Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief

McKay, Ryan and Dennett, Daniel

(2009)

McKay, Ryan and Dennett, Daniel (2009) Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32 (6).

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Abstract

The commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these opposing perspectives.

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This is a Submitted version
This version's date is: 2009
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/59b2d27f-7055-b3bc-2062-e30035348806/6/

Item TypeJournal Article
TitleOur evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief
AuthorsMcKay, Ryan
Dennett, Daniel
DepartmentsFaculty of Science\Psychology

Identifiers

doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09991555

Deposited by Research Information System (atira) on 22-Jul-2014 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 22-Jul-2014


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