Anarchy, state, and utopia and the natural right of property

Abstract

In this thesis, the political philosophy of Robert Nozick as espoused in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is examined. Nozick's main conclusions are that the minimal state, whose functions are limited to such actions as the protection of its citizens against unjustified force, theft, fraud and the enforcement of contracts, is justified and no more extensive state can be justified. Nozick's defence of this position rests on two pillars. The first is the principle of the inviolability of the individual, which has its roots in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the second is the extensive natural right of property, which has its roots in Locke's Second Treatise of Government.In this thesis, Nozick's use of the principle of the inviolability of the individual is accepted and his use of the natural right of property is examined. Arguments in support of this natural right are evaluated in two categories. In the first category are those arguments in support of a natural right of property, which are based on human labour. These are discussed in chapter three which concentrates on arguments offered by Locke. In the second category are those arguments which attempt to deduce a natural right of property from the principle of the inviolability of the individual. These are discussed in chapter four. The conclusions of these examinations are that none of the arguments considered is successful in establishing a natural right of property and that these two approaches cannot provide successful arguments in support of a natural right of property. Furthermore, (most, if not all) other approaches to this problem, such as arugments from utility and arguments from liberty, are shown to be irrelevant to Nozick's position because they cannot establish natural rights. These arguments can at most justify property rights as a means to an end, and as such they would not be natural rights. Therefore, while it may be possible to justify some systemof private property rights, there is no justification for the claim that individuals have an extensive natural right of property.