The notions of freedom and predictability with special reference to Hume, Mill and Bradley

Abstract

The introduction consists of a general statement of the problem of free-will. The chapter on Hume begins with a brief sketch of his metaphysical position, followed by an analysis of his conception of necessity. His arguments against the idea of liberty are then evaluated. In connection with this the concept of prediction is also discussed and it has been attempted to show that freedom of spontaneity is, either, not freedom, or has no distinction with freedom of indifference. His arguments from the standpoint of morality and religion are critically considered. His effort to prove the problem of free-will as verbal is shown to be inconclusive. Mill's metaphysical position is not discussed in detail but only occasionally referred to or presupposed.The inconsistencies of his language in describing causality and necessity are pointed out. Next, his analyses of the direct consciousness of free-will, and of free-will which is involved in the idea of morality, are discussed and criticized, together with his conception of "one's desire to mould one's character". Reference has been made to his theory of punishment. The chapter on Bradley deals with a description of his analysis of the '-vulgar notion of responsibility' followed by a critical treatment of his arguments against Libertarianism and Necessitarianism, with reference to his notion of predictability˙ Attempt has been made to estimate how far the introduction of a notion of absolute self can do justice to the popular conceptions of freedom and moral-responsibility. In the context of moral responsibility, reference is made to his theory of punishment. The conclusion consists of a summary of the results of the previous chapters and a comparative discussion of the merits of each view as a reconciling project.