usually better informed than the Captain-General of Cuba.

Anglo-Spanish relations were rendered disagreeable by the consistent bombardment of Spain with suggestions for the more effective enforcement of the Treaties of 1817 & 1835. Reform of the Penal Code, & registration of slaves were advised, and Spain was repeatedly urged to declare the trade piracy.[77] There were complaints about the corruption of officials,[78] and strong protests about the refusal of Spain to allow British ships cruizing off the Cuban Coast to anchor within Spanish waters.[79] Palmerston & Russell even discussed breaking off diplomatic relations with Spain on this issue.[80] Not only was the Slave Trade

76. Crawford to Russell. Separate & Reserved. 27 Feb. 1864. FO.84/1218. Omitted from extract in A & P. (1865) LVI p. 436.
77. Buchanan to Malmesbury Confidential 24 Feb.1859 FO.84/1079
Buchanan to Malmesbury 3 March 1859 FO.84/1079
Russell to Crompton 13 Dec. 1862 FO.84/1173. (Most confi-
Russell to Edwardes 9 July 1863 FO.84/1196 dential)
Russell to Crampton 9 Dec. 1863 FO. 84/1196
Russell to Crampton 7 Dec.1864 FO.84/1217.
78. Russell to Buchanan 1 Nov.1859 A.& P. (1860) LXX Class B Spain No.166 - FO. 84/1079
Russell to Buchanan 11 Feb 1860 A. & P. (1860) LXX No.177 Spain Class B p.145.
79. Russell to Edwardes 31 July 1863 FO. 84/1196
Russell to Edwardes 1 Sept.1863 A.& P.(1864) LXVI. p.1100 FO. 84/1196.
Crampton to Russell 16 Dec 1863. FO.84/1196.
80. Palmerston to Russell Private 3 Aug. 1863 G & D 22/22

watched with vigilance, but Britain also kept a close eye on the various other schemes to introduce labour into Cuba. She advocated a system of contracts for Chinese coolies, and opposed their uncontrolled immigration which had caused such hardship.[81] Britain refused to countenance plans for the introduction of free African labour into Cuba on the grounds that it might too readily degenerate into the slave trade in disguise.[82] She had opposed similar efforts by the French, and with good reason. The status of the 'Emancipados', or negroes freed from captured Slavers, was a matter of concern to the Foreign Office, and protests were made to Spain on the subject.[83] Even the use of Yucatan Indians was inquired into.[84]

The policy of suppressing the Slave Trade led England to build up a unique and efficient information service in Spanish Colonies, and to keep a watchful and distrustful eye on all the activities of Spanish Colonial government. By virtue of the Treaties of 1817 & 1835, she freely criticised the working of the administration

81. Buchanan to Malmesbury 25 May 1859 FO.84/1079 A.& P. (1860) LXX Class B. Spain p.118 No.148.
Russell to Buchanan 19 Oct. 1860 FO.84/1108.
Bunch to Russell 31 Jan.1865 FO.84/1241 - Omitted from Extract in A. & P. (1866) LXXV p.250 No.179.

82. Malmesbury to Buchaman 5 May 1859 FO.84/1079.
Wodehouse (Under Secretary) to Edwardes 13 June 1861 FO.84/1139. (Private)

83. Palmerston to Russell Private 17 July 1862 G.& D.22/22.
Minute by Wylde (Senior Clerk Slave Trade Depart.) 11 Jan. 1864 FO. 84/1203.

84. Malmesbury to Crawford 12 March 1859 FO.84/1080.

of a foreign and independent power. She sent her warships to cruise in Spanish waters. Most remarkable of all, however, was the relationship between the Cuban Authorities and the British Government. Since the lesser officials were almost all involved in the trade, the most reliable source of information for the Captain-General was the British Consulate. Crawford was many years in Cuba and his knowledge of the Slave trade and the traders was almost unrivalled. His position far exceeded that of any normal Consular agent in a foreign country. He considered that General Serrano, who became Captain-General of Cuba in 1860, was sincere but : "of a very weak disposition, and of so amiable a character that it is not surprising that he has unwittingly allowed himself to be duped by his officers."[85] He, therefore, took the liberty of hinting to him that it would be best if he acted according to his own impulses and not the advice of others in his endeavours to suppress the trade.[86] The British were loud in their praises of any official who showed good faith in his efforts against

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85. Crawford (Acting Consul-General Havana) to Russell 30 Oct. 1862 FO. 84/1174 - Omitted from Extract in A. & P. (1863) LXXI P.476

86. Crawford to Russell 26 Aug. 1861 FO. 84/1140.

the Slave traders. Thus Crawford praised Brigadier Letona when speaking to Serrano,[87] and Russell made the tactless suggestion that this same official should receive a gold snuff box worth a £100 from the British Government by way of appreciation of his attempts to suppress the trade within his own jurisdiction.[88] This plan did not materialize for Crawford thought the Brigadier would be unable to accept the offer.[89] It is a curious suggestion that a foreign power should reward a Spanish Officer for his zeal in carrying out the orders which he received, and the job which he was paid to do by his own Government. Russell regarded Letoner's actions as a service to humanity and appears to have thought it suitable for Britain to reward him.

The relations between the British Government and Captain-General Dulce were even more remarkable.[90] Dulce took over the Government of Cuba from Serrano in 1862.

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87. Crawford to Russell 26 Aug. 1861 FO.84/1140. Brigadier Letona had arrested some Spanish Slave Traders and sent them to Havana, where Serrano released them and reprimanded Letoner.

88. Russell to Crawford. Secret & Confidential 26 July 1861 FO. 84/1140 (based on Russell Minute of 15 July 1861 FO. 84/1140).

89. Crawford to Russell 26 Aug. 1861 FO.84/1140.

90. General Domingo Dulce y Garay - Marquis of Castellflorite. 1868-1869. Captain-General of Cuba 1862 - 1866 & 1868-9.

He was unmarried, which Crawford considered an advantage, for the high officials of the Island were usually bribed through their wives; but his private fortune was small which laid him open to temptation.[91] It was a relief therefore to the British Authorities to find in Dulce a sincere and capable collaborator in their struggle against the Slave traders. He displayed an unusual frankness in his conversations with Crawford and his son and on Crawford's death, with his successor, Bunch. He complained of the corruption of his whole staff and asked Crawford to communicate information directly and privately to him.[92] He spoke openly of the lack of support which he received from Madrid, and said that he had advocated reform of the Penal Code of 1845, and that the trade should be declared piracy and his own powers extended. He was immediately supported by Russell, who instructed Crawford and Edwardes to urge the same thing on Miraflores, without mentioning Dulce.[94] First Edwardes and later West were also instructed to express the hope that he would not be removed from his post as a

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91 Crawford to Russell 10 Jan. 1863 F.O 84/1196 (Most confidential)

92 Crawford (Acting Consul-General Havana) to Russell 28 Aug. 1863 FO. 84/1203 omitted from Extract in A. & P. (1864) LXVI p. 1122 No. 186.

93 Crawford (Acting Consul-General Havana) to Russell Confidential 23 May 1863 FO. 84/1203
Russell to Edwardes 9 July 1863 FO. 84/1196
Bunch to Russell 16 Dec. 1864 FO. 84/1218

94 Russell to Edwardes 9 July 1863 FO. 84/1196
Russell to Crampton 9 Dec. 1863 FO. 84/1196.

result of the intrigues of the Slave dealers.[95] Dulce was informed of the British support being given to his policy.[96] Relations of this kind between Spanish Officials and the British Government existed also outside of Cuba. Hood, the British Agent in Santo Domingo City reported that the Dominican Chief of Police, Valvade, had said that he would resist any attempts on the part of the Spanish to re-introduce Slavery into the Island, provided he could be sure of British protection.[97] This was not possible, but he was advised to keep his opinions to himself and use his position to procure information which would enable the British Government to make protests at Madrid.[98]

The Cuban Slave trade had virtually died out by the time the Russell Government fell in 1866. The first great blow struck at it had been the Lyons-Seward Treaty of 1862, the second the abolition of Slavery in the United States. The sentiments of the Creoles underwent a change, it became

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95. Russell to Edwardes 11 Aug. 1863 FO. 84/1196.
Russell to West. Confidential 17 Aug. 1865 FO. 84/1239.
Omitted from Extract in A. & P. (1866) LXXV p.233 No.146.
96. Russell to Crawford. Confidential 31 Dec. 1863 FO.84/1203.
97. Hood to Russell. Confidential 6 May 1862 FO.84/1174.
98. Ibid.

evident that the end of Slavery itself was only a matter of time, and they therefore ceased to co-operate in the trade which had become both hazardous and extremely expensive. The result of the long period of passive Spanish resistance to Britain's attempts at suppression, was the irritation which characterised the relations of the two countries. Spain had shown her lack of respect for treaties. Britain, on the other hand, had assumed with regard to the Spanish Colonies the same paternal and interfering tone which she had applied to Spain herself in the fifties. The Spanish bitterly resented this. They considered that the violemt language of Palmerston, annually attacking them on the continuance of the trade would have been better spent upon the United States, who until 1862, had refused to allow the British to search ships under her flag, a concession which Spain had already made.[99] It was an added source of irritation that Spain was called upon to repeat her denials of anyintention of introducing slavery

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99. Buchanan to Russell 5 March 1861 FO 84/1108. Enclosing copies of speeches made in Cortes by O'Donnell, Concha (Marquis of Havana) and Gonzalez Bravo, as a result of Palmerston's speech in Parliament of Feb. 26 1861 - See Hansard Ser. III vol. CLXI. and above page

Buchanan to Russell 6 March 1861 FO. 72/1004.

into Fernando Po and San Domingo under the guise of free labour.[100]

The persistance of the trade was a vital factor in Britain's attitude to Spanish Colonial expansion. It was one of the strongest reasons advanced against the Spanish occupation of San Domingo in 1861. Palmerston considered that O'Donnell's assurances on the subject were satisfactory, but that future Spanish Governmemts might not pursue his policy.[101] However, the fact that the Negro Republic of Hayti lay next to the Colony was in Palmerston's view a deterrent to the introduction of slavery,[102] and Spain was warned of Britain's interest in the welfare of this small nation.[103]

In regard to Cuba, Malmesbury went so far as to say on the question of the Cuban Slave trade :

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100. Russell to Edwardes 17 May 1861 FO.84/1139.
Russell to Crampton Confidential 16 June 1862 FO.84/1173.
Russell to Buchanan 26 Sept. 1859 FO.84/1079. A. & P. (1860) LXX Class B. Spain p.132 No. 163.

101. Palmerston Minute. 12 May 1861 FO. 391/7.

102. Ibid.

103. Russell to Crampton 28 Aug. 1861 FO. 72/1002.

"... if Spain continues to show that utter want of principle, and that utter and base ingratitude which she has displayed towards this country, which has always been her friend, I do not hesitate to say that she must expect that indifference will be exchanged for amity, and instead of our taking her part she must expect us to leave her to whatever consequences may ensue , whether proceeding from her present conduct or not."[104] Explaining these words on hearing of the indignation of the Spanish Governmemt, Malmesbury said that England had always supported Spain against the ambitions of the United States, but that if Cuba was to be an open resort for Slave traders, Britain would not mind if the Americans annexed the Island.[105] This was in keeping with the language of Palmerston and Russell in the early fifties. Palmerston had declined a proposal to guarantee Cuba to Spain, on the grounds that such an engagement was impossible so long as the slave trade was carried on there.[106] Russell had warned the Spanish of the probable indifference of public opinion to the loss of Cuba while the trade continued,[107] and this was repeated by Clarendon in 1857.[108]

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104. Hansard Ser. III vol. C.L. Col. 2208. 17 June 1858.
105. Malmesbury to Buchanan 20 July 1858 FO. 72/933.
106. Palmerston Minute. 16 Dec. 1850 FO. 96/22.
107. J.M.Callahan - Cuba & International Relations. 1899 p. 236. No reference - (original found in B.F.S.P. vol. 42. No. 271. Russell to Howden 31 Jan.1853.
108. Clarendon to Howdem 17 June 1857 FO. 72/912.

Such statements, however, cannot be taken at their face value. There was in fact no British indifference to the fate of Cuba. Malmesbury himself had entered into an agreement with France to guarantee the Island to Spain in 1852, an engagement which never came into force owing to the refusal of the United States to adhere to it.[109] In the same document in which Palmerston stated the reasons for his refusal to adhere to such a proposal in 1850, he said that : "Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible how important it is for Spain to retain possession of the Island of Cuba."[110] Clarendon in 1854-5 approved Howden's efforts to prevent Spain losing Cuba through the machinations of that very curious emmissary Pierre Soulé, the United States Minister to Madrid.[111] Proposals for the peaceful sale of Cuba were equally objected to by the British Government.[112] Russell's statement quoted at the beginning of this chapter shows that the views of Britain had not changed in 1861. The Slave trade was clearly not the dominant factor in England's relations with Spain as a Colonial power. In spite of Palmerston's conviction that the Spanish would re-intro-

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109. A.A.Ettinger - The Proposed Anglo-Franco- American Treaty of 1852 - to Guarantee Cuba to Spain. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 4th Series XIII 1930.

110. Palmerston Minute. 16 Dec.1850 FO.96/22.

111. A.A.Ettinger. The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé 1853-1855. 1932. pp. 285

112. Clarendon to Howden 21 April 1857 FO.72/911.

duce Slavery into San Domingo,[113] he made no effective protests at the eclipse of the Dominican Republic, though the Spanish occupation took place in 1851 during the revival of the Slave trade. When the Dominicans were in revolt in 1863-5, Russell was willing to delay recognising them as belligerents longer than he felt legally justified in doing, for the sake of lessening the embarrassment of the Spanish Governmemt.[114] To some extent it seems as though Spain was being handled by the British Governmemt with 'kid gloves' - the iniquities of her rule were mamifest. Britain protested against her addiction to the Slave trade, but she was not willing to use all the means at her disposal to put an end to it. The policy of coercesion so effectively applied to Brazil was not tried upon Spain. Russell provided evidence for assessing the true importance of the trade in Anglo-Spanish relations when he wrote :

> "The Spanish Government really behave so ill about "the Slave Trade, and debt to Englishmen that it is difficult to keep on good terms with them. But I am determined to do so, if it can possibly be done."[115]

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113. Palmerston Minute 26 June 1862 FO. 84/1174.
114. Russell to Crampton 10 Dec 1864 FO. 72/1077.
Russell to Crampton Telegram 15 Dec. 1864 FO. 72/1077.
Russell to Crampton 18 Dec. 1864 FO. 72/1077.
115. Russell to Buchanan 1 Nov. 1860 G.D. 22/115.

Thus the most important part of Britain's policy towards Spain as a Colonial power in the years 1859-68, was to maintain her in her possessions, in spite of all the irritations and difficulties which Spanish rule entailed. The reasons for this are to be found in the position of Spain as a world power.

Spain's great merit as a Colonial power in the eyes of England was paradoxically her commercial and naval weakness. In the far flung areas where British & Spanish interests clashed, Spanish ambitions could be easily curtailed. Fernando Po lay at the heart of a rich trading area, but Spanish merchants made little headway in their trade in the Bights of Benin & Biafra, and where they attempted to establish monopolies they were checked by Britain. True, Britain sustained a diplomatic defeat in the Sulu Archipelago, but she could afford a concession to Spain where her interests were small,[116] and in the final settlemeamt she retained the Northern Coast of Borneo. Spanish rule was so ineffective over most of the Philippines that there was little danger of her spreading her power far afield. Her commercial ineptitude made her a preferable neighbour to either France or the Netherlands, the only other serious contestants around the East Indies or Fernando Po.

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116. A letter from the Governmeamt of India of 1865 stated that no complaints had been received of ill effects on English trade as a result of Spanish domination. India Office to Foreign Office 14 Dec.1865 - Enclosure FO. 71/1.

The most important of Spain's Colonies were in the West Indies. Here Britain's policy was determined by her attitude to American ambitions. Cuba was of vital importance to the United States. The Island was strategically placed to command the Gulf of Mexico and the mouth of the Mississippi River, and it lay between the North American Republic and any projected route across the Isthmus of Panama or any other point in Central America. By the time Palmerston formed his last administration, England, the United States and France had suspected each other of designs upon Cuba for nearly forty years. The situation became more critical in the late forties and early fifties of the nineteenth century when the acquisition of California and discovery of gold stimulated American interest in a Central American transit route, and boosted her ambitions to acquire more land. The Southern States anxious to add another Slave holding territory to the Republic began filibustering attacks upon the Island. Talk of 'manifest destiny' and the policy of 'young America' was alarming to both England and France. The proceedings of Soulé in Madrid, and the official American attempts to get Cuba in 1854-5, were rendered evem more dangerous by the movement in the United States to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty - the compromise agreement over Central America which was

proving difficult to carry into effect;[117] and by American attempts to lease Samana Bay from the Dominican Republic as a naval base.[118] The Panama railway was completed in 1856 and canal schemes were actively discussed by private companies. The Carribean was already an important area for British commerce, the building of a canal would greatly enhance its strategic and commercial importance. Britain therefore opposed all American activities in this area in the fifties. The British and French naval squadrons opposed the Filibusters, and representations were made to Washington on the subject. Howden did his best to frustrate Soulè's schemes. The leasing of Samana Bay was prevented by the action of the British and French Consuls.[119] England maintained her protectorate over the Bay Islands and the Mosquito Indians.

In the late fifties, however, Britain's policy in the Carribean was reversed. The importance of the area to the United States was realised, amd British trade with them was too great to risk a war. Public opinion showed

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117. M.W. Williams Anglo American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915. 1916.
118. C.C.Tansill. The United States & Santo Domingo. 1798-1873. 1938. Chapter VI
119. Ibid. p.198.

itself against the Central American policy of the Government.[120] There had been objections to the project of defending Cuba as early as 1852, when the Spectator had protested against England's binding herself to : "uphold the perishing interests of Spain against an inevitable doom".[121] It was felt by mercantile interests that American expansion might at least end chaos and enable British trade to be extended.[122] This change in British policy between 1856 & 1859 resulted in the final settlement of the Central American troubles by the British relinquishment of the Bay Islands and Mosquito Shore. This was done on the conclusion of a series of treaties with the Central American States in 1859-60.

In the last Palmerston administration therefore, the main causes of dispute between Britain and the United States in the Carribean area had been removed. The outbreak of the Civil War was temporarily to eclipse American power and ambitions. The old fears and suspicions, however, died hard. The policy of opposing United States expansion had been Palmerstons, and though he had completed the British withdrawal from the Isthmus, he seems, [illegible] to have hankered after the old policy, for he continued to regard American annexations in the West

120. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. II pp. 275.
121. A.A.Ettinger. The Proposed Anglo-Franco-American Treaty of 1852 to Guarantee Cuba to Spain. 1930. See above.
122. Cambridge Modern History. Vol. XI pp.283.

Indies as undesirable. He preferred to see Cuba and Porto Rico in the hands of Spain tham in those of the United States or even France. French ambitions at this period were an unknown quantity, as the expedition to Mexico was to prove. This preference was the dominating factor in Britain's policy towards the Spanish annexation of San Domingo. In a Minute on this subject, Palmerston expressed his views. The existing state of affairs on the Island of Hispaniola was dangerous and unstable and "that which English interests would be most hurt by, would be the establishment of the North Americans in the Island; the next bad thing would be the transfer of the Island to France; the least objectionable to us would be its annexation to Spain, that is to say commercially and politically speaking, and setting aside the question about slavery".[123] English objections to Spanish annexation appear to have been based mainly upon fears of American action. Britain had good reason for her apprehensions, for when she had proposed joint-cruizing of British and American ships around Cuba for the suppression of the Slave Trade, Seward had been willing to consider the suggestion providing it was coupled with a guarantee of the indepemdence of Hayti and San Domingo, since the annexation of either of these by Spain would mean an

123. Palmerston Minute. 12 May 1861 FO. 391/7.

extension of slavery.[124] Russell rejected this suggestion, as the movement for rejoining the Spanish Empire appeared to be spontaneous in San Domingo.[125] His fear of war between Spain and the United States which might cost Spain all her West Indian Colonies caused him to warn her of the danger, a danger which the Civil War might postpone but would not eradicate.[126]

Britain's subsequent policy, however, showed the general decline of her interests in the Carribean. She refused a Spanish proposal of 1863 for a treaty between West Indian powers for mutual defence of their Colonies. As Russell noted, England could protect her own colonies and was not prepared to enter into fresh engagements concerning Cuba[127] - a contrast from her policy of eleven years before. A suggestion made by Hayti that Britain, the U.S.A., France and Spain should guarantee the neutrality of the Samana Peninsular was not seriously discussed with Spain.[128] In 1867 Stanley refused the suggestion that he should lease the Bay for £30,000. The Admiralty

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124. Lyons to Russell 10 May 1861 - Enclosed in Russell to Edwardes Confidential. 5 June 1861 FO.185/382.
125. Russell to Lyons 31 May 1861. Ibid.
126. Russell to Edwardes 14 May 1861 FO.72/1001 A. & P. LXV 1861 No.11. p.537.
127. Russell Minute on Crampton to Russell 9 Oct. 1863. FO.72/1061
Russell to Crampton 27 Oct. 1863 FO.72/1054.
128. Russell to Crampton 10 March 1865 FO.72/1095.

thought it unnecessary, and Stanley thought it inadvisable to do the very thing which Britain feared the United States was trying to do. [129] In 1868 Stanley refused a suggestion from the French Consul at Santo Domingo City that the British & French representatives should again co-operate in a joint protest against the sale or lease of Samana to the United States. Britain's policy in the Carribean had lost the vigour of the previous decade. Protests were made against Seward's negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West Indian Islands, and the proceedings in San Domingo were watched, but the conviction that England's interests were really threatened was dying.

Between 1859 and 1868 Great Britain's policy towards the Spanish Colonies was one of maintaining the territorial status quo. She wished to see Spain strong enough to defend herself against the ambitions of both France and the United States. In spite of all the inevitable irritations of Spanish rule she preferred to see such strategic points as Fernando Po, the Philippines and Cuba under her control. These years lie at the tail end of a long period of Anglo-American opposition in places as far apart as Cuba and the Hawaian Islands. In the fifties there were fears of American plans to penetrate into the West Indian and the Sandwich Islands and to unite the two by the Central American transit route. In the sixties such schemes were abandoned, but in any case British policy had already changed. She had begun to travel the route

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129. C. C. Tansill The United States and Santo Domingo 1798 - 1873. 1938 p. 242

130. Ibid. p. 256

which was to enable her to view with equanimity the annexation of the Philippines and Porto Rico by the United States and the independence of Cuba, in 1898.

CHAPTER IV

British Policy towards Spanish Overseas Enterprises.

"The period of prostration produced by wars and discord is past: Spain is now positively in a period of development and of true restoration: The power of Spain is not great yet enough to threaten; but it is, however, strong enough to defend the integrity of the territory of the Monarchy and the dignity of her unsullied name."[1]

Thus the Spanish Foreign Minister described the position of his country at the outset of the period 1859-1868. In "defence of the dignity of her unsullied name", Spain was to embark in the next five years on a series of enterprises in which she drained her resources and achieved nothing. She was activated by a desire to prove that she was once more able to take her place among the powers, to pursue an independent policy and to protect her own interests. The Government of O'Donnell sought to gain popularity at home and deference abroad

1. Calderon Collantes speaking in the Spanish Cortes - Translation enclosed in Buchanan to ~~Russell~~ Malmesbury, 1 Jan. 1859. FO.72/954.

by successful military expeditions. It was also a means of occupying outside of Spain the more turbulent spirits of the Spanish Army, who by their 'pronunciamentos' and revolts had reduced her to impotence and anarchy at intervals over the previous half century.

Spain's aggressive policy was to have its repercussions upon Anglo-Spanish relations. From 1859-1861 these relations were dominated by the problems arising from the war between Spain and Morocco which broke out on October 22nd. 1860, after months of bickering and negotiations. The story of Britain's part in these negotiations, of ~~their~~ her efforts to prevent war by representations at Madrid, and by using her great influence in Morocco to urge the Moors to yield to Spanish demands; of her attempts first to limit the scope of hostilities, and them to end the war; and finally of her successful efforts to prevent a renewal of the conflict when the Moors failed to carry out the terms of peace, is too well known to bear recapitulation.[2] Britain's policy in this war was, however, to affect her relations with Spain, and to elicit from her extremely clear and forceful statements of what she considered to be her interests in this area.

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2. F.R.Flournoy British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston. 1935. Chapter VII pp. 182.
J. Becker y Gonzalez. Historia de las relaciones de Espana durante el Siglo XIX. 1924.

A mere punitive expedition by Spain against Morocco, would probably have aroused little feeling in England, where it was acknowledged that Spain had certain just causes of grievance. Her fears were, however, awakened by the language used in the Spanish press and Cortes. For many months before war broke out, Spaniards spoke and wrote in grandiose style of Africa as a field for Spanish expansion.[3] The Queen was persuaded that a war against the Infidel would give to her reign some of the glory of that of her famous namesake, Isabella the Catholic. It became clear in the summer and autumn of 1859 that war with Morocco would be extremely popular in Spain, and that the Government was being swept along on the tide of public opinion.[4] Britain's policy towards the war was to place her in direct opposition to the ambitions of most patriotic Spaniards.

Faced with the possibility of a Spanish war of conquest against the Moors, Britain stated her interests in the matter. These interests were primarily strategic. It was a fundamental factor in British policy to secure freedom of navigation in the Straits of Gibraltar. As long as Spain, Britain and Morocco divided between them the points upon the Coast which could command the Straits there

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3. Buchanan to Malmesbury 3 Feb. 1859 and Enclosure from La Epoca. FO. 72/954. (This despatch quoted in Flournay (see above) is erroneously referred to as addressed to Russell.
4. Flournay p. 197 Op. cit.

was no great danger to British interests, but any change in possessions on the Moorish Coast which would enable Spain to block or impede this passage, would be a direct threat to these interests. When it was proposed to enlarge the ~~region~~ zone around the fortress of Ceuta, Russell made clear the great importance he attached to this freedom of the Straits and his reasons. He stated "Great Britain... ... taking into view her commerce in the East, her possessions in the Mediterranean and her passage to India through Egypt, feels called upon to defemd those interests to the utmost. She cannot therefore consent to the proposed aggrandisement," which would give to Spain the power to "forbid access to, or egress from the Mediterranean Sea".[5] During the peace negotiations he protested against any extension of Spanish territory west of Bermeja Point, which would enable Spain to establish a cross-fire from points on the African and Spanish Coasts and thus to impede and endanger shipping.[6]

Before the war broke out engagements were sought from Spain that she would not permanently occupy Tangier.[7] Such an occupation, it was thought, would not only give

5. Russell to Buchanan 18 Oct. 1859 FO. 72/953.
6. Russell to Buchanan 3 May 1860 FO. 72/975. (Tel.)
7. See Flournoy pp. 195 Op. Cit.

her a strong position on the Straits, but also threaten the safety of Gibraltar. Britain obtained supplies for her fortress from Tangier.[8] In peace time these supplies could be obtained elsewhere, including Spain.[9] The danger in case of war with Spain however, was obvious, as Codrington wrote the more Moroccan resources could be enjoyed by Gibraltar the more "we became independent of the uncertain state of our land frontier."[10]

The importance attached by Britain to these considerations was made clear, but her policy was not altogether consistent. Malmesbury was ready to resist by force any Spanish attempt to land in or near Tangier.[11] Six months later Russell was content with a Spanish assurance in writing that Spain had no aggressive intentions towards Morocco, an assurance of doubtful force relating only to Tangier.[12] Her policy had shown some fluctuations

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8. Malmesbury to Buchanan Telegram 11 March 1859 FO.72/952. Codrington to Herbert 15 Sept. 1859 G. & D. 31/1. Palmerston to Russell 1 Nov. 1859 G. & D. 22/20. Russell Minute (date uncertain) 1859 FO. 96/26. For details of the Provisions obtained See Flournay Op. Cit. p.p. 34, 35, 232-3.
9. Herbert to Russell. Private. 3 Nov. 1859 G. & D. 22/25.
10. Codrington to Russell. Private. 20 Oct. 1860. G. & D. 22/86.
11. Malmesbury to Buchanan 12 March 1859. FO. 72/952. See Flournay Op. Cit. p. 188.
12. Flournay Op. Cit. p. 195.

in the course of negotiations. Early in October Palmerston wished to offer to hold Tangier in trust for Morocco.[13] As late as October 19th he wished to prevent the Spanish Army leaving any port in Spain, if satisfactory assurances were not received from the Spanish Government.[14] He had more than once expressed doubts as to the reliability of any such assurances that Spain would make no permanent conquests. He thought that the "Spanish Pund ' onor consists in breaking all engagements whenever it suits their purpose to do so,"[15] and that with regard to Tangier "Possession is eleven points of the law, and the Spaniards once in, might be much disposed to step over the twelfth."[16] It is surprising therefore that he should have been satisfied with the general assurances received.[17] Flourney attributes

13. Palmerston to Hammond 4(?) Oct. 1859 FO. 391/7.
Palmerston to Russell Private 5 Oct. 1859 G. & D. 22/20.
Palmerston to Russell Private 7 Oct 1859 G. & D. 22/~~20~~13
*See G.P.Gooch The later correspondence of Lord John Russell 1848-78 Vol. II p. 241. In both the published and the original version of the letter of 7th October Palmerston speaks of holding Ceuta in trust and states that if the "Spaniards get hold of it we shall never get them out of it again." Since Ceuta was already a Spanish fortress Palmerston probably was referring to Tangier. This would tally with his suggestion in the two unpublished letters cited.
14. Palmerston to Russell Private 19 Oct 1859 G.& D. 22/20.
15. Palmerston to Russell Private 8 Oct 1859 G.& D. 22/20.
16. Palmerston to Hammond 4 Oct 1849 FO. 391/7.
17. For the kk loopholes in these assurances See Flourney Op. Cit. pp. 195-6, 200.

* Also - Palmerston to Russell 11 Oct. 1859 G. & D. 22/20.
See E. Ashley - The life of Viscount Palmerston 1846 - 1865. 1876 Vol. II p. 166.

this unexpected collapse of ~~the~~ Brit~~ish~~ aim's opposition to Spanish plans, to the failure of the other powers, particularly France, to co-operate with her, and to the intensity of Spanish feeling on the subject.[18]

Suspicions of France played an important part in moulding British policy towards the Spanish Moroccan dispute. In fact a study of this subject furnishes evidence of the uneasiness of the Anglo-French Alliance of this period. Palmerston wrote to Russell that he thought the Spanish-Moroccan war the first step towards "the Emperor's map of Europe for 1860", and that the next move would be against Turkey.[19] He entertained suspicions that "our good ally" wished to turn the Mediterranean into a 'French Lake'.[20] According to Clarendon "La carte de l'Europe en 1860" allotted Morocco to Spain.[21] British statesmen felt that that Spain was being made use of by France, that she was being used by Napoleon to make war on Morocco;[22] but that she would not long be left in possession of her gains, for

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18. Ibid p.200.
19. Palmerston to Russell. Private. 26 Nov.1859 G.& D. 22/20. He was probably inspired by a French publication La Carte de L'Europe en 1860. (not traced.)
20. Palmerston to Russell Private 28 Nov. 1859 G.& D. 22/20.
21. Clarendon to Hammond Private 25 Oct. 1859 FO. 391/3.
22. Palmerston to Russell Private 1st Jan. 1860 G.& D. 22/21 Newcastle (Colonial Office) to Russell 9 Oct. 1859 G.& D. 22/25.

sooner or later France would annex that country weakened by her conflict with Spain.[23] Palmerston believed that if Spain gained points on the African Coast, both on the Straits of Gibraltar, and on the Atlantic, it would be an asset to France, for in any war in which France and Spain were allied against England, this would enable the two powers to close the Straits to English shipping.[24] Clarendon reported Vaillant as having said that France would not consider herself safe in Algeria until she possessed a port on the African Atlantic Coast.[25] These suspicions were not lessened when France refused to co-operate in demanding guarantees that Spain would not expand her territory west of Ceuta,[26] and when France made no remonstrances to Spain on the subject of her war with Morocco.

To add to British anxiety came the warnings from Buchanan that Spain was anxious for war, and that her ambitions might drive her into subservience to France.[27]

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23. Clarendon to Russell Private 23 Sep. 1859 G.& D. 22/29.
24. Palmerston to Russell 7 Oct. 1859 - G.P.Gooch - Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1875 1925 Vol.II p. 241. Original in G. & D. 22/13
Palmerston to Russell 11 Oct 1859. E. Ashley - The Life of Viscount Palmerston. 1846-65 1876 Vol. II p. 166 Original in G. & D. 22/20.
25. Clarendon to Russell Private 23 Sept. 1859. G.& D. 22/29.
26. Flourney Op. Cit. p. 199.
27. Buchanan to Russell 13 Oct 1859 FO. 72/959. (confidential)

He reported that she showed "an insane and morbid jealousy of interference ~~and~~ or remonstrance on the part of Her Majesty's Government."[28] Prior to this the language of Spanish statesmen had not been reassuring. They tried once more the old game of playing off England against France.[29] There were rumours that Napoleon's advice was being sought. The Spanish press assumed an arrogant tone.[30] O'Donnell hinted to Buchanan that any attempt to interfere with Spanish dignity and independence, such as opposing a landing on the Moroccan Coast, would not only cause great resentment but might lead Spain to look for friendship elsewhere.[31] The war was intensely popular in Spain[32] and Buchanan reported growing irritation against England.

In face of the doubts as to French policy and the violence of Spanish feeling, English resistance would have been dangerous. If Spain could be prevented from assuming a dominant position on the Straits, it was more in keeping with British interests to maintain her friendship.

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28. Ibid.
29. Buchanan to Russell 5 Oct. 1859. FO. 72/959.
30. Buchanan to Russell 7 Oct. 1859. FO. 72/959. (confidential) ~~A. & P. (1860) LXVIII p.~~
31. Buchanan to Russell 20 Sept. 1859 FO. 72/958.
32. Buchanan to Russell 5 Oct. 1859 FO. 72/959.

She might after all serve as a barrier to France in Africa in a war between that country and Britain.[33] Russell's correspondence with Buchanan indicates that he wished to maintain Spanish friendship. There is almost a note of apology in his statement that the British Government were "sincerely desirous of maintaining with Spain the most amicable relations, but they are bound to provide for the safety of Her Majesty's possessions".[34] Buchanan tried to convince O'Donnell and Collantes, during and after the war that considering the British interests involved, and the language used by foreign governments on the question of aggression in Morocco, Russell had adopted a most friendly course toward Spain.[35]

Russell's method of conducting the negotiations, however, was hardly friendly. His tone was reminiscent of the paternal attitude adopted by Britain towards Spain in the fifties. Buchanan reported Spanish resentment at what was regarded as Britain's bullying tone.[36] Statements such as Russell's that "the Spaniards ought to be much obliged to us that we allow them to land on the Moorish Coast and to occupy Tangier on such shallow pretexts as

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33. This was Howden's view expressed in a letter to Russell of 18 Sept. 1859, Marked Private and Confidential. G&D 22/86
34. Russell to Buchanan 22 Sept. 1859 FO. 72/958 A. & P. (1860) LXVIII p.593
35. Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961. Memorandum from Buchanan to O'Donnell. Enclosed in Buchanan to Russell 12 Nov. 1860. FO. 72/985.
36. Buchanan to Russell Private 7 Oct. 1859 G. & D. 22/86.

they have put forward as excuses or motives for their war" indicate his attitude towards Spanish Foreign policy.[37] Buchanan was told to inform Collantes that he considered the war unjustifiable, unnecessary and costly.[38] His policy raised feeling in Spain which was long in dying out. It cost Britain the friendship of the Liberal party.[39] The outbreak of war only intensified Spanish irritation. The press became even more virulent when it was erroneously suspected that Britain was helping the Moors.[40] Reports from the Spanish Army that British officers had been seen among the Moors were credited in Spain. Hostile feeling had been apparent in Algerciras in September 1859 when the crew of an English boat was attacked.[41] Codrington reported that the war increased the bitterness of Spanish feeling at the British possession of Gibraltar.[42] The constant sight of the Union Jack flying over it, by troops at Algerciras was an aggravation manifested in "personal acts" against Englishmen. Many Spanish officers and men came and went freely between Gibraltar and Spain, but not a single officer called upon the Governor. Codrington added that the guns of Tariffa had begun to fire on all

37. Russell to Buchanan Private. 23 Nov 1859 G.& D. 22/115.
38. Russell to Buchanan 26 Oct. 1859 FO. 72/953.
39. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Dec. 1859 FO.72/961.
40. Buchanan to Russell 6 Nov. 1859 FO.72/960.
    Buchanan to Russell 26 Dec.1859 FO.72/961.
41. Somerset, (Admiralty) to FO. 14 Oct.1859 Enclosures. FO. 72/972.
42. Codrington to Russell Private 17 Nov.1859 G. & D. 22/86.

ships within range who did not show colours.

An added cause of grievance at this time was Britain's renewal of her claims for payment of the debt due since the Carlist war.[43] It was singularly unfortunate from the point of view of Anglo-Spanish relations that Britain should have raised this matter in 1858 after a lapse of some twenty years. The question was brought up by Malmesbury because Spain appeared to be recovering from her prostration and her finances seemed to be improving.[44] He was admittedly influenced by her more vigorous foreign policy. He remarked on Spanish activities in Mexico, Morocco, Cochin China[45] and Borneo;[46] and stated that "it may not unfairly be affirmed that in any country where occasions for aggression seem rather to be sought for than to be accepted as unfortunate necessities, the actual and acknowledged obligations of the state will have been placed on a satisfactory footing and national credit at home will have been not less cared for than

43. This debt was contracted under Additional Article II of the Quadruple Alliance, for the arms and stores furnished by Britain. Payment was demanded in 1835, but was deferred owing to the exhaustion of Spanish resources. In December 1840 it was again asked for and Spain agreed to try to meet the obligation, but nothing further transpired.

44. Malmesbury to Buchanan 17 Nov.1858 FO.72/934.

45. Spain semt a token force with the French Army to Cochin China in 1857-8.

46. See Chapter III.

national reputation abroad." Britain therefore felt justified in calling the attention of Spain to this ancient debt. When Russell came to office, he pressed for payment. Negotiations were in progress in the autumn and winter of 1859. It appeared to Spaniards that Britain was attempting to embarass their financial position, at a moment when all their resources were needed to further the war. Their indignation was intense. Over Morocco, England was accused of "raising difficulties at every step.... and availing herself of the circumstances to claim, with an urgency too pressing not to have some secret cause, the payment of some millions.... which Spain owed to her".[47]

The result of Britain's policy in the Spanish-Moroccan conflict was to create a feeling in Spain that France would be a more profitable friend. Spanish statesmen ever ready to play off the two powers to their own advantage, hinted as much to Buchanan. Collantes told him that England "had driven the whole country towards the Pyrenees."[48] A Senator went as far as to assert that "Spain had suffered more from British friendship

47. Article in "Espana" enclosed in Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961.
The debt was liquidated in Jan. 1860.
Buchanan to Russell 9 Jan. 1860 FO. 72/944

48. Buchanan to Russell 12 Dec. 1859 FO. 72/961.

than she had ever done from French hostility."[49]
Ill-feeling continued throughout 1860. The Marquis of Duero, when President of the Senate, told Buchanan that France was paying court to Spain, while England provoked her.[50] He compared their policies as creditors of the country, saying that France was settling the debt due since 1823, in a manner advantageous to Spain.[51]

From 1859 to 1861 it must indeed have appeared to Spaniards that the greatest obstacle to their ambitions was Great Britain. Not only did she protect Portugal, and hold the fortress of Gibraltar, but she wielded great influence in Morocco, through her agent Sir John Drummond-Hay, and she had shown a determination to limit the extent of Spanish gains in the war. In these years too, by expressing her anxiety, she warned Spain against sending troops to the Papal States.[52] and against attempting to hinder Garibaldi's crossing of the Straits of Messina.[53] Further afield England contested Spanish claims in the Sulu Archipelago, and curtailed her commercial activities on the West African Coast. In 1861 she objected to the

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49. Buchanan to Russell ~~XX~~ 13 Nov. 1859 FO. 72/960.
50. Buchanan to Russell 12 Nov. 1860 FO.72/985.
51. Ibid.
52. Russell to Buchanan Private 12 Aug 1859 G.& D. 22/115.
Buchanan to Russell Confidential 16 Aug 1859 FO.72/957.
Russell to Edwardes Telegram 29 Oct. 1860 FO.72/976.
53. Foundations p. 226. Op. Cit.

to the annexation of San Domingo. France, on the other hand, had not discouraged the Moroccan campaign, nor the recovery of San Domingo, neither was she a rival in the Sulu Sea or the Gulf of Guinea.

Britain had no desire to lose the friendship of Spain. Buchanan tried hard to smoothe the ruffled feelings of Spanish Ministers. Whenever the subject arose he pointed out the dangers of a French, and the advantages of an English alliance. When, for instance, Collantes compared the policy of the two countries towards the Moroccan war, Buchanan repeated to him the story that France had, in her archives a plan for conquest of Morocco ready for use at the first opportunity.[54] He pointed out that Spanish occupation of the forts would be no obstacle, and added that he felt certain, therefore, that "the normal interests of Spain would soon cause her present irritation against England to be forgotten, and that the relations of the two countries would speedily be restored to their usual satisfactory state."

Britain was in fact saved from the dangers of Spanish alienation by the events of the next few years. In the course of the long negotiations with Morocco, after

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54. Buchanan to Russell Confidential 12 Dec 1859 FO.72/961. Howden had informed Russell of this, vouching for its authenticity.
Howden to Russell Private and Confidential 18 Sept. 1859 G. & D. 22/86.

the end of the war, she played the role of peacemaker. Britain urged Morocco to carry out her engagements to Spain, and she facilitated the raising of a loan in London to enable the Sultan to pay the indemnity. By her good offices she avoided a renewal of the war in the summer of 1861. It was a major British interest to end the dispute as soon as possible, and since O'Donnell had no wish to renew hostilities, Britain was able, in the words of Palmerston "to lay both Spain and Morocco under a cheerfully acknowledged obligation,"[55] by settling the questions at issue. By 1863 British and Spanish relations in Morocco were rendered more cordial by Spanish suspicions of France. Miraflores assured Crampton that the policy of Spain was not to weaken the power of the Sultan as he feared an extension of French territory from Algiers.[56]

The restoration of cordial relations between England and Spain in 1861 was largely due to their decision to co-operate in obtaining redress from Mexico.[57] The history of the expedition and the British interests involved are well known. The effect upon Anglo-Spanish relations was however, interesting. In this respect the joint expedition

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55. Palmerston to Russell Private 27 April 1862 G.& D.22/22 See Flournay Op. cit. p. 214.
56. Crampton to Russell 19 Sept. 1863 FO.72/1061.
57. For the history of the Mexican Expedition and its aftermath see E. Corti Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico 1929.

was a fortunate episode. In the fifties England had been anxious to prevent any Spanish attack upon Mexico. This was the decade of tension and rivalry between Britain and the United States in Central America. The argument used to discourage Spanish plans against her former colony, was that it might give the United States an excuse to quarrel with Spain, and to attack Cuba. Such warnings came from Clarendon in 1856 and from Malmesbury in 1858.[58] Malmesbury had been unwilling to take action in Mexico himself, before the Central American question was settled.[59] Joint intervention was however, already under discussion. By 1861 the United States were crippled by Civil war. They had allowed the Spanish annexation of San Domingo, though under protest. American power was temporarily eclipsed. England was finally spurred into action by the news that Spain could no,longer be deterred from sending an expedition to Mexico. O'Donnell stated that he would act alone if England and France failed to co-operate.[59a]

Russell had misgivings as to Spanish intemtions. The Spanish press was full of speculations and schemes of reconquest of the Indies.[60] The Prime Minister of Spain

58. Clarendon to Howden 5 June 1856 FO.72/889.
Malmesbury to Buchanan 6 Oct. 1858 FO.72/934.
Malmesbury to Buchanan Confidential 17 Nov 1858 FO. 72/934.
59. Malmesbury Minute 30 Nov. 1858 FO.96/26
59a. Crampton to Russell Private 5 Sept. 1861 G.& D. 22/86.
60. Ibid.

realised that the recent annexation of San Domingo would add to the suspicions of Spanish intentions.[61] He made it clear that in spite of the language of the newspapers, he had no intention of setting up a Bourbon Monarchy in Mexico, nor of interfering in the internal affairs of that country.[62] Russell continued however, to doubt the motives of Spain, and what was more important, those of France, who might make use of Spain, as he had feared she was doing in Morocco. Russell expressed anxiety when Cowley reported that the Captain-General of Cuba had been ordered to take Tampico and Vera Cruz while the three powers were still negotiating. These fears were revived when the Spanish force landed in Mexico before the arrival of the British and French expeditions. This incident was attributed to the Spanish desire to establish themselves in Mexico first, and thus gain an advantageous position.[63] It does not appear, however, that the Spanish had any ulterior motives. Their army awaited the arrival of the English and French before

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61. Crampton to Russell 8 Jan 1863 FO. 72/1055 Enclosing Extract from Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes Dec 29 1862.
62. Crampton to Russell Private 15 Sept. 1861 G.& D. 22/86.
63. Corti Op.Cit. Vol. I p.126.

taking any action. Sir Charles Wyke, the British Minister in Mexico, bore testimony to the correctness of their behaviour.[64]

In spite of Russell's suspicions, the Spanish co-operated with Britain and showed no desire to interfere in Mexican affairs. Wyke's letters were full of praise for the Spanish Commander-in-Chief, General Prim.[65] They dispelled all doubts as to that soldier's intentions. He was suspected of wishing to carve out an Empire for himself in Mexico.[66] Once in Mexico, however, he acted in complete accordance with the terms of the Convention of London.[67] Wyke thought that war with Mexico might have broken out had it not been for him.[68] When the French schemes became apparent the Spaniards withdrew simultaneously with the British. O'Donnell supported the actions of Prim and Wyke, and Russell thought Spain

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64. Wyke to Russell Private 31 Dec.1861 G. & D. 22/74.
65. Wyke to Russell Private 31 Jan. 1862 G.& D. 22/74.
Wyke to Russell Private 3 March 1862 G. & D. 22/74.
66. Crampton to Russell Private 11 April 1862 G.& D. 22/86.
This suggestion is refuted by Crampton.
67. Convention of London 31 Oct. 1861 Signed by Britain, France and Spain. A. & P. (1862) LXIV p. 103-6.
68. Wyke (~~Mexico~~) to Russell Private 31 Jan 1862 G. & D. 22/74.

had "behaved most honourably in the whole matter."[69]

The result of the Mexican expedition was greater cordiality in Anglo-Spanish relations, and a marked coolness between Spain and France. Napoleon aroused indignation in Spain by attacking the policy pursued by Prim and Wyke. The Spanish felt they had been duped by the French, who had altered the whole purpose of the enterprise. They had in fact gained nothing from the two expeditions undertaken in concert with France since 1857.[70] Their indignation was increased by Napoleon's reception of Marshal Concha, who was appointed Ambassador to Paris. He was told that the friendship or hostility of the two countries would depend upon the Queen of Spain.[71] The result was an outburst of loyalty in Spain, which led the Queen to remark that she would rather have Napoleon for an enemy than a friend.[72] During her successful tour of Southern Spain anti-French feeling was clearly manifested.[73] The Mexican expedition, therefore, reversed the position of the previous year, by restoring Anglo-Spanish and destroying Franco-Spanish good-feeling.

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69. Confidential Memorandum by Russell on Mexico (For Palmerston) 23 June 1862 G.& D. 22/27.
70. See Note 45 p.144
71. Crampton to Russell Private 16 Aug. 1862 G.& D. 22/86.
72. Crampton to Russell Private 16 Sept. 1862 G.& D. 22/86.
73. Crampton to Russell Private 22 Oct. 1862 G.& D. 22/86.

In 1864 Spain embarked upon a policy in South America which was to cause concern to the British Government.[74] To force Peru to grant redress for injuries to Spaniards, she siezed the Chincha Islands off the coasts of that Republic. This act alarmed all the former Spanish colonies. The proceedings of the Admiral in command of the Spanish Squadron and of the Representative of the Spanish government raised fears that Spain was about to attempt reconquest in South America. The annexation of San Domingo, and the proceedings of the French in Mexico were sufficient to alarm the weak and disrupted South American States. The seizure of the Islands was an effective blow struck at Peru, for much of her revenue was derived from the guano trade of the Chinchas. The British interests involved in the affair were entirely commercial, but they were considerable. The guano trade was valuable and necessary. The British merchants in Lima petitioned Russell to offer friendly intervention to settle the dispute.[75] Russell

74 See J.G.S. Ward. The Activities of Spain on the Pacific Coast of South America and her war with the "Confederation of the Andes" (Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador) 1860 - 1886. Unpublished Thesis 1939.

75 Ibid. p. 74-5.

offered good offices to Peru,[76] advised Spain to restore the Islands and expressed the hope that she would be conciliatory.[77] Nothing, however, came of his efforts. Since Spain did not interrupt the guano trade, and was particularly careful not to interfere with neutral interests, there was no call for further British action. Britain had also had her troubles with Peru, and Palmerston had little interest in ~~their~~ her difficulties. He wrote to Russell "the Peruvians deserve to be chastised by any Body and will be all the better for being well licked - provided we get our guano it does not matter whether it is sold to us by Spaniards or by Peruvians," but he thought the Spaniards would evacuate the Islands when they obtained satisfaction.[78] The dispute was settled without British aid.

By September 1865, however, Spain had drifted into war with Chile. In 1866 Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, had formed an alliance with Chile known as the "Confederation of the Andes", and all four were at war with Spain. British interests were more seriously affected. England's trade with Chile was estimated at over eight million pounds sterling

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76 Ibid p. 132.
77 Russell to Crampton. 17 Sept. 1864. FO. 72/1077.
Russell to Crampton. 15 Dec. 1864. FO. 72/1077.
78 Palmerston to Russell. Private. 24 May 1864. G. & D. 22/15.

per annum.[79] British property was endangered by the hostilities, and British trade suffered from the Spanish blockade of the coast. Clarendon did his best to prevent the outbreak of war. He protested against the hasty actions of the Spanish Admiral Pareja, who did not try to settle the dispute by conference. He protested also that the blockade of the Coast would ruin British trade with Chile, and he offered British good offices, saying he felt sure France would co-operate.[80] He tried to disuade Peru from allying with ~~Cuba~~ CHILE.[81] Together with France he proposed terms for the suspension of hostilities.[82] He urged Spain to raise the blockade and not to bombard Valparaiso or to occupy the Chincha islands again.[83] Chile refused the Anglo-French offer of 'good offices' accepted by Spain, and the proposals of the terms of peace drawn up by Clarendon.[84]

The efforts of Britain for a while earned her the hostility of both Spain and the South Americans. O'Donnell was irritated at the language of the English press,[85] which compared Spain unfavourably with Peru since she did not meet her debts.[86] He went so far as to accuse Clarendon of

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79 Ward. Op. Cit. p. 251.
80 Clarendon to Crampton. 18 Nov. 1865 FO. 72/1096.
81 Ward. Op. Cit. pp. 201.
82 Claremdon to Crampton. 2 Dec. 1865. FO. 72/1096.
83 Clarendon to Crampton. Telegram. 27Nov. 1865. FO. 72/1096.
Clarendon to Crampton. 1 Feb. 1866. FO. 72/1121.
Clarendon to Crampton. 30 May 1866. FO. 72/1122.
84 Ward. Op. Cit. pp. 411
85 Crampton to Clarendon. Telegram. 23 Nov. 1865. FO. 72/1102.
86 Ward. Op. Cit. p. 267.

menacing Spain.[87] The Spanish Foreign Minister accused British American and French agents in South America of encouraging the Republics to resist Spanish demands by assuring them of protection.[88] Clarendon's efforts to prevent the bombardment of Valparaiso were resented since this was Spain's only means of asserting her power. Criticism of the bombardment in the House of Commons aroused particular irritation.[89] Thomson who made efforts to prevent it in Chile by negotiating with the Spanish Admiral was accused of partiality by both sides. Chile resented his efforts to secure better treatment for the Spanish residents in that country.[90]

In fact Clarendon had little sympathy for either side. Russell thought "the conduct of Chile - a commercial nation in going to war with Spain without a motive and then expecting neutrals to protect her ports is preprosterous" and added "The less we have to do except by means of consuls with such nations as Chile the better".[91] Clarendon was indignant when Chile asked for Thomason's recall, he was glad to give the Chilean representative his passports in return.[92]

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87 Crampton to Clarendon. Telegram. 23 Nov, 1865 FO. 72/1102.
88 Crampton to Clarendon 28 Jan. 1866. FO. 72/1123.
~~88~~ Crampton to Clarendon. Confidential 11 May 1866. FO. 72/1124.
Crampton to Clarendon 6 June 1866. FO. 72/1125.
89 Crampton to Clarendon 20 May 1866 FO. 72/1124.
90 Clarendon to Crampton. 14 June 1866 FO. 72/1125.
91 Russell Minute (to Hammond) 26 May 1866 FO. 391/7.
92 Clarendon to Russell. Private. 24 May 1866. G. & D. 22/16.

He had not much more sympathy for Spain, who placed England in an awkward position by rejecting the good offices she had already accepted on hearing news of a defeat. Spain was determined to vindicate "her honour". Clarendon who was working to restore peace could not sympathise with her attitude. He added to her irritation by his frequent protests at her methods of conducting the war and the negotiations.

Britain's main interest was to end the war, which was ruining the South American States. Her good offices were finally accepted, in conjunction with France, and the new Foreign Secretary, Stanley, pressed for speedier negotiations.[93] Their peace proposals were however rejected by the South American States. Finally, Stanley withdrew the British offer in the hope that peace would be brought about by the mediation of the United States.[94] The war was still technically in existence upon the fall of Isabella, though there was no fighting after the Battle of Callao in 1866.

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93 Ward. Op. Cit. p. 423

94 Ward. Op. Cit. p. 450

There were certain fundamental factors in Britain's policy towards the various Spanish enterprises between 1859 and 1868. She was anxious to prevent or limit the scope of disturbances anywhere in the world. Spain, as a power anxious to reassert her lost prestige was liable to embark hastily on costly and unprofitable expeditions. In the case of the war with Morocco there were definite political advantages to be gained in Spain. O' Donnell achieved popularity as a result of the campaign. Britain, who considered her vital interests to be threatened had no sympathy with such Spanish aspirations or political manoevers . She feared not only the establishment of Spanish positions on the African Coast of the Straits of Gibraltar, but also a weakening of the power of the Sultan of Morocco, which would, bu causing disturbances within the Empire, enable France to find an excuse for aggressive action in and possible absorbtion of Morocco. The same fear of French activities underlay Britain's decision to join the Mexican expedition. Spain was at no time in the period a danger to Britain by herself. Britain's policy towards her undertakings therefore can be explained only in the light of Anglo-French relations. She tried to prevent Spanish expeditions, but where she feared French motives, as in the case of Morocco, she did not continue on her course. In

Mexico she adopted the expedient of joint action in the hope of preventing the enterprise from assuming the proportions of a conquest. In the Pacific war, French ambitions were not suspected. The war, however, interfered with British gains trade, hence her vigorous efforts to restore peace. Stanley's willingness to withdraw ~~from~~ his good offices in favour of the United States is evidence of ~~the beginning of~~ the end of the rivalry vetween Britain and the North American Republic for influence in South America. In the interests of commerce here, as in Central America, Britain needed peace, no matter how it was achieved.

Britain's policy towards Spain in this period was essentially one of maintaining the status quo, She had sincere doubts as to the wisdom of Spanish policy in all the enterprises ~~she~~ SPAIN undertook. Russell characterised the war with Morocco as a waste of Spanish energy and resources.[95] He took the same view of the attempt to subdue San Domingo and strongly advised that it be abandoned.[96] Britain desired to see Spain independent, in bith her home affairs and her foreign policy, and strong enough not to fall again a prey to foreign powers.

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95 Russell to Buchanan. 4 Nov. 1859. FO. 72/953.

96 See Chapter III.

Any drain on ~~the~~ her resources might lead to anarchy at home, and reduce her once more to impotence against outside interference. Her excess of zeal therefore in defence of her "unsullied name" was far from welcome to the British government. British Ministers considered it to be as much to Spanish interests as to their own that she should pursue a peaceful foreign policy.

Britain's policy towards Spain's wars and expeditions was not in this period successful, in so far as she did not deter Spain from her ~~cause~~ course. Her advise - freely given in the case of Morocco and the South American war went unheeded, but her interests suffered no great material damage. Spanish irritation ~~however~~, at her policy died down in each case when her help was required to secure peace.

CONCLUSION.

Anglo-Spanish relations in the second half of the nineteenth century deserve more attention than they are usually given. It is true that their interest is largely negative. Spanish affairs did not lead to the formulation of any new principles of British policy, or even to a redefinition of existing ones; in contrast to the first fifty years of the century. The relations of the two powers were guided by principles laid down before 1850 and invoked after 1870. The most important of these being non-intervention, and the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Portugal. These principles were not modified between 1859 and 1868. Anglo-Spanish relations in this period nevertheless furnish an interesting illustration of Britain's conception of her interests, and of her methods of promoting these interests.

The stability and independence of Spain was as much a British interest in 1870 as it had been in 1846. Strategic importance of the Peninsula was, if anything, enhanced in the period by the opening of the Suez Canal and with it the short sea route to India. The domination of Spain by France would have been quite as dangerous in the sixties as it had been in the fifties. Napoleon III appeared stronger than Louis Philippe. It may be said therefore that neither Britain's political principles nor her strategic interests in the Iberian Peninsula changed between 1846 and 1870.

These principles and interests, however, occupied less

of the attention of British Foreign Secretaries by 1870 than they had done earlier because they no longer appeared to be threatened. This was the result of changes in the General European situation. Spain by this period was no longer the battleground between the reactionary principles of the Holy Allies and the liberal principles of England and France. She had ceased also to be a field for the dynastic ambitions of the French. By 1870 Austria, Prussia, Russia and France were no longer attempting to interfere in or influence the internal politics of Spain. European politics in the sixties were dominated by the events leading to, or the issues arising from the unification of Italy and Germany. The withdrawal of the great powers, and particularly of France from Spanish politics made it unnecessary for Britain to protect her interests by interfering in Spain to secure a government friendly to her. The change in her policy in Spain may therefore be described as one of method due to altered European conditions rather than one of interest or principles.

Britain's ~~policy~~ attitude towards ~~Spain as a Peninsula~~ the Spanish colonies, ~~and Colonial power, and her attitude~~ towards the various Spanish enterprises of the period, lead to the conclusion that ~~British policy towards Spain was determined by the European situation~~ these were not the factors which determined her policy towards Spain. It is noticeable that none of the many irritating questions and unsettled disputes between the two countries led to any serious disagreements. England desired Spanish friendship. She showed a marked reluctance to push matters to extremes

in cases of dispute in which it was clear that Spaniards felt strongly. She gave way for instance on the question of the sovereignty of Sulu, and of Crab and ~~Beaque~~ Pasaje Islands;[1] she did not use all means in her power to end the Cuban Slave Trade. England did not in the end oppose the Spanish-Moroccan campaign, although she considered she had particularly vital interests at stake, because in face of Spanish determination and French indifference she probably feared a Franco-Spanish rapprochement. She showed throughout the period a strong desire not to see Spain weakened by the unnecessary draining of her resources. Thus she deprecated the continuation of Spanish efforts to subdue San Domingo, and the unprofitable wars with Morocco and the "Confederation of the Andes." Spanish weakness might leave her a prey to French ambition. In the case of the Spanish West Indian Colonies, Britain's attitude was affected by the reversal of her Carribean policy between 1856 and 1859. Her changed conception of her interests in this area, as a result of the realisation that she would suffer more from a conflict with the United States than from a withdrawal from Central America were to contribute to her indifference to the loss of the Spanish Colonies in 1898. ~~With this indifference to the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico it became evident that Anglo-Spanish relations were determined in Europe.~~

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1. The possession of these Islands was disputed from 1849. Spanish de facto sovereignty was recognised. in 1862
For case volume on this subject see FO.72/419.

Since the principles and interests which guided Britain's policy towards Spain underwent no change between 1859 and 1868, it follows inevitably that Anglo-Spanish relations in the period contributed little to the development of British Foreign Policy. These relations are of interest in a purely negative sense in that they illustrate certain recognised factors in British policy of the middle nineteenth century. Her desire, for instance, to avoid disturbances which might affect her trade in the remotest corners of the world; her interest in maintaining the principle of the 'open door'; her willingness to enter into engagements with native rulers, which bound them not to cede territory without her consent; but her reluctance to extend her own responsibilities by annexing their lands. They illustrate, too, the degree of her interest in the suppression of the Slave Trade and the methods employed to that end. The determination of Britain to protect her trade routes, especially in the Mediterranean, and her opposition to the Suez Canal Scheme played their part in her policy towards Spain. Deep suspicions of France are demonstrated at every stage of Anglo-Spanish relations in the first few years of the period. The withdrawal of Britain from the internal politics of Spain is entirely consistent with a general withdrawal from European affairs in 1864.

In the history of Britain's relations with Spain the period 1859 to 1868 is, however, of greater importance. It witnessed the final disappearance of that British interference which had started in the Carlist War. The fall of Isabella

II technically ended the Quadruple Alliance. This Alliance had in fact ceased to be a reality many years before, and with it went Britain's assumed right to admonish Spanish statesmen as though they were recalcitrant pupils. The end of Anglo-French rivalry and then of British attempts to further constitutional Government, enabled Spain to assume onee more the position of an independent nation prepared to work out her own salvation, free from foreign interference.

The nine and a half years from June 1859 to December 1868 embrace a transitional, and in many ways critical period, in the development from the policy of the forties to that of the seventies. It is impossible to state definitely at what stage the change actually took place. The face of Europe and indeed of the world, was changing rather faster than the conception of the older generation of British Statesmen, — Palmerston, Russell, and to a lesser extent Clarendon. There was a noticeable reluctance to abandon policies and methods which were in fact no longer suited to the age. Thus Spaniards were still warned of the dangers of French influence, and both Palmerston and Russell expressed fears of French designs upon the Peninsula in the sixties; though France had shown loyal co-operation in the previous decade, and was by this time more concerned with events in Northern and Central Europe than in Spain. In the Caribbean the same tendency can be traced. The British came to terms with the United States in 1850 when they

signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but nine difficult and dangerous years were to elapse before they bowed to the inevitable and withdrew from Central American politics. This decision was virtually forced upon Palmerston and he never abandoned the conception that British interests would be threatened by American expansion in the West Indies.

In the same way Palmerston and Russell retained their interest in the internal politics of Spain until 1864. In 1863 Russell was willing to give Miraflores his moral support, and in 1864 he made his last comment on Spanish politics. No actual, advice was offered by Britain after 1856, but Howden was ready to warn the Queen should he deem it necessaryin 1857. It is impossible to tell whether advice would have been forthcoming between 1857 and 1863 ~~since~~ had not the character of O'Donnell's Government made it unnecessary. That none was proffered in 1863-6, is however evidence of a definite change of British policy, This was probably due to rebuffs and diplomatic defeats elsewhere, and to the fact that the critical European situation was absorbing the attentions of British Statesmen. While Russell was at the Foreign Office his tone was never particularly courteous towards Spain, and Palmerston always retained the idea that Spaniard's should be grateful for British services in the Carlist War. There remained a tendency to regard Spain rather as a wayward child. By 1870 experience had shown the futility of giving advice to Spaniards, nevertheless the desire to use the old methods had not entirely

disappeared. Clarendon wished to send Howden to Madrid and regretted the inadequacy of Crampton as a medium for influencing Spanish affairs. Stanley, on the other hand, was a younger man, not trained in the Palmerston school. When he became Foreign Secretary the abandonment of the old methods was the result of conviction and not of enforced caution. It may, however, be stated that in spite of changes of method, it continued to be, as Russell had put it "a fundamental maxim of British policy to wish well to Spain and earnestly to desire her welfare and prosperity." [2]

2. Russell to Edwardes 14 May 1861 FO. 72/1001
A & P (1861) LXV. p. ~~256~~ 526

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