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HISTORICAL COMMENTARY

ON

PLUTARCH'S LIFE OF BRUTUS

The commentary attempts to gain a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the events and personalities included in the Life of Brutus or forming part of the historical background of the biography. Since Plutarch is biographer and moralist first and only then an historian, his narrative is checked and complemented from a comparison of other sources, in order to outline Brutus' part in the final struggle of the Roman Republic.

Some modern questions and discussions on points raised by this survey are included also. Plutarch's portrayal of Brutus - since, again, he is prepared to sacrifice strict accuracy to his general moral purpose - is briefly considered in relation to other evidence, especially the contemporary evidence of Cicero, which affords a comparison and modifies the idealistic presentation of Plutarch's Life.

c. 1. The ancestors of Brutus.

Cicero: Brutus 97, 331. Tusc. IV 1, 2. Phil. I 6, 13. II 11, 26. IV 3, 7. X 6, 14. Orat. II 55, 224 - 56, 227. Att. XIII 40, 1. XVI 5.

Appian: II 112, 469. Dio 44, 12, 1-3. 47, 45, 4.

Nicolaus: (Vita Caes.) 19. 26.

Livy: I 56-60. II 1-6. IV 14 f. Dionysius of Halicarnassus IV 67 ff. V 18. VI 70, 1.

Valerius Maximus: II 9, 2. IV 4, 1. V 5, 1. 8, 1. VI 4. Ext. 1. VII 3, 2. VIII 14, 6. 2. IX 1, 3.

Silius Italicus: Punica VII 643-660. VIII 607 f. IX 415.

Pauly - Wissowa X 961 ff. Suppl. V 355 ff.

Grueber - CRRBM I pp. 477-480.

Sydenham: Roman Republican Coinage p. 150.

The Life begins conventionally with some account of Brutus' family. This chapter deals with the two most famous of the reputed ancestors of Brutus: Lucius Junius Brutus, in popular belief the expeller of the kings and first consul, and Servilius Ahala who assassinated Spurius Maelius in 439 B.C., on suspicion of aiming at monarch (see Dion. Hal. IV 67 f., Livy I 56 - II 6. IV 14 f.).

The association of the Servilian and Junian families with these early Liberators was general in antiquity. According to Plutarch (1, 6), no-one doubted Brutus' descent from Ahala

through his mother Servilia, but objections were raised especially by enemies to his claim to be a descendant of the first consul; and with reason. Even if L. Brutus is an historical figure, there is no possibility that the later Junii Bruti were connected with him. His line was believed to have died out with the two sons whom he executed (Dion. Hal. V 18. Val. Max. V 7, 1). Posidonius, who defended the claim (1, 7), seems to have originated the theory that L. Brutus had a third son. There is no trace of his existence in traditional accounts of the early Republic.

The family apparently disregarded the chief objection to their claim - that the first consul must have been a patrician, while the historical Junii are plebeians (Dion. Hal. V 18). Accounts of them before the fourth century are unreliable. They did not attain nobility until the consulship was thrown open to the plebeians. Thereafter they are found holding the chief offices of the Republic (see Livy VIII 12, 13. 29, 2. IX 21, 1. 28, 2. - cf. Val. Max. II 9, 2. VIII 14, 6. IX 1, 3. Livy Per. 16. Sil. It. VII 607 f. IX 415); for their plebeian origin see Livy 34, 45, 3 - the tribune of 195 B.C.

The origin of the connection with the first consul is unknown, but was well-established by the mid-second century when the poet Accius produced his praetexta "Brutus" in honour of his patron, Dec. Junius Brutus Callaicus, cos. 138 B.C. (see

Cic. Brut. 28, 107. de leg. II 54. pro Arch. 27. Varro de C.L. 5, 80). Dionysius (VI 70, 1) invents an early plebeian L. Junius who tried to assume to cognomen Brutus and who is later numbered among the first tribunes (cf. Plut. Coriol. 7, 1). He is almost certainly a fictitious counterpart of the first consul (see PW X 968).

Schur (PW Suppl. V 366-8) reaches the conclusion that L. Brutus himself is a figure of legend. He is not the sole example of a patrician, famous in the traditions of the early Republic, who is represented in later times only by a plebeian family bearing the same name (note the Cassii, Sempronii, Volumnii, etc.). Possibly, ennobled plebeians fabricated patrician ancestors for themselves without troubling to reconcile the discrepancy.

However it developed, the connection was commonly accepted in the time of Marcus Brutus. Cicero frequently referred to it (e.g. Brut. 97, 331. Tusc. IV 12. Att. XIII 40, 1. Phil. I 6, 13. IV 3, 7. X 6, 14), stressing the association of Brutus' name and family with liberation from tyranny.

In 44 B.C. it was fully exploited by Republicans in order to prepare the ground for, and after, popularize, the assassination of Caesar (see below 9, 6 f.). To accomplish it under the name of Brutus was all but a guarantee of good faith. In the struggle following Caesar's death, Cicero helped to propagate this view (see Phil. IV 3, 7. I 6, 13). In the

Tenth Philippic he urged it, to overcome the apprehension of certain senators concerning Brutus' intentions in occupying Macedonia (X 6, 14).

In the same way, Brutus, hoping to win the people with his Games in July 44, intended to revive the "Brutus" of Accius (Att. XVI 5).

Brutus himself clearly believed (or wished to believe) in his descent and took pride in it. 'Imagines' of L. Brutus and Ahala were to be seen in his house among his ancestors (Phil. II 11, 26), and he induced Atticus to draw up his genealogy, tracing his line back to the two heroes (Nepos Att. 18, 3. Cic. Att. XIII 40, 1). His natural interest was increased by his sympathy with the strong Republican views of his supposed ancestors. At the beginning of his career he turned to this tradition and as triumvir monetalis 60/59 B.C. issued coins bearing portraits of his ancestors and "Libertas" (see Grueber I pp. 478-80. Sydenham p. 150). In addition to the family pride displayed here, there may have been some intention of advertising his political stand on entering public life. At that time, too, when the first triumvirate was forming, the reminder of former champions of liberty was significant. Brutus was not alone in recalling them. Vettius tried to implicate Cicero in his "plot" (see below) by quoting a remark of his: "Ahalam Servilium aliquem aut Brutum opus esse reperiri" (Att. II 24, 3).

Later writers, aware of Brutus' keen interest in his family history, believed it was one of the chief motives for his part in the conspiracy against Caesar (Dio 44, 12-13. App. II 112, 469). In this connection, L. Brutus was more important to him than the Servilian line. Ahala is never mentioned except in conjunction with Brutus.

It is significant, too, that Brutus continued to be known by his father's name after his adoption and even in his official title the name of Brutus was retained (see Phil. X 11, 25-26. Dio 41, 63, 6). And this, although in the first century B.C. the Servilii were more prominent than the Junii Bruti, who in the preceding generation had produced several lawyers and minor Populares, no important figures (see Cic. Brut. 47, 175. 34, 130. de Orat. II 55-56. Livy Per. 88. App. I 60, 271). Apart from distant Junian ancestors, the Servilii played a greater part in Brutus' life. After his father's early death in 77 B.C., he was drawn closer to his mother's family and eventually adopted by his maternal uncle (see below p.31). The personal influence of his Mother, Servilia, may be seen in this. From Cicero's letters it is clear that she was always active in his affairs, both public and private (see Att. XIII 16, 17, 22. XV 11. ad Brut. I 18). 2, 1. More important was the influence of her half-brother, Cato (cf. Cato Min. 1, 1). His attachment to her (see Asconius in Scaur. 17 "apud Catonem maternam obtinebat

auctoritatem") and the death of the elder Brutus perhaps first led him to take particular interest in his nephew.

Plutarch introduces Cato here, where some account of Brutus' father might have been expected. (The latter is not mentioned until c. 4, 1 and then very briefly). He notes Brutus' admiration for his uncle and his imitation of him. Certainly his political and philosophic views display the effect of his association from youth with the uncompromising Republican and Stoic - though he was never, like Favonius, a blind imitator. Cato's opinions were modified in him, at once less extreme and less steadfast.

A slight indication of his opinion of his uncle is found in Cicero. In his "laudatio" of Cato he gave credit to his part in the Catilinarian debate in 63 B.C., at Cicero's expense (Att. XII 21, 1. cf. PW X 984); in the "Brutus", Cicero allows him one comment on Cato - "in quo perfectissimo Stoico summam eloquentiam non desiderem" (31, 118).

It was his relation to Cato more than the legendary connection with the first consul that influenced surviving Republicans in 44 B.C. and led them to look to him as a possible leader.

c.2, 2f. Brutus as philosopher and man of letters.

Cicero: Brutus, Orator, Academica, de finibus. Tusc. V 10.13. ad Atticum XII 5B. XIII 8.

Tacitus: dial. de orat. 18, 21, 25.

Quintilian: Instit. Orat. III 6, 93. IX 3, 95. X 1, 123. 7, 27. XII 10, 11. 1, 22.

Seneca: Dial. XII - Cons. ad Helv. 9. Ep. Mor. 95, 45.

Pliny: Ep. V 3, 5. Aurelius Victor: de vir. ill. 82, 2.

Statius: Silvae IV 9, 20-23.

Hercher: Epistolographi Graeci pp. 177-191.

Keil: Grammatici Latini I pp. 130. 367. 383. 388.

Teuffel: History of Roman Literature (Eng. trans.) I 209.

E. Filbey: Concerning the Oratory of Brutus (C.P. VI 1911 pp. 325 ff.)

R.E. Smith: The Greek Letters of M. Junius Brutus (C.Q. XXX 1936 pp. 134 ff.)

G. Boissier: Cicéron et ses amis pp. 343-345.

This aspect of Brutus attracted Plutarch above all and is the dominant feature of the character he portrays. It appears in the preliminary sketch in c.1, 3-5 - οὗτοσὶ δ'ὃπερ οὖ γράφεται ταῦτα παιδείᾳ καὶ λόγῳ δὲ φιλοσοφίας κατακμείξας τὸ ἦθος ...

There is no doubt of its importance. Brutus was always more of a philosopher and student than a man of action and in this lay one of the chief causes of his failure in

politics. His birth and training led him to embark on a career that, in other circumstances, he might not have chosen. Throughout his public life he betrayed his preference for study. He never failed to find time to devote to it, no matter what other affairs were on hand. Cicero bears witness to this: "in maximis occupationibus nunquam intermittis studia doctrinae, semper aut ipse scribis aut me vocas ad scribendum" (Orator 10, 34). Quintilian, too, probably with this passage in mind, holds him up as a model of industry for the student: "neque enim fere tam est ullus dies occupatus ut nihil lucrativae, ut Cicero Brutum facere tradit, operae ad scribendum aut legendum aut dicendem rapi aliquo momento temporis possit" (X 7, 27). Cicero again, in the "Brutus", comments on his "singularis industria" (6, 22); c.f. "contine te in tuis perennibus studiis" (97, 332).

Plutarch (below 4, 8) tells how he occupied his leisure time in Pompey's camp "περὶ λόγους καὶ βιβλία", and was engaged on an epitome of Polybius just before Pharsalia. During his stay at Athens in the autumn of 44 B.C. (c. 24, 1-2) he attended the lectures of Theomnestus and Cratippus while negotiating with the governors of the neighbouring provinces. Appian gives a similar picture of him during the campaigns of 43-42 B.C.: ὁ δὲ Βροῦτος ὅπῃ γίγνοιτο καὶ φιλοθεάμων ἦν καὶ φιλήκοος, ὅτε καὶ φιλοσοφήσας οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (IV 133, 561).

Cicero ascribes to him a love of study for its own sake.

In the "Brutus", he replies to Cicero, who has been deploring the loss of free speech in the Forum: "Ceterarum rerum causa ... istuc et doleo et dolendum puto; dicendi autem me non tam fructus et gloria quam studium ipsum exercitatioque delectat" (6, 23). This unpractical attitude is exemplified in the style of speaking that he cultivated.

In philosophy, Brutus, though influenced by Cato, did not follow him strictly. Plutarch's statements on his attachment to Plato and the Old Academy, his admiration for Antiochus of Ascalon, and his acquaintance with Aristus are well supported by Cicero - see Acad. I 3, 12: "Brutus quidem noster ... Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu cuius tu (Varro) fratrem Antiochum" (cf. Brut. 97, 332)
de fin. V 3, 8: "... cuius oratio attende, quaeso, Brute, satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris maxime probatam existimo"
Brut. 40, 149 "vestra, Brute, vetus Academia ...".
Brutus, that is, followed Antiochus in rejecting the scepticism of the Middle and New Academy, which Cicero defended.

Antiochus had insisted on the essential agreement, at least in ethics, between Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics, who all derived ultimately from Plato. In Cicero's "Academica" his doctrines are expounded by his friend Lucullus: "(Plato) reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos

nominibus differentes, re congruentes, a quibus Stoici ipsé verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt" (II 5,15). Elsewhere, Cicero confirms Antiochus' (and Brutus') approval, in particular, of Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus and Polemo (Tusc. V 10, 30. 13, 39. de leg. I 38. Acad. II 42, 131. 45, 137). The close connection between Academic and Stoic ideas is emphasized see de leg. I 53 "de re una solum dissident, de ceteris mirifice congruunt". Again, Antiochus, "qui appellabatur Academicus", is said to have been "- si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus" (Acad. II 43, 132).

Through this affinity of ideas and his association with Cato, Brutus had much of the Stoic in him. Antiochus, however, differed from the Stoics in his conception of the wise man; he taught that physical excellence and external goods could contribute to happiness - c.f. Acad. II 43, 134: "Zeno in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat; quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit, beatam sed non beatissimam". Yet he seems to have favoured the Stoic view on the question of the emotions, though the Academics in general maintained a different opinion, see Acad. II 44, 135: "Sed quaero quando ista fuerint ab Academia vetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent? ... illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas ...".

The distinguishing characteristic of the Old Academy was

its insistence on moderation: "Omnis virtus sit, ut vestra, Brute, vetus Academia dixit, mediocritas" (Brut. 40, 149). And again, "Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum" (Acad. II 44, 135). This doctrine, above all, appealed to Brutus and he practised it not only in philosophy but in his political life also.

Of his own philosophic works only a few quotations and brief references survive. Cicero extravagantly praises his work: "Brutus quidem noster ... sic philosophiam Latinis litteris persequitur nihil ut isdem de rebus Graeca desideres" (Acad. I 3, 12). The flattering comparison with the Greeks is repeated in "de finibus" (I 3, 8): "te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia ...".

Brutus' chief contribution seems to have been his treatise "de virtute", written in the form of a letter to Cicero in the summer of 47 B.C., see de fin. i 3,8 "gratissimo mihi libro quem ad me de virtute misisti". It is identified with the letter mentioned in the "Brutus" ("epistulam quam ad te Brutus misit ex Asia" (3, 11)) which, Cicero says, first roused him from his despondency (3, 12) and which prompted him to repay the debt with his "Brutus".

The treatise was written after Brutus' visit to M. Claudius Marcellus in his exile at Mytilene (Brut. 71, 250). Seneca quotes his account of the visit and its effect on him: "Brutus, in eo libro quem de virtute composuit, ait se Marcellum vidisse

Mytilenis exulantem ... Itaque adicit, visum sibi se magis in exilium ire qui sine illo rediturus esset quam illum in exilio relinqui ... Idem ait Brutus C. Caesarem Mytilenas praetervectum quia non sustineret videre deformatum virum" (Cons. ad Helv. 9, 4-8).

Cicero, towards the end of the "Brutus" returns to this "letter" and quotes a passage which, like Seneca's fragment, bears closely on the political situation: "tuis suavissimis litteris, quibus me forti animo esse oportere censebas, quod ea gessissem quae de me etiam me tacente ipsa loquerentur mortuo viverentque; quae si recte esset, salute rei publicae, sin secus, interitu ipso testimonium meorum de re publica consiliorum darent" (Brut. 96, 330).

The book was evidently intended to reconcile Cicero to the victory of Caesar and the loss of freedom in public life. Boissier (op. cit. p. 344) summarizes: "la morale du livre était que pour vivre heureux on n'a besoin que de soi". This recalls Brutus' letter to Cicero in 43 B.C.: "... longe a servientibus abero mihique esse iudicabo Romam ubicumque liberum esse licebit ... Quid enim est melius quam memoria recte factorum et libertate contentum neglegere humana?" (ad Brut. I 16, 8-9).

Here, too, Brutus shows that he could consider the possibility of a life spent apart from Rome and public affairs, that he was not as strongly attached to the city itself as Cicero

was. Boissier (p. 344) points out that this aloofness and detachment, which Brutus cultivated, may command respect in a philosoper but is not the best attitude for a statesman and party leader to adopt. Brutus, indeed, was not fitted to be such a leader, especially in the age in which he lived. The character of the idealist and doctrinaire is revealed in his actions repeatedly, often in conflict with the needs of a particular situation. Of such men Boissier observed "Ils peuvent être des sages; ils font de mauvais chefs de partis" (p. 345).

The titles of two other treatises have been preserved. Seneca briefly describes one: "M. Brutus, in eo libro quem περὶ καθήκοντος inscripsit, dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus" (Ep. Mor. 95, 45).

The third title is found in the grammarian Diomedes (G.L. I p. 383, 8 K) "apud veteres ridunt reperimus dictum, ut M. Brutus de patientia 'inridunt horum lacrimas' ".

Later critics rated Brutus higher as a philosopher than as an orator, see Tac. Dial. 21 "Brutus philosophiae suae relinquamus; nam in orationibus minorem esse fama sua etiam admiratores eius fatentur". Quintilian, too, (X 1, 123) places him among the philosophers and considers his philosophic works more successful than his speeches.

Plutarch, with his greater interest in this aspect of Brutus, briefly dismisses his ability as writer and speaker in

Latin (2, 5: Ῥωμαϊστὶ μὲν οὖν ἤσκητο πρὸς τὰς <δε>ξέους καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐκανῶς ὁ Βροῦτος ...)

Cicero provides evidence of his training and early career as an orator. He studied at Athens under the rhetorician Pammenes (Brut. 97, 332) and was beginning to speak in the courts at Rome when his career was cut short by the Civil War and subsequent loss of free speech in the forum (ib. 6, 22): "Cum enim in maximis causis versatus esses ... subito in civitate cum alia ceciderunt tum etiam ... eloquentia obmutuit".

He is said to have taken part in several cases with both Cicero and Hortensius (ib. 51, 190. 94, 324), but only one in which he spoke at Rome is known. At the trial of his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, on a charge of 'maiestas' in 50 B.C., Brutus appeared for the defence with Pompey and Hortensius (ib. 94, 324 and F. III 11, 3). His 'laudatio' of Appius is also mentioned by Diomedes (G.L. I 367, 26 K) "ut Brutus laudatione Appii Claudii 'qui te toga praetexta amicuit'".

Brutus composed and published a defence of Milo, 'exercitationis gratia' (Quint. X 1, 23. 5, 20. III 6, 93. Ascon. in Milon. 36). Both Asconius and Quintilian note Brutus' line of argument in this, since it differed from Cicero's. He did not attempt to exonerate Milo, but claimed that the death of Clodius was a benefit to the state: see Ascon. 36, 11 "interfici Clodium pro re p. fuisse - quam formam M. Brutus secutus est". c.f. Quint. III 6, 93

"ideoque pro Milone aliud Ciceroni agenti placuit, aliud Bruto ... ille etiam gloriatus sit occiso male cive".

The speech Brutus delivered before Caesar in 47 B.C. on behalf of Deiotarus (below 6, 6. Cic. Brut. 5, 21. Att. XIV 1, 2) also survived and was known to Tacitus (Dial. 21).

In his style of speaking Brutus joined the reaction against Cicero and became one of the self-styled Atticists, who professed to model themselves on the Attic orators ("Atticorum similes esse volumus" Brut. 83, 286-7). They cultivated greater simplicity and severity in thought and diction, avoiding rhetorical ornament and emotional appeal (see Brut. 84, 289: "Quare si anguste et exiliter dicere est Atticorum, sint sane Attici").

Brutus and his contemporary C. Licinius Calvus were prominent in this group which, inevitably, met with opposition from Cicero. He condemned them for poverty of thought and dryness of expression and for the mistaken view that the most concise and severe style represented true Atticism, see Orator 9, 28 "Putant enim qui horride inculteque dicat, modo id eleganter enucleateque faciat, eum solum Attice dicere". c.f. Brut. 82, 285: "... ieiunitatem et siccitatem et inopiam, dum modo sit polita, dum urbana, dum elegans, in Attico genere ponit ... 'Atticos, inquit, volo imitari.' Quos? nec enim est unum genus ...".

They retorted by accusing Cicero of verbosity and

diffuseness. Tacitus (Dial. 18 & 25) and Quintilian (XII 1, 22) refer to the controversy between Cicero and the leading Atticists, his 'obtrectatores', "quibus inflatus et tumens ... et parum Atticus videretur". (Dial. 18) It was carried on in letters, evidently known to Tacitus and Quintilian. Here, Cicero's real judgment of Brutus appears, shorn of compliment - see Dial. 18: "Legistis utique et Calvi et Bruti ad Ciceronem missas epistulas, ex quibus facile est deprehendere Calvum quidem Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum atque diiunctum; rursusque Ciceronem a Calvo quidem male audisse tamquam solutum et enervem, a Bruto autem, ut ipsius verbis utar, tamquam fractum atque elumbem". The use of the unusual word 'elumbis' in the metaphorical sense, of style, with the meaning 'enervated' has no parallel elsewhere; it provides another example of that inclination towards the abstruse in Brutus.

Quintilian (XII 1, 22) notes that Cicero was not wholly approved by Brutus and Calvus, "qui certe compositionem illius etiam apud ipsum reprehendunt".

Of all those who took part in the controversy, Tacitus finds Brutus alone in his manner of conducting it - see Dial. 25: "Nam quod invicem se obtrectaverunt et sunt aliqua epistulis eorum inserta ex quibus mutua malignitas detegitur, non est oratorum vitium sed hominum ... solum inter hos arbitror Brutum non malignitate nec invidia sed simpliciter et

ingenue iudicium animi sui detexisse". Even here, then, he practised "mediocritas". Yet Tacitus' description contrasts with Cicero's complaint of the haughty tone of Brutus' letters to him ("contumaciter, adroganter ... solet scribere" Att. VI 1, 7. c.f. 3, 7). Possibly Tacitus judged differently or was less sensitive to inconsiderate frankness - c.f. Dio's comment on Cicero (46, 29, 1): αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀκράτῳ καὶ κατακορεῖ τῇ παρρησίᾳ ἀεὶ πρὸς πάντας ὁμοίως ἐχρῆτο, πολλὰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἠξίου τὴν ὁμοίαν ἀντελαμβάνεσθαι.

In criticising the Attici in the "Orator" and "Brutus" Cicero never plainly acknowledges that Brutus, whom he wished to convert to his own style of oratory, was one of them. On the contrary, in the "Brutus" he fails to give a true representation of Brutus' views; perhaps he is intending to give a picture of his ideal Brutus and at the same time enabling himself to attack the Atticists without openly criticising the real Brutus. Thus, for instance, Brutus, in the dialogue, expresses pleasure at Cicero's digression to demonstrate the Atticists' faults (85, 292. "mihi ... fuit periucunda") and throughout he is made to agree with Cicero. He calls the Stoic orators "ad dicendum inopes" (31, 118) - but is allowed to exclude his uncle Cato - and later asks if restraint (sanitas) is not a defect, for the orator must inflame his audience (80, 279); he extols Marcellus (71, 249-250) and,

therefore, Cicero ("tui similem in dicendo")
(see Filbey C.P. VI pp. 325 ff.).

But in the final passage of the "Orator", Cicero hints at their differences, see 71, 237: "Habes meum de oratore, Brute, iudicium; quod aut sequere, si probaveris, aut tuo stabis, si aliud quoddam est tuum". The truth emerges in a letter to Atticus: "Quin etiam cum ipsius precibus (c.f. Or. 71, 238) paene adductus scripsissem ad eum de optimo genere dicendi, non modo mihi sed etiam tibi scripsit sibi illud quod mihi placeret non probari" (Att. XIV 20, 3).

The clash of opinion is characteristic of their troubled friendship, inevitable in the encounter of two such different personalities. The same style could not please both. For that reason Cicero refused to correct the speech Brutus delivered after the assassination and later published, see Att. XV 1a, 2. "Itaque eam corrigere non potui. Quo enim in genere Brutus noster esse vult et quod iudicium habet de optimo genere dicendi, id ita consecutus in ea oratione est, ut elegantius nihil possit; sed ego secutus aliud sum sive hoc recte sive non recte."

The style cultivated by the Attici exactly suited Brutus, but he strove too laboriously to acquire it and, lacking natural eloquence, he displayed chiefly the defects to which it was prone; it was apt to become too plain, meagre and spiritless in aiming at simplicity and dignified restraint.

Cicero's criticism of Calvus might justly be applied to Brutus: Brut. 82, 283: "accuratius quoddam dicendi et exquisitius afferebat genus; quod quamquam scienter eleganterque tractabat, nimium tamen inquirens in se atque ipse sese observans metuensque ne vitiosum colligeret etiam verum sanguinem deperdebat".

In describing the speech he had refused to correct, Cicero characterizes Brutus' style, and points to the vital deficiency which all his study and practice could not supply, see Att. XV, 1. "est enim oratio scripta elegantissime sententiis, verbis, ut nihil possit ultra; ego tamen, si illam causam habuissem, scripsissem ardentius."

His speeches in general, too carefully avoiding rhetorical flourishes, were evidently cold, dull and monotonous, see Cic. Or. 31, 110: "tu autem eodem modo omnis causas ages? ... aut in isdem causis perpetuum et eundem spiritum sine ulla commutatione obtinebis?"

Later critics, too, found him uninspiring as an orator (see Tac. Dial. 21; Quint. X 1, 123). Tacitus dismisses the speech "pro rege Deiotaro" - "ceterosque eiusdem lenitudinis ac teporis libros". Statius (Silvae IV 9, 20-23) criticizes the taste of a friend who gave a copy of Brutus' works as a present ("Bruti senis oscitationes"). However admirable Brutus' oratory might appear to a fellow-student of the art, it was not of a kind to appeal to a wide audience, and so

failed of its primary object. Cicero's observations on Calvus again are probably true of Brutus, see Brut. 82, 283: "itaque eius oratio nimia religione attenuata doctis et attente audientibus erat inlustris, a multitudine autem et a foro, cui nata eloquentia est, devorabatur." According to Cicero, all the Atticists were unpopular (ib. 84, 289): "At cum isti Attici dicunt non modo a corona ... sed etiam ab advocatis relinquuntur ... subsellia grandiorem et pleniorem vocem desiderant."

Brutus seems to have experienced this reaction in his audience - see Brut. 51, 192: "Ego vero, inquit ille, ut me tibi indicem, in eis etiam causis in quibus omnis res nobis cum iudicibus est, non cum populo, tamen si a corona relictus sim, non queam dicere." The dependence on the crowd, suggested here, is surprising in Brutus, who despised and avoided the type of oratory most likely to appeal to the general listener.

Possibly this, too, is merely part of the Ciceronian picture of him; yet there is no obvious reason for misrepresentation here.

In spite of his defects, Brutus displayed some impressive qualities. Quintilian (XII 10, 11) names "gravitas" as his distinguishing characteristic and comments on the impression of earnestness and sincerity gained from his works: "Brutus suffecit pondere rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit" (X 1,123).

Tacitus picks out the same trait (Dial. 25 "... gravior Brutus"). Caesar himself, hearing Brutus speak, was struck by his vehemence (see below 6, 7 and Cic. Att. XIV 1,2 "... quicquid vult, valde vult"). The same speech Tacitus later stigmatized as cold and dull (Dial. 21), but he found more vigour in other speeches, see Ann. IV 34 "Bruti contiones falsa quidem in Augustum probra, sed multa cum acerbitate habent."

Other written works of Brutus include a political pamphlet 'de dictatura Pompei', published in 52 B.C., of which Quintilian has preserved a fragment, expressing Brutus' attitude to autocracy, see IX 3, 95: "Praestat enim nemini imperare quam alicui servire; sine illo enim vivere honeste licet, cum hoc vivendi nulla condicio est." Seneca (Contr. X 1, 30, 8) quotes his direct attack on Pompey, "cum quidem eius civili sanguine non inquinatas solum manus sed infectas ait".

His eulogy of Cato appeared early in the year 45 and seems to have displayed his usual faults of style. Atticus was not satisfied with it (Att. XII 21, 1 "... ea quae requisieras") and Cicero repeats Caesar's verdict: "Bruti Catone lecto, se sibi visum disertum" (Att. XIII 46, 2).

In addition to his work on Polybius, written in 48 B.C. (see c.4, 8), Brutus made epitomes of the annals of Fannius and Caelius (Att. XII 5a XIII 8 Teuffel 209, 3). He also produced some verses - probably youthful attempts. Tacitus thinks

little of them and classes them with the verses of Caesar and Cicero, see Dial. 21 "Fecerunt enim et carmina et in bibliothecas rettulerunt, non melius quam Cicero sed felicius quia illos fecisse pauciores sciunt." Pliny (Ep. V 3, 5) excuses his own attempts at verse by citing famous men who shared this weakness, his list including Brutus.
c.2, 5-8. Plutarch, passing over Brutus' work in Latin, of which he was no critic, discusses only his Greek style as exemplified in his letters to the Asian communities in 42 B.C. He gives some examples of the epigrammatic, laconic brevity which characterized this style. It was akin to the deliberate austerity of his Latin, but seems to have been more exaggerated. The quotations correspond to nos. 1 (p.178), 69, (p.191) and 25 (p.182) of the collection of Greek letters attributed to Brutus (Epist. Graec. pp. 171-191), except in one particular. The letter to the Samians (c.2, 7) is addressed to the Lycians in Hercher.

The existing letters are full of difficulties and are probably not a completely genuine collection (see below on cc. 30-33; and Smith C.Q. XXX pp. 134 ff.). This passage in Plutarch certainly provides external evidence in their favour; his quotations may be authentic examples of Brutus' style. The letters as we have them are all brief, some consisting of a single line (e.g. no. 33). They rather resemble hasty notes, except in some instances where rhetorical antithesis is

consciously used (e.g. no. 11, pp. 179-80); and here it seems too elaborate for the particular occasion. It may be that these were the embellishments of later rhetoricians, using the original letters as a basis. The replies are admittedly the work of the editor Mithridates (pp. 177-8). And in the case of no. 11 in Hercher, the letter is suspect in itself since it contradicts all the sources. For Brutus' distinctive style we have only Plutarch's evidence. Mithridates indeed mentions it (ἑνὸς ... χαρακτῆρος) but he also admits that the original letters may have been written by secretaries (εἴτε ἰδίας εἴτε τινὸς τῶν εἰς τοῦτο μισθοῦ δοκίμων), in which case they could not be taken as evidence of Brutus' style. Farther, in c.53, 7 (below) Plutarch suggests that forged letters of Brutus were already known in his day (A.H.Smith, p. 203).

Other letters of Brutus, which have not survived, are mentioned by Charisius and Diomedes (G.L. 130, 15. 388, 7 K), including one addressed to Caesar.

c.3 Cyprus.

Plutarch: Cato Minor 34-39

Dio. 38, 30, 5. 39, 22, 1-4

Vell. II 45, 4-5

Livy Per 104

Cicero: de domo sua 20, 52. 25, 65
Att. V 21. VI 1-3

de vir. ill. 80, 2. 82, 4.

Val. Max. VIII 15, 10.

S.T. Oost: Cato Uticensis and the annexation of Cyprus (C.P. L 1955 pp. 98 ff.)

Gelzer P.W X 1006

Boissier: Cicéron et ses amis pp. 330-336

Tyrrell and Purser III Intro. XXV-XXXII VI Intro. xcvii ff.

Meyer: Caesar's Monarchie p. 455.

The mission to Cyprus (58-56 B.C) on which Brutus accompanied Cato is the only event of his early career given in any detail by Plutarch.

The annexation of Cyprus was proposed and passed in the assembly by Clodius early in 58, and by a separate measure, Cato was appointed to undertake it as 'quaestor cum iure praetorio' (Vell. II 45, 4). The object of the appointment was to remove Cato from Rome for a time 'per honorem turpissimum' (de domo 25, 65) and to lengthen his task, the

restoration of certain Byzantine exiles was included in the decree (de domo 20, 52. Plut. Cato Min. 34, 5).

Cato despatched this business first, sending Canidius on to Cyprus. When he became suspicious of his representative, he directed Brutus to act for him until he should arrive himself (3, 2).

In Cyprus, the younger Ptolemy committed suicide on being deprived of his kingdom. All his personal possessions were appropriated and sold for the benefit of the Roman treasury (c.f. Livy Per 104). In this, Brutus was his uncle's assistant and returned with him to Rome in 56, conveying the royal treasure. Both Senate and people are said to have come down to the Tiber to welcome Cato on his return, in admiration of his integrity (Plut. Cat. Min. 39. Vell. II 45, 5. Val. Max. VIII 15, 10).

S.T. Oost, however, has recently pointed out some difficulties in the pro- Cato accounts, not least (one that Plutarch, Cato 38, reveals by elaborate explanation) the loss of both copies of his accounts on the journey home. Ptolemy's household officers testified to his honest administration but, the written record being lost, it could not be proved - or questioned. This raises "a suspicion of illegality": Oost agrees that it can be no more, but he is inclined to think that if Cato himself was unimpeachable he may have been willing to overlook the misconduct of friends or relatives. Clearly, he suspects that Cato may have been protecting Brutus.

The suspicion cannot be confirmed from reports of Brutus in other public affairs. He was not associated with the misgovernment of Appius Claudius in Cilicia, 53-52 B.C. (de vir. ill. 82, 4) and in Cisalpine Gaul he continued to be honoured as a benefactor long after his death (see c. 58).

Private financial transactions were a different matter; it would appear that he drew a clear distinction between private and state business. For in the sample of his affairs found in Cicero's letters (Att. V 21. VI 1-3), an aspect of his life overlooked by Plutarch is revealed.

In his dealings with Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia and still more with the town of Salamis in Cyprus, Brutus showed that he was imbued with the ideas of the Roman aristocracy and shared its irresponsibility towards the provinces. Cicero was surprised and disappointed in him (Att. V. 21, 13. VI 1, 6). He was particularly shocked by the circumstances of the Salaminian loan; the discreditable agents employed, the high rate of interest charged, the harsh measure taken to recover the debt - including the besieging of the town council with a troop of horse, which resulted in the death of several members (Att. VI 1, 6. 2, 8). Cicero during his proconsulship in Cilicia in 51 was expected to show himself accommodating in this affair. He was reluctant to offend Brutus so early in their acquaintance, but could not in conscience accede to his requests (c.f. VI 2,7 "fieri non poterat nec si posset ego pati possem") and he was

further annoyed by the tone of Brutus' letters, see VI 1, 7 "ad me ... contumaciter, adroganter, ἀκοινονοήτως solet scribere" c.f. VI 3, 7. Yet, after all, when Atticus upheld Brutus, he would not assert his own judgment. The Salaminian case was left open, to be decided by his successor, and the sequel is unknown.

The influence of contemporary society and its practices can be seen at work here. Brutus showed a complete lack of regard for the Cyprians and was not above circumventing the law in his private interests: he secured two decrees to exempt his agents from the provisions of the lex Gabinia on usury (Att. V 21, 11-12).

He was accounted an honest man in his own day, but his conception of justice and of duty was narrow, unimaginative, based on set rules and not illuminated by liberal thought or feeling: a failure not uncommon in his race and class. "Neither religion nor sympathy aroused in them a sense of the claims of aliens and dependants" (Inge: Society in Rome, p.39). Non-Romans, more particularly the despised subject-nations of the East, did not come within the pale of their consideration. The provinces existed purely for their personal advantage (c.f. Boissier p. 334). Brutus evidently concurred in this opinion. He was not enlightened by his study of philosophy, nor could his limited understanding conceive a wider sphere of duty than tradition prescribed "nourrie dans les opinions egoïstes de

l'aristocratie romaine [son âme] n'avait pas assez d'étendue ni d'élevation pour en decouvrir l'iniquité" (Boissier op. cit. p. 335).

His letters prove that he was not indifferent to the claims of friends and clients within his own world; here, he obeyed the precepts of his own treatise 'de officiis'. Gelzer (PW X 1006) comments on the proportion of letters on behalf of friends or dependants in the small surviving collection of letters to Cicero (see ad Brut. I 6, 2-4. 7. 11. 13.). They include appeals in the interests of his nephews and step-son, recommendations of the affairs of his friends, Flavius and Antistius Vetus, and a plea for Glyco, Pansa's physician and a relation of one of Brutus' freedmen, when he was charged with responsibility for Pansa's death. "Nihil minus credendum est ... Rogo te et quidem valde rogo (nam Achilleus noster non minus quam aequum est laborat) eripias eum ex custodia conservesque. Hoc ego ad meum officium privatarum rerum aeque atque ullam aliam rem pertinere arbitror" (I 6,2). In his own sphere, therefore, he did not fall short of what was expected of a Roman 'nobilis'; but he failed to extend his sympathies further.

This picture bears slight resemblance to Plutarch's magnanimous philosopher. There is no reference in the Life to Cicero's revelations. If he knew the letters from Cilicia (and he quotes Cicero elsewhere) he must have suppressed his

knowledge and wilfully falsified his portrait here. For he states (c.3, 3) that Brutus had no taste for his task in Cyprus in 58, since it was unworthy of a scholar.

The reaction against Plutarch has led to another kind of distortion, in which the character of Brutus is torn out of its proper environment and judged with undue emphasis on this aspect (see Tyrrell and Purser loc. cit. Carcopino II p. 107 f.).

The Roman temperament, and the general lowering of moral standards in the dissolution of the Republic partly explain why Brutus did not find the profitable business of usury incompatible with the pursuit of 'virtus'; also, why the admiration of antiquity was not affected by his less philosophic activities. Carcopino believes that the publication of Cicero's correspondence was intended by Augustus to discredit former opponents; if so, it was singularly ineffective until modern times, in this instance. No use is made of the letters Att. VI 1-3 by historians of the Empire. Unless this is a conspiracy of silence, it may be supposed that they did not find them worthy of particular note (- an attitude more recently adopted by Syme p. 57-58 note, Meyer p. 455 note, Tenney Frank p. 342, Ferrero II p. 304). The discovery that Brutus was, in this respect, not so very different from his contemporaries cannot but affect a modern estimate of him; but it was a defect of the age - cf. Meyer p. 455: "nicht schoen; aber er ist echt roemisch-republikanisch".

cc. 1 - 4 (additional).

In his introductory chapters, Plutarch offers no detailed account of Brutus' early life before 49 B.C. His biography concentrates on the last three years, since the assassination of Caesar and its consequences provide the central interest, without which the rest would have little value. While no complete picture of the earlier years exists, some information can be gathered from other sources.

On the date of Brutus' birth, accounts disagree. There are three references: Cicero (Brut. 94, 324) speaking of Hortensius, says "annis ante decem causas agere coepit quam tu /Brutus/ es natus", i.e. his birth-year was 85 B.C. But Velleius (II 72, 1) gives his age at his death: "Hunc exitum M. Bruti partium; septimum et XXX annum agentis, fortuna esse voluit". Livy (Per 124) gives his age at death as about forty; but the main controversy is between the conflicting statements of Cicero and Velleius. Nipperdey (Rhein. Mus. XIX 291) attempted to solve the problem by emending Cicero to "annis ante sedecim" - a reading adopted by the Teubner text of 1902. Seeck (Hermes 42, 505-8) who upheld Velleius tried to refute the arguments in favour of Cicero (unemended) from Brutus' career. It is doubtful if this can be done successfully. In spite of Seeck's arguments, it is probable that Brutus held the quaestorship in 53 B.C. (see de vir. ill. 82, 3-4), and since

Sulla's lex annalis of 81 was still in force Brutus must have been born not later than 84 B.C. - therefore, Cicero's date is very apt. Moreover, if - as now seems certain - he was triumvir monetalis as early as 60/59 B.C., then Velleius must be rejected; Brutus would not have entered on his public career before the age of twenty, except in unusual circumstances. None of the authorities suggest that he was an exception to the rule. On the contrary, their emphasis on his education both at home and abroad leads naturally to the conclusion that he did not enter public life before the normal age, i.e. that Cicero's indirect evidence is to be preferred to Velleius' definite statement.

Brutus' education was begun by the Greek freedman, Staberius Eros (who also taught Cassius). His generous sympathy for the children of the proscribed under Sulla's régime is described by Suetonius (de Grammaticis 13), see also Pliny NH 35, 199 on Eros' arrival in Rome as a slave. Brutus continued his studies at Athens under the rhetorician Pammenes and the Academic Aristus (Cic. Brut. 94, 324. Acad. I 3,12) and also at Rhodes (de vir. ill. 82, 2).

During this early period, he was adopted by his uncle and became officially Quintus Caepio Brutus (c.f. Phil X 11, 25-26). The exact date is not known. Grueber (CRRBM I p. 480) and some others have supposed that it was shortly after the death of his father in 77 B.C. The first existing reference belongs to the

summer of 59 (Cic. Att. II 24, 2 "Q. Caepio, hic Brutus"). For this reason the adoption has been dated to the same year by Gelzer (PW X 976) and Muenzer (PW II A^2 1779). The identity of his adoptive father is uncertain - see Muenzer PW ~~M~~ A^2 1775-1780 on the Caepiones of this period. Gelzer, whose conjecture seems the most reasonable, identifies him with Pompey's legate in the campaign against the pirates, 67 B.C. (Florus I 41, 10) and the Caepio bethothed to Julia before her marriage to Pompey (Plut. Caes. 14, 3, Pompey 47,4, Suet. Jul. 21. App. II 14, 50 Dio 38, 9). He was probably a brother of Servilia, but not Cato's favourite half-brother who died in 67, leaving his own daughter and Cato as joint heirs; possibly, he was an elder half-brother of Servilia.

Muenzer (II 1779) records the suggestion that the Caepio betrothed to Julia was in fact Brutus. Syme (p. 34) adopts this view and believes that the proposed marriage was the work of Servilia. But there is no evidence in the sources to support it.

About 60-59 B.C. Brutus entered on his public career, filling the minor office of triumvir monetalis, see Broughton: Magistrates of the Roman Republic II p. 442; Sydenham: Roman Republican Coinage pp. lxiv and 150; Grueber CRRBM I p. 479. The coins issued by him commemorate L. Junius Brutus and Servilius Ahala (see above c.1). Babélon (Monnaie de la Rep. Rom. II p. 114) assigns them to the period after Caesar's death;

but the later coins of Brutus were not struck at Rome. Grueber holds it certain that they were issued by Brutus as an ordinary officer of the mint and not later than 59 B.C. Sydenham (followed by Broughton) prefers the year 60 but agrees on the period.

In the year 59 also, Brutus' name first appears in politics in connection with the affairs of Vettius and the alleged plot against Pompey. In Cicero's account, Vettius' first deposition in the Senate emphatically named Brutus among the "manus iuventutis", but his statement next day, when Caesar brought him before the people, excluded all mention of Brutus (Att. II 24, 3). It was evident that he had been coached in his story. Merivale (I 1, 97) and others thought there was some plot among the hot-headed younger men. Only Dio, however, of the authorities, believed in it, and he named Cicero and Lucullus as its authors (38, 9, 1-4). Cicero gave it as the general opinion that the plot was a fabrication (Att. II 24, 3). He himself suspected Caesar and later openly accused Vatinius (in Vat. 10, 24-11, 27. Pro Sest. 63, 132). Suetonius also implies that Caesar was responsible (Iul. 20, 5). It is more likely to have been arranged by his partisans (Plut. Lucullus 42, 7) or some agent like Vatinius, in order to rouse Pompey's suspicions of the 'nobiles'. Had Caesar been the author, he would surely have chosen a better tool for his purpose than Vettius.

The use of Brutus' name would obviously make a fictitious

plot more plausible; his hostility to Pompey was well-known, and he had recently proclaimed his Republican sympathies through his coins. Other connections of his were implicated also - Bibulus, Lucullus, Domitius Ahenobarbus and Aemilius Paullus (who was not even in Italy at the time).

On the affair of Vettius, see also App. II 12, 43-13, 46. Dio 37, 41, 2. Oros. VI 6, 7. C.A.H. IX p. 520-21. Rice Holmes: Roman Republic I p. 323-4 and note p. 479 ff. In 58 B.C. Brutus left Rome for Cyprus (see c.3). From his return in 56 to 53 B.C. he was probably at Rome, though not active in public affairs. His marriage to Claudia must have taken place about this time. The same years saw the beginning of his acquaintance with Cicero (c.f. F. XV 14, 6).

Sometime before the Civil War, he entered the college of pontifices (see Cic. Brut. 42, 156. 58, 212. ad Brut. I, 5, 3. 15, 8. For numismatic evidence see Grueber op. cit. II p. 472 f. Plate CXI, 7, Broughton, op. cit. II pp. 576. 254).

In 53, he accompanied his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, to Cilicia, probably as his quaestor (de vir. ill. 82, 3-4). His close association with this man from 54 to 49 is nowhere mentioned by Plutarch; Appius was scarcely the best companion for his young philosopher. He forms a complete contrast with Cato and provides an example of the senatorial nobility at its worst. From Cicero, his successor, we have evidence of his rapacity and mismanagement in Cilicia and of his insolence

towards Cicero himself (Att. V 15, 2. 16, 4. 17, 6. VI 1,2. c.f. F. V 10, 2). He was also seriously implicated in 54 with his fellow-consul Domitius, Cato's brother-in-law, in the discreditable bargain concluded with the candidates for 53. The resulting scandal disconcerted Domitius - but Appius had nothing to lose by it (Att. IV 17, 2. 15, 7. Q.F. II 14, 4. 15, 2). On his return from Cilicia, he was tried on a charge of maiestas but secured an acquittal. In the same year, 50 B.C., he was even elected censor: his activities in the office are described by Caelius (F. VIII 14, 4).

Brutus escaped implication in the scandal of the Cilician administration (de vir. ill. 82, 4), in spite of his association with Appius. This, and his appearance for the defence at his father-in-law's trial, outlines his career in the Civil War.

He seems to have attracted attention early in life. Cicero, who was so much his senior in years and rank, sought his friendship on the recommendation of Atticus (Att. VI 1, 3 & 7). He was very well connected, and at the same time his character and habits, his relation to Cato, distinguishing him from the majority of his contemporaries, gained him a considerable reputation before he had actually achieved anything notable.

c.4. The Civil War, 49-48 B.C.

On the outbreak of war, Brutus - according to Plutarch - was expected to join Caesar, since he had always held aloof from Pompey on his father's account.

The elder Marcus Brutus is identified with the tribune of 83 B.C. (see Cic. pro Quinct. 20. 65. 69) who proposed to found a colony at Capua (de leg. agr. ii 38, 89. 34, 92-93. 98). Like others of his family, he was a lawyer (Cic. Brut. 62, 222. F. VII 22. de fin. 1, 12) and supported the Populares. He seems to have been expelled from Italy with the followers of Marius in 88 B.C., for he is said to have returned later from Spain with other exiles to join Cinna (Licinianus 35, 5). He escaped the proscriptions, but after Sulla's death in 78 B.C. he was one of the leaders in Lepidus' uprising and held Cisalpine Gaul for him. Besieged in Mutina by Pompey, he surrendered and was given a safe-conduct, but soon after, executed on Pompey's orders (Plut. Pompey 16. App. II iii, 464. Oros. V 22, 16-17 Livy Per. 90).

4, 3. Brutus' refusal to acknowledge Pompey before 49 must have been very marked, for by his marriage to Claudia he had formed a connection with Pompey, whose elder son had married Claudia's sister. In 52, however, Brutus had openly shown his hostility on political as well as personal grounds with the publication of his pamphlet (see above on c.2) - in this

connection, it is notable that he was not deterred by his alliance with the Claudii from condemning Clodius, his wife's uncle, and defending his murder (Quint. III 6, 93).

There were other considerations which might have drawn Brutus to Caesar's party. The political sympathies of his family had lain with the opposition to the Senate in the previous generation. Not only his father, but the Brutus who was praetor in 88 B.C. and died at Lilybaeum in 82 (Livy Per. 89) and L. Brutus Damasippus, praetor in 82, followed Marius. His mother Servilia was brought up with Cato and Caepio in the house of their uncle, the younger Drusus, at the time when the Italian question was being pressed (Plut. Cato Minor I, 1-2, 2,1). Although her second husband, D. Junius Silanus, was allied with the Senate, Servilia no doubt retained her earlier sympathies in her association with Caesar and exerted her influence on his behalf. Moreover, if Gelzer's conjecture is right, Brutus' adoptive father was, up to 59 B.C., one of Caesar's adherents. Another Caesarian, M. Aemilius Lepidus, became his brother-in-law; while his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, had no strong political affiliations.

Brutus' decision in favour of Pompey seems to have been largely the work of Cato. He himself, like Cicero, might have preferred to remain neutral, since he had no enthusiasm for either leader. And in avoiding Pompey he had the excuse of family loyalty.

Plutarch implies (4, 3) that he overcame his reluctance at the beginning of the war, before he went to Cilicia as the legate of Sestius. But from another source it appears that he required a plain direction from Cato before declaring openly for Pompey- (de vir. ill. 82, 5 "civili bello a Catone ex Cilicia retractus Pompeium secutus est"). Plutarch's narrative alone, i.e. the journey to Cilicia and decision there to proceed to Macedonia, without his interpretation supports this account; and Lucan, in his imaginary conversation between Cato and Brutus, presents a similar picture (Bell. Civ. II 234 ff.), see ll. 246-7 Namque alii Magnum vel Caesaris arma
sequantur,
Dux Bruto Cato solus erit.

ll. 323-5 Sic fatur et acres
Irarum movit stimulos iuvenisque calorem -
Excitat in nimios belli civilis amores.

c.f. Cicero's report of him in June 48 B.C.; Att. XI 4a "Brutus amicus; in causa versatur acriter".

4, 5. There is no other account of Pompey's warm reception of Brutus in Macedonia (see Plut. Pompey 64,5 ff.). It may be an exaggeration of Brutus' reputation and the regard in which he was held, on Plutarch's part.

cc. 5-8. Caesar and Brutus.

Cicero: Att. II 24. XI 13. 15. XIV 1. XII 19. 27. 29. 36. XIII.
Fam. XIII 10-14. VI 6,10. VIII 10. XV 14.

Appian: II 87, 365. 111, 462.-113, 470.

Dio: 41, 63, 3. 42, 6 & 13. 44, 19, 5.

Suetonius: Divus Iulius 50, 2. 82, 2.

Plutarch: Caesar 57; 62. Antony 11.
Cato Minor 24. Crassus 17-30.

Caesar: Bell. Civ. III 34. 36. 101-106. (Bell. Alex. 66-68).

T. Rice-Holmes: The Roman Republic III 210-211. 482. I 436 ff.

R. Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 58-59.

E. Meyer: Caesars Monarchie pp. 451. 455-6.

Abbott: Society and Politics in Ancient Rome pp. 66 ff.

J. Carcopino: Correspondance de Cicéron pp. 104 ff.

G. Walter: Caesar (Eng. trans. I & II)

Deutsch: Caesar's Son and Heir (University of California publications CP IX pp. 168 ff.)

L.C. Purser: M. Brutus as Caesarian (Hermathena IX 1894-96 pp. 369 ff.)

c.5. Caesar's concern for Brutus is illustrated here by the report of his orders at Pharsalia: μὴ κτεῖνειν Βροῦτον ἀλλὰ φείδεσθαι (cf. App. II 112, 468). It is attributed to consideration for Servilia and belief that Brutus was his son.

5, 2-4. Caesar's connection with Servilia was notorious. Cicero, in his account of the affair of Vettius in 59 hinted that the withdrawal of Bfutus' name was due to Servilia's influence with Caesar, see Att. II 24, 3 "Primum Caepionem de oratione sua sustulit ... ut appareret noctem et nocturnam deprecationem intercessisse."

Suetonius refers to it (Iul. 50,2 "ante alias dilexit M. Bruti matrem Serviliam") and Appian (II 112, 469) gives it as one of several possible motives for Brutus' part in the conspiracy.

5, 3-4. The incident of the letter, during the debate on the Catilinarians is repeated in Cato Minor (c. 24, 1-4). It is the earliest indication of any connection between Caesar and Servilia.

5, 2. The legend that Brutus was Caesar's son appears to have grown only when the dramatic possibilities of such a relationship could be exploited. There is no contemporary reference to it. Cicero's letters contain no hint of such a rumour, though he was aware of the relations of Caesar and Servilia and did not spare the reputations of Brutus' half-sisters (see Att. VI 1, 25. Suet. Iul. 50, 2). Had he entertained any idea of it, he would surely have referred to it somewhere. Neither is it found in Nicolaus' contemporary biography of Augustus. It appears only in the later historians, partly to explain the favour shown to Brutus by Caesar, partly to heighten the dramatic effect of the

assassination. This, too, is the source of Caesar's supposed last words to Brutus: "... tradiderunt quidam M. Bruto irruenti dixisse: καὶ σύ, τέκνον ;" (Suet. Iul. 82, 2; cf. Dio 44, 19, 5.) Suetonius and Dio alone repeat this story, and both discredit it.

The legend can have no foundation in fact. If Brutus was born in 85 B.C., Caesar at that time was only fifteen - or, possibly, seventeen (Eutrop. VI 24. see Rice-Holmes op. cit. I 436 ff.). Even if Velleius could be proved right and Brutus' birth placed in the year 78, it would be equally impossible, for Caesar was then just returning to Rome, after receiving the news of Sulla's death (Suet. Iul. 3,1). In any case, there is no reason to believe that he was intimate with Servilia so early in his life. The earliest references belong to the years 63 and 59 (see above 5, 3 and Cic. Att. II 24. Suet. Iul. 50, 2 - Caesar is said to have presented her with an expensive pearl during his first consulship). Plutarch appears to be placing the incident of December 63 and Brutus' birth in the same period, without considering its absurdity. He repeats the popular story, but from the rest of his narrative it is clear that he could not have attached much importance to it.

c.6, 1-3. Immediately after Pharsalia, Brutus surrendered to Caesar and was pardoned at once, see Plut. Caes. 46, 4 and 62, 4 App. II iii, 464. Dio 41, 63, 6. Nic. Dam. 19. Vell. II 52, 5. de vir. ill. 82, 5.

6, 4-5. The betrayal of Pompey's plans to Caesar is mentioned only by Plutarch. Apart from the improbability of Brutus' knowing any private plans of Pompey, Caesar's own account, if it may be trusted, provides evidence to the contrary, see B.C. III 102-106 on Caesar's movements after Pharsalia; especially 106, 1 "paucos dies in Asia moratus eum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines ...., Alexandream pervenit".

From this it is clear that Caesar did not make his way direct to Egypt from Larisa and that he was well able to guess the direction of Pompey's flight, without aid from Brutus.

6, 6-7. Brutus evidently met Caesar again in Cilicia in 47 on his return from the Alexandrine war (cf. Bell. Alex. 66. Cic. Phil. II 11, 26). There, he interceded for Cassius.

Cassius, in command of a section of the Pompeian fleet, had been active in Sicilian waters in the summer of 48 B.C. (see B.C. III 5, 3. 101. Dio 42, 13, 1). On being assured of the victory of Pharsalia, he ceased operations against Caesar's shipping and sailed away from that area (B.C. III 101, 7). Dio (42, 13, 1) implies that he went first to Cato, but after receiving news of Pompey's death left to make his peace with Caesar. Appian, too, (II 87, 365) suggests that Cassius parted from Cato and Scipio when he sailed east, but in his account (II 87, 365. 88, 370-372), Cassius, making his way to Pharnaces in Pontus, encountered Caesar at the Hellespont and

instantly surrendered, though with his seventy triremes he might have overwhelmed Caesar's small boats. Appian clearly identified this Cassius with the tyrannicide (see II iii, 464), but Dio (42, 6, 2) and Suetonius (Iul. 63) in relating the same story, call the Pompeian captain Lucius Cassius. From Caesar (B.C. III 101-102) it seems impossible that Gaius Cassius could have reached the Hellespont by that time, for he did not leave Sicily until he had definite news of Pharsalia - the Pompeians distrusted the first reports - and Caesar himself is shown hastening into Asia in pursuit of Pompey. Appian is alone in his account and is probably mistaken in assuming that it was Gaius Cassius who surrendered at the Hellespont.

This is the conclusion of Rice-Holmes (op. cit. III p. 482), E. Meyer (op. cit. p. 536 note) and Carcopino (Hist. Rom. II 2, index of Cassii). The Cassius mentioned by Suetonius and Dio could not have been the brother of Gaius (as Froehlich thought - PW III 1680 & 1728), for he was a Caesarian (B.C III 34. 36), but is otherwise unknown.

Cicero at Brundisium March - May 47 heard rumours of Cassius' movements at Rhodes: his proposed journey to Caesar at Alexandria, abandoned on hearing of the revival of the Republican cause in Africa (see Att. XI 13, 1. 15, 2). Cicero clearly ranks him with those who had not yet committed themselves to Caesar's cause and would be welcomed back in the event of a Republican victory (XI 15, 2). But he was at Tarsus (Phil. II

11, 26) when Caesar arrived there and was reconciled to him before August 47 - the date of F. XV 15: "Tu enim eam partem petisti, ut et consiliis interesses ... ego ... ab illo longissime et absum et afui" (15, 3). It seems probable, then, that he was pardoned at Tarsus. He became Caesar's legate (F. VI 6, 10), perhaps in the campaign against Pharnaces, for he took no part in the African and Spanish wars.

While Caesar was settling the affairs of Asia in 47, Brutus pleaded for Deiotarus of Galatia, who was penalized for his adherence to Pompey. There is considerable confusion in the text here (c. 6, 6), but if the reading Λιβύων βασιλεῖ is correct, Plutarch must have been misinformed.

6, 7. Cicero has a different version of Caesar's comment on Brutus' speech, see Att. XIV 1,2 "De quo ... Caesarem solitum dicere: Magni refert hic quid velit, sed quicquid vult, valde vult; idque eum animadvertisse cum pro Deiotaro Nicaeae dixerit." It is not known whether this was the Bithynian or Ligurian Nicaea (see Tyrrell and Purser V p. 225). For Deiotarus' appearance before Caesar, see Bell. Alex. 67. Brutus' plea was not successful, for Deiotarus was forced to cede part of his territory (B.A. 68, 3; cf. Dio 41, 63, 3).

Brutus seems to have remained with Caesar during his stay in Asia, but left him to visit Marcellus at Mytilene (Cic. Brut. 71, 250) while Caesar returned to Italy ("ait Brutus C. Caesarem Mytilenas praetervectum ..." Sen. Cons. ad. Helv. 9,8)

This was in the late summer of 47 B.C., see Cic. Att. XI 21, 2. "Ille ad Kal. Sept. Athenis non videtur fore. Multa eum in Asia dicuntur morari."

6, 10-12. Before leaving Rome again for Africa, Caesar made Brutus governor (legatus pro praetore) of Cisalpine Gaul for the year 46, see Cic. F. VI 6, 10 "Brutum Galliae praefecit" - App. II iii, 465. In the "Brutus" (46, 171), he is said to be leaving for his province in the near future. Several letters of Cicero (F. XIII 10-14) are addressed to him in Gaul, recommending various people or business interests.

Plutarch's praise of Brutus' administration cannot be checked from other sources. The chief reference is in Cicero, whose complimentary phrases cannot be taken literally, see "Orator" 10, 34. "itaque efficis ut cum gratiae causa nihil facias omnia tamen sint grata quae facis. Ergo omnibus ex terris una Gallia communi non ardet incendia in qua frueris ipse tua virtute."

It is not clear what Plutarch has in mind in his comparison of Gaul under Brutus with the other provinces and their unhappy state - unless, perhaps, he is embellishing Cicero. Contemporary sources do not present this picture. Cicero is presumably referring rather to the disturbed state of other provinces than to gross maladministration. At that time, apart from Africa and Spain, where the civil war continued, Transalpine Gaul had seen a rising of the Bellovaci, which was

suppressed by Decimus Brutus (Livy Per. 114), and Syria was thrown into confusion by the Pompeian Caecilius Bassus, who incited the legions there to revolt and murder Caesar's legate and kinsman Sextus Julius Caesar (Livy Per. 114. App. III 77, 312-316).

As an indication of Brutus' popularity in the Cisalpine there is the story, told by Plutarch in the Comparison (c. 58), of Augustus' visit to Milan, where he found a statue of Brutus still standing; he allowed it to remain there, commending the people for their loyalty to a benefactor.

6, 12. Brutus was succeeded in March 45 B.C. by Pansa, and left the Cisalpine. It is not clear from Plutarch's narrative that there was any lapse of time between Brutus' governorship and Caesar's return through the province. But in fact Brutus travelled north again to meet him on his return from Spain some months later. The interval Brutus passed in and near Rome, in constant communication with Cicero, whose letters record his movements following his return to Italy (see Att. XII 19. 27. 29. 36 XIII passim). He spent some time on his estate at Tusculum, where he was Cicero's neighbour (Att. XIII 7a, 11, 44). In June 45 he took an important step, divorcing Claudia in order to marry his cousin, Porcia, Cato's daughter (Att. XIII 9, 2. 10, 3). It was unexpected, and caused much speculation, see Att. XIII 10, 3 - "sermunculum ... omnem". "Sunt enim qui loquantur etiam mecum." The sudden formation

of this alliance, after his reconciliation with Caesar, showed a decided independence of action and proved that he had not entirely abandoned his former allies for Caesar's friendship. Indeed, it marked the beginning of his return to them and the re-assertion of Cato's influence over him. After his uncle's death, he may have felt some regret or shame for his own course (see Syme op. cit. p. 58). This strengthening of the family tie could only draw him back to Cato's Republican principles and dispose other men to associate him even more with Caesar's most determined opponent. It could not, therefore, have been welcome to Caesar, and certainly did not meet with Servilia's approval (Att. XIII 22, 4). Cicero was eager to hear if any word had come from Caesar (Att. XIII 16, 2. 17, 1), but he seems to have let it pass in silence.

7, 1-6. After his return to Rome, Caesar continued his favours to Brutus. He nominated him praetor urbanus for 44 and promised him the consulship for 41 (at least, according to Velleius II 56, 3).

Plutarch suggests that Caesar was responsible for the estrangement of Brutus and Cassius, which followed the appointment; cf. App. II 112, 466. It is quite possible that he chose this means of hindering any political combination between two potential enemies of his regime. Meyer (op. cit. p. 540), in support of this interpretation, points to his similar method

with Antony and Dolabella, who were brought into conflict over the consulship of 44.

At the same time, he seems to have emphasized the personal nature of his preference of Brutus, in the source used by Plutarch and Appian, at least (cf. Plut. Caes. 57, 5. App. II 112, 467). It is quite consistent with his other acts and appointments, a part of the personal government by one man, who was to choose his own ministers. The resentment of the 'nobiles' and their accusations of tyranny inevitably followed.

7, 1. For Cassius' relationship to Brutus as husband of his half-sister Junia Tertia, see also Cic. Att. XIV 20, 2. XV 11, 1. Dio 44, 14, 2. Tac. Ann. III 76.

7, 3. πολλὰ τοῦ Κασσίου καὶ λαμπρὰ τὰ Παρθικὰ νεανεύματα.

Cassius won a considerable military reputation from his exploits at Carrhae and in Syria, 53-51 B.C. Quaestor to Crassus, he was left in command after the triumvir's death, retrieved the disaster of Carrhae as far as possible and, with the re-organised remnants of Crassus' army, defended Syria from the Parthian invasion which followed, even inflicting a defeat on the Parthian forces in 51 after repulsing them from Antioch, see Plut. Crassus 17-30. Livy Per 108. Cic. Phil. XI 13, 35. Eutrop. VI 18, 2. Oros. VI 13, 5. Joseph. Bell. Iud. 180-182. Ant. XIV 105. 119 f. de vir. ill. 83, 2.

Cicero unfairly belittled his successes (Att. V 18, 1. 20, 3. 21, 2), though he wrote to Cassius himself in glowing

terms (F. XV 14). Cassius was succeeded by Bibulus and left Syria in the autumn of 51 B.C.

8, 1-4. Plutarch believed that Caesar entertained some misgivings concerning Brutus and received warnings of him. The sayings of Caesar recorded here are repeated in the Lives of Caesar (62, 10) and Antony (11, 6) and in the Moralia (206, 14). In "Caesar" 62, 6, he reveals his mistrust of Cassius, too; τί φαίνεται βουλόμενος ὑμῖν Κάσσιος; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ λίαν ἀρέσκει, λίαν ὠχρὸς ὤν.

8, 3. Plutarch's interpretation of this remark of Caesar (οὐκ ἂν ὑμῖν δοκεῖ Βροῦτος ἀναμεῖναι τοῦτ' τὸ σαρκίον) is scarcely possible. It is difficult to believe that Caesar could ever have considered Brutus as a possible successor. He must have seen his complete lack of the abilities necessary for such a position, quite apart from his knowledge of Brutus' Republican views. His eagerness to secure him as an ally does not mean that he saw in him a possible heir. The absence of Brutus' name from his will suggests the contrary (see Deutsch, Caesar's Son and Heir pp. 168 ff.).

Plutarch may be offering his own opinion here, or possibly recording some tradition known to him. Carcopino apparently accepts his view and finds in it one reason for Octavian's animosity towards Brutus (op. cit. II p. 106).

The favours bestowed on Brutus by Caesar were noted by other authorities (e.g. Appian II 111, 464-465; 112, 467.

Dio 41, 63, 6. Vell. II 56, 3. 52, 5) but Plutarch lays more emphasis on Caesar's personal regard for Brutus. This he attributes in the first place to the influence of Servilia (c.5, 1); later he refers it to Brutus' own merits.

Caesar may have protected Brutus' name in the affair of Vettius to please Servilia; but, though she retained enough influence with him to secure the reversion of Aquila's estate after the Civil War (Att. XIV 21, 3), it is not probable that his attitude to Brutus in later years was determined to any extent by his old attachment. And it was only after Pharsalia that his recognition of Brutus became marked. He pardoned him at once, and other Pompeians at his request, according to Plutarch; he sent him to the important Cisalpine Gaul and preferred him before men with better claims, even before some of his own followers. Moreover, he bore with open expressions of Republicanism from Brutus and showed no open displeasure at his marriage to Porcia. It was not his habit to interfere in the lives of his followers; see Matius to Cicero F. XI 28, 7 "Caesar numquam interpellavit quin quibus vellem atque etiam quos ipse non diligebat, tamen iis uterer."

He pursued this policy, even when Brutus' friendships and family alliances could not avoid political implications. In this case, there were other reasons for it, not connected with personal considerations, either for Servilia or for Brutus. He had need of men like Brutus in his work of pacifying and

reorganizing the state. His influence and his reputation would assist Caesar's cause; there were already too many disreputable adventurers among his partisans. The adherence of Cato's nephew and pupil would be a decided asset. Brutus was, more than any other, heir to Cato's ideas, both political and philosophical. It was natural that Cicero, Cassius, and other Republicans should begin to look to him, to expect him to take part in any Republican revival. To secure his support for Caesar's regime would thwart Cato's worshippers and destroy a potential centre of resistance at once. Caesar therefore set himself to win him over. It is noticeable that both the Republicans and Caesar evidently saw something in Brutus, in spite of his defects, which they felt to be worthy of consideration.

For any private affection of Caesar's part there is little evidence; but it is significant that he did not mention Brutus in his will, while both Antony and Decimus Brutus were among his secondary heirs.

Brutus' opinion of Caesar must have been influenced by Cato's unyielding opposition to him. Dio says he always showed hostility to Caesar, see 44, 13, 1 ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀντεπολεμήσαντα τῷ Καίσαρι. The first clear indication of it is his refusal to serve as Caesor's quaestor in 53 B.C., "quod is bonis ammibus displicebat (de vir. ill. 82, 3). Yet in the Civil War he chose to make his peace with Caesar rather than

follow Cato and the more determined Optimates to Africa. In this he shared the opinion of Cicero and Cassius (see F. XV 15) and was prepared to support Caesar's rule against the violence of Pompey's sons for the sake of peace. cf. Cassius' opinion F. XV 19, 4, and the words given to Brutus himself by Cicero: "doleo nihil tuam perpetuam auctoritatem de pace valuisse" (Brut. 76, 266). But he never became a Caesarian. O.E. Schmidt's theory, that Caesar used him as a decoy to lure Republicans into acceptance of his supremacy is not tenable (see Purser, Hermathena IX pp. 369 ff.). It is quite out of character. Brutus had not the subtlety and tact for such a rôle, even if he had become a convinced Caesarian. In particular instances brought forward by Schmidt, the natural interpretation is the very opposite of his e.g. Brutus' visit to Marcellus. If this was intended, as Schmidt maintains, to convert one of Caesar's bitter enemies, it was unsuccessful. On the contrary, his references to Marcellus in his "de virtute" (see above on c.2, 2) suggest that he was the one to be won over. It is equally unlikely that his requests to Cicero to write on Cato and on oratory were invitations to come out in support of the new dispensation. Again, the result was just the reverse of what a Caesarian would have wanted. Cicero was so much aware of this that he insisted on Brutus' sharing the responsibility for his "Cato", evidently from fear of Caesar (Or. 35, 238).

Nothing, in fact, in Brutus' character or career will support the theory. He took office under office under Caesar, but without dissembling his Republican sympathies. He openly lauded irreconcilable opponents of the dictator - Marcellus in the de virtute, Cato in the laudatio composed after his uncle's death (Sen. Cons. ad. Helv. 9, 7-8. Att. XII 21 & XIII 46, 2). It appears from Plutarch (below 40, 7) that he censured Cato's suicide, but that may have been an attempt to justify his own compromise with his principles (see Meyer op. cit. p. 452). However, he acquiesced in Caesar's regime only so long as he believed that Caesar would restore Republican government at the conclusion of the war and abdicate, following the example of Sulla in 79 B.C. He clung to this hope long after Cicero had abandoned it. In July 45 B.C. he wanted Cicero to write to Caesar (Att. XIII 44, 1); at that time he was himself preparing to go to meet the dictator as he returned from Spain (Att. XIII 23, 1), doubtless to discover his plans for the future. His interview with Caesar left him optimistic. He wrote to Rome, reporting his impressions, but Cicero was not convinced, see Att. XIII 40, 1. "Itane? Nuntiat Brutus illum ad bonos viros? εὐαγγέλια. sed ubi eos? Nisi forte se suspendit ..."

Brutus too must have been disillusioned during the last months of the year, as it became quite clear that Caesar had no intention of abdicating. He was reputed to have criticized

Sulla and to have said that the Republic was an empty word - see Suet. Jul. 77 "Nihil esse rempublicam; appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie ..." Whether the report was true or not, it expressed his disregard of the constitution, and that soon appeared in his actions.

7, 7. While doubts of Caesar and his own position were beginning to assail Brutus, he was first approached by his friends who hoped to draw him away from Caesar entirely and to persuade him to take an active part again in the defence of the Republic.

Plutarch says they were the friends of Cassius, but there were others interested in Brutus' political direction, Cicero, for instance, who had tried to rouse his ambition and his pride in his ancestry in the "Brutus" (see 6, 22. 97, 331-3). He was disappointed by Brutus' acceptance of Pharsalia (cf. Att. XIII 40, 1) and puzzled, too, when Brutus wrote to clear Caesar of any suspicion of complicity in the murder of Marcellus. He felt that this defence was unnecessary (Att. XIII 10, 3 - June, 45). He need not have feared that Brutus was becoming a loyal follower of Caesar. There is no reason to suppose that he ever felt any personal attachment to him. He had little opportunity to become well acquainted with him. Caesar was away in Gaul from the time when Brutus was beginning to appear in public life (Cic. Brut. 71, 248). After Pharsalia, in the years 48-44, he spent some time in

Caesar's company, but of his reaction to Caesar's personality there is no evidence. Knowledge of his mother's relations with Caesar may have affected his private opinion (cf. App. II 112, 469), though it did not prevent him accepting favours from Caesar.

One of the outstanding features of his relations with Caesar is the freedom of action and speech which he retained, even when Caesar was at the height of his power. He never stooped to flattery, nor did he win Caesar's favour by conciliating him.

This undaunted frankness is another aspect of the "superbia" which the elder Seneca noted in him (Suas. VI 14) and which so often offended Cicero. Too inflexible, outspoken and ungracious in ordinary social intercourse, he was saved by those very qualities from joining in the general adulation of Caesar.

cc. 8-18. The conspiracy against Caesar.

cc. 8-13 The formation of the conspiracy.

Appian: II 111, 462-115, 479.

Dio: 44, 11, 4-18.

Plutarch: Caesar 60-63.

Suetonius: Div. Iul. 80-82.

Nicolaus: Vita Caes. 19.

Cicero: Phil. II 11, 25-15, 37. Att. XIV 1,2. Fam. XII 4. XV 15-19.

Velleius: II 56.

Livy: Per 116.

Orosius: VI 17, 1. Eutropius VI 25. Florus II 13, 92.

Frisch: Cicero's fight for the Republic pp. 25-41.

Wirszubski: Libertas as a political idea at Rome pp. 87 ff.

Taylor: Party Politics in the age of Caesar pp. 175 ff.

Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 56-60. 95.

Rice-Holmes: The Roman Republic III pp. 330-342.

Meyer: Caesar's Monarchie pp. 530-539.

Gelzer: PW X 988-991. Froehlich PW III 1729-30.

Boissier: Cicéron et ses amis pp. 347 ff.

Ferrero: Greatness and Decline ... (Eng. trans.) II pp. 3o3 ff

Tenney Frank: History of Rome pp. 333-4. C.A.H. IX p. 736.

c.8, 5f. Cassius: his character and the nature of his opposition to Caesar (ἀνὴρ θυμοειδὴς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐδικῶς μισοκαίσαρ ἢ κοινῇ μισοτύραννος).

Plutarch gives first as the popular belief, this sketch of Cassius as a violent character stirred by personal resentment against Caesar. (cf. Vell. II 56, 3). He then refutes it (c.9, 1-4) and affirms that Cassius was moved by hatred of autocracy itself, relating the anecdote of his encounter with Faustus Sulla in his schooldays, as early evidence of his Republican sympathies. The same story is told by Valerius Maximus (III 1, 3).

There is no convincing evidence to support the popular view. Cassius does not seem to have entertained any strong, personal dislike of Caesar, certainly not before 44 B.C. During the Civil War, he had not been associated with the extreme Optimates, though he followed Pompey from the beginning. In February 49, he was acting as Pompey's messenger to the consuls at Capua (Att. VII 21). Although he showed no hesitation in reaching this decision and took an active part in the war, he shared Cicero's views. They had discussed the situation - probably when Cassius was Cicero's guest at Formiae in February 49 (Att. VII 23-25) - and had reached the same conclusion. They would not take part in a prolonged and desperate struggle but would let one battle settle the issue for them. See Cicero's letters to Cassius of 47 and 45 B.C.

(F. XV 15 "utque nostrum spe pacis et odio civilis sanguinis abesse a belli (necessarea) pertinacia voluit ... Sermo familiaris meus tecum et item mecum tuus adduxit utrumque nostrum ad id consilium ut uno proelio putaremus si non totam causam at certe nostrum iudicium definire convenire".

In accordance with this decision, Cassius ceased operations with his fleet after Pharsalia (Caes. B.C. III 101), later surrendered, and was actively employed by Caesar, see F. VI 6, 10 "Cassium sibi legavit". cf. F. XV 15, 3 "Tu enim eam partem petisti ut et consiliis (i.e. Caesaris) interesses".

While Cassius was at Pompey's headquarters at Luceria in 49 B.C. he seems to have advised Cicero not to commit himself by leaving Italy. See F. XV 15, 4 "atque utinam primis illis (sc. litteris) quas Luceria miseras paruissem! sine ulla enim molestia dignitatem meam retinuissem."

During the African and Spanish campaigns Cassius was given no appointment but lived in retirement in southern Italy (F. XV 17, 4. 19, 1). Froehlich (PW III 1729) supposes that during this period of enforced idleness his opposition to Caesar first emerged. But his letter to Cicero of January 45 (F. XV 19) contains no hint of bitterness. On the contrary, he expresses anxiety concerning Caesar's position in Spain and has no wish to see Pompey's son victorious: "peream, nisi solicitus sum, ac malo veterem et clementem dominum habere quam

novum et crudelem experiri". (19, 4).

In the same letter, he declared his intention of returning speedily to Rome, should Caesar be successful. Clearly, he was not an inveterate enemy of the dictator. Cicero later asserted that he had planned to assassinate Caesar in 47 B.C. on his arrival in Cilicia (Phil. II 11, 26), but there is no other evidence to support or refute this story, and, since Cassius was most probably reconciled to Caesar at Tarsus on that occasion (see above) it seems, at least, doubtful. There is more reason to suppose that, like Brutus, and others, he hoped the constitution would be re-established at the end of the war and supported Caesar's dictatorship only while he believed it to be a temporary measure. When that hope was disappointed, his attitude to the "old and merciful master" promptly changed.

As to his resentment of personal slights - he may have been exasperated by his defeat in the contention for the praetorship; the choice of a younger man, though Caesar himself admitted that Cassius put forward the better claim, gave him a taste of the new régime which was certain to enfuriate him. But it was an additional rather than a main cause of his hostility. The quarrel with Brutus which resulted was not maintained long (see below c. 10, 3).
8, 6. The story of Caesar's confiscation of his lions at Megara during his aedileship cannot be taken seriously.

There is no hint of it in accounts of Caesar's legate, Calenus, at Megara (Plut. Caes. 43, 1. Dio 42, 14, 3). Moreover, at the beginning of the war, Cassius was one of the tribuni plebis (Att. VII 21, 2). There is no record of his aedileship - if he ever held the office. And apart from this, the story itself is too trivial to be regarded.

It is not necessary to search for such petty motives to explain Cassius' conduct. It is enough that he was a Roman 'nobilis' and a true representative of the old governing class, whose position and privileges were threatened by the supremacy of Caesar. Hence, his active opposition when he became fully aware of the threat. He came of a family prominent in the history of the Republic and, true to its kind, intolerant of extraordinary powers which could raise one of the 'nobiles' above his peers. See Cic. Phil. II 11, 26 - "C. Cassius in ea familia natus quae non modo dominatum sed ne potentiam quidem cuiusquam ferre potuit ...".

In taking office under Caesar, he did not dissemble his real sentiments. According to Dio (44, 8, 1), when a majority of the Senate decreed an unusual number of honours for Caesar on one day, Cassius declined to vote. In Nicolaus' account of the Lupercalia (Vita Caes. 21), it was Cassius who stepped forward and removed the diadem when Caesar protested.

Cassius was a perfectly sincere Republican, but not, necessarily, an idealistic one. "... to a Roman senator, the

res publica was at the same time a form of government and a way of life. Free political activity among his equals was as a rule considered to be the senator's vocation and his aim in life" (Wirszubski op. cit. p. 88) cf. Phil. XIV 6, 17 "Magnus est in re publica campus ... multis apertus cursus ad laudem".

This political activity was checked by Caesar's victory. The state became 'res privata'. All honours and dignities were in the gift of one man (Suet. Iul. 76, 2) and the 'nobiles' were not content to be humble recipients. "gravis ... erat liberis ipsa beneficiorum potentia." (Florus II 13, 92) cf. Nic. Dam. 19: κὀτὸ τὸ ἐν χάριτος μέρει λαβεῖν τοῦθ' ἁ κατὰ πολλὴν εὐμάρειαν κεκτῆσιν ὑπῆρχε, σφόδρα ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἑνὸν ἐλύπει.

Caesar's complete ascendancy "after the victory of Munda, his disregard of constitutional forms, his seeming contempt for the senate (see App. II 107, 445-446. Dio 44, 8, 1-4. Suet. Iul. 78, 1. Livy Per 116. Cic. F. VII 30) made the 'nobiles', both former Pompeians and Caesarians, ready to combine against him in the interests of their order. They were all, equally, affected. The life for which they had been prepared and to which they looked forward with confidence was no longer open to them.

At the same time, to strict Republicans Caesar's rule was a "tyranny", not so much in the quality of his government as in his own position, which violated the spirit of the constitution.

Instead of the traditional distribution of power, all authority was vested in one man, who stood above the law. See F. IV 9, 2 "Omnia enim delata ad unum sunt; is utitur consilio ne suorum quidem sed suo". Suet. Iul. 77 "debere homines consideratius iam loqui secum ac pro legibus habere quae dicat".

Such considerations formed the basis of senatorial opposition to Caesar, which came to a head in the conspiracy. The conspirators' object was to reverse the decision of the Civil War and to re-establish the traditional form of government.

The motives of each individual cannot now be satisfactorily analysed. Petty resentments and jealousies could not have been absent, in such a large number; the leaders of the movement would welcome the support of all who were hostile to Caesar, including those who had private quarrels (see Tenney Frank p. 342). There were followers of Pompey who had suffered from the Civil War and were eager to retrieve their losses and the disgrace of defeat - for instance, Quintus Ligarius, Pontius Aquila, Servius Sulpicius Galba. There were also dissatisfied friends of Caesar (who, according to Seneca, out-numbered the others - Dial. V 30, 4) who had not received the rewards they expected or who were offended by the advancement of former Pompeians (Nic. Dam. 19).

"Many ... may have been actuated by paltry and personal

considerations. But these, after all, were not the real, dynamic forces at work" (Ferrero op. cit. II p. 306). The aim of those who set the conspiracy on foot was the restoration of the Republic; that is, of senatorial authority and freedom for political competition among the 'nobiles'. The most prominent members owed their advancement to Caesar and could expect no more from Caesar's death than they were likely to receive if he lived - except that free activity which they claimed as a right. Among conspirators known by name there are more ex-Pompeians than Caesarians (see PW X 255), yet/of the inner group only Brutus and Cassius had previously opposed Caesar: Decimus Brutus, Trebonius, Tillius Cimber, the brothers Casca were all Caesarians and the first two were in high favour with the dictator. Both had been allotted important provinces for 44 B.C., Trebonius had held the consulship for the latter half of 45, Decimus was nominated consul for 42. They had no reason to be among the disappointed friends who turned against Caesar. On that account Meyer (op. cit. p. 538) defends them and asserts the essential idealism, however/misplaced, of their motives.

The predominance of the Caesarians and the choice of Cato's nephew for the head of the conspiracy proved that it was in no sense a resurrection of the Pompeian cause. The loyalty of its members was to the Senate and the constitution. They were senators first and only then Caesarians or Pompeians.

Republicanism was not merely a facade, a hollow slogan, behind which petty quarrels and disappointed expectations sheltered. But within the dual conception of the Republic - as a form of government and a way of life - could be contained a wide range of motives from strict regard for legal forms to selfish anxiety for the preservation of class privileges. At its best their Republicanism was narrow in outlook, clinging to outworn tradition, with no constructive programme.

For Brutus, the sources in general agree in presenting him as a disinterested patriot and champion of 'libertas', even where his fellow-conspirators are doubted. According to Appian (II 112, 469) and Dio (44, 13, 1) he was influenced chiefly by public appeals to his family pride and by his connection with Cato. He was undoubtedly proud of the defenders of liberty among his ancestors, and his Republicanism derived primarily from Cato; the two factors form an integral part of his mental outlook. They are not isolated motives. His attitude to autocracy at the beginning of his career is expressed in the dictum quoted by Quintilian from his attack on Pompey (IX 3, 95 see above on c. 2). His understanding of his own cause can be seen in his letters of 43 B.C. (ad Brut. I 4, 2. I 16 & 17) which permit a comparison of the reality with Plutarch's idealised picture. See I 16, 8:- "ego vero ... is sum qui non modo non supplicem sed etiam coerceam

postulantes ut sibi supplicetur."
"ego certe quin cum ipsa re bellum geram, hoc est cum regno et imperiis extraordinariis et dominatione et potentia quae supra leges se esse velit, nulla erit tam bona condicio serviendi qua deterrear." (17, 6)
"quod enim nondum senatus censuit nec populus Romanus iussit id adroganter non praeiudico neque revoco ad arbitrium meum" (I 4, 2).

He was, principally, a constitutionalist, defending the laws and the senatus auctoritas. But in him the native Roman love of legality and aversion to autocracy were coloured by his study of philosophy and acquaintance with Greek ideas of tyranny and liberty (cf. ad Brut. I 16, 6). This made him, to Plutarch, a more interesting and sympathetic figure than Cassius and the other conspirators. His conception of the Republic, however, was basically the same, and he shared the limitations of his colleagues. He had no better understanding of the condition of the Republic. Yet it may be said that his principles, however narrow, were not insincere or conveniently identified with personal gain. He tried to prove that by refusing to penalise any of Caesar's adherents or to usurp authority in the confusion following Caesar's death.

At the beginning of 44 B.C. Rome was ripe for conspiracy. Opposition had been gathering since Caesar's return in the

autumn of 45. His attitude gave offence to many; Republicans were particularly shocked by his assumption of quasi-regal honours. Moreover, the defeated 'nobiles' were not yet ready to accept their relegation to a secondary and subordinate part in politics.

Caesar was well aware of the general feeling - Cicero quotes his words on one occasion (reported by Matius): "Ego dubitem quin summo in odio sim cum M. Cicero sedeat nec suo commodo me convenire possit? Atqué si quisquam est facilis, hic est. Tamen non dubito quin me male oderit." (Att. XIV 1, 2 cf. 2, 3). Rumours of plots against him were in the air, but he preferred to ignore them (see c. 8, 1 above and Caes. 62, 4-5). It was not in his nature to surround his life with elaborate precautions (see Vell. II 57, 1. Plut. Caes. 57, 3 App. II 109, 455). He also believed that it would be obvious, even to the 'nobiles', that his preservation was in the interests of the State. See Suet. Iul. 86, 2: "non tam sua quam rei publicae interesse, uti salvus esset ... rem publicam si quid sibi evenéret neque quietam fore et aliquanto deteriore condicione civilia bella subituram."

Discontent, however, was spreading. Even the people were becoming uneasy. There are some indications that popular dissatisfaction was stirred up by the opposition - traces of a deliberate campaign to discredit Caesar. Plutarch (Caes. 57, 2-3), Dio (44, 7, 2-4) and Nicolaus (20) suggest that

the heaping of extravagant honours on him was as much the work of enemies as that of flatterers. The opposition lent its support and added to the original proposals in the hope that they would make Caesar odious to the city generally and prepare the way for a reaction. The same design has been seen in the notices which began to appear about this time on the statue of Lucius Brutus and on the tribunal of his living namesake (App. II 112, 469. Dio 44, 12, 1-3. Plut. Caes. 62, 7-9. Suet. Iul. 80, 3). Plutarch (9, 6 f.), with Appian and Dio, explains the notices as part of the plan to incite Brutus and draw him over to the opposition. Suetonius (loc. cit.) more plausibly includes them with other public criticisms of Caesar's actions, especially of his new additions to the Senate. The authors, so Cassius is said to have declared, were the πρῶτοι καὶ κράτιστοι, not the common people (c.10, 5. App. II 113, 472).

More important were the persistent rumours that Caesar aimed at kingship and the ambiguous incidents which brought this question into the open - for instance, the crowning of Caesar's statues by night, the greeting with the title of 'rex' as he returned to the city after the Latin festival in January 44, the offer of a diadem at the Lupercalia in February.

What lay behind these incidents and who instigated them remains obscure. But (excluding the Lupercalia) their effect was to put Caesar at variance with the tribunes Caesetius and

and Marullus. He was displeased by their officious interference in the kingship incidents, and when they publicly complained that their freedom was curtailed, he lost patience and caused them to be deposed by the assembly; at the same time they were expelled from the Senate on a motion of the tribune Helvius Cinna. This action was highly unpopular (see Plut. Caes. 61, 8-10. Ant. 12, 7. Dio 44, 9-10. App. II 108, 449-453. Suet. Iul. 79, 1-2. Nic. Dam. 20. Vell. II 68, 4-5. Livy Per 116. Cic. Phil. XIII 15, 31). The resulting alarm and resentment must have encouraged Caesar's enemies. What hand they had in causing it cannot be ascertained. But to persuade the people that Caesar was an aspiring tyrant was precisely what they wanted and nothing could serve that end better than a clash with the tribunes of the people and an act that could be called oppression. Caesar, by giving way to justifiable irritation, had played into their hands. He realised it himself - see Nic. Dam. 20 - his complaint to the Senate: μείζονός τε γνώμης καὶ ἐπιβουλῆς εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ δραθὲν, εἴ πως δύναιντο εἰς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτὸν διαβαλόντες ὡς ἂν δυναστείας παρανόμου ἐσῶντα. cf. Appian 108, 452, and 109, 454 λέγεται τοῖς φίλοις αὐτὸν ἐντέλλασθαι φυλάσσειν ὡς δεδωκότα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς λαβὴν ζητοῦσι καθ' αὐτοῦ.

His rejection of the diadem at the Lupercalia might possibly have been his answer, his attempt to vindicate himself.

(For this incident see Plut. Caes. 61, 1-8. Ant. 12. Nic. Dam. 21. App. II 109, 456-8. Dio 44, 11, 1-3. Suet. Iul. 79, 2. Vell. II 56, 4. Livy Per 116. de vir. ill. 85, 1. Cic. Phil. II 34, 84-87.)

It was clearly inspired and carried out by the Caesarians and may have been pre-arranged by Caesar himself not so much to try the reactions of the people as to put an end to the rumours of his aspirations to monarchy (see Rice-Holmes op. cit. p. 336). For that purpose he ordered the offer and his refusal to be inscribed in the official records.

What ~~was~~ his ultimate intentions were, what form of power he meant to establish and under what title must remain a matter for conjecture. The reality was his already, the trappings were less important. It was enough for the 'nobiles' that he did not mean to relinquish his power and did not refrain from flaunting it. Perhaps they believed he meant to establish a monarchy; still, 'regnum' was a term current in political abuse, and the title 'rex' could be deliberately used to alarm the people. What really mattered was the actual establishment of perpetual autocracy and the extinction of Republican ideas of liberty.

c.10. In this atmosphere, the conspiracy was developing. It may not have been the only one. The rumours of other plots may not have been without foundation. But the successful conspiracy from its numbers was evidently conceived on a larger

scale and represented a more general movement in the Senate. Its first beginning is not known. Cassius is usually and in all probability rightly regarded as the originator and organiser of the plot. He appears in this role in Plutarch (c.10, 1 and Caes. 62, 8-10) and Appian (II 113, 471 f.). Their account has been challenged by Gelzer (PW X 998-9) and Froehlich (PW III 1730) because Dio (44, 14, 1-2) speaks of Brutus as the prime mover and Nicolaus (19) only lists Cassius with the principal conspirators. The evidence of these two authors is not really sufficient to disprove Appian and Plutarch (see Rice-Holmes op. cit. p. 339 note 5). Dio is alone in supposing that Brutus originated the conspiracy. Nicolaus does not name a single author: he says the plot began with a small group and later spread widely to include a large number, ἐν οἷς μέγιστον ἠδύνατο Δέκμος τε Βροῦτος .... καὶ Γάϊος Κάσσιός τε καὶ Μάρκος Βροῦτος . cf. Suet. Iul. 80,4 where these three are called the 'principes' of the conspiracy.

Plutarch's account is more acceptable because it fits the characters of the two men.. It is incredible that Brutus first conceived the plot and set it in motion. Reflective rather than active, he required some external stimulus before proceeding to decisive measures. Cicero had seemed disappointed by his lack of response to veiled exhortations in 45 B.C. Since then other influences had been at work; his

observation of Caesar since his return, the promptings of friends (9, 5 Βροῦτον δὲ πολλοὶ μὲν λόγοι πρὸς τῶν συνήθων ... ἐξεκαλοῦντο. cf. Dio 44, 11, 4), not least, the constant reminder of Cato in Porcia. His mind was ready to receive the suggestion of conspiracy, but from another. It needed the presentation of an already defined Republican opposition to bring him to the point. When he knew that there was a plot on foot, he was prepared to join it. Plutarch (Caes. 62, 2) adds that he had hung back because he was much indebted to Caesar and hesitated to attack a benefactor.

Cassius on the other hand was very well suited to the part of conspirator, secretly contacting and organising the various disaffected elements, giving the opposition coherence and set purpose. What that purpose was is shown by the general demand for Brutus as leader and representative figure.

δεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ χειρῶν οὐδὲ τόλμης τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἀλλὰ βύξης ἀνδρὸς οἷος οὗτος ἐστίν... (c.10,1-3).

Brutus, both from his own reputation and from his connection with Cato, stood for the Republic in the general opinion. Not only that, but the influence he could exert through his kinship with many important families and through his friends was a consideration not to be overlooked. Representatives of many noble families and even men who had not approved the idea of assassination were to follow him later.

(see below on c. 28, 3 and 34, 3) Further, his name with its old, Republican associations marked him out for the head of a plot to remove the latest 'tyrant'. The people had already been reminded that the times called for another Brutus (9, 6f.). Decimus Brutus who also claimed the first consul as his ancestor (Phil. II 11, 26), could not in this enterprise command the same respect as Marcus. He was not known as a Republican, and, whatever his motives, the ties that had bound him to Caesar more closely than the rest could only make his appearance among the conspirators offensive and unnatural. Of the non-Caesarians Brutus was the obvious choice for leader. None of the others, not even Cassius, had the same prestige.

C.10, 3. The interview described here by Plutarch and also by Appian (II 113, 471-473), in which Cassius first broached the subject to his brother-in-law, is doubtless a dramatic fiction. But it is probably true that Cassius was the first to approach Brutus and induce him to declare openly for the Republic.

Plutarch and Appian also agree in placing Brutus' decision a very short time before the execution of the plot when the subject of the debate on the Ides of March was being discussed. Yet from the following chapters (11-13), which recount Brutus' activities in assisting the growth of the conspiracy, a certain lapse of time must be assumed. It is

unlikely, too, that Brutus was called in at the eleventh hour. When Cassius approached him, the idea of assassination was being seriously considered by a number of senators (whom Plutarch calls friends of Cassius, c.10, 1), but probably it had not spread beyond this inner group before Brutus' accession.

c.11. Having once entered into the plot, Brutus, characteristically, concentrated all his energies on it. The first necessity was the adherence of as many friends and political sympathisers as possible.

Ligarius, called here Gaius, but not found elsewhere under that name, must be the Quintus Ligarius numbered among the conspirators by Appian (II 113, 474). From Plutarch's account of him he can be identified with the Pompeian for whom Cicero pleaded successfully before Caesar in 46 B.C. (Cic. pro Ligario F. VI 13 & 14. Att. XIII 12, 19, 20, 44). Plutarch (Cic. 39, 5) says Caesar was himself moved by Cicero's speech for Q. Ligarius and was also induced by the pressure of public opinion, excited by Cicero, to grant a pardon. Ligarius' resentment was not softened and he remained hostile to Caesar (11, 2). Brutus, who is said to have been his friend, lost no time in approaching him and gaining his support.

c.12, 1. As it grew, the conspiracy began to extend from friends and allies of the leading members to all those who were

prepared to take part for various reasons. The number of those finally involved is given as 80 by Nicolaus (19), but sixty or more by others. (Suet. Iul. 80, 4. Eutrop. VI 25. Oros. VI 17, 2). Appian gives a list of some who were won over (II 113, 474). From this and other sources, twenty conspirators can be identified by name; among them are ten known adherents of Pompey and six Caesarians - the previous political affiliations of the remaining four are unknown. (see PW X 255).

12, 2 - cf. Plut. Cic. 42, 1. The conspirators, according to Plutarch, decided to exclude Cicero on account of his age and character. They were afraid that his natural hesitancy and timidity would hinder their purpose more than his reputation would assist it. They could feel sure that once the plot was successfully executed he would approve it.

Rice-Holmes (op. cit. III p. 340) has queried Plutarch's statement, suggesting that Cicero, though he took no active part, may have been in Brutus' confidence. He relies chiefly on the evidence of ad Brut. II 5, 1: "Scis mihi semper placuisse non rege solum sed regno liberari rempublicam: tu lenius immortali omnino cum tua laude".

This passage alone cannot stand against the evidence supporting Plutarch. Cicero himself in the Second Philippic refuted Antony's charge, that he had been the conspirators' adviser ("Caesarem meo consilio interfectum"). See II 11, 25

- 15, 37 "Quis enim meum in ista societate gloriosissimi facti nomen ~~est occultatem~~ audivit ?...." (II 11, 25).

More conclusive is the evidence of private letters, in which Cicero constantly complains of the conspirators' policy and affirms that, had he been included, he would not have left the work half-finished (i.e. by sparing Antony). See F. XII 4 to Cassius: "Vellem Id. Mart. me ad cenam invitasses ..." and F. X 28, a similar letter to Trebonius. There is no reason to believe that Cicero deliberately concealed his knowledge of the plot. The passage in his letter to Brutus does not immediately suggest a private discussion between them before the assassination. Nor was it written - as Rice-Holmes says - "a few weeks later"; the existing collection of letters to Brutus belongs to the year 43, after he had left Italy - by which time he had good reason to know Cicero's opinion on the subject.

Cicero's presence in the conspiracy would have been an embarrassment for other reasons than those given by Plutarch. A man of his standing, the most eminent of the consulars, must have taken precedence over the rest and appeared at the head of the conspirators. The original group, however, had decided on Brutus for this position. As a symbol of the Republic, to lend the required air of disinterested patriotism, either Cicero or Brutus might have been chosen; but not both. There was not room for the two of them in the same confederacy.

Neither would have wished to be subordinate to the other, and from their later disagreements it is clear that they could not work together successfully. Their lack of harmony might easily have wrecked the conspiracy.

A different point was raised by Boissier (op. cit. pp. 351-3). He defends Antony's charge on the grounds that Cicero was the spiritual if unconscious author of the conspiracy through the influence of his written works. The conspirators certainly called on Cicero by name immediately after the murder because of his distinguished position in the Senate and his known political sympathies. They had had no need of his exhortations, his regrets for the past and complaints of the present régime to spur them on to action. (See Meyer op. cit. p. 457.)

12, 3-5. The account of the debate on civil war and tyrannicide and its conclusion provides an example of Brutus' method of working, sounding his friends carefully before introducing to the plot those who were responsive. Of this group Labeo alone was selected; yet Favonius and Statyllius, though they disapproved on principle, followed Brutus when the assassination was an accomplished fact and both died at Philippi (see App. II 119, 500. Suet. Aug. 13, 2. below, c.34, 4. 51, 5).

12, 5. Decimus Brutus is mentioned by other authorities as one of the foremost conspirators without giving any indication

of how and when he came into the plot. (App. II 111, 464. 113, 474. Nic. Dam. 19. Suet. Iul. 80,4. Dio 44, 14, 3). Plutarch's explanation - that he was first approached by Cassius and Labeo but only induced to join them by Brutus - may be nothing more than an invention to enhance Brutus' reputation. Fellow-officers in Caesar's army e.g. Trebonius, who seems to have been one of the first Caesarians to fall away (Phil. II 14, 34) were, more probably, responsible for contacting Decimus.

Decimus was an important acquisition. He had been so near to Caesar, much nearer than Marcus Brutus, that his defection could not but delight the opposition and disquiet the Caesarians.

He had served under Caesar in Gaul 56-50 B.C. (B.G. III 11, 5. VII 87, 1), had assisted at the siege of Massilia in command of a fleet in 49 B.C. (B.C. I 36, 4) and from 48-46 governed Transalpine Gaul (App. II 48, 197. Livy Per 114). On Caesar's return from Spain, he rode through Italy with him, in company with Antony and Octavian (Plut. Ant. 11, 1). He ranked close to Antony in Caesar's estimation and was chosen with him as one of his secondary heirs (Plut. Caes. 64, 1).

In addition to his importance as a high-ranking Caesarian Decimus brought the practical advantage of a private troop of gladiators, to be used as a body-guard, if necessary,

after the assassination (App. II 120, 503. Dio 44, 16, 2. Vell. II 58, 2. Nic. Dam. 26β).

12, 8. The informal, almost careless, confederacy was considered remarkable by the authorities - cf. Appian II 114, 475. It was no clearly defined association, bound by oath; rather, a private understanding. There was no intention of banding together as a distinct party and drawing up a political programme. They were acting as senators, and they assumed that a majority of the Senate would support them.

c.13 The story of Porcia's attempt to force Brutus' confidence is told also by Dio (44, 13, 2 - 14, 1) - who says she was the only woman to know of the conspiracy - and by Valerius Maximus (III 2, 15).

Daughter of Cato and widow of Bibulus, she had every reason to be a determined enemy of Caesar. Her influence on Brutus since their marriage in the summer of 45 (see above) must have played a considerable part in shaping his political course. This anecdote (which may come from the memoirs of her son, Lucius Bibulus - see c. 13, 3) gives some idea of her character - she was evidently a true daughter of Cato (cf. Cato Minor 73, 6). As might be expected, she was not a favourite with her mother-in-law who, no doubt, feared that she would alienate Brutus from Caesar. A letter of Cicero to Atticus in 45 B.C. contains a hint of strained relations: "De Bruto nostro perodiosum, sed vita fert. Mulieres autem

vix satis humane, quae iniquo animo ferant, cum (in) utraque officio pareat." (Att. XIII 22, 4)

The suggestion of antagonism between the two women, both desiring to influence Brutus, has been further developed by Max Radin in his "Marcus Brutus" and by Abbott (op. cit. pp. 71-72) and is used to explain the vacillations of Brutus' policy from 45-44 B.C. An interesting speculation, but given too much emphasis by these writers.

Apart from brief reference in c.2, 1 (Κάτων ... πενθερὸν ὕστερον γενόμενον..), Plutarch has not hitherto mentioned this marriage. And here he says nothing of when it took place and its significance in Brutus' relations with Caesar (see above).

c.13, 3. L. Bibulus, Brutus' stepson, was already a young man, not as Plutarch says, παιδίον μικρόν. He held a command in Brutus' army in 42 but survived the defeat of Philippi and made his peace with Antony (App. IV 104, 434 , 136, 575-6). See also ad Brut. I, 7.

cc. 14-17. The assassination of Caesar.

Appian:	II 114, 476 - 118, 494.
Dio	44, 15-20.
Plutarch:	Caesar 63-67. Antony 14.
Suetonius:	Div. Iul. 80, 4 - 82, 4.
Cicero:	Phil. II, 12, 28. 14, 34. de div. II 16, 37. 54, 110. I 52, 119.
Velleius:	II 57-58, 1.
Livy:	Per. 116.
Nicolaus	23-24.
Eutropius:	VI 25.
Orosius:	VI 17, 2-4
Florus:	II 13, 93-95.
Valerius Maximus:	I 7, 2. 6, 13. IV 5, 6. VIII 11, 2.

c.14, 1-4. A meeting of the Senate being called for March 15th, the conspirators finally decided to make the attempt then.

The senate was chosen as the most fitting place and also because they believed they could rely on the approval of most senators. If the assassination were carried out in their presence it could be sanctioned and the restoration of the Republic proclaimed at once (14, 1-2. App. II, 114, 476).

Dio (44, 16, 1) says their decision was influenced by the possibility of introducing weapons into the senate and of

attacking Caesar there when he was quite defenceless. He explains further that they had delayed, hesitating to decide on a definite time and place, and through this delay and the number of those now privy to the plot they ran considerable danger of discovery. (44, 15, 1-3)

His account is borne out by Suetonius (80, 4) and Nicolaus (23) who describe several different plans discussed and rejected by the conspirators before they decided on the senate, e.g. the execution of the plot at the elections, at the theatre, or the Via Sacra near Caesar's house. The senate was considered better suited to their purpose; perhaps the ex-Pompeians felt also that it was peculiarly fitting that Pompey's curia should be the scene of Caesar's death (14, 4./Cic. de div. II 23). cf.

There was another reason for the choice. The conspirators were now pressed for time. Caesar's departure for Parthia was imminent. The meeting on the Ides was to complete the last arrangements, therefore Caesar's appearance in the senate then offered them their last opportunity of publicly striking him down. It could not be delayed any longer. Other suggested plans were abandoned in favour of this. See Suet. Iul. 80, 4: "postquam senatus Idibus Martiis in Pompei curiam edictus est, facile tempus et locum praetulerunt."

The reason implied by Plutarch above (c.10, 3 f.) and definitely stated by others (e.g. Dio 44, 15, 4. Suet. Iul.

79, 3 - 80, 1) - namely, that the plot was hurried on because a proposal to make Caesar king was to be brought forward and debated on the Ides - is extremely doubtful.

Most of the historians record the rumours circulating in Rome on this subject (Plut. Caes. 60, 2. Dio 44, 15, 3. App. II 110, 460-461. Suet. Iul. 79, 4). A prophecy was said to have been found in the Sybilline Books, that Rome would never conquer Parthia except under a king. Following this a report was spread abroad that at the last session of the senate before Caesar's departure L. Aurelius Cotta, one of the Quindecemviri, would propose to give him the title 'rex' for the forthcoming expedition; according to Plutarch (Caes. 64, 3) it was to be held outside Italy only. It was supposed, later, that the conspirators were anxious to anticipate this debate, since they could neither vote against the proposal nor abstain from voting (Dio 44, 15, 4. Suet. Iul. 79-80. App. II 113, 470 ff.). This assumes that Caesar or his friends (cf. Plut. Caes. 60, 2) were responsible for the oracle and the spreading of the story. Meyer (op. cit. p. 529 note 1) accepts this version, but it was more likely to have been the work of Caesar's enemies. Dio casts some doubt on the report (44, 15, 3) and Cicero himself, who had heard the rumour about Cotta some months before (Att. XIII 44, 1), afterwards declared it to be an imposture. See de div. II 54, 110 on the Sybilline Books - "Quorum interpres nuper falsa

quidam hominum fama dicturus in senatu putabatur eum quem re vera regem habebamus appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus ... ".

In that case, the conspirators must have known that there was no fear of such a question being raised in the senate. The origin and real meaning of the affair have not been satisfactorily explained. It may have been part of the compaign to bring odium on Caesar. Cotta's share in it is obscure - but it may be significant that Cassius too was one of the quindecemviri (see Broughton: Magistrates of the Roman Republic II p. 369).

c.14, 4 f. The Ides of March 44 B.C.

The coming of age of Cassius' son (not mentioned elsewhere) provided an excellent excuse for the gathering of a large number of senators at Cassius' house on the morning of the Ides. The conspirators were thus able to meet without attracting attention.

The composure of those who had to conduct public business before the senate met is recorded by Appian too (II 115, 482). It was considerably shaken before Caesar appeared.

c.15. The chief cause was Caesar's long delay, and, as the morning advanced, the fear that he might not come at all.

The reasons for the delay are given in greater detail in the Life of Caesar (63-66) and in other sources (App. II 115, 480. Dio 44, 17, 1-3. Vell. II 57, 2. Val. Max. I 7, 2.).

These dwell on tales of supernatural warnings and on Calpurnia's attempts to keep Caesar at home, in consequence of a disturbing dream.

c.15, 2-6. While the Senate was gathering, various minor incidents contributed to the increasing anxiety of the conspirators. ~~Caesar~~ Casca, accosted by a friend, nearly betrayed himself; Brutus and Cassius were alarmed by their encounter with Popilius Laenas, who referred obscurely to their enterprise (App. II 115, 483-484). Plutarch, again probably drawing on Bibulus, adds that news of Porcia's collapse was brought to Brutus and further distracted ~~to~~ him (15, 5-9).

16, 1. Caesar at length arrived. Plutarch says he came only to postpone any important business. The ~~ex~~use of indisposition is nearer the truth than that he paid any attention to the warnings of priests and soothsayers, especially since he was brought to the Senate in a litter.

No further details of events on the previous night and the morning of the Ides are given here. Other accounts include the familiar incidents: the dinner at Lepidus' house on the 14th and Caesar's comment on death; the disturbed night and Calpurnia's dream - of which there are several versions - Caesar's decision the next morning to postpone the meeting of the Senate. The authorities are agreed that he was eventually persuaded to change his mind by Decimus Brutus, but there are varying accounts: Dio says Decimus was sent from the Senate by

the other conspirators for this purpose, Appian (II 115, 481) that he was already with Caesar at his house, and Plutarch (Caes. 64) appears to be following the same version (see Plut. Caes. 63-66. App. II 115, 479 - 117, 490. Dio 44, 17-18. Nic. Dam. 23-24. Vell. II 57, 1. Florus II 13, 93-94. Obsequens 67. Val. Max VIII 11, 2. I 7, 2).

All the sources emphasize the supernatural element and the seeming inexorable fate - Caesar, in spite of human and divine attempts to warn and deflect him, going forward heedlessly (cf. Appian II 116, 489 χρῆν γὰρ ἃ ἐχρῆν Καίσαρι γένεσθαι). That there really was some human attempt to forewarn him seems certain. Knowledge of the conspiracy was beginning to leak out - see Florus II 13, 94. "Manaverat late coniuratio, libellus etiam Caesari datus eodem die".

Most of the authorities agree that Caesar received a paper, containing information of the plot against him, on his way to the Senate. Plutarch (Caes. 65, 1-2) says it was given him by the Greek sophist Artemidorus, who was acquainted with the friends of Brutus; others, by a person unknown, though Artemidorus is said to have tried to reach Caesar with information, in Appian's account (see App. II 116, 486. Suet. Iul. 81, 4. Dio 44, 18, 3. Vell. II 57, 2. Nic. Dam. 19).

c.17. Caesar's entry into the Senate. The failure of the preliminary sacrifices is noted by Appian (II 116, 488-489), Nicolaus (24), Florus (II 13, 94). According to Nicolaus,

Caesar thereupon betrayed some reluctance to proceed, but was again urged on by Decimus.

17, 2. Antony, who was not to share Caesar's fate and whose presence might have proved dangerous, was detained outside by Trebonius (see also App. II 117, 490. Dio 44, 19, 1). Plutarch (Caes. 66, 4) says, mistakenly, that Decimus detained him - see Cicero, Phil. XIII 10, 22 and II 14, 34: "Cum interficeretur Caesar, tum te a Trebonio vidimus sevocari".

17, 3-7. The death of Caesar.

see Plut. Caes. 66. App. II 117, 490-494. Dio 44, 19, 3-5. Suet. Iul. 82. Nic. Dam. 24. Livy Per 116. Vell. II 56-57. Cic. Phil. II 12, 28. de vir. ill. 78, 10. 83, 6. 82, 6. Oros. VI 17, 1. Florus II 13, 95. Eutrop. VI 25. Val. Max. IV 5, 6.

In descriptions of the scene, certain points remain substantially the same in all, but there are many variations in detail. Most of these details must be untrustworthy; in the general confusion no-one could have retained a clear and accurate impression of the scene. The conspirators surrounded Caesar as he took his place under the pretence of presenting a petition. Their number is not given, but they could only have been a part of the sixty or more who were in the secret.

c.17, 3-6. Cimber's part, the pre-arranged signal for the attack, and the first, ineffective blow, delivered by Publius Casca are well authenticated. After that, accounts differ.

c.17, 5. Casca's cry to his brother is repeated by Nicolaus (24). Caesar's words are different in Suetonius (Iul. 82, 1

"ista quidem vis est").

c.17, 6. It seems fairly clear that Caesar at first made some attempt at resistance. (cf. App. II 117, 492-493. Suet. 82, 2. Nic. Dam. 24). In Suetonius, Appian and Plutarch (Caes. 66, 10) it appears quite determined (see App. II 117, 493 - σὺν ὀργῇ καὶ βοῇ καθάπερ θηρίον.). Appian, like Plutarch, says he abandoned the attempt when he saw Brutus among his assassins; others only record that he was overcome by the number of his opponents - see Dio 44, 19, 5: ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν, μήτ' εἰπεῖν μήτε πρᾶξαί τι τὸν Καίσαρα δυνηθῆναι.

Plutarch's version is part of the later romanticised picture of Brutus and Caesar, as also is the story, rejected by Suetonius and Dio, of Caesar's last words to him.

In the mêlée, many of the conspirators themselves were wounded - including Brutus (App. II 122, 512. Nic. Dam. 24). Cassius' zeal is expressed by Aurelius Victor - de vir. ill. 83, 6 "in caede dubitanti cuidam, vel per me, inquit, feri".

Nicolaus (26) says that of all his friends only two, Censorinus and Calvisius Sabinus, tried to defend Caesar. From all accounts it is clear that the rest of the Senate made no attempt to intervene. He is said to have received twenty-three wounds (thirty-five, in Nicolaus 24, alone); of all these only one, according to the physician Antistius, was mortal (Suet. Iul. 82, 3).

cc. 18-20. Events after the assassination, from 15th to 20th March.

Appian: II 118, 494 - 148, 615.

Dio: 44, 20-52.

Nicolaus: 26-27.

Cicero: Phil. II 12, 28. 14, 34-35. 35, 88 - 36, 91. Att. XIV 10. 14. XV 11.

Plutarch: Caes. 67-68. Ant. 13.

Suetonius: Div. Iul. 83-84.

Velleius: II 58-59.

Frisch: Cicero's fight for the Republic pp. 42 ff.

Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 97 ff.

Ferrero: Greatness and Decline ... (Eng. trans.) III pp. 1-29. Appendix A pp. 309 ff.

Rice-Holmes: Roman Republic III p. 568.

c.18, 1-3. The sources all present the same picutre of the confusion and panic which spread through the city with the news of the assassination. The Senate dispersed at once in disorder and Brutus was unable to deliver his prepared speech. The Senate's reaction upset his plans and prevented the immediate and formal restoration of the Republic on which he had counted. His first action had been to call upon Cicero, whose name was so closely associated with the Senate and the constitution. See Phil. II 12, 28: "Caesare interfecto, ... statim cruentum

alte extollens Brutus pugionem Ciceronem nominatim exclamavit atque ei recuperatam libertatem est gratulatus."

18, 3-4. Brutus is generally and, no doubt, rightly credited with the policy of moderation followed by the conspirators, in particular, with influencing the decision to spare Antony. See App. II 114, 478. Nic. Dam. 25. Plut. Ant. 13, 2. Vell. II 58, 1.

Dio alone gives it as the decision of all, without reference to Brutus (44, 19, 1-3). Cicero, however, blamed him for allowing Antony to become dangerous: "Haec omnis culpa Bruti" (Att. XV 20, 2).

The reasons given in the sources for this course are Brutus' determination to demonstrate their disinterested motives by beginning and ending with the death of Caesar and his fear that the assassination might otherwise degenerate into a general massacre of political opponents.

Plutarch alone adds the suggestion that Brutus hoped for a change in Antony, once Caesar was removed (18, 4-6). This is not unreasonable if, as he says, (Ant. 13) the conspirators had previously considered Antony as a possible confederate and if he was suspected of having plotted against Caesar (see c.8, 2. Caes. 62, 10). According to Cicero, Trebonius had sounded him on the subject in the year 45, at the time of his estrangement from Caesar. See Phil. II 14, 34: " ... quem et Narbone hoc consilium cum C. Trebonio cepisse notissimum est".

Brutus' later attitude to Antony further supports Plutarch. Even in 43 B.C. he was reluctant to give up all hope of reaching an accommodation with Antony, until the formation of the triumvirate finally disillusioned him (see Syme op. cit. pp. 184, 203).

18, 7. The dispersal of the Senate left the conspirators alone and completely disconcerted. They were not prepared for this turn of events and, without the backing of the Senate, could do nothing. Therefore, concern for their personal safety made them withdraw to the Capitol, protected by the gladiators.

In Plutarch's account of the Ides, the 'liberators' on the Capitol are joined by a number of senators and friends; Brutus then delivers his speech and is afterwards escorted down to the forum to address the people, the other conspirators following; but the hostility shown to the praetor Cinna for his condemnation of Caesar forces them to retire again; Brutus finally dismisses all but his confederates from the Capitol.

In all this, Plutarch, chiefly concerned with the part played by Brutus, emphasizes the univeral respect he commanded, which influenced the people's reaction to the assassination.

From other sources it appears that the conspirators, having failed to arouse any popular sympathy on their first appearance in the forum, withdrew with their guard. Appian (II 119, 500)

says they were joined in the forum by distinguished men, including Lentulus Spinther, Favonius and Dolabella, who wished to be associated with them. Those who later assembled on the Capitol to confer with them were friends and sympathisers rather than a general gathering, as Plutarch suggests. Cicero was prominent among them (Att. XIV 10, 1).

Appian agrees with Plutarch in referring the contio in the forum to the afternoon of the Ides; but in his account, Cinna's demonstration and an unexpected display of Republican zeal from Dolabella prompt a section of the people (bribed by the conspirators) to call for them; whereupon Brutus and Cassius appear alone, both address the people and return to the Capitol. Later, in the evening of the 15th, Appian describes the opening of negotiations with Antony and Lepidus (II 118, 494 - 125, 521).

In Plutarch and Appian, all these events are crowded into one day, but since they both speak of the first session of the Senate on the next day, whereas it is known to have been held on the 17th from Cicero (Phil. II 35, 89 "post diem tertium veni in aedem Telluris"), Ferrero (op. cit. III pp. 309 ff.) has suggested that their narrative should be extended to cover the two days before the Senate's meeting. His suggestion seems all the more reasonable when it is remembered that Caesar had not appeared in the Senate until the morning was well advanced (above, 15, 1). Unless Ferrero's extension is adopted it must

be supposed that the rest of the Ides was almost impossibly crowded, while on the 16th the conspirators remained completely passive throughout the day.

The discussion held by the Republican leaders on the Capitol certainly took place on the 15th (see Att. XIV 10, 1 "illo ipso primo Capitolino die"). The embassy to Antony was probably sent at the conclusion of this conference, and as the envoys went to Antony on the evening of the 15th (Nic. Dam. 27), it may be assumed that the conference occupied the whole of the afternoon. In that case the contio in the forum must be referred to the 16th - as, in fact, it is in Plutarch: Caes. 67, 7 (μεθ' ἡμέραν).

The meeting on the Capitol was held to consider what action should be taken and what approach made to Antony. It was essential that the Senate meet as soon as possible and reach a new settlement. Cicero strongly advised Brutus and Cassius to convoke the Senate on their own authority, as praetors. See Att. XIV 10, 1: "Meministine me clamare, illo ipso primo Capitolino die, senatum in Capitolium a praetoribus vocare debere?".

They refused. Such action on their part would have been unconstitutional; it was the proper function of the surviving consul, Antony, who could not be ignored, in any case. As they had not removed him together with Caesar, they found it necessary to treat with him, in the hope of reaching a

peaceful agreement. Ferrero (op. cit. II p. 311) even believes that the necessity for a consul in the smooth running of the state was an important reason, perhaps the chief, in the decision to spare Antony. He points to the confusion that followed the loss of both consuls at Mutina in 43 B.C. This consideration perhaps persuaded the other conspirators to accept Brutus' policy. But Cicero, who thought it a mistake to trust Antony, refused to join the embassy that was sent to negotiate with him. See Phil. II 35, 89: "Dicebam illis in Capitolio liberatoribus nostris cum me ad te ire vellent ... quoad metueres omnia te promissurum, simul ac timere desisses, similem te futurum tui. Itaque cum ceteri consulares irent, redirent, in sententia mansi".

The negative attitude of the conspirators, their lack of any bold plan of action after the assassination, which ruined all their hopes, has been frequently interpreted as the result of excessive timidity or sheer lack of foresight. It was, however, consistent with their policy (see Syme op. cit. p. 99). They had not planned a coup d'état. To have done so would have been merely to exchange Caesar's domination for their own, contrary to the principles of the sincere Republicans among them. And it would seem, from the course they followed, that these were dominant in the group and able to impose their policy on the rest. Brutus, the leading

Republican and the most moderate, had certainly hoped to effect a change of government without further violence or illegality. Hence his lack of plans - he had expected the Senate to deal with that part of the affair, after he and his associates had removed the dictator. When he was disappointed in his expectations that the Senate could automatically resume its old functions on the death of Caesar, when he found the people unimpressed by declarations of liberty, he saw no lawful course open to him but to approach Antony in order to arrange a meeting of the Senate. Then the delayed restoration of the Republic might yet be effected.

Brutus' counsels prevailed. The conspirators had mistaken the temper of the people (cf. App. II 120, 504 ἐπὶ γὰρ ᾤοντο τὸν δῆμον εἶναι Ῥωμαίων ἀκριβῶς οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πάλαι βιοῦτον . . .). They could expect no support from the legions or from Caesar's veterans - while Antony had good hopes of commanding the soldiers' loyalty and Lepidus was even then master of armed forces stationed on the island in the Tiber. Syme (op. cit. p. 99) believes that if the conspirators had resorted to violence the Caesarians would have retaliated and quickly overwhelmed them. Therefore they were obliged to rely absolutely on the Senate, but there they hoped to command a majority (App. II 125, 521). Brutus insisted on proceeding by legal methods and, possibly in their confidence of the Senate's support, even the more realistic

of the conspirators followed his lead.

The policy - and the whole enterprise - failed because the Senate was degenerate, unable to use the opportunity offered by the death of Caesar. In those circumstances, the passivity of the Liberators served no useful purpose, but merely allowed the initiative to pass to more ambitious, unscrupulous politicians.

Their first and greatest mistake, however, lay in their failure to perceive that the Senate itself had made autocracy not only possible but inevitable and that the removal of the autocrat would not, in itself, restore the Republic to a healthy and vigorous state. (See Wirzubski op. cit. p. 91) It is easy to condemn them for the political blindness which caused more civil disturbances yet it was not unnatural that the old aristocracy should fail or refuse to see that its government had lost its efficiency and that the time for it was past. Admiration for Caesar should not preclude a consideration of the 'nobiles'' point of view. (See Ferrero op. cit. I pp. 305-6 "Great man as Caesar was, it was impossible that his contemporaries should anticipate the childlike hero-worship of posterity".)

Caesar's friends are not much in evidence on the Ides of March. They dispersed in panic and concealed themselves until they saw how events were shaping. Antony fortified himself in his house (App. II 118, 496. Cic. Phil. II 34, 88). Lepidus

brought up his troops from the island to the Campus Martius, but took no more definite action for the moment. Dolabella alone appeared in public, having immediately assumed the insignia of the consulship promised him on Caesar's departure for Parthia (App. II 122, 511. Vell. II 58, 3). Ferrero (op. cit. III p. 311) argues that his declaration in favour of the conspirators should be dated to the 16th, since there is no suggestion at the discussion on the Capitol that they then had the support of a consul.

The Caesarians, at first, were far less assured than the conspirators seem to have believed. They could not have known precisely what group had originated the conspiracy or how many of the senators were involved. The combination of Caesarians with ex-Pompeians could not have been anticipated and therefore the discovery must have complicated the position of loyal Caesarians still further. Not only had they lost their leader, but their party was seen to be divided and a political regrouping was revealed.

Appian says they found further cause for alarm in the powerful connections of the leading conspirators and in the power Decimus Brutus would acquire as governor of Cisalpine Gaul (App. II 124, 518). On the Ides, therefore, they waited for some move on the conspirators' part, prepared for measures against Caesar's chief friends and adherents.

Antony and Lepidus (who seem to have been together by

the evening of the 15th - see App. II 123, 515) were reassured by the arrival of the embassy, which revealed at once the weakness of the conspirators' position. For the moment, they refused to commit themselves and returned a guarded answer.

The same night, Antony secured the possession of Caesar's money and papers (App. II 125, 524). On the 16th, the leading Caesarians, including Antony, Lepidus and Hirtius, held a council (Nic. Dam. 27). Like the Republicans on the Capitol, they were not agreed upon the course to follow. Lepidus spoke for avenging Caesar (cf. App. II 131, 547) and received some support, but Antony seconded Hirtius' proposal to reach an accommodation with the conspirators and the majority voted with him. He then convoked the Senate for the following morning. The chosen meeting-place was the temple of Tellus, conveniently near Antony's house (Phil. II 35, 89. App. II 126, 525). He was no more inclined to risk his personal safety than were the conspirators, securely holding the Capitol.

During the night of the 16th, Lepidus occupied the forum with his troops, in readiness for the morning (see App. II 126, 526. Dio 44, 22, 1. Nic. Dam. 27. cf. Phil. II 35, 89). Throughout that night, with fires lighted and guards stationed in the streets, the friends of both parties were active. (App. II 125, 523.)

c.19, 1. The first session of the Senate, 17th March.

Plutarch records only that Antony, Cicero and Plancus spoke

in favour of amnesty and concord, and that the conspirators were granted impunity. He adds that it was decided to bring before the people a measure to accord them honours, which does not agree with other sources. More important is his omission of all reference to the confirmation of Caesar's 'acta' at this session.

Dio (44, 23, 1 ff.) puts a long speech into the mouth of Cicero, whose proposals are then adopted. Appian (II 126, 525 ff.) gives the most detailed account of the session and the actions of the people while it was proceeding. In it can be seen the lack of unity among the senators and Antony's skilful management of them. He listened first to their opinions. The more enthusiastic proposed a vote of thanks to the ~~Capitol~~ Liberators. Others considered that they should only be granted impunity, as a concession to their distinguished relatives. Having heard them out Antony then laid the issue clearly before them: either they must agree to declare Caesar a tyrant and annul all his enactments and appointments (which would not only create enormous difficulties but also deprive many of them of office) and treat Caesar's body as that of a condemned criminal (thereby inviting a riot among the people and the veterans, now coming in from their colonies); or they must reaffirm the validity of his position and his acts and so, logically, condemn his assassins. By presenting this dilemma, Antony succeeded in turning the debate to his own advantage.

How mistaken the conspirators were in their belief that they could depend on the Senate then appears. It was as wax in Antony's hands. Nor were its members proof against his appeal to their self-interest. They were ~~clearly~~ cleverly guided to the decision he wanted.

He had no intention of allowing the conspirators to be officially approved and glorified as Liberators of the state from Caesar's tyranny. On the other hand, he was still upholding the moderate counsels he had advocated to the Caesarians. The condemnation of the conspirators was not in his interests. He was now the most prominent figure among the Caesarians, but he could not expect to command the loyalty of all Caesar's adherents. Hirtius and Pansa, for example, the consuls-elect, had no enthusiasm for Antony. Hence, the maintenance of his position depended on his ability to hold the balance between the two opposing parties. For the moment, the existence of the conspirators was necessary, to preserve the balance.

Dio (44, 34, 5-6) says Antony favoured the conspirators in order to check Lepidus, who, having been Caesar's magister equitum, was ambitious to fill his place and had the advantage of an armed band in the city, while Antony as yet commanded no following. This illustrates the same point: Antony's need of each side, to act as a check to the other, until he himself was firmly established.

The Senate, under his guidance, at length reached an

illogical compromise, to reconcile both parties and keep the peace. No action was to be taken against the conspirators, but Caesar's 'acta' were to be confirmed en bloc. Cicero put forward the proposal that this contradiction be glossed over, after the Athenian precedent, under the form of an 'amnesty'. See Phil. I, 1 "ieci fundamenta pacis Atheniensiumque renovavi vetus exemplum". Plut. Cic. 42, 2. App. II 142, 593. Dio 44, 34, 1.

Cicero himself later commended Antony's course at this time (Phil. I 29, 31). Nonetheless, Antony was left the real master of the situation. The recognition of Caesar's 'acta' made the amnesty more of a concession to the conspirators than an indication of approval. Their adherence to constitutional forms had given Antony an advantage which he did not scruple to seize. Once their hesitation to usurp authority had restored his confidence, he prepared to take the initiative and, before long, was able to reverse the situation and undermine their confidence.

During the session of the Senate, Brutus held a contio on the Capitol and tried to conciliate the veterans by promising to maintain Caesar's provisions for them (App. II 137, 570 - 142, 592).

Plutarch has no word of this, unless he has confused it with Brutus' first speech, delivered on the Ides. See above 18, 10: διελέχθη Βρούτος ἐπαγωγὰ τοῦ δήμου καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς πεπραγμένοις.

Plutarch and Appian both describe the people as being moved in his favour by his address.

19, 2 f. After the debate was concluded, the conspirators left the Capitol, but not before receiving Antony's son as hostage (see Phil. I 1, 2. 13, 31). A show of reconciliation followed. Brutus was entertained by his brother-in-law Lepidus, Cassius by Antony (see Dio 44, 34, 6-7).

In Appian's account (II 142, 594) the reconciliation takes place on the 18th. The conspirators, after receiving as hostages the sons of Antony and Lepidus, come down from the Capitol on the invitation of the people, still favourably inclined to them after Brutus' speech. For the moment, any serious disturbance of the peace had been averted. But the show of goodwill between Caesar's friends and Caesar's murderers could not last. Discussion on his will and funeral produced more difficulties and led to an outburst of popular anger against the conspirators.

c.20. This discussion, in Plutarch, takes place during the second session of the Senate on March 18th, at which the conspirators are said to be present. Cassius is represented strongly opposing a public funeral and reading of the will, while Brutus, in accordance with his policy, agrees to it. Velleius has a similar account II 58, 2: "cum cos. Antonius (quem cum simul interimendum censuisset Cassius, testamentumque Caesaris abolendum, Brutus repugnaverat ...)".

In Appian (II 136, 567) at the end of the session on the 17th, Piso calls back the senators and puts this motion, causing renewed disturbance. For Piso's part cf. Suet. Iul. 83, 1: "postulante ergo L. Pisone socero, testamentum eius aperitur recitaturque in Antoni domo".

20, 3 f. Here follows a description of the popular excitement on the publication of the terms of Caesar's will with its bequests to the citizens. This broke into open rioting at his funeral. In Plutarch's account of the funeral, Antony, seeing the effect of the customary laudatio on the people, began to excite them deliberately, until they were quite beyond control (cf. Ant. 14, 3).

With elaborations, this version is found in Appian (II 143, 596 - 148, 615) and Dio (44, 36-52). All are agreed that Antony delivered a speech which influenced the mob against the conspirators. Suetonius, however, has a different and more unexpected account. See Iul. 84, 2: "laudationis loco consul Antonius per praeconem pronuntiavit senatus consultum, quo omnia simul et divina atque humana decreverat; item ius iurandum, quo se cuncti pro salute unius astrinxerant; quibus perpauca a se verba addidit".

Beside this plain, simple account, the highly-coloured descriptions of the other authorities are suspect. For that reason, Deutsch ("Antony's Funeral Speech" University of California Publications in C.P. IX pp. 127 ff.) upholds

Suetonius, arguing that later historians would take the customary laudatio for granted, and further that Antony would not have made an inflammatory speech so soon after the reconciliation. To rouse the mob without appearing directly responsible would be more consistent with his policy. All this is very reasonable and, without Cicero's evidence, Suetonius might be accepted without hesitation. But there are, in particular, two references in Cicero which seem to uphold the traditional view. Deutsch's attempts to explain them away are not as convincing as his arguments against the historians. In the Second Philippic, Cicero directly accuses Antony: "Tua illa pulchra laudatio, tua miseratio, tua cohortatio; tu, tu, inquam, illas faces incendisti .." (Phil. II 36, 90-91). There is also a letter of April 44 (Att. XIV 10, 1): "At ille etiam in foro combustus laudatusque miserabiliter servique et egentes in tecta nostra cum facibus immissi." The most natural meaning of 'laudatus' here is the delivery of 'laudatio funebris'. But it might be reconciled with "perpauca verba" if it were not supported by the more explicit statement in the Second Philippic. Unless it can be shown that Cicero was guilty of gross exaggeration, it seems necessary to assume a 'laudatio' of some kind. The theatrical accounts of the historians may be largely discounted. However, with or without a set speech from Antony, the funeral had the desired effect of forcing the conspirators to

withdraw from public life, while Antony could not be directly charged with violation of the amnesty.

Plutarch holds that the funeral destroyed the conspirators' hopes and that Brutus' vote in favour of it was his second serious blunder; the first being his insistence on sparing Antony. But the funeral riots, by keeping the conspirators away from the Senate and leaving Antony master there, only completed what the session of the 17th had begun. The confirmation of Caesar's 'acta' had given Antony what he wanted. After that, it was only necessary to make the other part of the agreement, the amnesty, worthless to the conspirators and the foundations of his power were laid.

c.19, 5. The distribution of provinces 44-43 B.C.

How: Cicero. Select Letters II Appendix IX pp. 546-550.

Rice Holmes: Architect of the Roman Empire pp. 188 ff. 196.

Ferrero: Greatness and Decline ... Eng. tr. III Appendix B pp. 324 ff.

Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 110-111.

Frisch: Cicero's Fight for the Republic pp. 63-64 and 117.

Piganiol: Histoire de Rome p. 196.

Hall: Nicolaus' Life of Augustus p. 94.

Plutarch gives a list of the provinces assigned to the leading conspirators, by his account, at the second session of the Senate on March 18th 44, i.e. Crete to Brutus, Libya to Cassius, Asia to Trebonius, Bithynia to Cimber and Cisalpine Gaul to Decimus Brutus.

He is confusing the confirmation of provinces distributed by Caesar for 44 B.C. with the later assignment to Brutus and Cassius for 43. The appointments of Decimus, Trebonius and Cimber were made originally by Caesar and confirmed by the Senate after his death, probably on March 18th. See App. III 2, 4 καὶ ὅσοι παρ' αὐτοῦ Καίσαρος εἰλήφεσαν ἡγεμονίας ἐθνῶν, ἀπελελύθεσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας ...
- then follow the names of the three conspirators and their provinces as in Plutarch.

Decimus set out for Gaul in April. By the 26th Cicero

had heard rumours of his arrival (Att. XIV 13, 2). The others probably left Rome about the same time (Att. XIV 10, 1 - April 19th "... ut Trebonius itineribus deviis proficisceretur in provinciam?").

On the provinces assigned to Brutus and Cassius the authorities are not agreed. The appointment of Brutus to Crete is certain from Cicero: see Phil. II 38, 97. XI 12, 27. The same province is given in Dio 47, 21, 1 and Appian III 8, 29. Cassius, however, is variously said to have been appointed to Illyricum (Nic. Dam. 28), Bithynia (Dio 47, 21,1) and Cyrene (App. III 8, 29). Appian adds an alternative report that both Crete and Cyrene were assigned to Cassius, Bithynia to Brutus. Cicero does not give the name of Cassius' province, but Plutarch is probably right in saying Libya (i.e. Cyrene).

As to the date of this assignment by the Senate; the question was raised in June, certainly not March. On June 2nd or 3rd Cicero heard from Balbus that the distribution of praetorian provinces was to be settled (see Att. XV 9, 1). The assignment was made before September 19th (the dramatic date of the Second Philippic). August 1st, the date suggested by Groebe in Drumann i 429, 430, has been generally accepted; but Frisch, (op.cit. p. 117 note 107) argues that about that time diplomatic relations between Antony and the Liberators were broken off (see F. XI 3 - 4th August 44), therefore Antony

was unlikely to grant any concessions to them then. On that account and because Cicero accused Antony of making use of Brutus' province in a forged decree of Caesar (Phil. II 38, 97), he favours an earlier date.

There was also a tradition that the provinces of Macedonia and Syria had been assigned or promised to Brutus and Cassius for 43 B.C. by Caesar. It is found in Appian in many references (e.g. III 2, 4. 7, 24. 24, 91) and in Florus (II 17, 4). Piganiol (op. cit. p. 196) thinks it may have some foundation in a promise made by Caesar, but it seems more likely that it is an error arising from their later occupation of these provinces.

Plutarch, neither here nor elsewhere, suggests that provinces were assigned to Brutus and Cassius before Caesar's death. (See Ant. 14. Caes. 67. Cic. 42.) On the contrary, in all accounts the Senate is said to have decided the matter after the assassination. The strongest evidence against Appian and Florus is provided by Cicero, who after the allotment of Macedonia and Syria to the consuls, never claimed that Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of their rightful provinces. In fact, he later attempted to justify their occupation of these provinces on quite different and less valid grounds, and admitted that they had no legal claim. See Phil. XI 12, 27 "... in Macedoniam alienam advolavit"; 12, 28 - their justification is the law "ut omnia quae rei

publicae salutaria essent, legitima et iusta haberentur. ... Huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syria profectus, alienam provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, his vero oppressis suam lege naturae".

Cicero is evidently obliged to use such specious arguments, having no better claim to put forward. There is, however, a curious reference in a letter to Cassius, which seems pointless if Cassius had no claim at all to Syria: see F. XII 4, 2 "Dolabella valde vituperabatur ab hominibus non insulsis, quod tibi tam cito succederet, cum tu vixdum xxx dies in Syria fuisses."

The joke seems to suggest that Cassius was recognised as having a prior claim to Syria for 43 B.C., where Dolabella was trying to succeed him before he had even entered on his term of office. It may, perhaps, refer to the general belief in Rome that Cassius would go to Syria; or the real point of the remark may now be lost.

Ferrero (op. cit. III p. 326 f.) adopts the conjecture of Schwartz - that Caesar had already assigned Macedonia and Syria to Antony and Dolabella for 43 B.C. after their consulship. His arguments have been sufficiently refuted by Rice-Holmes (op. cit. p. 188 f.). Syme, however, (op. cit. p. 107) thinks that the assignment of consular provinces in March - April was probably in accordance with Caesar's known intentions. Considering the proximity of these provinces to Parthia, it is reasonable to suppose that Caesar

wanted reliable governors in them. He may have destined Antony for one of them - the choice of Dolabella for Syria is less obvious. In any case, it is clear that no final arrangements had been already decreed.

The consular provinces were decided in March or early April of 44 B.C. The Senate, no doubt in recognition of Antony's conciliatory policy, voted him Macedonia with the legions stationed there; his colleague, Dolabella, received Syria. This must have taken place before April 18th, for Cicero, in a letter of that date, refers to the appointment - see Att. XIV 9, 3 - on the situation in Syria: he adds "sed Dolabella et Nicias viderint".

In June, by measures brought before the people, the consuls were confirmed in their command for five years, and Antony was allowed to exchange Macedonia - while retaining its legions - for Cisalpine Gaul.

Rice Holmes (op. cit. pp. 192-6) believes that Phil V. 3, 7 and Livy Per. 117 refer to a single law, passed on June 1st or 2nd. See Phil V 3, 7 "Tribuni plebi tulerunt de provinciis contra acta C. Caesaris, ille biennium, hi sexennium". Livy Per 117 "/Antonius/ legem ... de permutatione provinciarum per vim tulisset."

Appian (III 27, 102) says that Antony asked for the exchange in order to have some pretext for bringing the Macedonian legions to Italy. (For the passing of the decree

see III 30, 115-120. 37, 150. 49, 198. 63, 251. cf. Dio 45, 25, 1. 46, 23, 4.) Piganiol (op. cit. p. 196) appears to believe that the exchange of provinces was a separate measure, not passed before August. This view, in which he is not alone, Rice Holmes (following Sternkopf: Hermes 47, pp. 357 ff.) attributes to the different emphasis in Cicero and the historians, the former dwelling on the prolongation of tenure, the latter on the exchange of provinces.

The extension of the consuls' command was certainly passed in June, see Att. XV, 11, 4 (June 8th) "Dolabella me sibi legavit a.d. iv Nonas ... bella est autem huius viris quinquenii licentia."

As for the exchange: Antony had been eager for the possession of Cisalpine Gaul for some time. At the end of April, Cicero had heard rumours of his designs on the province - to be put into effect at the session of June. See Att. XIV 14, 4: "Quae scribis Kalendis Iuniis Antonium de provinciis relaturum ut et ipse Gallias habeat et utrisque dies prorogetur, licebitne decerni libere?"

It appears from this that the two proposals were considered together from the beginning and therefore were probably passed as one law. It is noticeable, too, that Antony already meant to acquire the Transalpine as well.

In May, Antony's plans for June were causing anxiety. See Att. XV 4, 1: "Antoni consilia narras turbulenta ... sed mihi

totum eius consilium ad bellum spectare videtur, si quidem D. Bruto provincia eripitur."

Cicero's expectation of trouble in Cisalpine Gaul in a letter of June 5th further supports the belief that the 'lex de permutatione provinciarum' had already been passed - see Att. XV 10, 1 "Si vero aliquid de Decimo gravius, quae nostris vita ...".

From Cicero's evidence, therefore, there is no reason to dispute the view that the whole question of the consular provinces for 43 B.C. was settled as one measure in June.

The provincial situation was as follows: for 43, the consuls' position was assured with possession of Cisalpine Gaul and Syria, while Brutus and Cassius were relegated to the insignificant provinces of Crete and Cyrene; the other praetorian provinces were not yet allotted. In the summer of 44, the existing situation showed the original Caesarian appointments, but the Caesarian monopoly of provincial commands was broken by the three who had joined the conspirators. In the West, therefore, Further Spain was in the hands of Asinius Pollio, Hither Spain and Narbonensis of Lepidus, Gallia Comata of Plancus, but the Cisalpine of Decimus Brutus. The East was similarly divided: Illyricum and Macedonia were governed by Vatinius and Q. Hortensius, but beyond them, Asia and Bithynia were in the hands of Trebonius and Tillius Cimber, while Syria, as yet, was in confusion,

with the Caesarians Murcus and Crispus contending against the Pompeian Bassus (see below on c. 26).

c.21. From the funeral of Caesar (20th March 44 B.C.) to the Ludi Appollinares (7th - 13th July).

Cicero: Att. XIV - XVI, 7. F. XI 1-3.
Phil. I 1,1-3, 7. 7, 16 f. II 13, 31-33. 36, 91 ff.

Appian: III 1, 1-9, 30. 24, 91 - 27, 104.

Dio: 44, 53, 1-7. 47, 20, 1-4.

Nic. Dam.: 14. 17. Livy Per. 116.

Frisch: Cicero's fight for the Republic. pp 63 ff

Gelzer: PW X 993-998.

Merrill: On the date of F. XI 1. (C.P. X 1915 pp. 241 ff.)

21, 1. On the withdrawal of Brutus and Cassius from Rome, some authorities (e.g. Nic. Dam. 17) agree with Plutarch that they left the city at the time and in consequence of the riots after Caesar's funeral. Appian, however, states (III 2, 5) that Brutus and Cassius remained in Rome after the other conspirators had fled (II 148, 615) until the riots inspired by Amatius forced them to withdraw.

Amatius, or Herophilus, the Greek adventurer who claimed to be a son of the younger Marius, had been previously expelled from Rome by Caesar. (cf. Att. XII 49, 1. (May 45). Also Att. XIV 6, 1. Phil. I 2, 5. App. III 2, 3. Nic. Dam. 14). Returning after the assassination, he provided the city mob with a leader and incited them to further violence by calling

for vengeance on Caesar's murderers. He appeared early in April, from the evidence of Cicero's letters, and from the same source it is clear that Brutus and Cassius were still in the city, though unable to appear in public - see Att. XIV 5, 2. 11th April ("parietibus contineri"). On April 12th, Cicero heard of a conference of the Liberators and Antony. See Att. XIV 6, 1 "Antoni conloquium cum heroibus nostris pro re nata non incommodum." It is very probable, considering their position in Rome then and their departure almost immediately afterwards, that the conference at which Antony showed himself accommodating was closely connected with his procuring a decree for Brutus, the praetor urbanus, authorising him to be absent from the city for more than the stipulated ten days (see Phil. II 13, 31).

The Liberators certainly left Rome before April 15th, for by that date, Cicero at Formiae had heard rumours of Brutus' appearance near Lanuvium (Att. XIV 7, 1). Since it was apparently a casual report (and may therefore have taken a few days to reach Cicero) Merrill (C.P. X pp. 255-7) would fix the date of departure as early as April 9th. Cicero himself had left Rome only two days before (Att. XIV 1); therefore, Merrill's date allows one day only for the events mentioned in Att. XIV 5 and 6.

Frisch (op. cit. p. 68) suggests a date between April 10th and 13th - it is doubtful if it can be determined more

exactly.

The Liberators' first destination was Lanuvium, not Antium as stated by Plutarch (and Nic. Dam. 17). See Att. XIV 10, 1 "hoc meus et tuus Brutus egit ut Lanuvii esset?" cf. XIV 7, 1.

The mistake may have arisen because they moved to Antium later (see Att. XV 11). Gelzer (PW X 993) tries to reconcile the two accounts by suggesting that Brutus and Cassius retired to Antium after Caesar's funeral, returned to Rome when some order was restored and were obliged to withdraw again on the second outbreak of rioting. This seems an unnecessary elaboration and is not supported by any reference in Cicero. Moreover, Appian (loc. cit.) and Dio (47, 20, 1-2) agree with Cicero on this point.

The withdrawal of the Liberators from the city was an admission of defeat; though at first intended as a temporary measure. The field was then left clear for Antony, who without violating the agreement of March 17th had succeeded in ridding himself of their presence (see Phil. II 13, 33: "illos quos tu expulsos a te praedicas et relegatos."

He made use of the riots to impress on them the dangers of their continued presence in Rome. Merrill (C.P. X 241 ff.) has shown that the letter of Decimus to Brutus and Cassius (F. XI. 1) should be dated to this period in early April, not to March 16th or 17th. In it, Antony's way of working on their

fears can be seen: "Se ... neque arbitrari tuto in urbe esse quemquam nostrum; adeo esse militum concitatos animos et plebis".

When he had achieved his object and made possible their departure by senatorial decree, Antony took strong measures to suppress the rioters and summarily executed Amatius. His action was approved by Cicero and Brutus (Att. XIV 8, 1. Phil. I 2, 5).

There was still no open breach. The explosion of popular feeling had provided Antony with a weapon against the Liberators, confirming his initial advantage, but he could not yet afford to press this advantage too far and provoke them to retaliate. He also took care not to alienate the Senate. In March and early April he set himself to win the Senate's confidence - so successfully that even Cicero praised his policy in the beginning. See Phil. I 13, 32: "Proximo, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus non intermittebas quasi donum aliquod cotidie adferre reipublicae". See also I, 1-2, 5. II 36, 91.

Before its adjournment in mid-April, a number of measures designed to conciliate the Senate were brought forward (Phil. I 1, 3). The most important of these, in Cicero's opinion, and one that was taken as a pledge of Antony's honest intentions was the abolition of the dictatorship (see Phil. I 1, 3. 13, 32. II 36, 91. V 4, 10. App. III 25, 37. Dio 44, 15, 2.

Livy Per 116). It was intended and understood as an assurance that Antony was not seeking Caesar's position, and more than anything else secured for Antony at least the acquiescence of the Senate.

Before the end of March he also gave his support to Sulpicius' proposal on the publishing of Caesar's 'tabulae' - although he later disregarded it completely. See Phil. I 1, 3 "adsentiri etiam nos Ser. Sulpicio ... voluit, ne qua tabula post Id. Mart. ullius decreti Caesaris aut beneficii figeretur." cf. Phil. II 36, 91 where Cicero speaks as if Antony were the author of the decree. In early April, three senatus consulta were passed, two of them pro-Senate measures: the decree concerning Brutus (Phil. II 13, 31 - "M. Brutus, referente te, legibus est solutus si ab urbe plus quam decem dies afuisset.") and the proposed agreement with Sextus Pompeius - a concession to Republicans (App. III 4, 11. Dio 45, 9, 4) which was later brought to a conclusion by Lepidus (Dio 45, 10, 6). The Senate thus palliated was then ready to grant, in return, the provinces of Syria and Macedonia to the two consuls (see above on c.19, 5).

Antony, however, could not afford to conciliate the Senate at the expense of Caesarian support. As long as he had no military backing, his position in Rome depended on his skill in retaining the goodwill of both parties and in using one to check the other (see Syme op. cit. p. 115. Frisch p. 89).

But in mid-April he showed the Senate and the Liberators that his sympathies were unchanged, by delivering a speech in praise of Caesar at a meeting of the people (Att. XIV 11, 1. XV 20, 2). About the same time he began to act more openly in other ways. In a letter of April 22nd (Att. XIV 12, 1) Cicero first accuses Antony of misusing Caesar's papers. The possession of these papers gave him the opportunity of initiating legislation at will, under cover of Caesar's name. His schemes, according to Cicero, were financed by public funds from the temple of Ops. In the Philippics and in private letters, Cicero constantly attacks Antony on these grounds (e.g. Phil. I 2, 4. II 35, 92 - 39, 100. III 12, 30. V 6, 1-12. VII 10-15. XII 5, 12. Att. XIV 12 & 14 F. XII 1). Allowance must be made for exaggeration in his account, but no doubt there is some foundation for specific charges, e.g. the granting of citizenship to the Sicilians and the restoration of confiscated territory to Deiotarus in return for large bribes - two instances frequently mentioned. This was the kind of abuse that Sulpicius' measure had been designed to prevent.

Cicero's approval of Antony's earlier actions was soon followed by denunciations of the change in him, once he felt he had sufficiently placated the opposition - see Phil. III 12, 30 "duobus aut tribus senatus consultis bene et e re publica factis reliquas res ad lucrum praedamque revocaverit."

So in spite of the much-applauded abolition of the dictatorship, Cicero constantly lamented that, though the tyrant was dead, the tyranny lived on in Antony (Att. XIV 6, 2. 9, 2. 10, 1. 11, 1. 14, 2.). The policy initiated on March 17th had opened the way to it. Cicero, who had then supported the compromise, now pointed out its ludicrous aspect: "eius interfecti morte laetamur, cuius facta defendimus" (Att. XIV 9, 2).

From mid-April to late May, Antony was absent from Rome, travelling through the settlements of veterans in Campania and the south. Frisch (op. cit. p. 66) following Lange, believes that the journey was, ostensibly, concerned with a 'Lex Antonia de coloniis in agros deducendis' of March, traces of which can be found in the Philippics - Phil. VIII 9, 25 "Addit praeterea ut quos ipse cum Dolabella dederit agros, teneant ii quibus dati sint. Hic est Campanus ager et Leontinus". cf. Phil. II 39, 101. In Phil. V 4,10 the lex de coloniis is mentioned again in connection with Caesar's 'acta' and the abolition of the dictatorship, which suggests that it belongs to the same time. But the real purpose of his journey, which Frisch (op. cit. p. 81) calls "a veritable recruiting expedition" was to provide himself with the armed force he needed to secure his position, especially in view of the legislation planned for June, when the Senate should meet again. It was to include a new law on Caesar's 'acta' and a new settlement for the veterans.

Antony could not rely on the urban populace alone. He therefore set out to raise the veterans, returning in time for the session of June 1st with a considerable force.

Cicero (Phil. II 39, 100 - 41, 107) naturally gives a highly-coloured account of the Campanian progress and return to Rome, but rumours of this gathering and of Antony's plans for June alarmed Brutus and Cassius, who wrote to him concerning their own position and prospects of returning to Rome with safety (F. XI, 2).

On June 1st Antony found himself facing a much depleted and unresisting Senate. The Liberators and their friends had decided that it would be unwise to appear in a city full of Caesar's veterans. They were further influenced by fears of the drastic measures which, it was believed, would be brought forward by Antony. For the same reasons, Hirtius and Pansa also absented themselves (Att. XV 5. Phil. I 2, 6); while Dolabella, whose persecution of Caesar's worshippers during Antony's absence had so pleased the Republicans (Att. XIV 15, 2. 16, 2. F. IX 14. Phil. I 2, 5.) was soon bought over: "conlegam quidem de caelo detraxisti" (Phil. II 42, 107). There was no opposition to Antony.

21, 3. Ἀντωνίου σχέδον εἰς μοναρχίαν καθιστάμενου.

Antony's unchallenged supremacy may be said to have lasted from June 1st to August 1st. Plutarch's verdict on the character of Antony's consulship echoes that of Cicero, who was

biassed by his personal hatred of Antony, a hatred which became almost an obsession. Yet even in the early months of 44, after Caesar's death, while he still maintained friendly relations with Antony (see Att. XIV 12 a & b), he expressed his misgivings and saw in him Caesar's successor.

Charlesworth (C.A.H. X pp. 2-3) in fact believes that he expected to be named Caesar's heir, secured the confirmation of Caesar's 'acta' in this hope and suffered a bitter disappointment when the will was opened.

But it is impossible to say definitely what his aims were. He seems to have been an opportunist rather than a man with clear-cut plans, an astute politician rather than an aspiring autocrat. After the assassination, his first concern was to ensure his own safety, then to secure a position of power for himself. He certainly had no intention of allowing the Liberators to triumph or of relinquishing the high place he had won through Caesar. It may be doubted whether he saw himself as another Caesar or planned from the beginning to take his place. Cicero protested that Antony's whole consulship revealed his aspirations to "tyranny". In fact, it bore a closer resemblance to Caesar's first consulship than to his dictatorship (cf. Ferrero op. cit. III p. 43 and Syme op. cit. pp. 107-8). Even so, it was marked by less violence and bitter hostility than Caesar's consulship.

Antony was fortunate, too, in having both brothers in

office during his consulship, Gaius as acting praetor urbanus after Brutus' departure, Lucius as tribunus plebis.

On June 1st and 2nd, undeterred by the absence of leading senators he followed Caesar's example of 59 B.C. and took his proposals straight to the people; 'sine promulgatione' (Phil. II 42, 109). From Cicero's references, the proposals appear to have been: the extension of the consuls' provincial command for five years (see above on c.19, 5); a measure empowering the consuls with a committee to investigate Caesar's 'acta' (Att. XVI 16e, 11. Phil. II 39, 100) - this, apparently in accordance with a former decision of the Senate (Att. XVI 16 c, 11); probably between June 2nd and 9th, a lex agraria for the veterans, brought forward by the consuls (Phil. V 3, 7f.).

However unwelcome this new turn of events to the Senate, Antony was still, officially, respecting the compromise. Early in June, he proceeded to deal with the problem of the future of Brutus and Cassius.

The two praetors, after abandoning the city and their official duties, found themselves in an anomalous position, dependent on Antony's goodwill. They dismissed even their small guard of friends and adherents at his request (F. XI 2, 1). Again, this seems to have been the result of Brutus' policy. Gelzer (PW X 994-5) believes that it was dictated by his fear of giving the signal for war by determined self-assertion. For the sake of peace, he preferred to trust Antony - though, in

Gelzer's opinion, he could have raised a following in Italy, had he chosen. He evidently received some support from the municipalities, since the gathering of "necessarii" (F. XI 2) was enough to bring a protest from Antony; and the Puteolani and Sidicini chose Brutus and Cassius for their patrons. But such demonstrations were fairly harmless and while they might annoy, could not seriously disturb Antony. The Liberators themselves continued to hope for a peaceful accommodation and had no decided plan for the future, beyond returning to Rome as soon as it was safe. In May, writing to Antony, they restated their policy and acknowledged their reliance on him: "nos ab initio spectasse otium, nec quicquam aliud libertate communi quaesisse exitus declarat. Fallere nemo nos potest nisi tu ..." (F. XI 2, 2).

To this, Brutus clung as long as possible, hoping to avoid open war with Antony. But already in May he was contemplating exile as the only possible way (Att. XIV 18, 4).

Cicero, who had always advocated a stronger policy, deplored their reliance on Antony and lack of direction. His letters reflect the growing disillusionment, following his exultation over the Ides of March. With Antony in the ascendant, he was impatient of the paralysis of action, which had failed to offer any opposition to the consul's domination. See Att. XV 4, 2: "quod scribis te nescire quid nostris faciendum sit, iam pridem me illa ἀπορία sollicitat.

Itaque stulta iam Iduum Martiarum est consolatio. Animis enim usi sumus virilibus, consiliis mihi crede puerilibus."

Brutus, for his part, was confronted with the same difficulty as at the time of the assassination - the difficulty of offering effective opposition without violating his principles or abandoning his original intention of a peaceful restoration of the Republic. Gelzer thinks Cassius must have been at variance with his brother-in-law on this question (PW X 997). If so, he nevertheless took no steps on his own initiative, but continued to be identified with Brutus. They had remained together since their withdrawal from Rome. And now when the other two most prominent conspirators, Decimus Brutus and Trebonius, had gone to their provinces, they were recognised as the heads of the Republican group.

In May, with the fear of Antony's more radical plans for June before them, they were anxious to form an alliance with the moderate Caesarians, who also distrusted Antony. Cassius urged it particularly (Att. XV 5, 1). But Cicero, who was asked to approach Hirtius on their behalf, was not optimistic (Att. XIV 20, 4. XV 5, 6). He was justified. Hirtius had no love for Antony, but he was equally suspicious of Caesar's murderers. Negotiations proceeded no further.

Frisch (op. cit. p. 90) also argues the possibility of private negotiations with Antony from the proposed interview between Cicero and Antony's uncle, L. Caesar, (Att. XV 4 b)

which Brutus favoured, when it is taken in conjunction with a passage in the letter to Antony (F. XI 2, 3) "Quem enim impedimento futurum putas cum de nobis certum sit nos quieturos?" It is possible that they are here referring to some private assurance given to Antony of non-interference on their part in his programme for June.

Their course must have been discussed at the conference at Lanuvium to which Cicero and Atticus came (Att. XV 4, 2. 20, 2). It was probably decided then that neither the Liberators nor Cicero should attempt to appear in the Senate on June 1st. Yet, though they had withdrawn from active participation in public affairs, the presence of Brutus and Cassius in Italy was a problem that Antony could not afford to ignore indefinitely. Towards the end of May, Cicero heard that their future was to be considered by the Senate in June (Att. XV 5, 2). On June 2nd, he heard from Balbus what Antony had in mind for them: a commission to purchase corn for Rome, Brutus in Asia and Cassius in Sicily. At the same time, provision was made for the assignment of praetorian provinces for 43 B.C. at a later date (Att. XV 9, 1). This was Antony's plan to give them a decent pretext for leaving Italy before their year of office ended, but without conceding too much to them. Cicero's first reaction was indignation. See Att. XV 7, 1 "O rem miseram! primum ullam ab istis, dein si aliquam hanc legatoriam provinciam!"

He considered the commission inferior and slighting ("beneficio ... contumelioso" Att. XV 12, 1. "Dionis legatio" - XV 10, 1). But when he went to confer with the Liberators at Antium on June 8th, he had decided to advise them to accept; it was, at least, better than continuing inactive in Brutus' mock-Sparta at Lanuvium (see Att. XV 9, 1. "Hoc certe melius quam illa Περσικὴ portious ...").

He found in the family council at Antium irresolution, discontent, lack of agreement (see Att. XV 11). Cassius was resentful, Brutus hesitant, still wanting to return to Rome. The corn commission was not acceptable to either. But Gelzer (PW X 996) points out that Brutus, the constitutionalist, could not well ignore a decree of the Senate. Radin, on this point, ("Marcus Brutus" p. 186) compares Brutus' situation with that of Cato in 58 B.C., when Clodius succeeded in forcing on him the mission to Cyprus (see above c.3). Cato accepted, though unwilling, because the bill was passed by the popular assembly and became law. Brutus, faced with a similar decision, was at first inclined to go to Asia as directed (Att. XV 11 and 12). It was obvious that he and Cassius could not remain in Italy, in their present situation. But whether they left on Antony's terms or on their own in defiance of him was the question before them at Antium. Cassius was determined not to go tamely to Sicily; he would go to Greece instead (Att. XV 11, 1). Brutus remained undecided. To go abroad, but not to their

allotted provinces, meant either voluntary exile or a declaration of war. He still hoped that a change in the situation would enable him to return to Rome. Cicero succeeded in convincing him that it was not safe to make the attempt yet (Att. XV 11, 2).

Servilia, who with Porcia and Tertia was present at the council, promised to see that the distasteful commission was omitted from the senatorial decree. Her influence in the matter does not appear to have been questioned, even by Cicero who disliked her; but the sequel is uncertain.

Cicero left Antium still more disheartened. "Prorsus dissolutum offendi navigium vel potius dissipatam. Nihil consilio, nihil ratione, nihil ordine" (Att. XV 11, 3). The situation had been allowed to drift too long, beyond hope of saving it in Italy. At Antium, Brutus and Cassius had complained of past mistakes and lost opportunities. Cicero was more concerned about the future, but entirely agreed with criticisms of their policy hitherto. The Liberators had now no reason to linger in Italy, but Brutus decided to postpone his departure until the conclusion of his Games, in a last vain hope of a popular reaction in his favour (Att. XVI 5, 3).

c.21, 4-6. The Ludi Apollinares, held early in July, were the responsibility of the praetor urbanus. Brutus had hoped to fulfil this duty in person, and Cicero thought he should (Att. XV 10, 1). But by June it was obvious that he could

not show himself in the city with any safety.

21, 4. It was then decided that the Games should be held in Brutus' absence (μὴ παρόντος ἐκείνου cf. Att. XV 11, 2 "Constituit igitur ut ludi absente se fierent suo nomine" & Att. XV 12, 1).

21, 4. - ἀφειδῶς πάνυ χορηγουμένας .... . In this last attempt to win popular favour, the Games were prepared on a lavish scale. Atticus was, naturally, applied to for his assistance here. See Att. XV 18, 2 " ... de Bruto, cuius etiam ludorum sumptuosorum curam et (iam) administrationem suspicor ex magna parte ad te pertinere."

21, 6. Brutus' request that Cicero should attend the Games is found in a letter of 2nd July (Att. XV 26, 1). Cicero, who was just starting on his projected journey to Athens, was not able to oblige him: "Rescripsi scilicet primum me iam profectum ... deinde ἀτοπώτατον esse nec qui Romam omnino post haec arma non accesserim neque id tam periculi mei causa fecerim quam dignitatis, subito ad ludos venire." 21, 5. /On receiving news of the Games and their reception, he went to see Brutus, who was then staying on the island of Nesis in the bay of Naples (Att. XVI 1-5. Phil. X 4, 8). They had two grievances: one, the use of "Iulius" instead of "Quinctilis" in the announcement of the opening games (Att. XVI 1, 1), which greatly annoyed Brutus; he was anxious to have it rectified in a further announcement (Att. XVI 4, 1 - "... quam ille

doluit de 'Nonis Iuliis'. Mirifice est conturbatus. Itaque sese scripturum aiebat ut venationem eamquae postridie ludos Apollinares futura est, proscriberent (in) iii Idus Quinctilis."); the other was the substitution of Accius' play "Tereus" for his praetexta "Brutus" which Brutus had expected to be performed. He was, at first, delighted with the people's reception of the play, imagining that they had applauded the exploits of the first Brutus (see Att. XVI 2, 3. 5, 1). It is possible that C. Antonius, who as acting praetor urbanus presided over the Games in Brutus' absence, was responsible for these changes.

The celebration of the Games failed to produce the effect Brutus had hoped for. The choice of Accius' "Brutus" was obviously intended to rouse, or test, popular sympathy for the Liberators - Brutus must have believed, before he heard of the change, that the people had responded favourably. But Cicero knew that no reliance could be placed on empty applause at the Games and criticised the people for wasting their energies in applauding plays instead of using them in defence of the Republic (Att. XVI 2, 3). In the Philippics, however, he gives a more favourable report, magnifying the importance of the demonstration at the play and representing the people as well-disposed towards Brutus - see Phil. II 13, 31. X 3, 1. 4, 8. I 15, 36 - "illos qui, cum adesse ... non licebat, aderant tamen et in medullis populi Romani ac visceribus

haerebant. Nisi forte Accio tum plaudi ... non Bruto putabatis, qui ludis suis ita caruit, ut ... studium populus Romanus tribueret absenti, desiderium liberatoris sui perpetuo plausu et clamore leniret."

This is wild exaggeration, and may account for Plutarch's 21, 3 inaccurate description of popular feeling: ὁ δῆμος .... βροῦτον ἐπόθει ...

There was no reaction in favour of the Liberators, and Brutus was forced to abandon his last hope. Antony, certainly, was not now entirely popular; the city was not pleased by his suppression of their hero, Amatius, in April; and later his attitude to Caesar's heir cost him the goodwill of many. But there is no evidence that, tiring of Antony's supremacy, the people began to wish for the return of Brutus.

c. 22. Octavian.

Cicero: Att. XIV 5-6. 10. 12. 20-21. XV 2. 3. 12. XVI 8-15.
ad Brut. I 15-18. 3. 4a. II 5. F. XI 5-6. 27-28. XII 23. Q.F. I, 1.
Phil. III & V.

Appian: III 9, 30 - 24, 90. 28, 105 - 48, 197.

Dio: 45, 1-9. 11-17.

Nic. Dam: 2. 8. 16-18. 28-30.

Suetonius: Iul. 83. Aug. 4. 8. 10.

Vell.: II 59-60.

Plutarch: Ant. 16. Cic. 44, 5.

Orosius: VI 18, 1-2.

Eutrop.: VIII, 1.

Deutsch: Caesar's Son and Heir (Univ. Cal. publications in C.P. IX p. 149 f. 196 f.)

Chilver: J.RS. 1954. 44 pp. 126-7.

Crook: CR 1954 N.S.4. pp. 152 ff.

Frisch: Cicero ... pp. 76-78. 84-88. 144 ff.

Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 133-4. 147. 184.

Tyrrell and Purser: Correspondence of Cicero VI cxi ff.

Gelzer: PW X 1008.

22, 1-4. Octavian's first appearance at Rome after the assassination was earlier than Plutarch seems to imply - i.e. during Antony's absence, towards the end of April 44 B.C., not

after the Ludi Apollinares in July. In the second half of April, he was preparing for it - see Att. XIV 12, 2 (22nd April): "Quid censes cum Romam puer venerit ...". At the beginning of May, Octavian was evidently in the city (see Att. XIV 20, 5) and by the 18th, Cicero had news of his activities there (Att. XV 2, 3).

22, 1. On Octavian's connection with Caesar through his mother Atia, Caesar's niece, see Suet. Aug. 4, 1. Suetonius (Aug. 1-5) also gives the origin of the gens Octavia and a summary of his father's career. (cf. Cic. Q.F. I 1, 7. Phil. III 6, 15.) The humbler origin of his mother's family from Aricia was later used by Antony as material for propaganda (see Phil. III 6, 15).

22, 1. γράμματι δὲ πρὸς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ κληρονόμος ἀποδεδειγμένος. Plutarch puts these two points in the order of importance they were to assume later. In Caesar's will (according to Suet. Iul. 83, 2) Octavian was first-named heir, together with his cousins L. Pinarius and Q. Pedius, and then "in ~~mea~~ ima cera" adopted "in familiam nomenque". The exact meaning of the clause, with the question of Caesar's intention and Octavian's interpretation of it, has recently been discussed by Schmitthenner ("Oktavian und das Testament Caesars") in the light of Roman private law (see J.R.S. 1954 pp. 126-7. CR. 1954 pp. 152 ff.).

The case against Octavian's exploitation of the adoption

is based chiefly on the provisions in Caesar's will for a posthumous son (Suet. loc. cit.) and on the doubts of students of Roman law concerning the validity of testamentary adoption.

As regards the first, the provisions for a posthumous son do not positively prove that Octavian was not intended to be principal heir, nor can the position of the adoption 'in ima cera' be distinctly understood as a casual after-thought on Caesar's part.

The legal issue depends on the absence of evidence for testamentary adoption and still more on Ulpian's statement (Dig. I 7, 25) that the adrogator could not act "absens nec per alium".

Schmitthenner and others therefore argue that Octavian's "adoption" could not have been an "adrogatio", but was simply a "condicio nominis ferendi". It follows that the lex curiata, which Octavian was so anxious to obtain, was not merely irregular but wholly unprecedented, forced through by Octavian; hence, Antony's earlier obstruction. Schmitthenner concludes that the accepted interpretation of the final clause in Caesar's will was conceived in the first place by Octavian and used by him with outstanding success, but with no justification in Caesar's intentions.

The question of adrogatio by will cannot be dismissed so easily. Too little is really known of private law to deny the

possibility of such a procedure.

Caesar must have considered the future and no doubt hoped to be able to appoint a successor in time. He had accepted certain hereditary honours (see Dio 43, 34, 3. 44, 5, 3) and, though he still hoped for a son, in the last years he had advanced Octavian and associated the young man with himself. The will was made only a few months before his death (see Suet. Iul. 83, 1 "testamentum ... quod Idibus Septembribus proximis in Lavicano suo fecerat." But his choice of heirs was not made public - Deutsch argues that Caesar had no reason to publish his decision and that the actions of those about him provide further evidence of the general ignorance of his intentions (U.C.C.P. IX p. 149 f. 196 f.). Octavian himself did not know until after Caesar's death (see Suet. Aug. 8, 2 "utque primum occisum eum heredemque se comperit" cf. Dio 45, 3, 1. Vell. II 59, 5. Livy Per 116.). Nicolaus alone speaks of the adoption while Caesar was still living (Vita Caes. 8 υἱον ἤδη πεποιημένος i.e. at the time of Caesar's triumphs), but he later contradicts himself and gives the same account as the other sources (see c.17, on Octavian's arrival in Italy).

Whatever dynastic intentions Caesar had - and he could not have overlooked the enormous influence that would pass to his heir, adopting his name and inheriting his 'clientela' - Octavian was not yet in his confidence at the time of his death.

Octavian took his own way. At the time of Caesar's death, he was pursuing his studies at Apollonia and preparing to join the Parthian expedition (c. 22, 2. see also App. III 9, 30 f. Suet. Aug. 8, 2. Vell II 59, 4. Nic. Dam. 16-17. Dio 45, 3, 1). From more detailed accounts of his return to Italy (App. III 10, 33- 12, 40. Nic. Dam. 16-18. Vell II 59-60. Plut. Ant. 16) two points, in particular, emerge: his decision to return quietly, resisting the suggestion that he should appeal to the Macedonian legions at once, and his determination to accept the inheritance against the advice of his mother and his step-father, Philippus. He meant to be heir to Caesar's power as well as to his estate. He immediately assumed the name of Caesar, months before the formal ratification of the adoption, and was soon completely accepted as Caesar's son by the people and the army. The name of Octavius, which could never have commanded any following, was abandoned entirely. Antony knew how to provoke his rival by reminding him (and others) of his real origin (Phil. III 6, 15). On the other hand, "Caesar" gave him an immediate advantage and cloaked his rise to power with a semblance of righteousness.

Philippus, who had occasion to know him, distrusted him, and refused to call him "Caesar" (see Att. XIV 12, 2. ad Brut. I 17, 5. Att. XV 12, 2).

On reaching Italy, Octavian at first proceeded with caution. His first destination in Calabria was Lupiae (Nic. Dam. 17).

From there he made his way to Brundisium for further news. His arrival was rumoured as early as April 11th (Att. XIV 5, 3). There was also some false report of the arrival of the Macedonian legions (Att. XIV 6, 1). No doubt it was feared that Octavian would appeal to them.

He came, instead, to Naples, to his step-father's villa. During the Senate's recess, most of the leading Caesarians were to be found in the region of Naples. See Att. XIV 10, 3: "Octavius Neapolim venit xiv Kal. Ibi eum Balbus mane postridie, eodemque die mecum in Cumano." Att. XIV 11, 2 - "Hic mecum Balbus, Hirtius, Pansa. Modo venit Octavius et quidem in proximam villam Philippi ..."

He was evidently busy contacting Caesar's friends and preparing the ground for his appearance in the city (see Syme op. cit. p. 114 f.). Cicero, too, was skilfully placated. ("Octavius ... mihi totus deditus" Att. XIV 11, 2. "Nobis cum hic perhonorifice et peramice Octavius" Att. XIV 12, 2.)

He proceeded to Rome without haste, stopping at Tarracina on the way (App. III 12, 42). Appian (III 12, 40) and Velleius (II 59, 6) speak of popular demonstrations as he approached and finally entered the city. There, he set himself to win the favour of the people.

c.22, 3. Plutarch notes his payment of Caesar's bequests to the people, as a step to this end. He contrived it with the assistance of Pedius and Pinarius and also Philippus, though

he was unable to recover the part of Caesar's fortune in Antony's hands. Thus he soon gained much popularity, while Antony, by obstructing and slighting Caesar's heir, did not assist his own cause. Plutarch here very briefly sketches their growing rivalry and differences. The clash was inevitable. Cicero and Atticus foresaw it, when they knew that Octavian had decided to accept his inheritance (Att. XIV 10, 3). Antony would not consent to yield or share his primacy among Caesarians with a boy who owed everything to Caesar's name (cf. Phil. III 11, 24-25). From the first interview he expressed his comtempt for Octavian and refused to co-operate with him.
(see App. III 14, 50 - 21, 77. Plut. Ant. 16. Dio 45, 5, 3-4. Vell. II 60, 3-5. Nic. Dam. 28)

Octavian had taken the first step towards his object by establishing himself in Rome before Antony's return. Soon after his arrival, early in May 44, he took care to make himself known to the people, introduced officially by the tribune L. Antonius (see Att. XIV 20, 5 - 11th May. XIV 21, 4). Some days later, news of the "Octavi contio" had reached Cicero (Att. XV 2, 3).

About the same time, he sought to win over the people by presenting some games, with material assistance from old friends of Caesar's (see Att. XV 2, 3). On this occasion he made an attempt to produce Caesar's chair and wreath in public

(App. III 28, 105. cf. Nic. Dam. 28). Antony thwarted it with the aid of tribunes and amid the applause of the equites (Att. XV 3, 2). It is thought that these Games may have been the Ludi Ceriales, postponed from April through the disorder in the city (see Rice-Holmes "Architect" p. 191. Syme p. 116. C.A.H. X p. 10).

In the months that followed, Antony lost no opportunity of hindering Octavian's attempts to claim his inheritance. He retained the money in his possession, allowed a tribune to obstruct the proposed 'lex curiata', and pursued his policy further in the litigation over Caesar's estate (see App. III 22, 80. Dio 45, 5, 3-4).

He is also said to have opposed Octavian in a design to obtain the tribunate, in place of Helvius Cinna (see App. III 31, 120-123. Plut. Ant. 16. Dio 45, 6, 2-4. Suet. Aug. 10, 2). The effect of all this was merely to increase popular sympathy for Octavian.

After the Ludi Apollinares, from 20th to 30th July were celebrated the Ludi Caesaris Victoriae. Their success, to which Matius contributed and so earned Cicero's reproaches (F. XI 27 & 28) was crowned by the appearance of the comet hailed as Caesar's star. Octavian was quick to take advantage of this fortunate coincidence and of the profound impression it made on the people (see Suet. Iul. 88. Plut. Caes. 69. Dio 45, 7, 1. Obsequens 68. Val. Max. III 2, 19).

Perhaps to late July rather than September belongs Octavian's candidature for the tribunate (see Frisch p. 113). It was his first attempt to enter public life and would follow naturally on the success of his Games. Here, Antony violently opposed him (Suet. Aug. 10, 2. App. III 31, 121-122), thus bringing their former differences to an open quarrel. Henceforward, their rivalry was not confined to semi-private affairs in connection with the will, but was continued more seriously in political manoeuvres.

Plutarch, therefore, rightly places his chapter on Octavian here, between Brutus' Games and departure from Italy. He ignores Octavian's earlier movements leading up th this point; but it was only in late July that Octavian began to emerge as a serious figure on the political scene.

22, 3. καὶ χρήματα διαδιδοὺς συνίστη καὶ συνήγε πολλοὺς τῶν ὑπὸ Καίσαρι στρατευσαμένων.

The events of July - October 44 B.C. gradually led to the situation here described.

Relations between Antony and Octavian became more and more strained (see App. III 28, 105 - 29, 111. Dio 45, 5-8. Nic. Dam. 28. Plut. Ant. 16, 2).

A public reconciliation, of short duration, was forced on them by the veterans with the tribunes acting as spokesmen (App. III 30, 115. Nic. Dam. 29. Dio 45, 8, 1). It was followed by fresh quarrels and mutual suspicion. Appian

(III 39, 156) speaks of a second reconciliation on the Capitol, but this too was ended by Antony's accusation of an attempt on his life, inspired by Octavian (Nic. Dam. 30. App. III 139, 157. Suet. Aug. 10, 3).

Cicero gives his account of the "Caesaris Octaviani conatum", in which he was disposed to believe, see F. XII 23, 2 "de quo multitudini fictum ab Antonio crimen videtur ... prudentes autem et boni viri et credunt factum et probant".

The truth of the matter has never been ascertained. It may well have been only a device of Antony's to bring discredit on Octavian. At all events, he did not press the charge - though, indeed, Cicero attributes this to his increasing unpopularity, see F. XII 23, 2 "tanto se odio esse intellegit ut ... rem proferre non audeat".

Antony left Rome on October 9th to meet the Macedonian legions at Brundisium, before leading them north to take over Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus Brutus (F. XII 23, 2). Cicero alleges that he meant to march on Rome. But whatever his original intentions, his hand was forced by the sudden turn of events.

After his departure, Octavian began to act more openly. Sending agents to tamper with the legions at Brundisium, he himself went to Campania, to enlist the veteran settlers there. He was especially successful at Calatia and Casilinum - see Nic. Dam. 31. App. III 40, 164-166. Dio 45, 12, 1-4. Suet. Aug.

10, 3. Vell. II 61, 2. Plut. Ant. 16. Cic. 44. Tac. Ann. I 10. Cic. Phil. III 2, 3. IV 1, 2-3. V 8, 23. 16, 44.

It was at this point that he began to court Cicero more assiduously, in an attempt to win his support for the coup he was planning.

22, 4-6. Cicero's collaboration with Octavian.

The alliance of Cicero and Caesar's heir was entered on at a time when each had need of the other and intended to use the other for his own purposes. Octavian, with no official position as yet, needed a responsible spokesman in the Senate, in particular someone of considerable influence and reputation. Syme (p. 132-3) points out that his relatives were not numerous or prominent and his friends and supporters were then obscure or disreputable. Cicero, on his side, conceived the plan of playing off Octavian against Antony, hoping that, once he was destroyed, the Senate would be strong enough to deal with Octavian.

22, 4. Κικέρων τῷ πρὸς Ἀντώνιον μίσει τὴν Καίσαρος ἔπραττε. (cf. Plut. Cic. 45. Ant. 16, 3).

As early as June 44, Cicero had seen the possibility of using Octavian - see Att. XV 12, 2 "sed tamen alendus est; et ut nihil aliud ab Antonio seiungendus". However, it was Octavian who took the first step. While he was gathering his troops in early November 44 B.C., preparatory to marching on Rome, he wrote constantly to Cicero, asking his advice, trying to persuade him to commit himself openly to the coming struggle with the consul. Cicero was not yet ready. Pleased as he was to find a counterpoise to Antony, he did not trust Octavian, see Att. XVI 8, 1 & 2 (which Frisch, p. 146, takes to mark the

first move towards collaboration): "Plane hoc spectat ut se duce bellum geratur cum Antonio .. quem autem sequamur? Vide nomen, vide aetatem. Atque a me postulat primum ut clam colloquatur mecum vel Capuae ... Docui per litteras id nec opus esse nec fieri posse. Misit ad me Caecinam ... consultabat utrum Romam ... proficisceretur an Capuam teneret et Antonium venientem excluderet an iret ad tres legiones Macedonicas ..." From other letters, too, it can be seen that Cicero was besieged by urgent requests from Octavian, but still hung back: see Att. XVI 9 on the receipt of two more letters from him "nunc quidem ut Romam statim veniam; velle se rem agere per senatum ... ille urget; ego autem σκήπτομαι. Non confido aetati ..." "ab Octaviano cotidie litterae ut negotium susciperem" (Att. XVI 11, 6).

Plutarch (Cic. 44, 1) mentions the proposal of a definite compact between the two for their mutual advantage, made by Philippus and Marcellus.

Octavian's attempted coup failed. He occupied the forum with armed men on 10th November, but his hopes of official backing from the Senate were not realised, as Cicero had foreseen: "Romam veniet cum manu magna ... Putat senatum statim. Quis veniet? Si venerit, quis incertis rebus offendet Antonium?" (Att. XVI 11, 6) Octavian was obliged to address the people in the assembly, introduced by the tribune Ti. Cannutius. Here, he made no secret of his intentions.

Cicero saw a copy of his speech: "Iurat 'ita sibi parentis honores consequi liceat' et simul dextram intendit ad statuam ..." (Att. XVI, 15, 3). According to Appian (III 41, 167) he also spoke against Antony - cf. Dio 45, 12, 4-6. The veterans, however, were not yet prepared to fight Antony, who now approached with the Macedonian legions. Many preferred to return home again. Octavian, with depleted forces, was obliged to withdraw from Rome. He march north into Etruria and made his headquarters at Arretium (App. III 42, 174). cf. Dio 45, 12, 6.

At Brundisium, meanwhile, Antony had encountered mutinous troops and had ordered summary executions to restore order (Att. XVI 8, 2. Phil. III 2, 4. App. III 43, 175 - 45, 184. Dio 45, 13, 2-3). On receiving news of Octavian's activities, he returned to Rome and summoned the Senate to meet on 24th November, but failed to appear himself.

When the Senate met on the Capitol on 28th, he did not succeed in bringing forward a motion to declare Octavian "hostis" (Phil. III 8, 19-20). Antony's position was further weakened by the desertion first of the Martian and then of the Fourth Legion (Phil. III 3, 6 & 9, 24. App. III 45, 185. Dio 45, 13, 3-5) to Octavian. He immediately left Rome to rejoin his remaining forces and proceed with them to Cisalpine Gaul (Dio 45, 13, 5). On his arrival, Decimus Brutus, who had been established there since April, refused to surrender the

province (App. III 49, 198. Dio 46, 35, 2). He would not risk an encounter with Antony, but by the end of the year was preparing to stand a siege in Mutina (App. III 49, 200-201. Dio 46, 36, 1).

In Rome, Cicero, who had returned on 9th December (F. XI 5, 1), had not intended to appear in the Senate before 1st January 43, when Hirtius and Pansa, the consuls-designate, would take office. When, however, the Senate met on 20th December to provide for the presence of armed guards on 1st January (F. XI 6, 2. Phil. III 5, 13. Dio 45, 15, 3), Cicero prepared to support Decimus and Octavian for their stand against the consul and to urge the Senate to action against Antony. No doubt both rebels were pressing Cicero to obtain official sanction for their actions (see F. XI 6, 1). With the Third Philippic, Cicero first came forward publicly as the champion of Octavian. Earlier in December, he had been satisfied by Octavian's attitude to the election to the tribunate of Casca, one of the murderers. He had previously decided to take this as an indication of Octavian's future policy towards Caesar's murderers - see Att. XVI 15, 3 "certissimum esse video discrimen Cascae nostri tribunatum, de quo quidem ipso dixi Oppio cum me hortaretur ut adolescentem totamque causam ... complecterer, me nullo modo facere posse, ni mihi exploratum esset eum non modo non inimicum tyrannoctonis, verum etiam amicum fore." Octavian evidently offered no opposition to the

election of Casca - for which Antony later reproached him and Hirtius: "Cascam tribunatum gerere passi estis" (Phil.XIII 15, 31).

With the delivery of his Fifth Philippic on 1st January, Cicero committed himself still further. After condemning the suggestion of negotiating with Antony, roundly abusing Antony himself, and urging the passing of the senatus consultum ultimum, he went on to propose honours for those who had opposed the consul. He extolled Octavian (Phil. V 16, 42 f.), proposed that he be given imperium with the title of propraetor, in spite of his youth - citing the precedent of the young Pompey (V 16, 43. 45. 17, 46). He went further, offering himself as sponsor for Octavian's continued loyalty, see V 18, 50-51: "Omnis habeo cognitos sensus adulescentis ... Promitto, recipio, spondeo, patres conscripti, C. Caesarem talem semper fore civem qualis hodie sit ..."

Cicero was now fully embarked on his dangerous course and could not afford to look back. His new alliance at length brought alarmed protests from Brutus in Macedonia. The extracts given by Plutarch correspond closely to passages in ad Brut. I 16 and 17 to Cicero and Atticus respectively. (cf. Plut. Cic. 45, 2 - ἐφ' ᾧ σφόδρα Βροῦτος ἀγανακτῶν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀττικον ἐπιστολαῖς.)

22, 4. οὐ δεσπότην βαρύνοιτο .... etc.

cf. I 16, 7. "non dominum fugisse sed amiciorem dominum

quaesisse videberis."

- πολιτεύοιτο δουλείας αἵρεσιν φιλανθρώπου.

cf. I 17, 4. "dum habeat a quibus impetret quae velit et a quibus colatur ac laudetur servitutem, honorificam modo, non aspernatur."

22, 5. οἱ δὲ πρόγονοι ... οὐδὲ πατέρας δεσπότας ὑπέμενον.

cf. I 17, 6. "sed dominum ne parentem quidem maiores nostri voluerunt esse."

- ἀλλ' ἓν μόνον εἶναι βεβουλευμένον, τὸ μὴ δουλεύειν.

cf. I 16, 9. "... neque desistam abstrahere a servitio civitatem ..."

and I 17, 6. "... nulla erit tam bona condicio serviendi qua deterrear."

22, 6. θαυμάζειν δὲ Κικέρωνος ..... τύραννον.

cf. I 17, 5 and 2 - "quid hoc mihi prodest, si merces Antoni oppressi poscitur in Antoni locum successio?"

Of the whole collection of letters to Brutus, the authenticity of these two has been the most disputed, though they are now generally accepted.

see Mueller, Teubner text p. 521, cxlix. Tyrrell and Purser VI pp. cxi ff. Gelzer PW X 1008. Syme op. cit. pp. 147. 184.

Plutarch here affords proof that such letters were known and accepted in his day; therefore, if they were forgeries, they would be of an early date. But the intimate knowledge

of the characters and events of the time, which they display, suggests, rather, that they are genuine; and the style and character of the letters themselves is not incompatible with that of Brutus.

For the date of the letters: Plutarch, who calls them τὰς πρώτας ἐπιστολάς (c. 23, 1) seems to assign them to the time before Brutus' departure from Italy, which is clearly impossible from internal evidence. They undoubtedly refer to the situation after the Battle of Mutina in the early summer of 43 B.C. (see I 17, 5 "quid enim nostra victum esse Antonium, si victus est ...") and were probably ~~were~~ written within a short time of each other, from the identity of subject-matter. I, 16. was evidently written when Brutus had heard of Octavian's aspirations to the consulship, i.e. in July 43. I, 17 is thought to be the earlier of the two (see Gelzer PW X 1008-9) and is, in fact, dated by Tyrrell and Purser to the middle of May (VI pp. 153 & 162).

Plutarch, in his Comparison of Cicero and Demosthenes (4, 4 /537), corrects his dating here by quoting the letter to Cicero in connection with Octavian's demand for the consulship.

The question of Cicero's collaboration with Octavian developed into one of the serious differences which continued to trouble the relations of Brutus and Cicero. Fundamental differences of temperament and outlook made complete agreement on matters of policy impossible. In seeking to restore the

Republic, though both desired the same end, they could rarely agree on the best means of attaining it (cf. ad Brut. II 5, 1). But this and other quarrels of the last year were more particularly occasioned by their different views of the situation. Cicero's policy was motivated chiefly by his feud with Antony, who, to him, was the most dangerous enemy of the Republic. For personal considerations, too, he was bound to oppose any suggestion of peaceful negotiations with Antony. In his Philippics he had gone too far ever to retract. On the other hand, while he may never have trusted Octavian entirely, he was prepared to risk his advancement because he thought Antony more to be feared and persisted in believing that he could control Octavian (see ad Brut. I 3, 1 "... Est omnino illud difficilius, sed tamen non diffidimus"). He had returned to his old dream of acting as guide and mentor to the first statesman of the Republic (see Syme op. cit. p. 143). He tried to persuade himself - and succeeded in persuading others - that Octavian would be loyal; and he was, naturally, encouraged in this belief by Octavian himself, no mean dissembler.

Brutus refused to be charmed out of his natural misgivings, see ad Brut. I 17, 5 "licet ergo patrem appellet Octavius Ciceronem, referat omnia, laudet, gratias agat, tamen illud apparebit, verba rebus esse contraria".

His position was just the reverse of Cicero's. For him, there could be no accommodation with Caesar's heir. Cicero

had realised this at first, before he came under the spell of Octavian, see Att. XVI 14, 1 "si multum possit Octavianus, multo firmius acta tyranni conprobatum iri quam in Telluris atque id contra Brutum fore". Similarly, Brutus' break with Antony was not irreparable. Even as political opponents, they were still able to understand and appreciate each other (see below c. 29, 7 & 10). They had previously been bound by formal amicitia; no greater quarrel had interrupted it than the sharp exchange of letters in August 44 (see F. XI 3). Nor had Antony displayed a violent, unrelenting hostility towards Brutus and Cassius, though necessarily outwitting them in gaining power for himself. Had they been willing to acquiesce, they might have remained in high favour - "Atqui non solum bono domino potuimus Antonio tolerare nostram fortunam sed etiam beneficiis atque honoribus ut participes fui quantis vellemus" (ad Brut. I 16, 4). Brutus continued to believe in the possibility of reconciliation with Antony, but in Octavian he saw a greater menace to the Republic, and he was justified by events. He perceived the dangers of too rashly applauding and advancing Octavian, and was alarmed by the lengths to which Cicero's policy was carried: "timeo de consulatu, ne Caesar tuus altius se ascendisse putet decretis tuis quam inde si consul factus sit descensurum! Quodutinam inspectare possis tem orem de illo meum" (ad Brut. I 4, a, 2-3). He disapproved of the voting of extraordinary honours: "ego certe quin cum ipsa re bellum

geram, hoc est cum regno et imperiis extraordinariis et dominatione et potentia quae supra leges se esse velit ..." (I, 17, 6 cf. I 16, 5). The advancement of Octavian called out a re-statement of his own Republican principles. Also, with his distrust of Octavian went a strong objection to Cicero's methods. The adulation of Octavian, "hunc divinum adulescentem" (Phil. V 16, 43), was repugnant to him, who had never fawned on Caesar himself. The terms of Cicero's letter to Octavian - the immediate cause of his general protest - angered and disgusted him: "Particulam litterarum tuarum quas misisti Octavio legi ... sic enim illi gratias agis de re publica tam suppliciter ac demisse ... ut prorsus prae te feras non sublatam dominationem sed dominum commutatum esse. Verba tua recognosce et aude negare servientis adversus regem istas esse preces." (I 16, 1)

Cicero's commendation of the "Liberatores orbis terrarum" to Octavian's mercy was a prime cause of vexation - he returns to it repeatedly throughout the letter; clearly, it had made a strong and painful impression. And the very sharpness of his disappointment in such a man as Cicero drove him to condemn his present attitude in stronger terms: cf. I 16, 10: "fatur enim duriorem esse condicionem spectatae virtutis quam incognitae. Bene facta pro debitis exigimus, quae aliter eveniunt ut decepti ab iis infesto animo reprehendimus."

Yet while he had a more vivid apprehension of the dangers

involved, his position at a distance made him less able to appreciate the difficulties of Cicero at Rome. Cicero himself pleaded expediency in justification of his policy: "Huic habiti a me honores nulli quidem, Brute, nisi debiti, nulli nisi necesarii ... Quamquam ego illi tum verborum laudem tribui eamque modicam, decrevi etiam imperium ... erat exercitum habenti necessarium ..." (ad Brut. I 15, 7 f.) Cicero had no real choice of allies; Octavian and his army afforded the only check to the domination of Antony, for there was nothing to be done without military power. The state of the Republic was to blame, not Cicero. Boissier (op. cit. p. 376) points out that this last phase of Cicero's career was largely due to Brutus' encouraging him to return to Rome (in August 44); therefore, Brutus should have been the last to reproach him for the course he adopted after his return (cf. ad Brut. I 15, 5). Nonetheless, Brutus was right in seeing the greatest danger in Octavian and in warning Cicero against him. He had been useful to the Senate in opposing Antony, but that did not make him a loyal servant of the Senate, since the limiting of Antony's power was in his own interests - see ad Brut. I 16, 7. "Quem quod laudas ob ea quae adhuc fecit, plane probo; sunt enim laudanda, si modo contra alienam potentiam, non pro sua suscepit eas actiones." By July 43, Cicero had begun to realise that it might not be possible to undo what he had done. He now regretted the

pledge he had given to the Senate: "Maximo autem cum haec scribebam officiebar dolore quod cum me pro adulescentulo ac paene puero res publica accepisset vadem, vix videbar quod promiseram praestare posse." (ad Brut. I 18, 3)

Within a month of this, Octavian was to show beyond further doubt what his plans were and how much influence Cicero exercised over him.

With his march on Rome, to take by force what the Senate would not grant, the failure of Cicero's policy was complete, and his part in public life ended.

cf. App. III 89, 369: Κικέρων τε ὡς τέως αὐτοῖς ἐπεπόλαζεν οὐδὲ ἐφκίνετο...

cc. 23-27. The Revival of the Republican Cause 44-43 B.C.

Sources:- Cicero: Phil. X & XI. I 3, 8 - 4, 10. ad Brut. I & II. Fam. XII 4-8. Att. XVI 7. 3. 4.

Appian: III 24, 91. 77, 312 - 80, 325.

Dio: 47, 20-32.

Vell.: II 62, 3. 69, 1-5.

Livy: Per 118.

Syme p. 119 pp. 163 ff. Gelzer: PW X 998-1005.

Frisch: "Cicero" pp. 113-118. pp. 212 ff.

Rice-Holmes: "Architect" pp. 21-23. 44-46, & 197.

Boissier: "Cicéron ..." pp. 370 ff.

Ferrero: (E.T.) III pp. 77-8, 91, 136 ff.

c. 23. The departure of Brutus and Cassius from Italy.

Plutarch makes the decision to abandon Italy follow the beginning of hostilities between Antony and Octavian and the corruption of the legions, i.e. October-November 44 B.C. (cf. Nic. Dam. 31). This is certainly a mistake. Brutus left Italy towards the end of August (Att. XVI 7, 5. Phil. X 4, 8). Already in July, while lingering near Naples for news of his Games, "non tergiversantem sed exspectantem si qui forte casus" (Att. XVI 5, 3), he was making preparations for the voyage: "paratiorem enim offendi Brutum quam audiebam. Nam et ipse (et) Domitius bona plane habet dicrota, suntque

navigia praeterea luculenta Sesti, Buciliani, ceterorum" (Att. XVI 4, 4). Cassius, too, was stationed at Naples, with a small fleet of his own (Att. XVI 4, 4). From here, in the latter half of July, the two praetors published an edict, in which they re-asserted their desire for peace and gave that as their reason for abdicating their office and leaving the country. See F. XI 3, 3 "... non licere praetoribus concordiae ac libertatis causa per edictum de suo iure decedere ...?" The general terms of the edict are found also in Velleius (II 62, 3) "M. Brutus et C. Cassius ... testati edictis libenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros dum (dum rei p. constaret concordia nec ullam belli civilis praebiturosmateriam ...". Phil. X 4, 8 contains echoes of this: "At hunc (Brutum) iis ipsis ludorum diebus ... nihil nisi de pace et concordia civium cogitantem. Eundem vidi postea Veliae cedentem Italia ne qua oreretur belli civilis causa propter se." In Phil. I 3, 8, Cicero described the edict as "plenum aequitatis". He saw a copy of it on returning from his attempted voyage in August (Att. XVI 7, 1); that is, if Rice-Holmes' conjectural identification of the edict mentioned by Cicero here and in the First Philippic with that quoted by Velleiue is accepted (see "Architect" pp. 22 & 267). Cicero has no reference to a later edict, which might correspond to Velleius, and indeed it seems more likely that only one edict was published, especially since that of July was evidently on the same theme as Velleius'.

Its publication provoked a sudden attack, by edict and private letter, from Antony. From the reply of Brutus and Cassius, in which they complained of the tone of his letter ("litteras ... contumeliosas, minaces, minime dignas quae a te nobis mitterentur" F. XI 3, 1), it only appears that Antony was irritated because they had made some demand - it has been suggested, the repeal of the corn commission - or because they had chosen to demand it publicly by edict.

Antony's attack immediately followed a conciliatory speech and rumours of a favourable change in his policy. See Att. XVI 7, 1: "Summam spem nuntiabant fore ut Antonius cederet, res conveniret, nostri Romam redirent." and Phil. I 3, 8 "... a quibus primum accipio M. Antoni contionem quae mihi ita placuit ut ea lecta de reversione primum coeperim cogitare ... Addebant praeterea ... rem conventuram, Kalendis (Sext.) senatum frequentem fore; Antonium repudiatis malis suasoribus remissis provinciis Galliis ad auctoritatem senatus esse redituram".

Frisch (pp. 113-118) has pointed out the reasons for Antony's sudden change of attitude. It was just at this time that Octavian was becoming a serious rival for the favour of people and veterans. Antony's speech, which was soon followed by the publication of the Liberators' edict (Phil. I 3, 8) did not please his Caesarian supporters. Threatened by the increasing popularity of Octavian, Antony could not afford to

offend them and was forced to adopt a more radical policy in order to compete with his rival. Under pressure from the veterans, he effected a temporary reconciliation with him, (see above on c.22) and about the same time abruptly terminated friendly relations with Brutus and Cassius. Their edict gave him his opportunity; his attack brought only a restrained and dignified reply, in which they stated their own case and their reluctance to be drawn into open hostilities, but concluded with a half-veiled warning: (F XI 3, 4) "... vocemus te ad nullas inimicitias, sed tamen pluris nostram libertatem quam tuam amicitiam aestimemus. Tu etiam atque etiam vide quid suscipias, quid sustinere possis, neque quam diu vixerit Caesar, sed quam non diu regnarit fac cogites ...". It was their last communication with Antony. They set out from Naples soon afterwards, having now no reason to linger in Italy. It is not at all likely that they were influenced in this by the intrigues of Octavian, as Nicolaus (c. 31) and Dio (47, 20, 3) state. At that time he was still dissembling his real intentions regarding Caesar's murderers. Gelzer (PW X 999) refers to Cicero's letter of June (Att. XV 12, 2): "In Octaviano ... satis ingenii, satis animi, videbaturque erga nostros ἥρωας ita fore, ut nos vellemus, animatus".

Antony was responsible for their departure, not Octavian. For the remaining months of his consulship, there was no place

for them in Italy. But they were not giving up all hope. They had wished to be well-represented in the Senate on the 1st August - see Att. XVI 7, 1 "... et fore frequentem senatum Kalendis, a Bruto et Cassio litteras missas ad consulares et praetorios ut adessent rogare."

Piso's attack on Antony at this session, though a brief, unsupported attempt, yet as the first sign of a challenge to Antony's domination from the Senate, delighted Brutus. He was still more pleased by Cicero's decision to give up his journey to Greece: "quam valde ille reditu vel potius reversione mea laetatus effudit illa omnia quae tacuerat ... Maxime autem dolebat me Kal. Sext. in senatu non fuisse. Pisonem ferebat in caelum ..." (Att. XVI 7, 5). They met at Velia on the Lucanian coast, on the 17th August, as Cicero was
23, 1 returning; Brutus' fleet was then at the mouth of the river Heles (Att. XVI 7, 5. ad Brut. I 15, 5. Phil. X 4, 8). Plutarch does not mention this last meeting. His account, drawn, as he says, from Bioulus' memoirs (23, 7) gives a more intimate picture of Brutus with his wife and friends before his departure, but barely sketches the political background. In this respect, Cicero's account is complementary to his.
24, 1. From Velia Brutus finally set sail for Athens, Cassius following later. It is difficult to say precisely what their plans were at that moment. They had certainly abandoned any intention of carrying out the corn commission;

and they also ignored the praetorian provinces assigned to them by Antony (see above 19, 5) - provinces of no importance, where Antony need have no fear of them. But it may be doubted if any provocation was intended by this or if they set out with a definite hostile intent. They betrayed no haste in leaving, lingering in Italy from June to September and planning a leisurely voyage - see Att. XVI 4, 4 "Illud est mihi submolestum quod parum Brutus properare videtur ... deinde quantum intellego tarde est navigaturus consistens in locis pluribus." And at the end of September, Cicero did not know what they had in mind, whether they intended to make some attempt on behalf of the Republic, or whether they planned voluntary exile only for their personal safety (see F. XIII 2, 3: quare spes est omnis in vobis; qui si idcirco abestis ut sitis in tuto, ne in vobis quidem; sin aliquid dignum vestra gloria cogitatis, velim salvis nobis ...").

Brutus, at least, was still anxious to reach some peaceful settlement and avoid civil war. Gelzer (PW X 997) thinks Cassius was not in agreement with him, and Syme (p. 184) inclines to the same opinion. Yet even if Cassius would have preferred a stronger policy from the beginning, he continued to act in concert with his brother-in-law; and any public pronouncements were made in the name of both (see F. XI 2 & 3). The two letters to Antony, in the nature of manifestoes, are sincere statements of principle (see F. XI 2, 2 "nos ab initio

spectasse otium ..." etc.), expressive of the firm but negative attitude Brutus had tried to maintain.

Their edict had asserted that they were withdrawing in order to prevent war; in their last letter to Antony they made it clear that he would have to give the signal for it; they would not challenge him, unless driven (F. XI 2). It was, most probably, a fair expresion of their intentions on leaving Italy; but that does not mean that they had not considered what steps they would take, if it became necessary. No doubt they had the provinces of Macedonia and Syria in mind - there is no real proof that they had definitely planned to seize them, before they reached Athens. Schwartz (Hermes 33, 192) asserted that they were preparing for their campaign in the east during their stay in Campania. Gelzer (PW X 998) and Rice-Holmes (Architect p. 197) have corrected him. The fleets Brutus and Cassius collected in July were a necessary precaution against pirates - reports of whose activities had alarmed Cicero (Att. XVI 2, 4); and the passage in F. XI 3, 2 proves no more than that Antony, in his attack, had accused them of sending envoys abroad and tampering with legions in the provinces, and these charges he did not repeat in his edict ("quod te questum esse negas" "cum haec reticueris"). It is unlikely that he expected them to be taken seriously; they are comparable to the supposed attempt on his life by Octavian.

Ferrero (Eng. trans. III pp. 77-78, 91, 107) conjectures from later events and from the construction he puts on Att. XV 13, 4 that Cassius, on his own initiative, negotiated with the commanders in the East before leaving Italy and actually set out from there for Syria "with a well-defined plan for seizing the province", while Brutus, he believes, intended to go into voluntary exile in Greece and (apparently) abandon his colleague. The very slender evidence will scarcely support his intricate re-construction. From Att. XV 13, 4 it only appears that by the end of October 44 certain rumours had reached Rome from the east concerning Cassius "Interea narrat eadem Bassi servum venisse qui nuntiaret legiones Alexandrinas in armis esse, Bassum arcessi, Cassium exspectari"). Syria was the obvious point for Cassius to choose to rally his supporters, on account of his military reputation there (cf. Phil. XI 13, 35) - anyone might have thought of it. That he was looked for there, once he was known to have left Italy, does not, by itself, prove that he had been in communication with the province since June or July. No doubt he received some good assurance of his reception before he finally arrived in Syria, but such negotiations might more easily have been conducted from Athens; and if he had approached the Pompeian adventurer Bassus, he must have been unsuccessful, for Bassus was the only one to resist him when he appeared in the province (F. XII 12, 3). Moreover, his

remaining in or near Italy even longer than Brutus does not suggest that he was pursuing a more determined course of action. How much longer he waited is not quite certain. Cicero says "Cassi classis paucis post diebus consequebatur" (Phil. X 4, 8). Yet Rice-Homes (op. cit. p. 44), following O.E. Schmidt, dates his departure to the first half of October, and Syme (p. 119) also thinks he did not leave Italian waters for some time. Rice-Holmes relies on the evidence of two letters to Cassius (F. XII 293), written late September-early October, from which it is argued that Cassius was then still in the south of Italy. It appears from F. XII 2, 1 that by the end of September Cassius had read and congratulated Cicero on the First Philippic; and after these letters there occurs a gap in the correspondence with Cassius until February 43 (F. XII 4) when Cicero had no certain news of his movements. But Rice-Holmes argues (from F. XII 2, 3) that Cieero then wished Cassius to return to Rome. The paragraph is obviously addressed to both Liberators - Cicero changes here from the singular to the plural - and only expresses his uncertainty of their plans and, in guarded terms, his hope that they intend to take action. The reference to their absence, and, in the following letter (F. XII 3, 2) to Antony's hostility towards Cassius' legate rather suggest that he was already on his way. And, in fact, Frisch (p. 118) and Charlesworth (C.A.H. X p. 10) find no

difficulty in accepting Cicero's statement in the Tenth Philippic and dating Cassius' departure to the end of August.

24, 1. The first destination of the Liberators was Athens, where they were received with enthusiasm: cf. Dio 47, 20, 4 καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λαμπρῶς ὑπεδέξαντο. Plutarch, unlike Dio, does not specifically mention Cassius here, but he evidently followed the same account, for later (28, 6), speaking of their meeting at Smyrna in 43, he says: ἀλλήλοις ἐνετύγχανον ἀφ'οὗ πρῶτον ἐν Πειραιεῖ χωρισθέντες ὥρμησαν. It may reasonably be assumed, then, that Cassius followed Brutus to Athens, in accordance with his first plan (see Att. XV 11, 1: ille in Achaiam se iturum").

For some months, Rome had no certain news of them. Some information was privately brought by Brutus' agent Scaptius at the end of October - Att. XV 13, 4 "De Bruto te nihil scire dicis, sed (Servilia) venisse M. Scaptium ... ad se tamen clam venturum sciturumque me omnia ...").

They took no open and decisive action at first. To all appearances, they were merely distinguished visitors to Athens; Brutus spent much of his time attending the lectures of the philosophers. But, according to Plutarch, while indulging in his favourite pursuit, he was also secretly preparing for war. He was, at least, looking for allies and opening negotiations with the neighbouring provinces. The Greek Herostratus was
4, 2 sent to Quintus Hortensius, the governor of Macedonia. He had

not, hitherto, belonged to the same political group, but he was related by marriage to Brutus' adopted family, the Servilii Caepiones, and in this case, family ties prevailed. From Dio (47, 21, 3 & 26, 1) it may be inferred that Trebonius was also approached, as was natural enough. The first open
34, 4 movement on Brutus' part was the acceptance of the Asian tribute from the quaestor Apuleius, at Carystos, see App. III 63, 259. Dio 47, 21, 3. By his own account, it was this which (by furnishing him with the means) led to his raising forces in Greece. See Phil. X 11, 24 "nam de M. Apuleio ... cui testis est per litteras M. Brutus, eum principem fuisse ad conatum exercitus comparandi".

Ferrero (E.T. III p. 135 f.; cf. Boissier p. 370) believes that Brutus was prepared to live in retirement at Athens and had no thought of vigorous action, until the enthusiasm of various elements in Greece and Macedonia, focusing on him and crystallizing in the material assistance brought by Apuleius, forced him to place himself at the head of a new movement.

Plutarch is probably nearer the truth in showing Brutus engaged at first in private negotiations only, not committing himself to any revolutionary course until his meeting with Apuleius placed him in possession of public funds, diverted from the government at Rome. The decisive step was taken following news of events in Italy, the raising of armies there by November (see Syme p. 184) which proved once again that

nothing could be done without military aid. Gelzer (PW X 1000) believes that Brutus was influenced by Antony's redistribution of provinces on November 28th (Phil. III 10, 25), in which, he says, Brutus, Cassius and Trebonius were no longer recognised. It might be objected that Brutus and Cassius had shown no disposition to accept the provinces previously assigned them and that Trebonius' command would end in 43. However, if Antony had not yet plainly declared war on them, with the rise of Octavian he was forced to appear less accommodating than formerly: see F. XII 3 for evidence of his attitude in October 44; a more violent speech against the Liberators, and obstacles put in the way of Cassius' legate: "Auget tuus amicus furorem in dies ... ante diem vi Non. Oct. productus in contionem ... ea dixit de conservatoribus patriae, quae dici deberent de proditoribus ... cetera cuius modi sint, ex hoc iudica, quod legato tuo viaticum eripuerunt". In December, Republican opposition to Antony gathered head all at once in the provinces. Gelzer (PW X 1000) notes the simultaneous resistance of Decimus in Cisalpine Gaul and Brutus and Cassius in the East. It may be supposed that Brutus and Cassius acted together.

28, 6. Plutarch later suggests that they set out about the same time for the provinces they meant to occupy: ἐν Πειραιεῖ χωρισθέντες ὥρμησαν, ὁ μὲν εἰς Συρίαν, ὁ δὲ εἰς Μακεδονίαν.

cf. Velleius (II 62, 3) "intento ac pari animo sua auctoritate ... provincias exercitusque occupaverant". In this design they were supported by Trebonius in Asia. According to Dio (47, 26, 3) it was he who had sent the Asian tribute to Brutus, and he also allowed Cassius to pass through his province to Syria and gave him assistance (47, 26, 1).

24, 6. This incident at the banquet is related also by Valerius Maximus (I 5, 7) and Appian (IV 134, 564). From Plutarch's account, which refers it to the arrival of Apuleius, it would appear that Brutus' birthday fell in winter, (see PW X 973). Appian, however, gives this story with other supposed portents of disaster and refers it to a different occasion.

25, 1. Before the end of the year Brutus was provided with additional funds by the quaestor of Syria (Dio 47, 27, 2-4) Antistius Vetus - see ad Brut. II 3, 5 "Vetus Antistius me tamen pecunia sublevavit" and ad Brut. I 11.

Velleius admits that the two quaestors were willing parties to the interception of the tribute, see II 62, 3 "... pecunias etiam quae ex transmarinis provinciis Romam ab quaestoribus deportabantur a volentibus acceperant".

25, 2. With this money, Brutus proceeded to levy forces in Greece. He was joined by veterans of Pharsalia and young
24, 2-3 Romans studying at Athens (including Cicero's son and Horace); he also intercepted two cohorts of cavalry intended for

Dolabella - see Phil. X 6, 13 - and appropriated the arsenal at Demetrias, which Caesar had established for his Parthian campaign (cf. App. III 63, 259).

25, 3. At the beginning of 43 B.C., Hortensius surrendered Macedonia to Brutus, recognising him as his successor and holding a levy to provide him with fresh troops (Phil. X 6, 13 and 11, 24). Brutus' occupation of the province coincided with the arrival of C. Antonius, appointed governor of Macedonia on 28th November by his brother (see Dio 47, 21, 4).

25, 4 Brutus hastened to intercept him before he could gain a secure footing in the province.

26, 1-3. Plutarch uses this story of Brutus' illness on the march to meet Antonius for the purpose of showing the disposition even of enemies towards his hero; he then continues his narrative of the brief struggle with C. Antonius to the defection of his army and his capture near Apollonia. See App. III 79, 321-4. Dio 47, 21, 1-7. Vell. II 69. Livy Per 118.

Brutus had also occupied Illyricum, which was then governed by Vatinius. Cicero (Phil. X 6, 14) says Vatinius opened the gates of Dyrrhachium to Brutus and surrendered his army. Dio (47, 21, 6) has a different account: he declares that Vatinius was hostile (not unnaturally, since he was a Caesarian) but that his soldiers took the decision upon themselves during his illness. At all events, Brutus won over his legion without a struggle (cf. Vell. II 69).

While still besieging Apollonia, since he was now, in effect, master of Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum, Brutus sent a despatch to Rome to inform the Senate of his actions and of the new state of affairs across the Adriatic. It arrived early in February; Pansa, acting consul in the absence of Hirtius, who was engaged in the campaign at Mutina, immediately convoked the Senate to hear it (Phil. X 1, 1). At this session, Cicero delivered his Tenth Philippic, opposing the motion of Calenus, that Brutus should be deprived of his command (Phil. X 3-8; ad Brut. II 3, 4) and successfully pleading Brutus' case. He urged that Brutus had acted in the Senate's interests, if without waiting for its authority, in holding Macedonia against Antony's brother and had at last provided a Republican army. Moreover, the Senate could scarcely refuse to legalize Brutus' position, since both Octavian and Decimus had received its sanction on 20th December (X 7, 15). The news of this had probably reached Brutus before he entered Macedonia (cf. Frisch p. 215). The proposal which was carried approved Brutus' actions and gave him, officially, command of the provinces and legions he possessed, with permission to raise funds for his operations; adding a clause "ut cum suis copiis quam proxime Italiam sit" (X 11, 25-26). cf. App. III 63, 258. Dio (47, 22, 2) explains the acceptance of this proposal by the Senate's growing suspicion of Octavian and its desire for the support of a more reliable army. The position of the Senate

at the beginning of 43 was undoubtedly improved. Under Cicero's leadership, it had at last begun to challenge Antony; and at the same time it received support from the provinces where the Liberators were finally rousing themselves to action. Decimus in Gaul and Brutus in Macedonia were more likely to prove loyal defenders than Octavian. Following on the despatch from Brutus, there were persistent rumours of Cassius' movements. It seems to have been generally believed or expected that he had established himself in Syria and gathered an army, anticipating Dolabella, who had set out for his province without delay (see F. XII 4 & 5). It was, indeed, reasonable to suppose that Cassius would not be slower or less successful than Brutus in taking action (Phil. XI 12, 27-28), but no news of him had yet reached Rome. Meanwhile, the Senate's new hopes received an unexpected check. Dolabella, on his way through Asia to Syria, had murdered Trebonius at Smyrna and seized his provinces. Reports of it arrived in Rome at the beginning of March (see F. XII 7); Dolabella was immediately outlawed, and the question arose, who was to conduct the war against him? Cicero, in the Eleventh Philippic, advocated the appointment of Cassius, but his proposal was vehemently opposed by Pansa and failed. Cicero did not stop there, but made a speech in favour of Cassius to the people. His course in this affair did not meet with the approval of Cassius' family and Servilia (see F. XII

7, 1 "id velim mihi ignoscas quod invita socru tua fecerim ... in contione quidem Pansa dixit matrem quoque tuam et fratrem illam a me sententiam noluisse dici"). It appears that they did not want to offend Pansa, and, since they did not yet know of Cassius' successes, they may have thought that Cicero had gone too far in his assertions: see Phil. XI 12, 28 "C. Cassius ... nonne eo ex Italia consilio profectus est, ut prohiberet Syria Dolabellam?"

Cassius, however, was already in a position to challenge Dolabella's title to Syria. On his arrival, probably early in February, he had won over the three armies engaged there. Caesar's general, L. Staius Murcus, with three legions and the governor of Bithynia, Q. Marcius Crispus, who had come with his three legions to assist Murcus, both joined Cassius; their opponent, the Pompeian adventurer Q. Caecilius Bassus, was compelled by his troops to surrender; finally Aulus Allienus, who was taking four legions from Egypt to join Dolabella, handed them over to Cassius instead (see F. XII 11 & 12). By 7th March 43 (the date of F XII 11), Cassius was master of Syria, with twelve legions (App. IV 59, 251). Brutus had news of it when he wrote to Cicero on 1st April (ad Brut. II 3, 3) and before 12th April it was common knowledge in Rome (ad Brut. II 4, 5), though Dolabella's occupation of Asia seems to have hindered communications with Cassius (F. XII 12, 1). As soon as he was well established, Cassius wrote to inform

Cicero, to reassure him of his intentions and to enlist his aid in the Senate; which Cicero had actually given while he was writing (see F. XII 11, 2 "Nunc te cohortatione non puto indigere, ut nos apsentis remque p., quantum est in te, defendas. Scire te volo firma praesidia vobis senatuique non deesse ...").

For the Senate, then, the first months of the year 43 saw a more hopeful prospect opening. The Optimates could now depend on the support of the eastern provinces: "Magnis subsidiis fulta res p. est; a prima enim ora Graeciae usque ad Aegyptum optimorum civium imperiis muniti erimus et copiis." (F. XII 5, 1) In the West, Cicero was in communication with Plancus in Transalpine Gaul, Lepidus in Narbonensis and Hither Spain and Pollio in Farther Spain, whose loyalty to the Senate he hoped to preserve (ad Brut. II 2, 1). The Senate's eventual recovery of complete control was held to depend on the outcome of the campaign at Mutina (F. XII 5, 2) where Decimus Brutus still held out, while Antony was now threatened by the armies of Octavian at Forum Cornelium and the consul Hirtius at Claterna. Reinforcements from Italian levies were being prepared by Pansa, who, with the spring, was to join his colleague. In a comparatively short time, the situation had changed completely.

For Brutus, however, the occupation of Macedonia marked a serious retreat from his original stand on peaceful and

constitutional methods. He had maintained it as long as he could, but his slow realisation of its futility, of the impossibility of attempting anything without military power to back it, was further assisted by the turn of events in Italy. His own withdrawal had not prevented an appeal to arms there, as he had hoped. That finally decided him to adopt a more resolute policy. Cicero, in the Tenth Philippic, urges his long reliance on his former policy in justification of his final gathering of troops: "Temptavit quid patientia perficere posset; nihil cum proficeret, vi contra vim experiundum putavit" (11, 23). He related the change in Brutus (4, 9. 7, 14) to the new opposition of the Senate to Antony's domination. He laid strong emphasis on Brutus' moderation and forbearance but, allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, he represented Brutus' actions and motives accurately enough, with only a hint of his own privately expressed criticism: "itaque illi ipsi - qui tarditatem Bruti reprehendant, tamen idem moderationem patientiamque mirantur" (X 7, 14). Nonetheless, Brutus had been forced to retreat to a new standpoint. Henceforward, he was prepared to "be his own Senate" (cf. Phil. XI 11, 27), to act independently in the interests of the Republic, without waiting for the Senate's mandate. Already, the Liberators were beginning to see themselves as the embodiment of the Republic - see Vell. II 62, 3 "praetexentes esse rem publicam..",

Livy Per. 118 "sub praetextu reipublicae ...". It was, had Brutus realised it, an admission of the hopelessness of his attempt to restore the old Republic. He had achieved nothing by adhering to his principles; to have any hope of success he was obliged to use the weapons of his opponents, and thus prove again that the old form of government could no longer hope to work efficiently. Brutus could not, or would not, see it. A determined and ruthless course from the beginning might have given him the advantage over his political opponents, though it would not have recreated the Republic. But even now, he would not completely abandon his hopes of a peaceful agreement. This last attempt to cling to his old policy directed his attitude to C. Antonius and led to another clash with Cicero.

26, 6. Plutarch notes that C. Antonius, after capture, was treated honourably and allowed to retain the insignia of his office, though this brought protests from Rome, especially from Cicero (see ad Brut. I 2a, 3, 4. II 5, 5. App. III 79, 321-4. Dio 47, 21, 7).

On 1st April 43 Brutus wrote to Cicero, asking his advice - among other matters - on C. Antonius: see ad. Brut. II 3, 2 "Antonius adhuc est nobiscum, sed medius fidius et moveor hominis precibus et timeo ne illum aliquorum furor excipiat. Plane aestuo. Quodsi scirem quid tibi placeret, sine sollicitudine essem ..." Cicero, at first, was of the opinion

that he should wait for the outcome of the war at Mutina: "Quod me de Antonio consulis, quoad Bruti exitum cognorimus, custodiendum puto." (ad Brut. II 4, 3) But on 13th April a letter from Brutus was read in the Senate and with it one from C. Antonius, in which Brutus had allowed him to style himself 'proconsul'. This caused a sensation and even confounded Cicero: "Vehementer admiratus senatus. Mihi autem non erat explicatum quid agerem. Falsas dicerem? .. Confirmarem? non erat dignitatis tuae ..." (ad Brut. II 5, 3). Such recognition of C. Antonius' title to Macedonia was most unwelcome to the Senate; and the possible danger in this to those who had taken up arms against him was not overlooked: "Sestuis causae non defuit post me, cum quanto suum filium, quanto meum in periculo futurum diceret, si contra proconsulem arma tulissent" (ad Brut. II 5, 4).

To Cicero and the Senate Brutus' clemency to Antony's brother, just when events at Mutina were reaching a crisis, was untimely, and even alarming, if it suggested that he might not be ready to lend them his wholehearted support against Antony. They may have begun to fear, as Boissier says (op. cit. pp. 372-3), having seen Brutus so slow to take the lead in any open and decisive action, that this lenient attitude indicated fresh hesitation and withdrawal on his part. At that point, they had no patience with his scruples and did not appreciate his policy. Cicero, in particular, was anxious to impress on him the

desperate nature of the struggle in which they were engaged: " ... nec quicquam aliud decernitur hoc bello, nisi utrum simus necne" (ad Brut. II 5, 5).

26, 6. In this last phase of his career, Cicero exhibited a vehemence and fanaticism at variance with his former political conduct. He saw that they were entering on the final contest for the Republic and abandoning his old hesitancy concentrated all his energies on prosecuting the war with Antony. Seeing no hope in peaceful measures, he pressed for more determined action, for the restoration of the Republic by force of arms if necessary, for a ruthlessness to match that of their enemies - see ad Brut. II 5, 1& 5 "Pacem ipsam bello atque armis effici posse arbitrabar ... His ergo consulimus, quibus victoribus vestigium nostrum nullum relinquetur?"

He denounced all attempts to come to terms with their opponents or to use moderation in dealing with them, realising that their own existence was at stake (see ad Brut. II 15, 10). He reminded Brutus (II 5, 1) that peace could not be won by fine words alone: an admission which reveals the great change in his outlook. Commenting on this, Boissier explains this apparently uncharacteristic phase in Cicero's life: - "Il n'y a rien de violent comme les colères des gens modérés quand on les pousse à bout" (op. cit. p. 372). For him it was "une lutte à outrance", and so with Antony's brothers as with Antony (see ad Brut. I 3, 3 "trium fratrum unam et eandem esse causam").

In this frame of mind, he was exasperated by Brutus'

refusal to wage war relentlessly on the Antonii or to share his own sense of urgency.

Brutus, for his part, still shrank from the prospect of civil war. He was not prepared to conduct a ruthless campaign against his opponents: see ad Brut. I 2a "scribis enim acrius prohibenda bella civilia esse quam in superatos iracundiam exercendam."

He had not yet abandoned all hope of compromise. Syme (*p.* 184) suggests that this was the reason for his reluctance in April to have Cassius' successes published at Rome (see ad Brut. II 3, 3). To him, the possession of the eastern provinces and legions provided a basis for negotiation. If the Republicans held the East, evenly matched against the combined Caesarian forces in the West, some compromise might even yet be effected and the ultimate and fatal trial of strength between them averted (see Syme p. 183-4. 203. Gelzer PW X 1003-5). This belief dictated his policy towards C. Antonius, whom he hoped to use as a hostage.

Ferrero's interpretation (Eng. tr. III p. 146 f.) is too strained and derives entirely from his view of Brutus as a singularly weak and impressionable character. It is incredible that Brutus was completely dominated by Antonius, adapting his policy to suit his prisoner even to the extent of a quarrel with Cicero.

On the contrary, Brutus and Cicero had always held

opposite views on Antony and Brutus' actions at this time are quite consistent with his general policy. It was his last attempt to secure a peaceful settlement.

The dispute is closely connected with the quarrel over Octavian and stems from the same difference of opinion. Cicero protested against the use of mild, law-abiding methods in dealing with the Antonian faction - see ad Brut. I 2a, 1 "Vehementer a te, Brute, dissentio nec clementiae tuae concedo, sed salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementiae."

Brutus, however, again insisted that it was more dangerous to load Octavian with honours than to fail to crush the Antonii completely (cf. ad Brut. I 4, 2). He persisted, even though C. Antonius repaid his indulgence with repeated attempts to stir up mutiny among his troops (c. 26, 7-8. cf. ad Brut. I 2, 3), until at length Brutus was obliged to place him under guard.

On the mutiny described by Plutarch, Dio (47, 23, 1 - 24, 2) who gives a similar account, shows Brutus using greater severity in dealing with it.

C. Antonius is said to have been left at Apollonia, with a certain Gaius Clodius, by Dio. Plutarch, however, evidently believed that he was left in the charge of Hortensius (see below c. 28, 1).

c. 27. Events in Italy and the West, 43 B.C.

Cicero: Philippics V - IX, XII - XIV. F. X 5-35 XI 8-26. XII 5, 9, 10, 25. ad Brut. I 10. 12-15. 18.

Appian: III 50, 202 - 77, 312. 80, 325 - IV 52, 224.

Dio: 46, 29-56. 47, 1-19.

Velleius: II 63-67. Livy: Per. 119. 120.

Plutarch: Ant. 17-21. Cic. 45-49.

Mon. Anc. 1 - 2.

Suetonius: Aug. 10 - 12.

Eutrop.: VII 1 - 3.

Oros.: VI 18, 3-13.

At the beginning of the year, while Antony was blockading Decimus Brutus in Mutina, the Senate decided, against Cicero's advice, to send an embassy to negotiate with him. Yet at the same time Decimus and Octavian were commended and honoured. The embassy, having lost its most influential member, Servius Sulpicius, who died on the journey (see Phil. IX), failed, and the two remaining envoys, Philippus and Piso, returned on the 1st or 2nd February. Antony not only refused to capitulate or to allow the envoys to approach Decimus, but sent counter-demands to the Senate (see F. XII 4, 1 " ... intolerabilia postulata .."). He, however, was not declared "hostis". His supporters in the Senate carried the proposal to declare a state of emergency ("tumultum") rather than war ("bellum")

which would have involved the outlawing of Antony (see Phil. VIII 1, 1-4). A second embassy, to include Cicero, was proposed in March but soon abandoned. On 19th March, Pansa with forces levied in Italy started for the north to join his colleague, who was conducting the campaign in conjunction with Octavian. Towards the end of the winter, operations against Antony had begun; he had been driven from Claterna (Phil. VIII 2, 6) and held only the towns of Bononia, Regium Lepidi and Parma (F. XII 5, 2). Dio (46, 37, 1) says that Antony, seeing Decimus was unlikely to surrender with relief in sight, left the continuance of the siege to his brother Lucius and himself moved to encounter Hirtius and Octavian.

On the 14th April the battle of Forum Gallorum was precipitated by Antony (see F. X 30). He encountered and defeated Pansa's troops as they came up; Pansa himself being fatally wounded. But Hirtius, renewing the battle late in the day with fresh forces, routed Antony and retrieved the situation. News of this, following premature reports of a defeat, was received in Rome with great rejoicing. At a meeting of the Senate, Cicero delivered his last extant speech, the Fourteenth Philippic, and carried the proposal of a fifty-days thanksgiving and the erection of a monument to the fallen. About a week later, probably 21st April, a battle was forced on Antony before Mutina, in which he was again defeated. The senatorial victory was not complete, even then, for the loss of both

consuls created serious difficulties. Hirtius had fallen in the battle and a day or two later Pansa died of the wounds received at Forum Gallorum. When, on 22nd April, Antony finally raised the seige of Mutina and retreated west, the surviving generals on the senatorial side were Octavian and Decimus Brutus. The latter was unable to pursue Antony effectively (F. XI 13) and Octavian refused to co-operate with him (e.g. F. XI 20, 4). At Rome, when news of the victory arrived on 27th, Antony and his followers were at last declared "hostes". The Senate, believing the threat to its existence removed, was extravagantly optimistic and now began its policy of discarding Octavian, who was no longer needed. In the award of honours Decimus was granted a triumph, Octavian an ovation only; and further, the supreme command was transferred to Decimus - Octavian was to be subordinate to him. Octavian and his soldiers alike refused to be relegated to an inferior position and treated with contempt by the Senate (cf. F XI 10, 11 "sed neque Caesari imperari potest nec Caesar exercitui suo ..."). He showed no disposition to follow up the victory at Mutina; and indeed the destruction of Antony was not in his own interests, for it would leave him no check to the Senate. Meanwhile Antony was joined at Vada by Ventidius Bassus, who had been recruiting forces in Picenum, and continued his march westward towards Lepidus in Narbonensis. The Senate, after the first elation, was filled

with disappointment and renewed anxiety. Its reliance now was on Decimus, who was virtually helpless, and on the doubtful loyalty of the Caesarian commanders in the west. Lepidus was the least reliable. Plancus, coming up to join him in opposing Antony, received no encouragement. Antony, now camping close by, secretly intrigued with Lepidus and his army; the final conjunction of the two occurred on 29th May, Lepidus pretending to act under compulsion from the soldiers. Plancus withdrew again beyond the river Isère and waited for Decimus (F. X 23). But their combined forces continued inactive, and in Rome optimism had given way to profound depression. On 30th June, Lepidus was declared "hostis". Brutus wrote from Macedonia on behalf of his nephews, the sons of Lepidus, and at home his mother and sister Junia had also applied to Cicero (see ad Brut. I 12; 13; 14; 15, 13; 18, 6). His concern for Lepidus' children, though natural enough, was not well received at Rome. The situation was too desperate to admit of half-measures or gestures of clemency; and the Senate expected Brutus' support against declared enemies. Cicero was annoyed by his attitude, but nonetheless did what he could (I 15, 13). Brutus, characteristically, was unwilling to believe the first reports of Lepidus' treachery - I, 13, 1 "Qui si eripuerit se nobis - quod velim temere atque iniuriose de illo suspicati sint ...". It is not likely that there was any political significance in Brutus' appeal - as has

been suggested. He did not attempt to defend Lepidus, once assured of his defection, but he was, naturally, concerned for the fate of his nephews and hoped to use his own influence on their behalf. He cannot be seriously reproached for failing to adhere strictly to Republican principles in this clash of political sympathies and family loyalty.

While Lepidus was befriending Antony, the attitude of Octavian gave further cause for alarm (27, 1-4 see ad Brut. I 10, 3. F X 24, 6). Assured of the loyalty of his army, he sent officers to Rome early in July to demand the consulship for him. When it was refused, he promptly marched on Rome. On August 19th he was elected, together with his cousin Q. Pedius. Plutarch refers (27, 3) to Augustus' memoirs, recording his extreme youth. cf. Mon. Anc. 1, 1-4 "Annos undeviginti natus .... populus autem eodem anno me consulem - creavit".

His first measures showed which way he was intending. His adoption was speedily ratified, the sentence of outlawry on Dolabella was abrogated, and finally a Lex Pedia provided for the prosecution of all those concerned in the murder of Caesar. C.27, 4-6; see also App. III 95, 392-394. Dio 46, 48-49, Suet. Aug. 10, 1. Livy Per 120. Vell. II 69, 5. Mon. Anc. 2.

A trial was staged, L. Cornificius acting as prosecutor of Brutus, Agrippa of Cassius. All the accused were condemned by

default.

27, 5. Publius Silicius mentioned here appears in Appian (III 95, 393) as the sole juror who ventured to vote for acquittal.

According to Dio (46, 48, 4) Sextus Pompeius was also condemned under this law. The legal position of Brutus and Cassius was thus completely altered. From holding proconsular authority over the east by senatorial decree, they had become outlaws. But the provinces were still theirs in fact if not in law and would have to be wrested from them by force.

Octavian soon left Rome and marched north, ostensibly to encounter Antony. Yet before long the Senate was induced to repeal the sentences on Antony and Lepidus - sufficient indication of what was to come. The last step was not long delayed. Pollio, who had been waiting on events, came up to join Antony and brought Plancus over with him, thus completing the union of the Caesarian generals. Decimus Brutus, isolated, tried to escape overland to Macedonia; but his troops deserted, and finally, falling in with a Celtic tribe, he was murdered by their chief at Antony's instigation (App. III 98, 405-9. Vell. II 64, 1. Oros. VI 18, 7). About the same time died also Minucius Basilus, another conspirator (App. III 98 409).

27, 6. Meanwhile, the conference of Antony, Octavian and Lepidus near Bononia in November had resulted in the formation

of the 2nd Triumvirate. They agreed to share supreme power in Rome, to divide the Western provinces, to prosecute the war with the Liberators, and to raise funds and crush opposition by proscription. Towards the end of the month they entered Rome separately with their armies and on November 27th the agreement received formal ratification by a Lex Titia: they became "triumviri reipublicae constituendae" for five years. Octavian then laid down the consulship (see App. IV 2, 4 - 4, 14. Dio 46, 55-56. Livy Per. 120).

27, 6. In the first announcement to the armies, all mention of proscription had been suppressed. But before the triumvirs came to Rome, the first names had been dispatched to Pedius (whose heart failed after the first night) and the proscriptions set on foot. Cicero, abandoned by his protégé to Antony's vengeance, was among these. The proscriptions did not take him completely unawares. Since the Senate's collapse in August, he had had time to escape from the new régime. But with the fall of the Republic in Italy, his courage had failed. He no longer had the will or strength to continue the struggle abroad: "Omnia illi displicuisse praeter mortem" (Seneca Suas. VI 19). And after the failure of his policy, and all that had passed between them, he could not have been eager to meet Brutus again. Indeed, none of the three camps in which others were taking refuge attracted him (Sen. Suas. VI 14). Unable to face a doubtful future in

uncongenial company and in the midst of wars, he hesitated and delayed, even after the posting of the proscription lists, until it was too late. He was overtaken and murdered on December 7th 43 B.C. by Laenas, whom he had once defended (see Plut. Cic. 47 f. App. IV 19, 73 - 21, 84. Dio 47, 8, 3-4. Seneca Rhetor. Suas. VI 17. de vir. ill. 81, 6).

27, 1. Plutarch passes over the activities of Brutus during the months when these events were taking place in Italy.

From Cicero, we know that he remained in the region of Dyrrhachium and Apollonia until he heard of the victory of Mutina in early May 43, when he began his eastward march. His intention was to repulse the cohorts of Dolabella, invading the Chersonese from Asia (ad Brut. I 2, 1). Cicero at first approved. While he still hoped for a successful issue to the war in the north and for the support of the Caesarian generals in the defence of Italy, he was of opinion that Brutus should assist in crushing Dolabella, whose hold on Asia constituted a serious threat to the Republican position in the east (ad Brut. I 2, 2; 4, 3. I 5, 1. Phil. XI 11, 26). When Brutus left Dyrrhachium, the danger from Antony was believed to have been averted. He therefore continued eastward, even when Dolabella's cohorts withdrew from Europe and he received news of the activities of Cimber and Deiotarus against Dolabella (ad Brut. I 6, 3). Dio (47, 24, 2 - 25) says he then crossed to Asia, but presently returned to Thrace.

Gelzer (PW X 1007) accepts this account and describes the brief incursion as a demonstration to impress the Asian communities. It is more probably an error on Dio's part. No other source records two crossings within the year, and it seems in itself a dubious account. It seems more likely that Brutus' campaign in Thrace was undertaken on his way to Asia and that he did not make the crossing before the end of the year 43. In Thrace, he won the support of some of the native princes, in particular of Rhascyporis (Dio 47, 25, 2) and of Polemocratia, who placed in his care both her son and the considerable royal treasure (App. IV 75, 319-320). After a successful campaign against the Bessi, completing the subjugation of Thrace, he assumed the title of Imperator (Dio 47, 25, 2. Sydenham p. 202-203).

Meanwhile, Cicero's opinion had changed with the changing situation in Italy. Before the end of May, when the rejoicing over the victory of Mutina had proved premature, he began to advocate the recall of Brutus and his army (ad Brut. I 9. 10. 12). Decimus held the same opinion (F. XI 14, 2). Cicero's appeals to Brutus became more urgent as the Senate's position grew worse with the defection of Lepidus and the new menace from Octavian (ad Brut. I 14. 15, 12). It also appears from ad Brut. I 10, 1 that in June a senatus auctoritas had recommended Brutus' return. The original proposal had evidently met with opposition, perhaps from the Antonian or

other Caesarian groups, for the Senate as a whole did not share Cicero's enthusiasm for the Liberators. In February, though Calenus' motion to deprive Brutus of his command was defeated, it was not unsupported (see Phil. X 7, 14 - 9, 19). Again, Cicero's proposal to give Cassius the eastern command was vetoed and raised some criticism of his championing of the Liberators - see Phil. XI 14, 35 "exaudivi etiam nimium a me Brutum, nimium Cassium ornari, Cassio vero sententia mea dominatum et principatum dari". Many of the senators may not have wished to recall the Liberators while there was hope of saving the situation without their aid. Appian (III 85, 350) says that the Senate sent secretly to Brutus and Cassius for aid. The tradition may have some connection with Cicero's last extant letter to Brutus, dated 27th July (ad Brut. I 18). He describes an interview with Servilia, at which Casca, Labeo and Scaptius were also present; he was asked his opinion on the question of recalling Brutus: "respondi ... et dignitati et existinationi tuae maxime conducere te primo quoque tempore ferre praesidium labenti et inclinatae paene reipublicae" (ad Brut. I 18, 2). The question was evidently being discussed in Republican circles already in June: see F. XI 25 & 26, 1 "Deliberent utrum ... Brutum accersant necne ...". But again the policy of the Republicans abroad failed to correspond with that of the government at Rome.

Cicero now, when he saw the coalition against Antony for

which he had worked, beginning to break up and a new combination of Caesarians forming, naturally turned for help to the Liberators. He had made every effort to keep the goodwill and loyalty of all the army commanders, but his persecution of Antony had pleased neither Republicans nor Caesarians. The new alliance was foreshadowed long before it became a reality. The adherence to the Senate of Plancus and, more especially, of Lepidus had always been questionable. Their despatches of 20th March, (F. X 8,) advocating peace, and probably sent in agreement with Antony, showed the direction of their thoughts. Antony, on his side, affirmed his continued associaation with them in his letter to Hirtius and Octavian (see Phil. XIII 19, 42-44 "Mihi quidem constat ... nec Lepidi societatem violare... nec Plancum prodere, participem consiliorum"). In the same letter, he dwelt on the folly of Caesarians uniting against him with former Pompeians, and reminded them that their destruction would be as welcome to the Senate as his: "utrum sit aequius concurrere nos, quo facilius revivéscat Pompeianorum causa ... an consentire, ne ludibrio simus inimicis" (Phil. XIII 18, 38) "... quibus, utri nostrum ceciderint, lucro futurum est" (19, 40). Antony knew the real worth of the uneasy and unnatural association of old enemies who had no new reason to trust each other. When, inevitably, the Caesarians began to fall away, Cicero relied absolutely on the Liberators, in whom he had

always had far more confidence (see F. XII 6, 1. 9, 2. 10, 4). He did not doubt their willingness or their ability to return and successfully defend the Senate at the crucial moment. And, in his opinion, the saving of the Republic depended on their return: if the Senate and Italy were lost, all was lost - a belief shared by Marsh ("Founding of Roman Empire" pp. 188-189). In this, Cicero would, naturally, be influenced by personal considerations; for him, the loss of Italy was fatal. He had no longer the energy or will to undertake the journey and begin the fight again in the provinces (see above). But the Liberators saw the situation in a different light. To Brutus, concerned with the pursuit of abstract ideas, the Republic and Rome were not inseparable; about this time he wrote to Cicero: "an tu Romae habitare, id putas incolumem esse? Res, non locus, oportet praestet istuc mihi" (ad Brut. I 16, 6) "mihi esse iudicabo Romam ubicumque liberum esse licebit" (16, 8). In view of this distinction, Brutus was prepared, like Pompey in 49, to abandon Italy at first and concentrate on the rich provinces of the east, drawing the war abroad, in the hope of winning back the peninsular later. His policy - and Cassius' too - was to consolidate his power in the east and secure a strong base for the Republic there. If the Caesarians overwhelmed Italy, Republicans could still find the Republic in his camp - many had already sought it (see ad Brut. II 4, 4). He was not prepared to risk

everything in a premature attempt to encounter his opponents on Italian soil, leaving the east but half-pacified, liable to revolt and thus cut off his resources. Moreover, his return in the summer of 43 was not practicable. Cassius was too far away and too fully occupied with Dolabella and his adherents to be able to join in an invasion of Italy; and without Cassius, such an expedition could not hope to succeed. Cicero assured him of the support of all right-minded citizens: "si Italiam attigerit (exercitum tuum), erit civis nemo quem quidem civem appellari fas sit, qui se non in tua castra conferat" (ad Brut. I 14, 2). Assertions of this kind, however, were not enough to inspire Brutus with confidence in his reception. He had formerly been disappointed in popular reaction to his cause; and of the other commanders in the west he could only rely on the co-operation of Decimus and his weakened forces("meas copiolas ..." F. XI 13, 2). His arrival would merely have precipitated the combination of the Caesarians against him (see Syme p. 185) and made certain his own destruction.

Dio (47, 24, 1-2) asserts that Brutus withdrew further from Italy for fear of the effect on his soldiers of events there, for the loyalty of some, corrupted by C. Antonius, had already wavered. He may with reason have entertained such fears. His army was partly composed of Caesar's veterans. That of Cassius contained an even greater number. They were

always the weak point in the Republican defence.

Brutus' decision is justified by the behaviour of the two African legions which Q. Cornificius brought to Italy in response to the summons. Instead of defending the Republic, they joined Caesar's heir (see App. III 91, 373. 92, 381. Dio 46, 45, 2).

To suggest that he might have made the attempt but for a petty disagreement with the Senate is unjustified. The question of Octavian was not a minor issue and it could not affect the practical difficulties in the way of Brutus' return; although it might be said that Brutus was less disposed to abandon Cassius and their joint policy in a rash attempt to save the Senate from the consequences of its own folly, after his repeated warnings.
- on this question see Syme pp. 185. 203. Gelzer PW X 1008. Ferrero Eng. tr. III 180. Rice-Holmes: "Architect" p. 65. Meyer p. 544. Tyrrell and Purser VI lvii.

What is apparent in Brutus' refusal is his increasing independence. The terms of the decree authorising his command had included the proviso, that he remain within reach of Italy (Phil. X 11, 26. XI 11, 25). The decree of April 27th, conferring imperium maius in the east on the two Liberators left Brutus considerable liberty of action (see ad Brut. I 5, 1); but there was also the senatus auctoritas of June (I 10, 1), to which a strict constitutionalist might have been

expected to pay attention. Brutus preferred to use his own judgment. He was beginning to lay aside his former scruples of legality and in that respect overstepping the bounds originally set for the rôle of Liberator. He had come to consider himself the representative of the Republic and, as such, not indistinguishable from the government at Rome.

This new attitude is strikingly illustrated by an action of Brutus at the end of his Thracian campaign. On the coins issued by his legates to the army appear some coin-portraits of Brutus himself. The use of portraits of living men was an innovation in Roman coinage. The privilege was first granted to Caesar, but in the wars after his death it was used by almost all the rival commanders as a form of propaganda (see Taylor: Divinity of the Roman Emperor pp. 107-8). Antony first made use of it in Gaul in 43 B.C., and Brutus later followed his example. Gelzer (PW X 1007-8) refuted those who saw in this step a monarchical tendency. In Brutus' case, it was not an usurpation of the royal prerogative, but a proclamation of his belief in himself as "liberator orbis terrarum". The portrait appears with other symbols of liberty, including a portrait of his supposed ancestor L. Brutus (Grueber CRRBM III plate cxi no. 12) and with the cap of freedom and two daggers, commemorating the Ides of March (ib. no. 17. cf. Dio 47, 25, 3). Gelzer notes that on

these coins he uses his birth-name not, as on others, his official title since adoption. Clearly, he intended the parallel with the founder of the Republic to be closely drawn.

Whether he was at all influenced by the precedent set by Flamininus (Gelzer loc. cit. Grueber I lvi), the meaning of his coins is plain enough. They repeat in varying forms the slogan of "Libertas" under which the Republicans fought. (cf Dio (47, 43, 1)) By this time Brutus was becoming, even to himself, the personification of his cause, "the living symbol of the constitution" (Radin p. 205); therefore his own portrait sometimes replaces the head of Liberty on his coins. It indicates a considerable development in his conception of the champion of Liberty since the Ides of March and, in that, a probably unconscious departure from the true spirit of Republicanism. Cato's influence had waned. Circumstances were largely responsible. He had been driven to adopt his opponents' methods and so deviate from his own principles, from the very cause for which he was fighting. Seneca (Suas. VI 11) quotes a remark of Cassius Severus on Brutus, Cassius and Sextus Pompeius: "et respublica suos triumviros habet".

c. 28.

Cicero: F. XII 4 - 15. ad Brut. II 3, 3. I 5, 1.

Appian: III 79, 323. IV 60, 258 - 65, 278.

Dio: 47, 24. 28 - 32.

Livy: Per. 121. 122. Vell: II 62. 69.

Josephus: Bell. Iud. 1, 218 ff. Ant. XIV 271 - 301.

Syme: p. 203 Gelzer PW X 1010-1011

Boissier: pp. 378 ff. Froehlich PW III 1732.

28, 1. On learning the fate of Cicero and of Decimus, Brutus wrote to Hortensius ordering the execution of C. Antonius as a reprisal (ὡς ... τιμωρῶν). The accounts of Appian and Dio differ slightly: Appian (III 79, 323) says the execution followed Antonius' repeated attempts to stir up mutiny among Brutus' soldiers: Dio (47, 24, 4) that C. Clodius, in whose custody Antonius was left, after a number of attempts by Antony's agents to rescue the prisoner, had him put to death; but whether on his own responsibility or following instructions from Brutus, Dio is uncertain. Plutarch's version seems the most reasonable, and is further supported by Antony's treatment of Hortensius after Philippi (cf. Livy Per 124). cf. also Livy Per 121 "... M. Bruti ... iussu ... occisus est".

28, 2. The execution of C. Antonius was Brutus' answer to

the proscriptions. As a reprisal, it was a mere gesture, unlikely to affect the triumvirs, who were quite prepared to sacrifice their own relatives (see App. IV 5, 16). However, it also advertised Brutus' final abandonment of his more conciliatory policy - C. Antonius could no longer be useful to him as a hostage. The formation of the triumvirate had destroyed his persistent hopes of an accommodation; once Antony had allied himself with Octavian, there could be no compromise. The opposition was now united and open. The Lex Pedia and the edict of proscription (App. IV 8, 31 - 12, 95) declared war on the Liberators and left them no alternative but to fight: the proscriptions gave notice of the character of the struggle.

Brutus was, therefore, finally freed of his old hesitations and scruples. He had given ground reluctantly, piece by piece; now, since there could be no more doubts, he was ready to adopt a resolute and more ruthless policy. He had resisted Cicero's advice while he lived: his death persuaded him that it had been sound: "aliis rebus, aliis temporibus locus esse solet debetque clementiae ... nec quicquam aliud decernitur hoc bello, nisi utrum simus necne" (ad Brut. II 5, 5).

If Plutarch is here quoting genuine comments of Brutus on Cicero's death (e.g. δουλεύειν γὰρ αὐτῶν αἰτίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν τυραννούντων) they reveal a new understanding on his part of the true state of the Republic, a realisation that

"tyranny" was the product of the times and that the removal of one autocrat would only bring forth successors, since the condition of Rome had made autocracy inevitable. For Brutus, it must have been a bitter admission. But the course of events since the assassination, culminating in the triumvirate and proscriptions, eventually forced him to recognise realities.

28, 3. Brutus' first objects on entering Asia: to equip a fleet, for which he demanded aid of the Bithynians and Cyziceni, and to secure the allegiance of the native rulers. The Greek letters to these communities, attributed to Brutus (Ep. Graec. p. 183-4, 189-90) are of little assistance here. Those to the people of Cyzicus simply demand the convoy of arms from Bithynia and admonish them for a request to withdraw from the alliance; those to the Bithynians demand warships and complain of their tardiness in providing them. From the final letter (no. 67 p. 190) it appears that Brutus equipped himself with a fleet drawn from other allies before the Bithynians responded to his demand; for which he imposed a fine in lieu of ships. The authenticity of these letters being suspect (see below c. 30-32), there is no good reason to dispute Plutarch's statement on this point.

Apart from his allies in the provinces, Brutus was by this time accompanied by many of the proscribed who had escaped from Italy - others joined Cassius or Sextus Pompeius (App. IV 70, 298). Before the proscriptions, many had

voluntarily abandoned Italy to seek his camp (ad Brut. II 4, 4). He had the support of the younger generation of Optimates, sons of those who had followed Pompey and Cato, many of them his kinsmen - see ad Brut. I 12, 1- 15, 1-2. II 3, 6. Syme p. 198.

At this point, Brutus recalled Cassius from his proposed invasion of Egypt, intended as a punitive expedition against Cleopatra who had sent evasive replies to his demands for assistance and had been giving aid to Dolabella (App. IV 63, 269. Dio 47, 30, 4) and favoured the triumvirs.

Cassius, during the year 43, had been occupied in securing his position in Syria and excluding Dolabella. At the beginning of May, he heard of his rival's invasion of Cilicia, the neighbouring province, and prepared to march against him (F. XII 12, 5). Dolabella actually entered Syria, but did not succeed in storming Antioch and was forced to fall back on the coastal town of Laodicea (F. XII 14, 4, end of May). This news was sent to Cicero by Lentulus Spinther, Trebonius' quaestor in Asia, who after the murder of Trebonius had gone to Brutus in Macedonia and subsequently took part in the campaign against Dolabella, in command of a fleet. He claimed to have given material assistance to both Liberators in the east, and in fact to have made possible Cassius' entry into Syria (F. XII 14, 1 & 6), which, even if somewhat exaggerated, throws further light on the part played

by Tebonius and his officers in the Republican occupation of the east.

The postscript to Lentulus' despatch of the Senate (F. XII 15), written on the 2nd June, announced Cassius' advance on Laodicea. The situation on 15th June is described in a letter of Cassius Parmensis to Cicero (F. XII 13): Dolabella was then closely invested in Laodicea by Cassius, the sea was closed to him also by Cassius' fleet under the command of Sextilius Rufus, his situation was already desperate. No certain news had reached Rome by 30th June (F. XII 10) but Cassius' letter of 7th May had arrived, and it was confidently expected that he would quickly bring the war to a successful conclusion. Already on 27th April, after the Battle of Mutina and the death of the consuls, who were to have undertaken the campaign against Dolabella, Cassius' position had been legalised, and the supreme command in the eastern provinces conferred on Brutus and Cassius jointly (see ad Brut. I 5, 1 "ad. v K. Maias ... dixit Servilius ... et ut Cassius persequeretur Dolabellam. Cui cum essem adsensus, decrevi hoc amplius, ut tu, si arbitrarere utile exque re publica esse, persequerere bello Dolabellam". cf. Vell. II 62, "Bruto Cassioque ... omnia transmarina imperia eorum commissa arbitrio" and Livy Per 121. App. IV 58, 248. 69, 294. 70, 297-8. Dio 47, 28, 5. 29, 5-6).

Laodicea was finally taken through the treachery of the

sentries. Dolabella committed suicide to avoid capture (App. IV 62, 267. Dio 47, 30, 5). Cassius then turned his attention to Tarsus, which had also favoured his opponent and which continued to hold out after the fall of Laodicea. It was soon taken, and a heavy contribution levied as the price of its resistance (App. IV 64, 273-276. Dio 47, 30-32). Preparations for the Egyptian campaign were beginning when Brutus recalled him.

28, 3-6. Plutarch gives, as Brutus' reasons for this summons, a general statement of his aims - in chief, to liberate Rome, not merely to establish personal authority and, with this in view, to remain within reach of Italy and bring relief as soon as possible. These views appear to be inconsistent with Brutus' attitude to the question of returning to Italy only a few months previously - unless his sole reason, then, was that the time was not ripe. Yet, after the triumvirate was well established, the attempt would have been even more hazardous. Brutus may have wished to confront the triumvirs and reach a decision at the earliest opportunity, without proposing an invasion of Italy. Dio (47, 32, 3) certainly mentions it among the plans discussed at Smyrna, but as a future possibility on which both were agreed. There were other reasons for recalling Cassius. Brutus no doubt felt that Egypt was too far afield and the danger from Cleopatra not so pressing; but, especially in view of the

great change in the political scene at home, a personal interview between the two Republican leaders was essential, in order to discuss the situation and decide their course of action (see Dio 47, 32, 1).

28, 3-6. The conference at Smyrna, early 42 B.C.: see App. IV 65, 276-279. Dio 47, 32, 1-4. Livy Per 122.

This was the first meeting of Brutus and Cassius since they parted at Athens, towards the end of 44 B.C. Plutarch dwells on the confidence inspired by the sight of their joint forces and the advance of their cause since they left Italy, almost alone and powerless. With their combined armies and the resources of the east, they were now in a position to challenge the triumvirate. That, according to Appian (IV 65, 276), was what Brutus proposed to do. In this account, he had recalled Cassius because Antony and Octavian were already sending their troops across the Adriatic (IV 63, 270); Brutus therefore suggested that they advance at once into Macedonia and confront the eight legions arriving there (IV 65, 276). Cassius, however, thought that the enemy might safely be disregarded for the moment, while they turned their attention to the disaffected communities of Asia, which might otherwise cut off their retreat when they returned to Europe. At the same time they would also strengthen their armies and increase their resources. Brutus agreed to adopt his plan. Dio (47, 32, 3-4) adds their reasons for believing that the triumvirs

presented no immediate danger: they were still occupied in Italy, and it was thought that Sextus Pompeius would further delay their departure (as, in fact, he did - see App. IV 85, 355-362).

30, 1-3. On the assistance given to Brutus by Cassius at Smyrna - against the advice of his friends: Cassius seems, throughout the campaign, to have been in a better position financially, though he had some difficulties at first in paying his soldiers (F. XII 12, 2). Brutus, in spite of the money brought to him by the quaestors and Atticus' generous aid (Nepos 8, 6), wrote to Cicero of his need of men and money, soon after his occupation of Macedonia (ad Brut. II 3, 5). Cicero was unable to secure any promises from the Senate (II 4, 4); it was not in a position to help Brutus further than authorising him to raise money in the provinces. But Cassius did not need to rely on Rome (see ad Brut. I 18, 5): "Maximus autem ... in republica nodus est inopia rei pecuniariae ... Impendent autem infiniti sumptus cum in hos exercitus ... tum vero in tuum. Nam Cassius noster videtur posse satis ornatus venire".

In addition to crushing incipient opposition, the campaign in Asia was also to provide them with sufficient funds for the final campaign against the triumvirs.

To the Smyrna conference also probably belongs the attempt of Gellius Publicola on the lives of Brutus and Cassius: see

Livy Per 122. Dio 47, 24, 4-6 appears to separate the two attempts but does not date them clearly.

Gelzer (PW X 1011) cites this incident as an example of the influence of 'amicitia'. No action was taken against Gellius because he was half-brother to Messalla Corvinus, who was intimate with both Liberators (Dio loc. cit. cf. Cic. ad Brut. I 12, 1. 15, 1).

c. 29.

This chapter - a digression from the main course of the narrative - is chiefly concerned with the development of the contrast between Brutus and Cassius, which Plutarch first drew in c. 1, 4 and to which he frequently returns. In order to throw his portrait of Brutus into stronger relief, he heightens the natural contrast of character and thereby misrepresents both men.

His brief character-sketch of Cassius (c. 29, 2) on the whole agrees with other reports (cf. App. IV 132, 553 f. - but a more generous estimate) and is not inconsistent with the tone of Cassius' extant letters to Cicero (F. XII 11 & 12. XV 19). But the distinction he makes, especially in discussing the ultimate aims of Brutus and Cassius, is largely unjust. Both Liberators had the same object in view - namely, the restoration of the Republic. There is no convincing evidence that Cassius occupied the East with the intention of establishing his own supremacy. Two incidents, in particular, in the year 42 illustrate his views - his rejection of the royal title at Rhodes and his adherence to Republican tradition in the issue of coins; there is no coin-portrait of Cassius.

Certainly, he was no doctrinaire. His opposition to autocracy was the natural reaction of the Roman nobilis. He remained in closer touch with reality than Brutus and was less

hampered by scruples. But that is no proof of insincerity. Plutarch's comparison with Pompey and the violent Popular leaders is not justified.

29, 3 f. The character of Brutus, idealised throughout, is presented here rather as a model philosopher-statesman than a real human figure. A comparison with Cicero's evidence reveals the discrepancy between ideal and reality.

Brutus was distinguished from most of his contemporaries by his studious habits and his more austere mode of life (yet see de vir. ill. 82, 3 for his connection with the notorious Cytheris); but that he was not (for instance) indifferent to gain is clearly shown by his business dealings in the East (see above on c. 3). Plutarch was unwilling to see that his mild philosopher, like a true Roman, could also be a hard man of business. In the same way, he treats Brutus' conduct in war, selecting for his narrative and embellishing such incidents as could serve his purpose, e.g. Brutus' grief at the destruction of Xanthus (c. 31), his dealings with the mutineers at Apollonia (c. 26, 8), his reluctance to kill his prisoners at Philippi (c. 45, 4-5). In one instance only, he has no palliation of the truth, see c. 46, 1-3 on Brutus' promise to his soldiers at Philippi. It is the only fault he finds in his hero. It was, however, not an isolated lapse, but is related to his exactions in Asia in 42 and his dealings with Cyprus - evidences of a flaw in his moral judgment.

The general confidence in his honesty of purpose in the war (29, 7), if true, was not wholly misplaced. There was a change in him, traceable in his actions from the Ides of March to the final campaign, as he began to see that war was inevitable and could not be waged with clean hands (cf. Tac. Ann. I, 9 "arma civilia ... quae neque parari possent neque haberi per bonas artis"). The effort to emerge victorious from the struggle in the conditions of the times led to deviations from strict principle. But it cannot definitely be inferred from that that he was no longer truly Republican - as far as was possible. An uncompromising Republican of Cato's type it was not possible to be, by that time, without abandoning politics or taking refuge in suicide (cf. Meyer op. cit. p. 538 "wollte man das Leben unter der Monarchie nicht ertragen, so musste man wie Cato freiwillig in den Tod gehn ..."). 29, 9 f. Plutarch says Antony was heard by many to express his belief in Brutus' integrity; and with this belongs Brutus' comment on Antony's folly in throwing in his lot with Octavian, when he might have been numbered among the Republicans (29, 10. cf. App. IV 130, 547 - a similar tradition). In Brutus' opinion Antony, a man of the same class and tradition as the Liberators, had formed an unnatural alliance with Octavian, when his place was naturally with them.

This was his final expression of the belief revealed in his former policy: the belief that he and Antony could find a

basis for co-existence. He had shown it in sparing Antony's life, in treating with him after Caesar's death, in honourable treatment of his brother. And this in spite of his disapproval of Antony's political conduct (see ad Brut. I 17, 6 "quamvis sit vir bonus ... Antonius; quod ego nunquam existimavi"). Differences with Antony were reconcilable. His antagonism towards Octavian was not of the same character. While Antony and Brutus might meet on common ground, there could be no agreement between Brutus and Caesar's heir. They represented opposing forces, and were conscious of it. Each, to the other, was "l'ennemi par excellence" (cf. Carcopino, "Correspondance .." p. 106).

Brutus, who had been slow and hesitant in resisting Antony, refused to countenance any alliance with Octavian. He counselled peace and moderation when Antony was the chief opponent: but with the rise of Octavian, in whom he recognised the real enemy of his Republic, he abandoned his hopes of averting war.

c. 30-32. The subjugation of Rhodes and Lycia (first half of 42 B.C.)

Sources: for Rhodes - App. IV 65, 278 - 75, 316.
Dio 47, 33, 1-4. Val. Max. I, 5, 8.

for Lycia - App. IV 75, 316 - 83, 348.
Dio 47, 34, 1-6.
Vell. II 69. Oros. VI 18, 13 (Epistolographi Graeci pp. 177-191)

Sydenham: Roman Republican Coinage pp. 201 - 205.

Grueber: CRRBM II pp. 470 ff. III Plates cxi & cxii

Macdonald: Coin Types pp. 198 - 200

Smith: The Greek Letters of M. Junius Brutus (cp. XXX 1936 pp. 194 ff.)

30, 3-4. A very brief account is first given of Cassius' capture of Rhodes, stressing the harshness of his dealings with the Rhodians (see below 32, 4). Appian treats the campaign more fully. Leaving Smyrna, Cassius prepared his fleet at Myndus. The Rhodian nobles were alarmed by these preparations, but the people, excited by two demagogues, were eager to fight. However, two separate embassies were sent to Cassius, the second headed by his former teacher, Archelaus, in the hope of conciliating him. But Rhodes had supported Dolabella in the recent war (cf. F. XII 14, 2-3, 15, 2-3) and Cassius now disregarded excuses and evasions. A naval battle in the territorial waters of Cos ended in the defeat of the Rhodian

fleet; the city itself was then attacked by land and sea and quickly taken, partly through the treachery of some of the citizens. Once captured, it was put under contribution and stripped of all money and valuables; not even the temples were spared. To those who had betrayed the city and now tried to save at least some of their temples and gods, Cassius, the Epicurean, returned a contemptuous answer (Val. Max. I 5, 8). In addition, a number of Rhodians who had led the opposition were executed; and from the whole of Asia, ten years' tribute was exacted.

According to Dio (47, 33, 3-4) Cassius, after twice defeating the Rhodian fleet, met with no resistance when he landed on the island, on account of his former association with Rhodes as a young man.

This victory was commemorated on coins struck at Sardis in Cassius' name by his legates, Servilius and Lentulus. One of these, in the symbols on the reverse, gives a pictorial summary of events: it shows a crab, the device of Cos, holding in its claws the aplustre, symbolising victory at sea; below is a rose, the usual device of Rhodes, and a loosened royal diadem; evidently a reference to the title Cassius rejected on his
30, 3 entry into the city, confirming Plutarch's anecdote.
(see Grueber II p. 483 III plate cxii no. 8)

The subjugation of Rhodes by Cassius seems to have been completed before that of Lycia. It was evidently a fairly

short campaign and is described by the historians, as by Plutarch, before the account of the Lycian campaign. Moreover, Cassius' legate Lentulus is said to have assisted Brutus in the later stages of the Lycian campaign, which suggests that the capture of Rhodes had then been effected. From the coins, another legate, M. Servilius, appears to have served both Brutus and Cassius at this time. And Appian (IV, 81, 341) seems to imply that Rhodes fell before Patara, the second Lycian city attacked by Brutus. If this is so, it throws suspicion on Brutus' supposed letter to the Rhodians (Ep. Graec. p. 179-180); while receiving some support from other letters in the collection - see no. 23 p. 181 to the Lycians (μετὰ τὸν πόλεμον. " Κάσσιος δ' ἔφθασεν) and no. 13 p. 180 (Λυκίᾳ ἡμῖν ὑπήκοος πᾶσα μετὰ τὴν Ῥοδίων ἅλωσιν). 30, 4 - 32, 4. Plutarch's account of the Lycian campaign deals only with the siege and destruction of Xanthus, in detail, and briefly with the taking of Patara, the two chief cities that held out against Brutus.

Appian, who appears to be using a different source here, describes the storming of Xanthus and the desperate resistance of its inhabitants, without mentioning any particular anxiety on Brutus' part to stop their self-destruction. Those who were saved - mostly slaves, very few free Xanthians - were held as captives and used in an attempt to induce the surrender of Patara. According to Appian, the people of Patara

capitulated on seeing preparations for a siege going forward; none of them was executed or banished but a heavy contribution was levied. About the same time, Lentulus, now acting as Brutus' legate, was sent against the sea-port of Myra, whereupon the Lycian confederation decided to come to terms with Brutus and promised military aid. Taxes were imposed on the whole community, and the Lycian fleet was despatched to Abydos, to await the gathering of the Republican forces. After this, the free Xanthians were restored to their city. Dio (47, 34) alone speaks of a battle in which Brutus overcame the combined Lycian forces and which persuaded most of the cities to surrender. His account of the taking of Xanthus and Patara is substantially the same as Appian's, and is followed by the surrender of Myra and the subjugation of the rest of Lycia. Dio also mentions the end of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (43, 33, 4) who was seized and put to death by Cassius after refusing to assist the Liberators.

32, 4. Plutarch's attempts to distinguish between the exactions of Brutus and those of Cassius in Asia are not supported by other sources, though Appian and Dio do not give an unfavourable account of Brutus. It is unlikely that there was much difference between the two leaders in their dealings with subject nations, considering their pressing need for more funds and reinforcements. Apart from Plutarch, only

Velleius (in describing their return to Macedonia) makes any such distinction, and that in favour of Cassius: "cum per omnia repugnans naturae suae Cassius etiam Bruti clementiam vinceret" (II 69, 6).

In connection with this campaign must be considered the collection of Greek letters, supposedly written by Brutus to the various Asian communities (Ep. Graec. pp. 177-191). In general, the information contained in them adds little to other accounts, but in one particular - the fates of Xanthus and Patara - they present a different picture. Several letters (nos. 11, p. 179. 25 & 27 p. 182. 43 p. 185 in Hercher) deal with this topic, holding the contrasted fates of the two cities before other recalcitrants. Xanthus is said to have been harshly treated for its obstinate resistance; its plea for mercy was refused, its youth killed, the city itself destroyed - no word of self-destruction. Patara, on the other hand, was not only allowed to retain its freedom and granted a remittance of the fine, but even received a gift of fifty talents from Brutus. (This, in itself, sounds highly improbable.)

Those who accept the letters (e.g. Gelzer PW X 1011-12 following Ruehl) reject Plutarch and the historians on the Lycian campaign. But the existing collection is full of difficulties. The letters are arranged in no sort of order, many are merely repetitious and supply little information of

events. The rest generally contradict the historians and are difficult, sometimes impossible, to arrange in chronological sequence. Letters dealing with the Lycians are mixed indiscriminately with those belonging to the early months of 43 B.C. when Dolabella was in Asia. This second group, consisting of letters to Tralles (p. 186-189) and Bithynia (p. 189-190) is very questionable; for instance, the accusation that the Bithynians had aided Dolabella overlooks the fact that Tillius Cimber had been governor of the province at that time and had, by Brutus' own account, resisted Dolabella (ad Brut. I 6, 3). The letter to the Rhodians (no. 11 p. 179), one of the most important for Xanthus and Patara, is suspect, since Brutus had no occasion to write to Rhodes when Cassius was conducting that campaign - quite apart from the chronological confusion mentioned above on c. 30, 3-4. This applies also to the two letters to the Lycians (nos. 21 & 23 p. 181), ordering them to supply Cassius with engines of war. See R.E. Smith (CQ. XXX pp. 194 ff.) who refuted arguments in favour of the letters, with a full discussion of Brutus' movements 43 - 42 B.C. from other sources.

If these letters are later compositions, inspired by genuine letters of Brutus, there remains the question, how far their version of the Lycian campaign may be trusted. They presumably drew on their source, but their material may have suffered distortion in the process: the contrast between

Xanthus and Patara is rhetorically exaggerated. In view of the other confusions or absurdities in the collection, it may be that the original account of the two cities was not unlike Appian's (who is in general the most reliable source on these campaigns), and that a rhetorician, finding it so presented, improved on it in order to produce a dramatic contrast between extreme harshness and incredible leniency.

It is evident, in any case, that Plutarch's narrative cannot be accepted without question· but it remains doubtful if the Greek letters alone can be used to challenge him.

c. 33. A digression: Theodotus, tutor of the young Ptolemy, who had counselled the murder of Pompey and had since been in exile in Asia, fell into Brutus' hands and was put to death by him in 42 B.C. (cf. Plut. Pompey 77.)

c. 34 - 35. The meeting at Sardis, summer of 42 B.C.

After the settlement of Asia, Brutus and Cassius joined forces at Sardis before crossing together to Europe and proceeding against the triumvirs. Here, in a private interview, they composed various misunderstandings that had arisen since their last meeting (cf. Dio 47, 35, 1). On their arrival, they were saluted as Imperators by their armies. Brutus, at least, had already assumed the title (see above on c. 27, 1).

35. The affair of Lucius Pella (or Ocella) illustrates the kind of difference which caused friction between the

Republican leaders. Cassius was irritated by Brutus' rigid adherence to legality on minor points when, in his opinion, the necessities of war demanded toleration of such lapses in subordinates. In this case, too, Brutus' condemnation of Pella was a reflection on Cassius' dealings with a similar offence (35, 2). But in his insistence that the Republicans should not countenance abuses for which they had condemned Caesar, Brutus forgot that he had himself in this war been compelled to override strict legal forms. His reluctance to admit the necessity for this is seen in his words and actions here (35, 4-5). Having given way where he was hard pressed, he then attempted to hold his ground at other points, failing to see how such inconsistency must exasperate his colleague. After the resources of the east had been drained to provide war materials, a single case of extortion might be overlooked.

The same failure to reach an effective compromise between his idealistic conception of the "liberation" and the reality had hindered his cause from the beginning. Yet it was reasonable to insist that they would have done better to submit to Caesar than adopt his methods in the name of the Republic.

34, 4 f. Favonius, the follower of Cato, who reappears here had followed Brutus since the assassination (App. II 119, 500) in spite of his original disapproval (c. 12, 3 above).

After Philippi he was taken prisoner and executed (Suet. Aug. 13, 2. Dio 47, 49, 4). He evidently shared Brutus' opinion of the triumvirs - Suetonius says he saluted Antony with respect, but reviled Octavian. 36-37, 7. The story of the ghost, said to have appeared to Brutus at the Hellespont, treated here at some length, is probably part of the later tradition which surrounded the fall of the Republic with innumerable portents of inevitable disaster (see Florus II 17, 8. App. IV 134, 565).

Some attempts have been made to rationalize the traditional story by assuming that Brutus was subject to hallucinations. Ferrero (Eng. tr. III pp. 201-202. 206) takes this view and believes that Brutus, being unfitted for the work he had undertaken, was now on the verge of a complete mental and nervous collapse. Syme (p. 204) on the contrary dismisses the "ghost" as part of the embellishments of later writers, wise after the event, foreseeing the fate of the Liberators. His explanation is far more credible, especially since there are no other serious indications of mental instability in accounts of Brutus. Plutarch himself describes him as calm and hopeful at Philippi (see below 39, 8. 40, 1 and above 29, 9).

cc. 37 ff. The campaign of Philippi (late 42 B.C.).

App. IV 86, 362 - 132, 553.
Dio 47, 35-49.
Plutarch: Antony 22
Suetonius: Aug. 13.
Florus II 17.
Val. Max. V 1, 11 I 7, 1. 8, 8.
VI 4, 5. 8, 4.
IX 9, 2.
Velleius II 70-72.
Livy Per. 123-124.
de vir. ill. 82, 6. 83, 6.
Oros. VI 18, 14-17.
Eutrop. VII 3.

Syme: pp. 204 - 206.

Rice-Holmes: "Architect" 1 pp. 80-88.

Ferrero: Eng. tr. III pp. 199 - 207.

37, 7 - 38. The Republicans advance to Philippi, throwing back the advance-guard of the triumvirs under Norbanus; Antony makes haste to assist him, while Octavian is delayed by sickness.

Appian's account more closely follows the movements of the army from the crossing of the Hellespont to the encampment at Philippi. He describes first the lustration of the army at the Gulf of Melas (88, 371 - 102, 426), where it was held necessary to confirm the loyalty of the soldiers, especially the large number of Caesar's veterans, with lavish gifts and personal exhortations (89, 374-5).

Meanwhile Norbanus and Decidius Saxa with the triumvirs

advance-guard had pushed forward into Thrace and blocked the Via Egnatia from Asia by occupying the passes of the Corpili and Sapaei through the mountains. As the Republican army advanced, they were outflanked by Tillius Cimber, following the coastline with his fleet; Norbanus therefore, at the western pass, recalled Decidius, thus leaving the Corpili open to the Republicans. Together they prepared to hold the second pass, and so effectively held up the advancing army that the men became discouraged. A circuitous route through the mountains was finally pioneered by Bibulus, under the guidance of Rhascyporis (IV 87, 369 f. cf. Dio 47, 25, 2) and by this the army advanced, again flanking Norbanus and Decidius, who were obliged to fall back on Amphipolis (104, 434-438), at the same time withdrawing their garrison from Symbolon, between Philippi and Neapolis (c. 38, 2. cf. Dio 47, 36, 1).

38, 3. Plutarch asserts that Norbanus and Decidius were only saved from a Republican attack by the arrival of Antony and his army.

Appian (IV 106, 443-4) has a different explanation: Brutus and Cassius, finding an excellent situation for their purpose near Philippi and hearing of Antony's imminent approach, set about fortifying a strong camp there. Dio (47, 36, 2) states definitely that Norbanus took care not to encounter the Republican forces and sent a summons to Antony and Octavian,

who had been delayed: Octavian at Rhegium by Sextus Pompeius who held Sicily, Antony at Brundisium by the operations of Staius Murcus and the Republican fleet (Dio 47, 36, 3-4. App. IV 85, 355-361). When Octavian at last joined Antony at Brundisium, Murcus was unable to prevent the transporting of their legions across the Adriatic. When this was known, Domitius Ahenobarbus was sent to reinforce him and the combined fleets succeeded in hindering the triumvirs' convoys from Italy.

38, 4. The encampment at Philippi: cf. App. IV 105, 439 - 106, 446. Dio 47, 35, 5-6. Brutus and Cassius pitched camp on high ground west of Philippi, astride the Via Egnatia; their armies encamped separately, but a single fortification enclosed and strengthened both. The flanks rested to the north against the wooded mountains they had just traversed, to the south against the marshes stretching to the sea. The island of Thasos, just off the coast, provided a base for their supplies, and the fleet anchored off Neapolis. Their situation left nothing to be desired, while Antony and Octavian when they arrived were obliged to camp on the plains near the marsh.

38, 3-4. Octavian, who had fallen sick, was left behind at Dyrrhachium while Antony hurried on to join up with the advance-guard (App. IV 10, 444. Dio 47, 37, 1-4). Octavian, however, though not fully recovered, soon followed. He could

not allow Antony to carry off all the honours of the campaign.

39. While the two armies confronted each other, a lustration was carried out on both sides, the Republicans again seeking to hold their troops by distributing generous donations, in contrast to the poverty or parsimony of their opponents.

39, 3-6. Similar stories of ill-omens besetting Cassius at this time are told by Dio (47, 40, 7-8), Florus (II 17, 1) and Obsequens (70). If the actual incidents are authentic, it is possible that they alarmed the more superstitious soldiers, but that Cassius' Epicurean philosophy was shaken by them is difficult to believe. This is no doubt comparable to and of the same value as the stories of Brutus' "ghosts" and Valerius Maximus' tale of Caesar's ghost haunting Cassius on the battlefield of Philippi (I 8, 8).

39, 7. Cassius' plan - to protract the war and avoid a pitched battle, since they held the superior position and were well-supplied, while being inferior in numbers to their enemies - is said to have been opposed by Brutus, who was anxious to reach an early decision. Plutarch describes a council of war at which, in spite of Cassius' advice, the majority voted with Brutus and decided to offer battle without further delay.

c.40 - 45. The first battle of Philippi: Plutarch's

account of the beginning of the battle is contradicted by Appian's more convincing description of military manoevres leading to a sudden engagement. Moreover, both Appian (108, 453-456) and Dio (47, 38, 1-4) represent Brutus and Cassius in complete agreement on the policy of waiting and starving out the enemy, which seems the more likely in view of Brutus' continuance of it after the first battle and his reluctance to begin a second. These facts are not consistent with Plutarch's account of his anxiety to finish the war. Further, since he had the advantage and good hopes of ultimate victory, he had no reason to force the pace.

The opposing army, cut off from Italy by his fleets in the Adriatic, was dependent on the resources of an impoverished Greece and Macedonia, which could not long support it. If the Republicans could succeed in avoiding battle until the approaching winter, the situation of the triumvirs would then be desperate. Brutus might well be ἐν ἐλπισὶ κακαῖς - as Plutarch himself says - and not impatiently eager to tempt fortune. On the other hand, Antony was anxious to force an engagement as soon as possible, and proceeded with characteristic energy and boldness. From this, Appian's narrative follows naturally (IV 109, 457 - 113, 472). Antony began building a way through the marsh, in order to cut off Cassius' camp from the sea; the work continued secretly for ten days, when Antony was able to build and garrison redoubts along his line.

Cassius thereupon began counter-works southwards across the marsh, cutting off from the main body Antony's men at the redoubts. Antony, perceiving this, immediately launched an attack on the counter-works and drew out his whole army to engage that of Cassius. At this point, Brutus' troops, without waiting for orders, charged and drove straight into the camp of Octavian, which was without its general. Antony, meanwhile, delighted at the success of his plan to bring on a battle, broke through Cassius' lines and stormed his camp.

Against this, Plutarch's account of a formal battle, beginning in the usual way, is suspect. Most of the narrative here - of the council, the contrast between the two leaders the night before battle, their last conversation, the preparation and disposition of the army - probably consists of later additions, dramatizing or inventing, to fill out the plain account of events. From other sources, it appears unlikely that Brutus and Cassius made the mistake of offering battle; Brutus' views on suicide may be authentic, but were probably not delivered at length before a waiting army; the story that Cassius yielded the post of honour on the right wing to Brutus sounds like an attempt to explain an arrangement which needs none: for as they were encamped Brutus already commanded the right. Only the account of the night before the battle cannot be dismissed at once, since it came, according to Plutarch, from Messalla. It might have seemed, otherwise,

that the description of the two - Brutus hopeful, Cassius uneasy and depressed - was only retrospective colouring.

Gelzer (PW X 1018) does not find it incompatible with Appian; but Cassius' protestations of his unwillingness to risk everything in one battle are difficult to reconcile with the surprise attack by Antony. Cassius' words here bear a suspicious likeness to those of Brutus, in Appian (IV 124, 520) before the second battle, even to the comparison with Pompey at Pharsalia. Gelzer (X 1015) supposes that the Republicans, though refusing to attack, were prepared and waiting for the decisive battle, and therefore accepts the account attributed to Messalla. This would explain also how Messalla came to be
40, 11 assigned to the right wing, but it does not solve all the difficulties in the conflicting accounts of Plutarch and Appian. Dio, who also speaks of a set battle (47, 42-47), says that Brutus and Cassius were forced into it against their will by the men, who threatened to desert (47, 38, 4-5). But this too closely resembles the situation before the second battle, and in any case, Dio's description of the beginning is vague and unsatisfactory.

c. 41 - 44. Accounts of the battle, once joined, follow the same general pattern of events: the spontaneous charge of Brutus' troops, the defeat of the Triumvirs' left wing and the plundering of Octavian's camp; Antony's success on the other wing, leading to the death of Cassius (see also App. IV 110,

461 - 114, 476. Dio 47, 45-47).

41, 1. This mention of Antony's trenches through the marsh confirms Appian's account on that point (though Plutarch says that Antony's men were surprised by a Republican attack).

41, 7-8. On Octavian's absence from the battle, Plutarch quotes his own explanation: that he quitted his camp, after a warning dream visited his physician Artorius - an explanation that leaves much to be desired; though he seems not to have been fully recovered from his illness at that time. For variations of the same story see App. IV 110, 463. Dio 47, 41, 3-4. Suet. Aug. 13, 1. Vell. II 70, 1. Val. Max. I 7, 1. Florus II 17, 9.

42, 5. The chief weakness on the Republican side, which really cost them the victory, was the lack of unity in their command. The two generals seem to have lost contact with each other and to have acted alone; Brutus then failed to send help to his colleague in time and Cassius, knowing nothing of the
43, 1-3 other wing, feared the worst. Plutarch attributes Cassius' defeat to his hesitation and delay in the beginning, which resulted in his being surrounded by Antony: whereupon his troops quickly broke and fled. His failure to control the situation, in this account, began with his preoccupation with the activities of Brutus' wing and his annoyance at their disorderly advance and the pillaging of the camp before the enemy was completely destroyed. If that were so, Cassius

must have been able to see what was happening on the right
4, 4-5 wing and must have known of Brutus' victory. Yet Plutarch definitely states that there was no communication between them and that Cassius believed Brutus had been defeated too, because he could see nothing of that part of the battlefield, nor even his own camp. In Appian's version, this confusion is a little more explicable; Antony's attack, while Cassius' men were engaged on the counter-works, took him by surprise and the consequent disorder was not improved by the behaviour of Brutus' army. Indeed, of the four armies only Antony's seems to have been properly organised and controlled. Under those circumstances, mistakes arising from confusion and panic would more easily occur than if the Republicans had offered battle, as Plutarch says, and had the ability to plan an attack and make their arrangements. Appian's account will also explain why Brutus and Cassius lost contact.

Cassius, driven from his camp (App. IV 113, 472), retired to a hill whence he could view the whole scene and learn the situation of both Republican armies. But clouds of dust obscured the battlefield (Dio 47, 46, 5); or, as Plutarch says,
43, 4 Cassius was short-sighted and unable to distinguish friend from enemy. Assuming that the approaching detachment of cavalry was the enemy in pursuit and fearing capture, he committed
43, 5f. suicide, without waiting for the return of his scout Titinius, whom he believed to have been taken prisoner.

Appian (IV 113, 472-475) gives two versions of this scene, one corresponding exactly to Plutarch's, the other - which he relates first - that Titinius actually returned in time with news of Brutus' success, but that Cassius refused to survive his own defeat. Froehlich (PW III 1735) considers this an attempt on Appian's part to give Cassius a noble and dramatic end, comparable to that of Brutus. Dio (47, 46, 1-5) has the same account as Plutarch, slightly condensed. On Cassius' death also, see Vell. II 70, 1-3. Plut. Ant. 22, 2. Livy Per. 124. Florus II 17, 10. 13. de vir ill. 83, 6. Val. Max. VI 8, 4. IX 9, 2.

All these accounts leave two questions still unanswered: why did Cassius, the more experienced general of the two, fail so completely and despair so soon? Or was he, in fact, murdered? As to the first, Appian's account shows that Cassius' troops were divided, one section being engaged on the counter-works, away from the camp, when the attack was launched on them; but Cassius obviously failed to gain control of the situation or rally his men. Dio (47, 45, 2) explains that Antony's generalship was superior to that of Cassius; in this first encounter, Cassius was immediately worsted.

Froehlich (PW III 1735) ascribes Cassius' failure to the deterioration of his ability since the spectacular beginning of his military career at Carrhae. This explanation is scarcely satisfactory, since such a falling-off had not

appeared in his activities of the past two years - his seizure of Syria, the defeat of Dolabella, the campaign against Rhodes and his conduct of the Philippi campaign hitherto. Froehlich further suggests, however, that Cassius was hampered by his partnership with Brutus and, possibly, too much dominated by him. There is probably much truth in this - and in any case the sharing of the supreme command of any army was bound to create difficulties and encourage mistakes. But it does not fully explain why Cassius found it so completely paralysing just at that crisis.

The explanation may be contained largely in Cassius' character. He seems to have been a good organizer, capable and energetic in planning, but in the execution of his plans easily discouraged and liable to panic. Although he seemed cool and resourceful enough in forming the conspiracy, on the Ides of March itself, at the mere suspicion of betrayal he was prepared to abandon the attempt and thought instantly of suicide (see above c.16, 3-4). So, again, his conduct of the war showed that he had considerable military ability, but in the crisis at Philippi, he lost his presence of mind and was too ready to fear the worst (cf. Vell. II 70, 2: "tum Cassius ex sua fortuna eventum collegae aestimans ..."). No doubt, since he knew himself to be the better soldier in general, he found it easier to believe that Brutus, too, had suffered defeat.

43, 8. On the second question, suspicion of foul play is mentioned by Appian (IV 113, 4 74) as well as Plutarch, since no-one but Pindarus actually witnessed Cassius' death and the freedman promptly disappeared. (Valerius Maximus - IV, 8, 4 - says Pindarus killed himself afterwards, but it is merely conjecture - he admits that the body was never found.)

Ferrero (E.T. III p. 204) inclines to this alternative explanation, since he finds Cassius' suicide incomprehensible. He believes that one of Cassius' attendants (presumably Pindarus) had been suborned by the triumvirs, and took advantage of the general confusion and flight to murder his master. This is certainly not impossible - the behaviour of the slave Demetrius, who took the cloak and sword from the
45, 2 body and carried them to Antony the same night is an indication that Cassius' attendants were not above suspicion. But there is no strong case against the traditional view; a view generally accepted in antiquity in spite of the possibility of a different explanation. Plutarch and Appian alone mention in passing that some people queried the suicide and cast suspicion on Pindarus. If Plutarch's story of the Parthian campaign is true and Cassius was known to have kept Pindarus by him for such a purpose ever since the disaster at Carrhae, it sufficiently explains the acceptance of the suicide. As to Pindarus' disappearance - Radin reasonably suggests (p. 220) that if he saw Titinius returning among friends and realised

Cassius' error, he would not be anxious to be found there, even without consciousness of guilt.

44, 2. Brutus' verdict on Cassius: ἔσχατον ἄνδρα Ῥωμαίων. He was, indeed, one of the last of the old nobiles, a class rapidly disappearing and finally defeated at Philippi. Cassius was typical of the class for which he fought, more than Brutus, the doctrinaire. A sincere Republican, a capable soldier and administrator, he was no statesman; his view was bounded by the interests of his own class. But he was far from being one of the worst of his kind. However narrow and outmoded the tradition for which he stood, he at least was active and earnest in its defence (cf. Eutrop. VII 3, 2 "dux nobilitatis Cassius").

His reputation in antiquity naturally suffered since he had fought for the wrong, that is, the vanquished party. But under the early Empire, at least, he evidently had his supporters - see Tac. Ann. IV 34 on the trial of the historian Cremutius Cordus, accused "quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto, C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset" - repeating Brutus' expression. In his defence, he cited others who had praised the Liberators or at least given them honourable mention - Livy, Asinius Pollio, and Messalla Corvinus, who "imperatorem suum Cassium praedicabat" (IV 34-35). cf. Appian IV 132, 553 - 135, 568. But though he had some admirers, he was always to be overshadowed by Brutus. Momigliano (J.R.S.

XXXI 1941 pp. 151 ff.) attributes this to the greater interest under the Empire in Stoicism - therefore in Cato and Brutus rather than the Epicurean Cassius.

44, 2. On Brutus' orders, the body of Cassius was taken, privately, to Thasos, that the men might not be disheartened by a public funeral (see App. IV 114, 477. Dio 47, 47, 1).

The consequences of his death for the Republicans were fatal. After the first battle, the situation was still more favourable to them; they continued to hold their strong position and were well supplied with provisions while their opponents, in addition to the former scarcity of food, had
45, 1 suffered considerable losses in men (according to Messalla) and had had their camp pillaged. Their distress became more acute through the early approach of winter, which rendered their
47, 1 low-lying camp scarcely habitable. The Republicans certainly appeared to hold the advantage, but the loss of Cassius counter-balanced it: Livy Per 124 "in aequalem fortunam partium mors Cassi fecit". Of the two leaders, he had been the better general and better disciplinarian (see App. IV 123, 518. Frontinus, Stratagems IV 2, 1). Moreover, his army, being now damaged and sullen, did not lighten Brutus' task as sole commander. There was bad feeling between the two Republican
5, 3-9 armies, one victorious, the other beaten in the battle, and a discordant atmosphere throughout the camp.

45, 1-2. The triumvirs' appreciation of the weakening of

the Republican position by the death of Cassius is shown in their revival of optimism (when the news reached them) after their despondency over the result of the battle. This is heightened and dramatized in the account in de vir. ill. 83, 7 "Cuius morte audita, Antonius exclamare dicitur: Vici." (cf. App. IV 119, 501.)

44 - 49. Brutus' position between battles.

44, 5f. Republican chances of victory still appeared high, though their successes in the first battle might have been much greater had the men thought more of fighting and less of plunder. Plutarch (below 46, 1) says Brutus reproached them with this (μικρὰ μεμψάμενος) - Appian (IV 117, 489 - 118, 498) provides him with a speech for the occasion.

45. The day following the battle, Brutus refused Antony's challenge to renew it (see App. IV 114, 478) and remained passive. According to Dio (47, 47, 2f.) he now took up a new position in Cassius' old entrenchments and transferred his headquarters.

45, 4f. Brutus' treatment of the prisoners is also discussed by Dio (47, 48, 3) who does not mention any attempt on Brutus' part to save them, but grants that circumstances forced him against his will to order their execution. His account is the more likely to be true since he is less inclined to favour

45, 8 Brutus. Plutarch's narrative of the affair provides evidence of P. Servilius Casca's presence at Philippi. He had fled from

Rome on the passing of the Lex Pedia.

46, 1. Appian (IV 118, 498) also records, as a current rumour, Brutus' promise to the soldiers of the plunder of Thessalonica and Lacedaemon, in the event of victory. For this, Plutarch has no excuse. He sees it as a single, incomprehensible lapse on the part of the mild, humane philosopher. It is, however, a part of his character, contradictory and recurring, stemming from his acceptance of the narrow Roman code (see c. 29).

46, 3. Plutarch again attempts to exonerate Brutus by referring any appearance of cruelty and injustice in his actions to the influence of Cassius - an unjust evasion. Moreover, the promise to the soldiers, on which he touched above, was made after Cassius' death.

46, 4f. Brutus' enforced reliance on his officers, now that he lacked the support of Cassius in military councils, was soon to have serious consequences, when they failed to support his policy (see App. IV 123, 518).

47. Situation of the triumvirs: now rendered almost desperate by shortage of food and the heavy rains and cold. Appian (IV 122, 512-514) further explains that the resources of Thessaly were exhausted, they could hope for nothing from Italy since Republican fleets patrolled the seas and their army was already beginning to feel the pinch of hunger. A detachment was sent to forage in Achaia. Dio (47, 47, 4)

adds that Antony and Octavian were impoverished and unable to repair the losses their men had sustained in the plunder of the camp. News of the victory of the Republican fleet in the Adriatic alarmed them still more.

The naval battle was said to have taken place on the same day as the first battle of Philippi. Domitius Calvinus was defeated by Ahenobarbus and Murcus, and the reinforcements and supplies intended for the triumvirs were destroyed (App. IV 115, 479 - 117, 489. Dio 47, 47, 4).

47, 4-6. Plutarch asserts that Brutus did not know of the naval victory until twenty days later, and that if he had, he would never have been drawn into another battle. How and when he learned of it, if not before the battle, is not made clear. His officers are said to have known on the eve of the second battle, but, not crediting their authority, failed to inform Brutus. Appian, on the other hand, states, without qualification, that Brutus heard the news - that being one of his reasons for adhering to his policy of passive resistance (App. IV 123, 515). Dio (47, 47, 5) implies that Antony and Octavian endeavoured to keep the news from their own men, as well as from Brutus. Plutarch believes they were successful in the last, though it is not easy to see how, if the news reached them, it could be withheld from Brutus, who had control of the sea. Appian's version seems to be more reliable on this point, too.

48. On the second appearance of the ghost, and other reports of unlucky omens, see Dio 47, 48, 4. App. IV 128, 538. Obsequens 70.

Plutarch's narrative of this period is largely composed of anecdotes and unconnected incidents, since his chief object is not to give a history of the campaign. For that, Appian provides a clearer picture of the state and the actions of both sides (see IV 121, 508 - 125, 522). He describes the desperate anxiety of the triumvirs to force another engagement before their army was hopelessly weakened; their attempts by daily challenges and abuse to rouse Brutus' soldiers and provoke him to retaliate. Brutus, however, observing the state of their army, refused to be drawn. He did not wish to forsake the advantage of his present position and hazard another encounter with troops driven desperate by want. His plan was to wait in safety behind his fortifications until winter and the want of food had broken down the opposing army, and then to send out his troops to complete their destruction. But the men, unwilling to endure a winter in camp when they thought the victory already theirs, were eager to taste its fruits, and influenced, too, by their opponents' propaganda, insistently clamoured for battle. The officers, while appreciating Brutus' reasons for delay, nevertheless thought that, in the present temper of the men, the war might be brought to a close more speedily - and more spectacularly. None of them doubted the result, in any case.

Brutus, alone and unable to enforce his will, like Cassius, seeing the army grow more restive, eventually allowed his better judgment to be overruled and agreed to offer battle. Dio (47, 47, 1-4 & 48, 1-4) gives a similar account, with an additional reason for Brutus' decision: The beginning of disaffection and desertion among the detachments of eastern allies, and his fear of its spreading.

Appian (IV 121, 508-512) describes the manoevres of the two armies between the battles - the triumvirs' object being to get through to the sea and cut off Brutus' line of supply. They had succeeded in occupying a hill close to his camp and garrisoning two more outposts along the same line to the south. Antony's courage and resourcefulness in such a venture were much to be feared and the danger that he might succeed would not have escaped Brutus - who had been countering the movement with outposts of his own and harrassing his opponents with night skirmishes and other devices (App. IV 121, 511. Dio 47, 47, 3). Indeed, Rice-Holmes thinks Brutus' change of plan was due more to Antony's manoevres than to compulsion from his own men (Architect p. 87, following Kromayer). But it is equally possible that he was driven to hazard a decisive engagement by internal discord. From the sources it appears that there was a want of unity among the officers as well as the men, and Heitland (Roman Republic III p. 424) has pointed out that Brutus' Republican principles hindered him in asserting an

arbitrary power when the general opinion was against him.

But the root of the trouble lay in the difference of aim between Brutus and his army. It was no true Republican army with which he hoped to restore the Republic, but a band of mercenaries, united by no common purpose, whose chief object in the war was personal gain, who followed individual leaders. Hence the need of the Republicans for unlimited resources with which to persuade their troops that it was more profitable to fight for the Republic than for its enemies; hence, too, the impatience of the army at Philippi: the men were more concerned to end the war quickly and plunder the possessions of their opponents than to take the surest way for the sake of the Republic.

It was yet another indication of the futility of Brutus' undertaking; the material with which to rebuild the Republic no longer existed.

49 - 51. The Second Battle of Philippi.

The date of this battle is fixed by Suetonius (Tiberius 5): "natus est Romae in Palatio xvi Kal. Dec. ... per bellum Philippense. Sic enim in fastos actaque in publica relatum est." i.e. it took place about 16th November 42 B.C. or a few days later. A difficulty arose with the discovery of a fragment of the Fasti Praenestini, which, Huelsen found, covered five consecutive days, 20th - 24th October (Year's Work in Classical Studies - 1922-3 p. 108, 1923-4, p. 33 ff.).

From this, the decisive battle of Philippi should be dated 23rd October /Augustus vicit Philippis posteriore proelio, Bruto occiso./. Wissowa (Hermes 58, 1923 pp. 372 ff.) saw no way of reconciling these two pieces of evidence. Others have since accepted 23rd October as the date of the first battle and 16th November for the second, which leaves about the right interval between them - twenty-four days, compared with Plutarch's twenty (47, 5). This seems to be the only possible solution, unless further evidence were obtained, and has been accepted by Syme (op. cit. 205), Rice-Holmes (op. cit. p. 85) and Others.

49. It was already late in the day when the battle was joined (εἰς ὥραν ἑνάτην). Brutus' underlying mistrust of his soldiers is betrayed here - Appian, however, says the men fought all the more desperately in order to show Brutus that they had been right (IV 128, 537).

50. The anecdote of Lucilius - told also by Appian (IV 129, 542-545): It is significant that Lucilius, to convince his captors that he was Brutus, asked to be taken to Antony, pretending to have more confidence in him than in Octavian. Brutus' views on the two opposing commanders must have been widely known.

Appian's account of the progress of the battle (IV 125, 522 - 130, 546) is similar to Plutarch's. He notes particularly

the desperate character of the fighting on both sides and, after the rout of the Republican army, Antony's determined pursuit, to prevent a sufficient force escaping and re-forming. Dio (47, 48, 4-5) makes the same points, and adds that in pursuing the fugitive army, Antony and Octavian remained alert all night to prevent the juncture of scattered detachments. This time there could be no doubt of the result of the battle.

c. 51 - 57. The end of Brutus.

Appian:	IV 130, 546 - 131, 552.	Livy Per. 124.
Dio:	47, 49, 1-3.	Florus: II 17, 14.
Plut. Ant. 22, 4.		Oros. VI 18, 16.
Vell. II 70, 4.		de vir. ill. 82, 6.
Eutrop. VII 3, 2.		

Syme: p. 206. Boissier: p. 379.

In the general rout, Brutus escaped to the surrounding hills during the night. Plutarch says he was accompanied only by a few officers and friends. Appian, on the contrary, states that he fled σὺν ἱκανῷ πλήθει (IV 130, 546) which he later defines as less than four legions (131, 549). At first, Brutus seems to have entertained some hope that the defeat was not complete (51, 5. cf. App. IV 130, 546. Dio 47, 49, 1). All agree that he intended to try to break through to his camp again, which was still garrisoned with his troops, according to Appian (IV 131, 549). In Plutarch, Statyllius evidently found the camp nearly intact, though he failed to return through the enemy lines which now lay between Brutus and his former position. The soldiers remained under arms throughout the night (App. IV 130, 548. Dio 47, 48, 5). Appian (IV 131, 549) says Brutus waited till morning, intending to offer further resistance, but finding then that his remaining officers were unwilling to

continue the struggle and planned to make terms with the triumvirs, he finally abandoned hope. Dio (47, 49, 1) agrees that news of the surrender of his men proved to him that his cause was lost, but, like Plutarch, he seems to imply that Brutus' death took place during the night after the battle.

51 - 52. The intimate details of the last night recorded by Plutarch seem to have come from an account by Brutus' friend Volumnius, who was with him, and are probably authentic - though the same Volumnius also included in his account of the campaign supposed omens and miraculous occurences (see above c. 48, 2-5).

52, 4f. Plutarch describes Brutus as still calm and even cheerful in taking leave of the friends who were with him. His final comments on the triumvirs and his assertion that his reputation for "virtus" would outlive him and condemn his conquerors presumably come from Volumnius also. But Dio (47, 49, 2) very briefly gives a different picture in recording the verse Brutus is said to have quoted before his death. It is sometimes identified with the second verse, mentioned by

51, 2 Plutarch, which Volumnius forgot. See Dio 47, 49, 2:

ὦ τλῆμον ἀρετή, λόγος ἄρ' ἦσθ', ἐγὼ δέ σε
ὡς ἔργον ἤσκουν· σὺ δ' ἄρ' ἐδούλευες τύχῃ.

These lines reflect a final despair, a collapse not only of hope but of belief also. They suggest that his pursuit of "virtus", his life-long devotion to philosophy, failed him at

the supreme moment. Seeing the triumvirs victorious and the Republic finally lost, he doubted of his old beliefs and principles. Possibly - contrary to Plutarch's account - he understood then that "virtus" would be appropriated by the victors, that it was an empty expression, a catchword, to be claimed and used by the party in power and denied to their vanquished opponents (see Dio 46, 34, 4-5).

It was his last disillusionment. In leaving his studies to become a political leader he met with continual disappointment. The people, the Senate, the army all failed him ultimately, for they were no longer what he believed them to be. His theories, formed by an isolated, bookish mind, were shattered by contact with reality. Finding at last how he had deceived himself, he lost faith even in his philosophy.

53, 4. Antony's treatment of Brutus' body (cf. App. IV 135, 568. Dio 47, 49, 2. Plut. Ant. 22, 6-8. Val. Max. V 1,11) again recalls their one-time friendship. Antony was capable of generosity to his fallen opponent. In contrast, the story was told that Octavian ordered the head of Brutus to be sent to Rome and cast at the foot of Caesar's statue (Suet. Aug. 13. Dio 47, 49, 2). The story has been doubted, but it serves as a last illustration of the difference between Antony and Octavian in their attitude to Brutus (see c.29 above).

53, 5. The account of Porcia's suicide is found also in Appian IV 136, 574, Dio 47, 49, 3, Plut. Cato Min. 73, 6,

Polyaenus 8, 32, Martial I 42, Val. Max. IV 6, 5 (whom Plutarch quotes). From Cicero's letters, however, it appears that she died in the summer of 43 B.C. (see ad Brut. I 17, 7 and I 9). Even if these letters are not authentic, they prove the existence of an alternative tradition, which is more likely to be true, since it is more prosaic. There would be no reason to invent it, if the dramatic suicide were true (see Gelzer PW X 1009. Tyrrell and Purser VI note p. 227). It was known, though less popular, in Plutarch's day (53, 6).

Philippi saw the end of many who had followed Brutus; it thinned the ranks of the aristocracy still more (see Vell. II 71, 2. Eutrop. VII 3, 2 - "infinitam nobilitatem"). Among the dead were Cato's son, the younger Lucullus, Livius Drusus, the father of Livia, Hortensius, Quintilius Varus and a nephew of Cassius (App. IV 135, 571-572. Plut. Ant. 22. Vell II 71, 2-3). Of the remaining conspirators, Cimber and the Cascas are not heard of again. Syme (p. 205) notes the lack of consulars in this list. The old Optimates of 49 (Cato, Bibulus, Domitius, Marcellus) had already disappeared. The younger generation of nobiles fell with Brutus and Cassius at Philippi.

Of those who escaped to Thasos, some with Messalla and Bibulus made terms with Antony, others (including Cicero's son) fled to Cassius Parmensis (App. V 2, 4) and later joined

Domitius' fleet in the Adriatic or went over to Sextus Pompeius (V 2, 9).

Philippi, then, did not see the end of all resistance to the trimmvirate but it marked, nonetheless, the end of the Republic. Pompeius was not Brutus' successor. While Brutus lived, the Republic existed in some sort, for it had a defender and a party. But the restoration for which Brutus hoped was impossible. Had he been victorious, his disillusionment would have been even greater. He could have done no more than restore the merest semblance of the Republic, maintained in existence by force of arms alone. "Hoc bello victores, quam rem publicam simus habituri, non facile adfirmarim" (ad Brut. I 15, 10).

His attempt, doomed to fail from the beginning, played its part in the dissolution of the Republic. Rome had not been ready for Caesar. His assassination and the wars that followed in 44 - 42 B.C. swept away still more of the old order, preparing the way for the new, when the revolution should be completed.

Brutus himself had no qualifications for the task of reconstruction. Plutarch was drawn to him chiefly by the qualities which made him unfit for it: the idealism, the set principles, the love of intellectual pursuits. The character he depicts, is, on the whole, similar to that of the historians, but with its harsher lines smoothed away. The result has a

little too much of the Greek in it; though Brutus was influenced by Greek thought and had a circle of Greek friends (e.g. Empylos, Strato, Aristus), he was always a Roman, and a Roman of his age. This is apparent from Cicero, whose impressions of him provide invaluable evidence; yet cannot always be taken too literally. On the one hand, complimentary reference in literary works paint an idealised picture, not unlike Plutarch's; on the other, the vivid accounts of the letters are sometimes subject to the distortion of misunderstanding or particular mood. Apart from the general historical background, Plutarch drew much of his material from memoirs and monographs by Brutus' friends (e.g. Volumnius, Bibulus, Messalla) which probably provide the basis for his character study and may be responsible for much of the idealising apparent in it. To reach any estimate of the real man is difficult in the contradictions of the sources. But the strongest impression is of a man "who in any ordinary age would have developed into nothing more than an aristocratic dilettante" (Ferrero II p. 304), a student by nature, thrust by his position at Rome and the regard of contemporaries into a part for which he was not fitted and which magnified his importance. The burden was too much for him and ended by destroying the world of ideas in which he had lived and with which he had attempted to oppose the real world of men and affairs.