Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A New Rationale for Consistency

Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann

(2002)

Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann (2002) Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A New Rationale for Consistency.

Our Full Text Deposits

Full text access: Open

dpe0202.pdf - 146.51 KB

Abstract

Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations Þrms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, Þrms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines Þtness in the evolutionary game. We show that the unique conjectures which are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate rivals' behavior correctly.

Information about this Version

This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 2002
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/467cb28a-a3d8-4fb0-031c-36c41db2dadb/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
TitleConjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A New Rationale for Consistency
AuthorsMuller, Wieland
Normann, Hans-Theo
Uncontrolled Keywordsconsistent conjectures, Cournot duopoly, evolutionary stability, indirect evoluntionary approach.
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 02-Nov-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 02-Nov-2012

Notes

©2002 Hans-Theo Normann, Jonathan Wadsworth. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.

References

Details