Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman (2000) Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games.
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In this chapter, we examine convergence behavior in simple bimatrix games. We classify the possible types of simple games, pick interesting examples of each type, and summarize convergence behavior under various information and player matching protocols.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2000 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/59fc8a4f-e522-910c-1155-4ab9a026872c/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 02-Nov-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 02-Nov-2012
©2000 Nicole Bouchez, Daniel Friedman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.