Events

Abstract

That the theory of events has not recently contributed significantly to the problem of supervenience is due mainly to the literature being devoid of a genuine theory of events. Kim's theory is not accompanied by a method for its application independent of the expressions used to refer to events, and Davidson establishes events as spatio-temporal particulars without a theory abouttheir nature. The analysis of events is approached here in the context of the elucidation of supervenience. Conditions of adequacy reflecting prior metaphysical assumptions and the intended scope of the analysis are initially laid down and after consideration of the work of Kim and Davidson, some suggestions of Cresswell are taken up, and while criticized, provide nevertheless the basic impetus for the analysis presented. This theory constructionally defines events as functions from possible worlds to region of space-time, in which the event is manifested in the various worlds. Incorporated in this account is a theory of how events may coincide in value at certain worlds, and how a 'partitioning process' accompanies individual events by virtue of which the manifestation is considered as an element or elements in a particular place in the causal history of the world in question. Different sorts of partitioning processes, and complex causal histories serve to allow the possibility of emergentism, notwithstanding the same-place-same-thing principle being taken as a condition of adequacy. An analysis of statements ascribing properties to events completes the account, which is then tested against the established adequacy conditions. It is shown to satisfy these, along with ascribing the appropriate truth-value to the various examples of purported event-identity considered in the paper.