Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability

Marco Mariotti

(1998)

Marco Mariotti (1998) Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability.

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Abstract

Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994), I define a class of abstract games which are proved to be dominance-solvable. I show moreover that, in the lending subclass of coordination games, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome.

Information about this Version

This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 1998
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/1b319029-33fe-f565-bcce-02caae3a40a7/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
TitleEscalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability
AuthorsMariotti, Marco
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by () on 25-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 25-Oct-2012

Notes

Copyright Marco Mariotti.

References

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