Dispositions and anti-realism

Abstract

This thesis aims at showing that the anti-realist conception of meaning and truth is fundamentally misconceived. There is a greater emphasis on the negative aspects of anti-realism than on positive arguments for rival accounts, and the main thrust of the negative argumentation is to draw unacceptable consequences of anti-realist theory. What unifies a rather hybrid thesis is a sustained attack on the anti-realist treatment of dispositions. Many of the points made in the thesis cannot be claimed to be original; phenomenalism and behaviourism have already been heavily criticised for instance, what is to be hoped is that a wider scope is given to many of these points by showing how they form an attack on views whose raison d'etre is a particular analysis of truth and meaning.Argument rather than deep analysis is conspicuous: given the limitations of space, I hope this is justifiable in the interests of polemic. Chapter 1, is partly take up by a brief account of some of the ways in which the anti-realist theory of truth and meaning has played a significant part. The rest of the chapter introduces an anti-realist treatment of dispositions - that of Dummett's logical behaviourism - and obvious objections are raised. Operationalism is argued to be a peculiarly lucid species of anti-realism, and for this reason its account of dispositional terms is studied in detail. Particular attentionis paid to Carnap's reduction sentences in order to show the impossibility of specifying observational conditions for predication of such terms. This leads on to a more general weakness of anti-realism; its inability to give a satisfactory account of the role of theory. Chapter 4 is devoted solely to a discussion of the Law of Excluded Middle, rejection of which is a startling feature of the anti-realist thesis. It is contended there that, on similar grounds, the anti-realist cannot accept the Principle of Non-Contradiction*We return to dispositions in Chapter 5, emphasising the weaknesses of anti-realist accounts of dispositions and attempting to show the requirement of a categorical basis for a disposition. Here again, the emphasis is chiefly on pointing to the defects of antii-realist accounts. The last chapter aims to sketch what is fundamentally at fault with anti-realism: its mischaracterisation of what it is for words and sentences to have sense. The examples of behaviourism and phenomenalism are employed here for their help in clarifying the issues.