Nikos Nikiforakis (2004) Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?.
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Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment, where we allow for both punishment and counter-punishment. We find that in both partner and stranger treatments cooperation declines over time. The reason is that people are less willing to punish under the threat of counter-punishment. Participants squander their endowment in costly confrontations leading to a relative payoff loss, in comparison to a treatment without punishments.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2004 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/686a7245-0a78-d5a3-ec7b-305159838a8f/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 12-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 12-Oct-2012
©2004 Nikos Nikiforakis. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.