

EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND ENTENTES 1879-85

A STUDY
OF CONTEMPORARY BRITISH INFORMATION.

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INTRODUCTION

It is almost a commonplace to say that sound information is essential for successful and active diplomacy. It is scarcely less so to point out that confidence in its accuracy and completeness is equally essential. The present thesis will therefore make an attempt to indicate, within the limits of its title, first the information actually received by the British Foreign Office, and secondly the degree of their confidence in its accuracy and completeness. With the first purpose in view, the ground will be cleared by distinguishing between certain classes of information and indicating the part played by each in the period under discussion. Under the second head attention will be drawn, as the information on the most important developments ~~are~~^{is} dealt with, to the sources from which that information was derived and to their relative value.

The first class of information concerns the interests of the different Powers. It indicates the action likely to be imposed upon them by economic factors, by the demands of trade or of geographical position, or by the championship of traditional ambitions: in short all that determines in which direction a Power is likely to make a move in the diplomatic field.

The second class concerns their internal affairs. It shows the character of the Government of each Power: whether it is likely to lay emphasis on one interest rather than on another; the situation of the Government within the country: its power to enforce its will, or the possibilities of restrictions being imposed upon its course by internal factors and if so, the strength and scope of these factors; and the military, naval and financial position of each country. This class includes, in fact, all information which goes to show the degree of strength with which any particular diplomatic move is likely to be carried through.

The third concerns the degree to which either the direction of the move or the strength behind it is likely to be modified by the relations and commitments of one Power to another.

In the period under discussion it is ^{the third} ~~this~~ class of information that is of vital importance. Various factors brought it about that at the opening of the period information under the first two heads was exceptionally full, and that this information proved with few modifications equally applicable at its close.

The simplification which had occurred in the diplomatic field as the result of the constitution of a united Germany and Italy, and the Ausgleich of Austria-Hungary, left the five Powers pitted against each other as never before. This

closer contact between them, emphasised by the development of communications, brought about a definition and clarity as regards the interests of the different Powers which had also not previously existed. The demands of a growing public opinion in general, and the influence of the incisive nature of German diplomacy in particular, were factors in accelerating this process. The crises of the last few years beginning with the War Scare of 1875, furnished the opportunity. The Congress of Berlin and the negotiations immediately preceding it, were instrumental in filling in the gaps, recapitulating and formulating what had already been learnt. Not until the emergence of the colonial question was diplomacy influenced by an interest that had not been formulated in this period.

Information on internal affairs was also less important in the period under consideration than in earlier or later periods. For many of those who determined the character and position of the Governments from 1879-85 had done the same for those of the preceding period, during which, moreover, they had become personally acquainted. One thinks particularly in this connection of Bismarck and the Emperor William, Francis Joseph and Andrassy, Alexander II, Gorehakoff, Giers and the Panslavists in Russia, and the men of the *Left* ~~Left~~ in Italy and in France. With the exception perhaps, of the advent of Jules Ferry in France, changes in personnel

did not effect important changes in policy. Andrassy, as a member of the Austrian Delegations, continued to influence the position of the Government, and Haymerle and Kalnoky carried on his policy. Alexander III maintained the policy of his father. At Berlin, Salisbury and Beaconsfield had made personal contacts with the Emperor and Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle, Gorehakoff and Waddington. Salisbury in addition, had made the acquaintance of Francis Joseph, of King Humbert, Depretis and Maffei in Rome and established contact through Ignatieff with the panslavist influences on Russian policy. The advantage ^{to} of the British Foreign Office of these personal contacts was lost when Gladstone and Granville came into power in April 1880. Some slight compensation was afforded, however, by Dilke's friendship with Gambetta, ^{by} a personal friendship dating from 1872 between the British Ambassador in Paris and Barthélemy St. Hilaire and by Granville's personal knowledge of Russia, although the latter was acquired as far back as 1856. Internal factors apart from changes in personnel, of importance for the policy of the different countries dated in origin to the period preceding that with which we are concerned. By 1878 the Foreign Office was sufficiently well-informed as to what these factors were in the different countries and their relative significance, to watch their development and accurately ^{to} estimate the part they were likely

to play under given circumstances. The importance of such factors as the military party and Hungarian politics in Austria-Hungary, the irredentist agitation and the papal question~~s~~ in Italy, the religious question in Germany, Panslavism and Mihilism in Russia, was fully appreciated.

Lastly, by 1878 relations and commitments of one Power to another had come to play the predominant part in diplomacy. This was partly the result of the fullness of the information possessed by each Power as to the interests and internal affairs of the others. For it was this information which made possible the development under Bismarck's leadership of a series of secret and interlocking agreements that made it impossible for one Power to negotiate singly with any other for the settlement of any individual issue. Moreover under his leadership commitments between the Powers assumed a systematised, definite and formal character that had hitherto only existed in isolated instances. Bismarck's policy, based upon the realisation that behind all diplomacy lies only the ultima ratio of war, produced a series of commitments on the part of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Rumania and Servia, as to the attitude they would maintain should war break out in stated contingencies.

The secret character of these agreements, and the fact that neither the British Foreign Office nor the British representatives abroad ever ^{consciously} ~~anxiously~~ accepted the principle on which the system inaugurated by Bismarck was based, added

considerably to the difficulties ordinarily experienced in procuring sound information and to the efforts that were devoted to securing it. The period under discussion, therefore, throws more light than usual on the sources from which diplomatic information was derived and on the factors which influenced its accuracy.

CHAPTER I.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS

AUGUST 1878 - AUGUST 1879.

1.

During the year that immediately followed the Congress information on the movement of Powers towards or apart from each other was conveyed, less by reports specifically dealing with the subject, than by telegrams or despatches communicating the acceptance or disapproval of proposals already made, or the suggestion of fresh combinations, in regard to questions under diplomatic negotiation. These reports collated and interpreted in the light of the knowledge which we have shown the Foreign Office to possess in regard to the interests of the different Powers, testified at once to the existence of a desire to co-operate between any two of them, or to the weakening of former friendships.

The degree to which a Power is informed by such means necessarily depends upon its position as a negotiator. If it is itself involved in close negotiations with all the Great Powers on a number of questions, and more particularly if these questions do not touch the vital interests of all of them - so that the decision of some is determined largely by its effect on European relations - then the information

a Power derives from this source will be at its fullest and most reliable. These conditions were exactly fulfilled by England in 1878-9. Associated closely with Austria-Hungary and less closely with France, she negotiated on a series of questions in connection with the Ottoman Empire. Decisions were demanded from all the Signatories of ^{the} Berlin ^{Treaty}, but it was evident that those of Germany, France and Italy, were determined primarily by their alliance policy. Later, associated more closely with France and less closely with Austria-Hungary, she negotiated on questions connected with Egypt. ^{Owing} ^{to} ^{the} ~~its~~ financial obligations ^{of Egypt} and its position as part of the Ottoman Empire, decisions were again demanded from all the Powers. In this case those given by Russia and Germany were determined by their alliance policy.

During the first period, ^{the end of which} ~~whose end~~ may be dated roughly in May 1879, the tendencies revealed by these negotiations are: the separation of Germany from her former allies; the increasing isolation of Russia; the rapprochement of Germany and France; a tendency of Italy to seek the friendship of England.

The impression that Schuvaloff gave ^{is} Andrassy in a conversation with him in November 1878, that the Russian evacuation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia might not take place within the period stipulated by the Treaty, ⁽¹⁾ combined

(1) FO.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November 1878.
Confidential

with the failure of Austria-Hungary to negotiate successfully the Convention with Turkey for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ⁽¹⁾ tended to strengthen Anglo-Austrian relations. A prolonged period of negotiation with Russia was then initiated. It was preceded by an exchange of views between England and Austria-Hungary which established the two questions to be settled with Russia. They were first her prompt evacuation of Balkan territory, and second a peaceful transition from her occupation to the regular ^{regime} ~~retime~~, such as would prevent the return of her troops on the pretext of Turkish outrages. Immediately after the Congress, Andrassy in conversation with Elliot, the British Ambassador in Vienna had revived the proposal he made there for a mixed European occupation of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia when the term of the Russian occupation expired. ⁽²⁾ Salisbury expressed his readiness to come to an understanding on the question. ⁽³⁾ At the end of November Andrassy's suggestion was embodied in a formal proposal. ⁽⁴⁾ Salisbury immediately stated that England would take part proportionately to her military strength. ⁽⁵⁾

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- (1) FO.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 709 1 October
Confidential
- (2) FO.7/932 Elliot to Salisbury 500 20 July 1878.
- (3) FO.7/925 Salisbury to Elliot 24 and 29 July 1878.
- (4) FO.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 819 23 November 1878.

Alternative proposals were also discussed for the event of the rejection of the mixed occupation by the other Powers. During the course of these negotiations Germany was not consulted by England, nor, as was evident to the Foreign Office by Austria-Hungary. Yet, very soon after Andrassy's formal proposal, Salisbury invited a confidential expression of opinion on the matter from Waddington. ⁽¹⁾ It was by France that the matter was raised unofficially at Berlin and through St. Vallier the French Ambassador in Berlin that the Foreign Office learnt Bismarck's views on the subject. ⁽²⁾ Bismarck, it appeared, would not advise the Kaiser to accept the proposal if it were made to Germany. Yet the proposal for a mixed occupation was, and had been from the start, an essentially Austrian combination. During February and March the exchange of views between England and the Dual Monarchy continued. ⁽³⁾ A division of opinion occurred ~~on the point~~ as to whether the Russian evacuation was to ^{begin} ~~commence~~ or to be completed by the date named in the Treaty. The matter was,

- (1) FO.27/2317 Lyons to Salisbury 1069 14 December 1878
Very Confidential
FO.27/2318 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 65 17 December 1878
Strictly Confidential
D[ocuments] D[iplomatiques] F[rançais] Series I Vol.II
No.371 footnote.
- (2) FO.64/910 Russell to Salisbury 691 28 December 1878.
Most Confidential
- (3) Especially FO.7/956 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram
6 February 1879.
FO.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 81 8 February 1879.
Confidential

therefore, put before the Powers. Germany again refused
to give an opinion in Austria's favour. ⁽¹⁾

It was soon made clear that her attitude was not the result of a desire to co-operate with Russia. In view of the doubtful reception that seemed to await the proposal of mixed occupation when it should be put before the Powers, it was temporarily given up in favour of an English combination. Salisbury proposed, and Andrassy agreed, that a project whereby Turkish troops should enter Eastern Rumelia immediately after the Russian departure under the surveillance of European officers, should be put before the Government at St. Petersburg. Lord Dufferin, newly appointed British Ambassador there, was instructed to do so at the earliest opportunity. ⁽²⁾ At this juncture the proposal originally made by Andrassy was taken up by Russia. On the 27th of February Schuvaloff in a conversation with Salisbury pointed out the dangers of insurrection breaking out in Eastern Rumelia on the departure of the Russian troops. He also stated emphatically that the immediate entry of Turkish troops into the province was to be avoided at all costs. In this difficulty he thought the idea of a mixed European occupation, put forward by Andrassy during the Congress, offered the only

(1) FO. 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot Telegrams 4 and 8 March 1879.

(2) FO. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 3 26 February 1879.

solution. He was prepared to urge his Government not only to consent to it but to propose it. ⁽¹⁾ Schuvaloff shortly afterwards left for St. Petersburg. As a result of his efforts the proposal for mixed occupation, when it was formally made to the Powers by a circular of March 19th, ⁽²⁾ came from Russia. The German reply was given immediately. It stated that she must decline all participation though she did not object to mixed occupation in principle. ⁽³⁾ Her reply, however, as was probably intended, wrecked the proposition. Austria-Hungary accepted the Russian proposal without reserves of any kind. ⁽⁴⁾ It was thus made clear to the British Foreign Office that Bismarck's prescription for dealing with Eastern difficulties - that when Austria and Russia had agreed upon any proposal Germany should give it her support - no longer held good.

The significance of the incident in this respect appeared all the more clear from the fact that Odo Russell, basing his views upon the belief that German policy was still guided by that precept, and knowing that Schuvaloff on his way to St.

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- (1) F.O. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 12 27 February 1879.
 (2) F.O. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram 21 March 1879.
 (3) F.O. 64/932 Russell to Salisbury 174 22 March 1879.
 (4) F.O. 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 29 March 1879.

Petersburg had seen Bismarck and discussed the topic with him, had informed the Foreign Office that the latter, true to his policy of supporting Austria and Russia when they were agreed, would assent to the proposal. ⁽¹⁾ Moreover the Foreign Office was informed that Germany's unfavourable reply was made in spite of repeated efforts on the part of Andrassy to induce Bismarck to accept. He had even taken steps to assure the Chancellor that the commander of the German contingent should act as Commander-in-Chief. ⁽²⁾

The Foreign Office would perhaps have appreciated the German attitude somewhat differently had St. Vallier communicated to Odo Russell the whole of his conversation with Bismarck when he had raised the question with the Chancellor in the previous January. The Chancellor had told St. Vallier that he would support an Austro-Russian occupation if it were suggested, and would make it clear to the two participants that if necessary he would support whichever was attacked by the other. He repeated this plan to St. Vallier in April, but it never appears to have been suggested to Russell, or through the German Ambassador in London, to Salisbury. ⁽³⁾

(1) F.O. 64/932. Russell to Salisbury 138 2 March 1879.

Secret
and 166 12 March 1879.
Most Confidential

(2) F.O. 64/932 Russell to Salisbury 197 6 April 1879.
Confidential

F.O. 7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 225 11 April 1879.

(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.371.
F.O. 64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 8 January 1879.
Most Confidential

D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.409.

As far, then, as British information was concerned the German attitude represented a distinct separation of Germany from her former allies.

Meanwhile with the arrival of Dufferin in St. Petersburg on the 4th March, the emphasis shifted from the exchange of views between London and Vienna to that between London and St. Petersburg. Austria-Hungary was kept informed but she ceased to take a direct part. German influence on the Anglo-Russian negotiations was as conspicuously absent as it had been from the Anglo-Austrian. The opening of the negotiations was facilitated by the withdrawal of the British fleet below the Straits, ⁽¹⁾ and an exchange of assurances as to the determination of the two Powers to secure the maintenance of the Treaty as far as Eastern Rumelia was concerned. The Russian declaration stated that neither the Emperor nor his armies would countenance or protect the inhabitants of Eastern Rumelia in resistance to the introduction of the régime provided for by the Treaty, but would exercise their influence to secure peaceful acquiescence. Dufferin declared on behalf of the British Government that they would at all times urge upon the Porte to respect the rights of the Eastern Rumelian

(1) FO. 7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 12 March 1879.
FO. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram 10 March 1879.

population as guaranteed to them by the new constitution.

Gorehakoff then reduced the points upon which an understanding was to be reached to three. They were the recording of the assurances recently exchanged in diplomatic notes to be addressed to the Porte; the conditions under which a mixed occupation was to take place; or in the event of that project falling through, the conditions to be imposed upon the entry of Turkish troops in order to secure that it took place without disturbances. (2)

When France gave a similar reply to that given by Germany and Italy made her acceptance of a mixed occupation conditional on German participation, (3) discussion (4) on the third point already initiated, was taken up seriously. On the 2nd of April the British Government formally submitted a proposal to Russia. On the 9th Andrassy was put in touch with the negotiations and it was intimated that he should (5) cease to urge the acceptance of mixed occupation upon Bismarck.

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- (1) FO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury 22 15 March 1879.
Recording Telegram
FO. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 7 16 March
Telegram
- (2) FO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury 30 19 March 1879
Recording Telegram 11.
- (3) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II No. 401.
FO. 27/2366 Lyons to Salisbury 323 20 March 1879
and Telegram 58 26 March 1879
FO. 45/378 Paget to Salisbury 117 25 March 1879.
- (4) FO. 65/1042 Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram 14
21 March 1879
FO. 65/1037 Salisbury to Dufferin 150 2 April 1879
- (5) FO. 7/950 Salisbury to Elliot Telegrams 9 April 1879
and 12 April 1879

Meanwhile the alternative proposal had reached its final shape. It took the form of five points of which only one touched a question of principle and was likely to produce a division of opinion among the Powers, when formally proposed to them. Aleko Pasha was to be immediately nominated Governor General of Eastern Rumelia. Turkey had already assured herself that none of the Powers, apart from Russia objected to his nomination. Secondly the European Commission appointed under the Treaty for the organisation and temporary administration of Eastern Rumelia was to be prolonged for a year. The consent of the Powers was expected on this point as no difficulty had been made when an extension of its original six months' term had been secured in December. Thirdly Turkish troops were not to be summoned by the Governor General into the interior of the province until after the evacuation of the Russian troops had been completed and then only with the consent of the majority of the Commission. The same condition applied to the occupation of Bourgas and Ichtman, but the previous consent of the Commission was not required. These last two points involved an infringement of Turkish rights under the Treaty. They were therefore, to be secured by English and Russian influence as spontaneous concessions from Turkey and no expression of opinion on the subject on the part of the other Powers was necessary. Lastly Turkish troops were to refrain from occupying the Balkan frontier of Eastern Rumelia for a year or until the delimitation of the

frontier was complete, whichever occurred first, provided all further disputes on the delimitation Commissions, which in accordance with the Berlin Treaty were then at work in the Balkans, were decided by a majority vote. The non-occupation of the Balkan line was again to be secured by Anglo-Russian influence on Turkey. To secure the acceptance of the majority principle for the work of the Commissions it was necessary to make a formal proposition to the Powers signatory to the Berlin Treaty and to secure their consent. This, as well as the other points of the agreement was finally secured, and the combination was successful in ^{obtaining} securing the peaceful and prompt evacuation of the Russian troops. (2)

The negotiations to secure its acceptance, however, furnished a further illustration to the British Foreign Office of the separation of Germany from her former allies. Germany stated her readiness to agree to whatever was accepted unanimously by the other Powers. (3) The Foreign Office knew

(1)	F.O.65/1043	Dufferin to Salisbury	86	7 April 1879
				Personal and Secret
	F.O.65/1038	Salisbury to Dufferin	170	8 April 1879
(2)	F.O.65/1038	Salisbury to Dufferin Telegram	40	12 April 1879
	F.O.65/1038	Salisbury to Dufferin Telegrams	25	15 April 1879
			39	21 April 1879
			41	22 April 1879
	F.O.65/1043	Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram	52	25 April 1879
	F.O.65/1038	Salisbury to Dufferin Telegrams	52	27 April 1879
			53	28 April 1879
	F.O.65/1044	Dufferin to Salisbury Telegram	14	2 May 1879
(3)	F.O.64/932	Russell to Salisbury Telegram		27 March 1879

nothing of the explanation which Bismarck had given to Andrassy when he took up this attitude. The Chancellor had stated that he could not accept a proposal which would place Russia, whose representatives were in a permanent minority on the Commissions, in a position of complete isolation. (1)

British information only offered further evidence of Austria-Hungary's inability to secure German support for a proposal to which she attached considerable importance, and of Germany's desertion of Russia. It was seen that on account of Germany's failure to reject the proposal outright, the latter Power was eventually compelled to accept a principle for the settlement of further disputes on the Commissions which, however limited was inimical to her interests.

Evidence of the isolation of Russia was afforded by a number of other negotiations that were going on at the same time as the negotiations in regard to the evacuation of Eastern Rumelia. The first of these, in point of date, was caused by Russia's refusal to accept the decision of the Bulgarian Frontier Commission in regard to the exact position of the frontier to the east of the fortress of Silistria on the Bulgarian-Rumanian section. (2) Austria-Hungary and England

(1) M.Müller: Die Bedeutung des Berliner Kongresses für die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen.
Radowitz to Reuss: 17 and 26 March 1879.

(2) Accounts and Papers 1878-9 LXXX Correspondence Respecting the European Commissions for the Demarcation of Frontiers
p.81.

at once consulted together as to the attitude they should
 adopt. ⁽¹⁾ They agreed to abide by the decision of the
 Commission and Italy supported them. ⁽²⁾ When Rumania, in
 spite of the Russian attitude occupied the frontier as
 delimited by the Commission, the three Powers instructed their
 representatives at Bucharest to offer her their moral support. ⁽³⁾
 Germany and France adopted a separate line, but failed to give
 Russia their support. For their ⁽⁴⁾ refused to offer any opinion
 as to whether Rumania or Russia were entitled to the territory
 in dispute.

When the Sultan in December 1878 in accordance with the
 Treaty, asked for the consent of the Powers to the nomination
 of Rustem Pasha as Governor General of Eastern Rumelia, German
 action was not separate from that of the other Powers. She
 "would concert with England," Russell reported, "in signifying
 her approval." ⁽⁵⁾ France, Italy and Austria also accepted

(1)	F.O.7/926	Salisbury to Elliot	Telegram	12 November 1878
			642	26 December 1878
			Confidential	
(2)	F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	44	18 January 1879
	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	Telegram	4 February 1879
(3)	F.O.27/2362	Salisbury to Lyons, Paget, Elliot and Russell	Telegram	3 February 1879
	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	Telegram	7 February 1879
(4)	F.O.64/931	Russell to Salisbury	30	17 January 1879 and
			Confidential 7 February 1879.	
	F.O.27/2362	Lyons to Salisbury	140	5 February 1879
(5)	F.O.64/931	Russell to Salisbury	13	6 January 1879
			Confidential	

during the first week of 1879. (1) Russia however maintained that the nomination could not be made until the Commission for the organisation of Eastern Rumelia had completed its work and fully defined the powers of the Governor General. (2) She adhered to this view unsupported, and in face of Austrian and English pressure until a solution was found in the nomination of Aleko Pasha concurrently with the issue of the Eastern Rumelian constitution. (3)

Germany's separation from her former allies was made still clearer by the continual revelation of German co-operation with France. Such co-operation, moreover, was often combined with action upon questions in which the interest of Austria-Hungary and Russia were concerned only remotely or not at all.

On August 22nd a Circular despatch from Waddington to the representatives of France at the different capitals informed them of the supreme importance which he attached to the prompt execution of the Treaty of Berlin in all its provisions. (4)

(1)	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	3	5	January 1879
	F.O.27/2361	Lyons to Salisbury	7	3	January 1879
(2)	F.O.65/1041	Loftus to Salisbury	3	1	January 1879
					Confidential
			11	14	January 1879
			85	8	February 1879
	F.O.65/1042	Dufferin to Salisbury	8	8	March 1879
			10	9	March 1879
			22	15	March 1879
(3)	F.O.78/2949	Malet to Salisbury	341	23	April 1879
		and	362	30	April 1879
(4)	D.D.F.Series I Vol.II No.341 footnote				
	F.O.27/2312	Adams to Salisbury	698	6	September 1878
					Confidential

A week later Dering, who was temporarily in charge of the Berlin Embassy, telegraphed that Radowitz, ^{who was in charge of the} ~~the German Minister~~ ^{German Foreign Office} ~~for Foreign Affairs~~, had been instructed by Bismarck to draw up a Circular inviting the Signatory Powers to unite in summoning the Porte in identic language to carry out the provisions of the Treaty without delay. ⁽¹⁾ The invitation was duly made by a note dated 2nd of September. Salisbury was at first inclined to suspect that the German Note was the result of Russian influence. ⁽²⁾ Beaconsfield, however, drew his attention to the possibility that Waddington "had been stimulating Bismarck." ⁽³⁾ Later Andrassy pressed Salisbury to give a favourable reply to the German note. ⁽⁴⁾ The British Minister then thought that the proposal, which he had already rejected, had arisen with Austria-Hungary. ⁽⁵⁾ But his fears

(1) F.O.64/907 Dering to Salisbury Telegram 31 August 1878
 Afterwards Waddington wrote as if 47
 Bismarck had taken the initiative
 in a matter in which France was
 primarily concerned.
 D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.346.
 Müller op.cit. p.77

(Bismarck to Radowitz Telegram 26 August 1879)

(2) Buckle op.cit. Vol.II p.1244.

(3) Buckle op.cit. Vol.II p.1245.

(4) F.O. 7/925 Salisbury to Elliot Telegram 17 September 1878

(5) Cecil ^{Vol II} p.336-337.

for Anglo-Austrian relations as a result of Schuvaloff's presence in Vienna, led him to look for opportunities of inadvertently giving offence where none existed. Elliot's reports, moreover, did not support his suspicions. ⁽¹⁾ Again, the eagerness of France in accepting the German proposal was very marked. Waddington it is true informed the French Ambassadors at London, Vienna, and Rome that he wished to know the opinions of the Governments to which they were accredited, before he replied. ⁽²⁾ Dering, ^{however} ~~moreover~~, reported from Berlin, that when the note was communicated to him, Waddington had immediately promised French support. ⁽³⁾ This information was soon confirmed from Paris. ⁽⁴⁾ In any case, the readiness with which Germany gave up her proposal, ⁽⁵⁾ in spite of the fact that Austria-Hungary, Russia and France had

(1) F.O. 7/934 Elliot to Salisbury Telegram 7 September 1878
and
671 19 September 1878

(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.341.

(3) F.O.64/908 Dering to Salisbury Telegrams 5 September 1878
8 September 1878

(4) F.O.27/2312 Adams to Salisbury 698 6 September 1878
Confidential

The note was communicated to Waddington by Hohenlohe on the 4th.

(5) F.O.64/908 Dering to Salisbury Telegram 12 September 1878
541 21 September 1878

The British reply was only given to von Brincken, the German chargé d'affaires in London on the 11th.
D.D.F. Ser.I Vol.II No.343. Buckle^{vii} p.1247.

accepted it, and Italy promised support if it were accepted unanimously, made it appear as if the note had been issued rather as a demonstration of friendship towards some other Power, than in the hope of advancing any German object in the East.⁽¹⁾

The negotiations on the Silistrian question, as we have seen, afforded evidence of Franco-German co-operation. During the course of the negotiations for the Russian evacuation of the Balkans, the French and German replies to the Russian proposal for mixed occupation were the same. The identity of their attitude was not accidental. St. Vallier had been invited by Bismarck to Friedrichsruhe^{ruhe} early in January. During the conversations that took place between them, the Chancellor had expressed the hope that Waddington would share his views on the subject.⁽²⁾ Russell, though he did not know exactly what had been said, was able to inform the Foreign Office that a discussion on the question had taken place.⁽³⁾ Later, Bismarck in speaking to the British Ambassador deliberately associated his attitude in the matter with that adopted by Waddington.⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) F.O.64/908 Dering to Salisbury Telegram 5 September 1878
 F.O.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury Telegram
 56 10 September 1878
- (2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.371.
- (3) F.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 8 January 1879
 Most Confidential
- (4) F.O.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 138 2 March 1879
 Secret

Negotiations were also going on concerning the recognition of Rumanian independence and the rectification of the Greek frontier. In the first of these questions Germany appeared to take up an attitude in direct contravention of Austria's interests. These demanded the extension of Austrian influence in Rumania, and therefore the immediate appointment of a Minister at Bucharest. In the second question Germany was seen to play an active part in a matter which did not touch Austrian and Russian interests.

In the autumn of 1878 Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey accorded diplomatic recognition to Rumania and accredited Ministers ^{to} ~~of~~ her Court. Germany and France co-operated in withholding recognition. They demanded that Rumania, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of the Berlin Treaty, should first arrange for complete religious equality within her territories. ⁽¹⁾ That involved the abrogation of the 7th Article of her constitution which provided that only Christians could enjoy civil rights in Rumania. The Powers, except for Germany and France, were prepared to be satisfied with a declaration from the Prince and Parliament of Rumania, that they intended to convoke a Constituent Assembly for the purpose. ⁽²⁾ England, however, having no interest at stake in

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.361.

(2) F.O.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 12 13 January 1879
Confidential

the matter was guided by a desire to show her friendship towards France and Germany and did not, for the time being, accredit a Minister. (1) Italy, who had already sent to her Consul General at Bucharest letters accrediting him Minister Plenipotentiary, thereupon instructed him to defer their (2) presentation.

The British Foreign Office had clear evidence as to the identity of the attitude adopted by France and Germany, and they possessed no information such as would enable them to explain the French action on the basis of French interests in Rumania.

During the early months of 1879 further information showed that the identity of the French and German attitude was maintained. The two Powers insisted on the fullest possible concessions from the Rumanian Government, in the face of a hostile public opinion in Rumania, and continual efforts on the part of England and Italy to find a compromise that would enable recognition to take place.

On the 1st of February England with Italy's support made (3) proposals for a compromise simultaneously to France and Germany.

(1) F.O.45/375 Salisbury to Paget 46 27 January:-
"Britain had taken rather a more unyielding tone than she otherwise would have done out of deference to Germany and France."

(2) F.O.45/341 Paget to Salisbury 493 18 November 1878

(3) F.O.27/2355 Salisbury to Lyons 108 29 January 1879

(1)
 No answer could be got from Waddington for some days.
 When it eventually came it took the shape of a counter-proposal
 supported by Bismarck. (2) No decision, however, was taken.
 For a Bill had meanwhile been introduced into the Rumanian
 Parliament providing for the convocation of a Constituent
 Assembly. Italy immediately expressed the view that the Powers
 should accept this as sufficient guarantee of the good inten-
 tions of Rumania. (3) England made representations to both
 France and Germany in the same sense. Again, no satisfaction
 could be got from either Power. (4)

Russell's reports made it clear that Germany had a definite
 object in adopting such an uncompromising attitude on the
 question. (5) For, he reported, ^{that} negotiations were going on
 between the German banking houses of Hausemann and Bleichröder

(1) F.O.27/2362	Lyons to Salisbury	119	1 February 1879
		139	5 February 1879
(2) F.O.64/931	Russell to Salisbury	130	28 February 1879
(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.403	footnote.		
(4) F.O.64/932	Russell to Salisbury	139	2 March 1879
		Secret	
		149	8 March 1879
		Most Confidential	
F.O.27/2364	Lyons to Salisbury Telegram	57	13 March 1879
(5) F.O.64/932	Russell to Salisbury	139	2 March 1879
		Secret	
		152	8 March 1879
		Secret	
		170	19 March 1879
		Confidential	
		198	6 April 1879
		Secret	

backed by the German Government, and Rumania for the purchase by the Principality of her railways which, on the bankruptcy of the original Rumanian Company, had fallen into the hands of German creditors. Besides demanding a price which the Rumanian Government declared was beyond its means, the German negotiators insisted that the working of the railways should continue for some time longer in German hands. At one stage they had gone so far as to offer the railways to both Austria-Hungary and Russia in order to secure Rumanian pliancy. The withholding of recognition was only another means of coercion. No information came from Paris to indicate that France had any similar object to attain, or that she had any interest in Rumania that would suffer by her failure to recognise its independence. The question appeared to have offered to France a reasonable opportunity for a demonstration of friendship to Germany.

On the Greek question there was at the outset a certain rivalry between England and France. Salisbury aimed at securing the peaceful cession of territory to Greece by means of British influence over the Porte. His original idea was that it should form part of an Anglo-Turkish arrangement of which the rest should provide for a British loan to Turkey, and for a guarantee by England and France against further demands from Greece. Parliamentary opposition prevented the first of these compensations from being offered to Turkey; but Salis-

(1)
bury's policy did not change.

Waddington had championed the claims of Greece at the Congress. When, therefore, ~~she appealed~~, in the face of a Turkish refusal to grant her the rectification of frontier for which the Treaty had stipulated, ^{she appealed} ₍₂₎ to the Powers in accordance with Article 24, the German chargé d'affaires in Paris was instructed to enquire what action Waddington proposed to take. Bismarck promised his support whatever he decided to do. ₍₃₎ The British Foreign Office had no information on this exchange of views. It resulted in the issue on the 21st of October of a French Circular proposing an identic and simultaneous communication to the Porte, expressing the hope that she would accept the principle of a rectification of frontier for Greece. ₍₄₎ The "immediate and complete" adhesion of the German Government, then indicated the latter's position. ₍₅₎ It became still clearer when Russell reported that Bülow, the German Foreign Minister, had made a point of expressing to him the pleasure of the Imperial Government,

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- Vol II
- (1) Cecil: ^{Vol II} App. 309, 314.
F.O. 27/2361 Lyons to Salisbury 64 19 January 1879
- (2) F.O. 27/2313 Adams to Salisbury 730 18 September 1878
- (3) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II No. 346.
- (4) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II No. 357.
- (5) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II No. 358.
F.O. 64/910 Russell to Salisbury Telegram 3 November 1878

that England had not entirely rejected the French proposal. ⁽¹⁾

In the interval that preceded the next stage in European negotiations, the Porte assented to a conference at Preversa between its own and Greek Commissioners. A new ground, however, for division of opinion between England and France was soon furnished. Layard, British Ambassador at Constantinople, on the 21st January advised the Foreign Office that Turkey should not be allowed to surrender Janina to Greece at any price. ⁽²⁾ His views were accepted. France, however, was prepared to sustain the Greek pretension that discussions at Preversa should be based on the line suggested at the Congress and recorded in its 13th Protocol. This they asserted passed north of the strategic point of Janina. When negotiations at Preversa broke down, and Greece once more appealed to the Powers for mediation, France again took the initiative. Her plan was now to secure a preliminary understanding with England. ⁽³⁾ She was prepared to accept Salisbury's proposal for a joint guarantee to Turkey against further Greek aggression,

(1) F.O.64/910	Russell to Salisbury	628	15 November 1878
(2) F.O.78/2943	Layard to Salisbury	73	21 January 1879
		Confidential	
(3) F.O.27/2363	Lyons to Salisbury	210	22 February 1879
		Very Confidential	
		232	27 February 1879
		Confidential	
F.O.27/2355	Salisbury to Lyons	275	5 March 1879

but in return he expected that Britain should support his views in regard to the future frontier line.

At this point Waddington told Lyons in strict confidence that he had rejected offers from Germany "to send ships of war into the Mediterranean to act with the French fleet to secure the execution of the Berlin decisions." The impression of the German attitude conveyed by this report was confirmed when Russell reported a conversation with Bismarck of the 2nd of March. The German Chancellor, it appeared, agreed with Waddington that the line offered by Turkey was "simply ridiculous." Germany, he said, had no particular interests in Greece but she desired to give France what "national satisfaction" she could, and would support any proposal that M. Waddington might make. (1)

Meanwhile at Constantinople the German and French Ambassadors, on the instruction of their Governments, co-operated in pressing upon the Porte the complete cession of the Berlin line. (2) Bismarck, the Foreign Office was also informed, was making efforts to persuade Andrassy to give similar instructions to Count Zichy. Szechenyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, Russell reported, was surprised to perceive how earnestly Prince Bismarck pressed the Greek question upon Austria-Hungary

(1) F.O.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 140 2 March 1879

(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.399.

and urged the necessity of her co-operation with France and
 Germany. ⁽¹⁾ The Chancellor's efforts failed as the attitude
 of complete reserve maintained by Zichy showed. The Russian,
 Labanoff, and the Italian, Corti, also maintained an attitude
 of reserve, while Britain pursued a line of her own. Malet
 had been instructed to advise Turkey to place herself com-
 pletely in England's hands. She would then see that the
 towns of Janina and Larissa were preserved to her. ⁽²⁾ Thus
 the co-operation of Hatzfeldt and Fournier was all the more
 marked in that they acted alone.

In spite of his failure to reach an understanding with
 England, Waddington's efforts continued. Bismarck again
 expressed the hope that Britain would support them. On the
 21st of April fresh proposals were formulated in a Circular
 to the French Ambassadors at the capitals of the five Great
 Powers. ⁽³⁾ Austria-Hungary, Italy and Britain accepted in
 principle but made distinct reserves. Russia, whose attitude
 Schuvaloff stated was one of comparative indifference, refused
 to express an opinion until the fate of the proposition had

(1) F.O.64/932 Russell to Salisbury 201 8 April 1879
 Secret
 D.D.F. Series I Vol.II Nos.399 and 403.

(2) F.O.78/2948 Malet to Salisbury 309 11 April 1879
 and 324 18 April 1879

(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II 413.

been decided by the replies of the other Powers. Germany immediately signified her complete acceptance. (1)

Russell's despatches impressed upon the Foreign Office the existence of a close co-operation between Germany and France. On the 15th May he described the "feeling of disappointment" in Germany at the lack of British support for the combined wishes of France and Germany. (2) At the same time, reports from Constantinople indicate that Germany was using her influence with Italy to bring about a change in her attitude favourable to France. (3)

By the 30th of May all the Powers had accepted Waddington's proposal in the form it finally assumed, and they united in urging upon Turkey and Greece the nomination of plenipotentiaries to take part in renewed negotiations at Constantinople, to be conducted under the auspices of the Representatives of the Great Powers. The question now ceased for the time being to be the subject of negotiations between the Powers. At the same time it loses its importance as an index for the relationships existing between the three Empires and between Germany and France. The French initiative

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- (1) F.O.27/2367 Lyons to Salisbury 515 8 May 1879
 F.O.45/380 Paget to Salisbury 198 6 May 1879
 F.O.65/1038 Salisbury to Dufferin 288 9 May 1879
 D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.416.
- (2) F.O.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 244 15 May 1879.
- (3) F.O.45/376 Salisbury to Paget
 Telegram 24 24 May 1879.

in subsequent negotiations did not receive German support. An exchange of views later took place between France and England on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other, but not between France and Germany. At Constantinople the situation developed into what Fournier described as a painful tête à tête between France and England. (1)

All the negotiations dealt with above furnished evidence of Italy's desire to co-operate with England. Thus British information showed that the Italian reply to the German note of September 2nd was the direct result of the attitude taken up by Britain. (2)

A little later when Austria-Hungary proposed to the Powers that the assembly of the Commission for the delimitation of the Montenegrin frontier should be postponed for the time being, Russia endeavoured to secure Italian support for a counter-proposition that it should assemble immediately. Italy was at first inclined to agree. When, however, it was learnt that England accepted the Austrian point of view, the Italian attitude immediately changed and the Russian proposition was rejected. (3)

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II. 433.

(2) F.O.45/334 Salisbury to Macdonnell 316A 7 September 1879
 F.O.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury
 Telegrams 49 8 September 1879
 56 10 September 1879

(3) F.O.45/340 Macdonnell to Salisbury
 Telegram 11 September 1879
 413 14 September 1879
 Confidential

The identical attitude adopted by Italy in regard to the Silistrian question has already been mentioned. The Foreign Office possessed evidence which showed that Italy's adoption of this attitude was the result of a deliberate intention on her part to associate herself with England. (1) At each successive stage in the negotiations, Menabrea the Italian Ambassador in London enquired the British view from Salisbury (2) and the Italian attitude was regulated accordingly. When England and Austria-Hungary both made proposals for the settlement of the difficulty, Italy immediately accepted the British proposals. (3)

When the idea of mixed occupation in the Balkans was first mooted, Menabrea informed Salisbury that it was absolutely contrary to the Treaty. It was likely to lead to a permanent Austrian occupation of Salonica, if not actually designed for the purpose, and Italy must offer an uncompromising resistance. (4) When, however, the Russian circular, formally making the proposal was communicated in Rome, although

(1)	F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	45	18 January 1879
	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	Telegram	4 February 1879
(2)	F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget		15 February 1879
(3)	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	61	16 February 1879
(4)	F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	40	18 January 1879
	F.O.45/377	Paget to Salisbury	22	27 January 1879
		Confidential		
			59	10 February 1879

Depretis still considered it the first step towards tearing up the Treaty, Paget reported that he would modify his attitude in order to act with England. If Britain accepted the proposal Italy would do so too, and in that case wished to come to a formal understanding with Her Majesty's Government as to the means to be employed to give effect to their resolution.⁽¹⁾

Three days later, Italy drew up her reply which was communicated to Paget before being sent to St. Petersburg as Depretis wished to know whether it met with British approval.⁽²⁾

Salisbury acknowledged the demonstration that Italy had given during these negotiations of her desire to act with England, by keeping Depretis closely informed of the course of the separate negotiations that ensued between England and Russia.⁽³⁾

Italian co-operation with England in the Rumanian question has already been seen. Again, immediately after the Greek appeal to the Powers for mediation, Italy enquired the attitude of the British Government, with a view to guiding her own by it.⁽⁴⁾

As a result of the information she thus acquired, the

(1)	F.O.45/378	Paget to Salisbury	109	22 March 1879
	F.O.45/378	Paget to Salisbury	110	22 March 1879
(2)	F.O.45/378	Paget to Salisbury	117	25 March 1879
(3)	F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	201	12 April 1879
		and	217	19 April 1879
(4)	F.O.45/340	Macdonnell to Salisbury	431	3 October 1878
			Confidential	

abandoned the championship of Greek claims that she had main-
 tained at Berlin. ⁽¹⁾ She concerted with England her reply
 to the French Circular of 21st October. ⁽²⁾ Then in the course
 of the following Spring she stated that she had entirely
 adopted the English point of view in regard to Janina. ⁽³⁾
 In April she again concerted with England, her reply to the
 French Circular. ⁽⁴⁾ In the following month she proposed that
 their "common understanding" on the Greek question should be
 reduced to a precise form and suggested that the two Powers
 should agree upon a line of frontier which they might oppose
 to any line proposed by France for recommendation to Turkey
 and Greece. ⁽⁵⁾

The diplomatic negotiations between the Powers after the
 summer of 1879, as distinct from those of the earlier part of
 the year, reveal ^{an} the evolution from Germany's separation from
 Austria-Hungary and Russia, ^{to} of an exclusive Austro-German
 friendship.

These negotiations were primarily concerned with two
 questions: the recognition of Rumanian independence and the

(1) F.O.45/340	Macdonnell to Salisbury	439	16 October 1878
(2) F.O.45/341	Paget to Salisbury	464	1 November 1878
(3) F.O.45/378	Paget to Salisbury	161	16 April 1879
		164	19 April 1879
		170	22 April 1879
Most Confidential			
(4) F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	232	30 April 1879
(5) F.O.45/375	Salisbury to Paget	304	28 May 1879

Egyptian question.

In regard to the first of these the most noticeable point was the sudden inclusion of Austria-Hungary in the negotiations towards the end of June. The fact that she had already accredited a Minister might well have been expected to lead her to continue to hold aloof. However, when Germany revived the negotiations by proposing that a Collective Note should be presented to Rumania summoning her to execute Article 44, the proposal was addressed to Austria-Hungary as well as to England, France and Italy. ⁽¹⁾ Walsham, who was now in charge of the Berlin Embassy, then reported that "Austria notwithstanding the fact of her having an accredited agent at Bucharest would now be prepared to support the representations of England and France and, if necessary, to take part in the negotiations, which in the event of Rumania declining to listen to these representations, His Highness suggested should be undertaken at Constantinople." ⁽²⁾ A few days later he was assured by Radowitz that Andrassy would withdraw his diplomatic agent if the present negotiations failed. ⁽³⁾ Later this information was corroborated from Vienna. ⁽⁴⁾ Austria-Hungary did in fact agree that the

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|----------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| (1) F.O.7/963 | Elliot to Salisbury | 422 | 8 July 1879. |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.64/934 | Walsham to Salisbury | | 1 July 1879 |
| (3) F.O.64/934 | Walsham to Salisbury | 356 | 16 July 1879 |
| | | Most Confidential | |
| (4) F.O.64/934 | Walsham to Salisbury | 359 | 18 July 1879 |

representations of the Powers should be made through her Minister at Bucharest. This was a British proposal designed to avoid the offensive character that collective remonstrances to Rumania would necessarily bear. In the course of the summer the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Boeresco came to Europe with proposals for a compromise. Andrassy declared that he was acting in complete accord with the other Powers and he joined with them in rejecting the proposals. (1)

During 1878 and the beginning of 1879, Germany had made use of the existence of a handful of German creditors to Egypt, ~~and~~ of the rights she possessed there as a result of the institution of the Mixed Tribunals, and ~~of the~~ ^{her own} pre-dominant position ~~of Germany~~ in European diplomacy during and after the Berlin Congress, to pursue a policy and to make her views felt along a line distinct from, though not necessarily in opposition to, the policy followed by England and France. (2) Germany in pursuing this policy had no marked co-operation from any Power. Italy and Austria-Hungary were, in fact, separated from Germany by their association with the Anglo-French entente. For they were both represented on an equal footing with England and France in the Commission of the Public Debt which had been constituted as a result of the

(1) F.O.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 9 August 1879.
F.O. 7/963 Elliot to Salisbury 9 August 1879.

(2) Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt. Vol.1. p.33 et sequ.
M. Kleine: Deutschland und die ägyptische Frage.

Goschen mission. They were thus automatically represented on the Commission of Enquiry into the Finances that was ^{constituted} in April 1878, from whose recommendations the appointment of the European Ministers and other arrangements of political importance arose. They were ~~then~~ jointly responsible with England and France for the state of affairs that existed until the coup d'état of April 1879. In the Autumn of 1878 Italy had demanded representation in the Ministry and Austria-Hungary had stated that, if Italy were represented, she would also demand representation. Neither Power however, had had outside support and they made their communications separately to England and France. ⁽¹⁾

The dissolution of the Commission of Enquiry cut the connection of Italy and Austria-Hungary with Anglo-French co-operation. The exchange of views that followed between England and France concerned proposals made to these Powers by the Grand Vizier for the deposition of the Khedive. Austria-Hungary and Italy were not consulted. ⁽²⁾

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- (1) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II Nos. 346, 347, 348.
 F.O.45/334 Macdonnell to Salisbury 436 5 October 1878
 F.O.27/2314 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 4 October 1878
- (2) D.D.F. Series I Vol. II No. 407.
 F.O.27/2365 Lyons to Salisbury Telegrams 64 9 April 1879
 66 10 April 1879
 68 12 April 1879
 F.O.27/2355 Salisbury to Lyons Telegram 9 April 1879

The nature of the negotiations that now took place served to bring out the fundamental distinction between the Austrian attitude and the attitude of England, France and Italy. They showed that while these three Powers were primarily concerned with the political aspect of the question, she was concerned only with the financial. Germany in accordance with her previous policy which tended always to favour the claims of the European creditors, issued a protest against the Khedive's assumption of the sole responsibility for the liquidation of Egypt's debts. It was almost immediately followed up by a similar communication from Austria-Hungary.⁽¹⁾ The Foreign Office for the first time had clear evidence of Austro-German co-operation on the question.

It was the more noticeable in that the policy they pursued was entirely distinct from that pursued by any other Power. The reactions of the different Powers to the German and Austrian protests made this clear. Waddington replied in general terms to Germany's invitation to support her protest, deprecated the German *démarc*^h*he*, and did not think that England and France should give their support.⁽²⁾ Italy

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II No.430.

Cromer: op.cit.^{Vol.I}p.135.

F.O.27/2367 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram 89 21 May 1879

F.O.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 258 25 May 1879

Confidential

276 2 June 1879

Confidential

(2) F.O.27/2368 Lyons to Salisbury Telegrams 92 26 May 1879

95 1 June 1879

regarded the protest as "inexpedient."⁽¹⁾ Russian support was only secured after a good deal of difficulty, as she wished to remain aloof. It was clear in fact that only the lead given by England was responsible for the ultimate support to the protest given by all the Powers.

A little later Austria-Hungary and Germany were seen to co-operate in unofficially advising the Khedive to abdicate. In thus concerting their support of the Anglo-French efforts, they again acted apart from the other Powers. This was recognised when Waddington in proposing to England that the advice so far given unofficially, should be repeated officially, suggested that the English and French representatives at Berlin should be instructed to ask the German and Austrian Governments to give the same instructions to their agents at Cairo.*⁽²⁾ Only when the German ^{and Austrian replies} reply had been received was a similar proposal made to Russia and Italy.⁽³⁾ British information showed clearly that Italy did not sympathise with the proposal although she ultimately accepted it.⁽⁴⁾ Russia rejected the proposal "Nous avons tellement écorché ces pauvres Turcs au nord" said Jomini who was

(1) F.O.45/381	Paget to Salisbury	270	12 June 1879
(2) F.O.27/2369	Lyons to Salisbury	634	16 June 1879
(3) F.O.27/2369	Lyons to Salisbury	643	20 June 1879
(4) F.O.45/381	Paget to Salisbury	280	22 June 1879

temporarily in charge of the Russian Foreign Office "que c'est bien le moins que nous les protégeons un peu au sud." (1)
 It appeared, and significantly, mainly from German sources, that she was intriguing at Constantinople against England and France. (2)

British information during the next months confirmed the evidence of Austro-German co-operation. St. Vallier, ^{as} Walsham now chargé d'affaires at Berlin reported, had asked at Berlin whether if France and England protested against the Sultan's revocation of the Firman of 1873, Germany would support their action. Bismarck had replied that "before giving a definitive answer he must know the views of the Austrian Government with whom he desired to act in complete harmony respecting Egyptian affairs." Again, in regard to the Anglo-French proposals for the establishment of the Control in accordance with Tewfik's offer, Bismarck was ready to support them but waited for the Austrian reply before saying so officially. Radowitz, Walsham reported, "laid great stress upon the necessity of Germany acting in concert with Austria on this occasion." (3)

(1) F.O.65/1044 Plunkett to Salisbury 286 23 June 1879
 Confidential

(2) F.O.64/933 Walsham to Salisbury 320 28 June 1879
 Secret

(3) F.O.27/2369 Lyons to Salisbury Telegram
 101 20 June 1879
 F.O.64/933 Walsham to Salisbury 301 21 June 1879
 303 21 June 1879
 309 21 June 1879

Finally when negotiations were initiated as to the powers and of membership ^{of} and the international commission of Liquidation that was to be instituted, Germany and Austria-Hungary united in taking the initiative. ⁽¹⁾ On the 5th August the Foreign Office were informed, Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador at Paris, had brought Waddington "on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian as well as the German Government" a memorandum embodying detailed proposals on these points. Next day a similar communication was made by the Austrian Ambassador. A little later the same proposals were made in London.

II.

In the same way that the relations between the Powers were reflected by the course of general diplomatic negotiations, they were shown by the more intense negotiations on the European Commissions which met in the Balkans to settle in detail the frontiers of the newly formed states and the constitution of Eastern Rumelia, and by the proceedings of the Commission of investigation into the state of the population of the Rhodope district.

Thus, the reports of the British members of the Commission for the organisation of Eastern Rumelia reflected the whole development of European relations from the Berlin Congress to the late summer of 1879 when its sessions were adjourned.

(1) F.O.27/2372 Lyons to Salisbury 832 5 August 1879
845 8 August 1879
Confidential

They showed clearly the German association with Russia that characterised the first two months after the Congress. On arriving at Constantinople, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the British Commissioner, found the German Ambassador and the German Commissioner supporting a number of claims made by Russia in respect of the competency and procedure of the Commission. ⁽¹⁾ One of these at least, touched upon a question of vital importance from the British point of view. It was the Russian contention that in spite of Article XXIII of the Treaty, the Commission should not take over the administration of the Eastern Rumelian finances. ⁽²⁾ In any case the combined effect of Russia's pretensions would be to prevent the establishment of any organisation in Eastern Rumelia, and to ensure that when her troops left the Peninsula the population of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia would be in such a state as to make a rising inevitable and so armed and organised in bodies of militia under Russian officers, that the success of the rising was assured, and so the work of the Berlin Congress ⁽³⁾ undone. The support therefore which

(1) F.O.78/2914 Wolff to Salisbury 19 9 September 1878
 25 13 September 1878
 Confidential
 28 14 September 1878
 Confidential

Müller: op.cit. p.78.

(2) F.O.78/2914 Donoughmore to Wolff 13 21 September 1878
 [assistant Commissioner]

(3) F.O.78/2916 Wolff to Salisbury 58 11 October 1878

they received from Germany was observed closely by the British representatives. The proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry into the condition of the refugees gathered in the Rhodope district, that was constituted on the 17th July in accordance with the 18th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, ⁽¹⁾ showed that this support was not limited to the particular issues with which the Rumelian Commission had to deal. The demands of Germany's Eastern policy could always be alleged as justification for the German attitude in respect of these, but only the demands of her alliance policy could explain the action of her representative on the Rhodope Commission. In the course of its investigations the question of the cause of the present plight of the population could not be kept out of the discussions, for witnesses before it continually accused the Russian soldiers of having perpetrated all sorts of outrages in the district during the Balkan war. The result was that Russia protested. The German Commissioner supported her protests. Finally when its report was drawn up and the accusations against the Russians were not omitted the Russian and German Commissioners refused ⁽²⁾ their signature.

It was made clear to the Foreign Office that Germany in

(1) British and Foreign State Papers. Vol.69 p.1107.

(2) Müller: op.cit. pp.75-77.

supporting Russia was isolating herself from all the other Powers. None of the other members of the Rhodope Commission refused their signature to its report. The Austrian, it was true, was saved by illness from the necessity of giving a decision, but when the joint report was abandoned, he sent home a separate report as strong against Russia as those of his colleagues. ⁽¹⁾ Then Wolff, on arriving at Constantinople, reported that he found both the Austrian Ambassador and Commissioner eager to work with him. ⁽²⁾ An exchange of views had in fact taken place between Wolff and Andrassy in Vienna, and Kallay had been instructed to act entirely with his English colleague. ⁽³⁾ The French Commissioners Baron Ring and M. Contouilly, evinced the same eagerness to co-operate with Wolff. ⁽⁴⁾ So that by the end of September the English, Austrian, and French Commissioners had held several private meetings and established certain points in regard to procedure and certain resolutions in regard to policy, which they would co-operate to carry out. ⁽⁵⁾ The

(1) A.&P.1878-79 LXXIX p.1. Further Correspondence respecting the proceedings of the International Commission sent to Mount Rhodope District.

(2) F.O.78/2914	Wolff to Salisbury	30	15 September 1878
(3) F.O.78/2914	Wolff to Salisbury	9	24 August 1878
		14	27 August 1878
(4) F.O.78/2914	Wolff to Salisbury	21	10 September 1878
(5) F.O.78/2914	Wolff to Salisbury	38	24 September 1878

Italian Commissioner associated himself with them, as far as the professed disinterestedness of his country would allow.

When the Commission set seriously to work at the beginning of November the German support of Russia was seen to weaken. The first discussions concerned the programme for its work that had been drawn up by the French, Austrian and English Commissioners and was now put before the Commission by Kallay. It was considered paragraph by paragraph, all those touching questions of principle being put to the vote. Russia voted unfavourably every time, but the different paragraphs were accepted "sometimes by a vote of six, sometimes by a vote of five, the German Commissioner almost alternating his vote between the Russian and the other Commissioners." When, as the next step, different Commissioners were told off to deal with the different chapters of the projected Constitution, Germany was effectually separated from Russia. For while the Russian Commissioners refused to take any part at all in this work, Braunschweig, the German Commissioner, undertook to prepare a number of chapters. ⁽¹⁾ When these chapters later came up for discussion in full commission he naturally defended his work against Russian opposition. At the same time the sub-committee that

(1) F.O.78/2916 Wolff to Salisbury 100 7 November 1878

had been appointed to deal with the administration of the Province appointed a German as Director of Finances. ⁽¹⁾ A struggle ^{opened} ~~commenced~~ between him and the Russian civil Governor in Eastern Rumelia, Prince Doudoukoff that continued with increasing bitterness until the departure of the Russian troops. The German Commissioner as was to be expected, supported his countryman throughout. In fact, Wolff reported that he had reason to believe that the German Government was "shocked at the proceedings of Prince Doudoukoff, both political and financial." ⁽²⁾ The only subsequent occasion on which German support of Russia was at all marked was in connection with the dispute as to the discussion of petitions presented by the inhabitants to the Commission. No important question of principle however was concerned and the German attitude was of no advantage to the general policy of Russia. ⁽³⁾ British information on the proceedings of the other Commissions confirmed this evidence. The Commission for the delimitation of the frontier of Bulgaria had assembled at Constantinople on the 11th of October and proceeded to Silistria on the 2nd of November. In the divisions of

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- (1) F.O.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 143 1 December 1878.
 (2) F.O.78/2918 Wolff to Salisbury 168 15 December 1878
 Confidential
 (3) F.O.78/2917 Wolff to Salisbury 155 8 December 1878
 Müller: op.cit.(Bülow to Bismarck 2 December)

opinion that occurred at Constantinople the Russian Commissioner had been warmly supported by the German. "In carrying out the work at Silistria" however, Horne the British member reported, "the greatest cordiality prevailing between the Representatives of Germany, Austria, Italy, Russia, Turkey and myself, in every case the vote was six against one." (1)

In the serious division of opinion that occurred in the section of this Commission dealing with the ~~future~~^{frontier} between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia Germany also sided with the other representatives against Russia. The Commission in carrying out their work had been met at one village by a hostile crowd of Bulgarians. The Russian member although he was seen to be well able to control the crowd, refused to do anything, asserting that his mission was a technical and not a diplomatic one. The German Commissioner was as strong as his colleagues in condemning the attitude of the Russian authorities in Bulgaria and of the Russian Commissioner. The British proposition that the Commission should return to Constantinople to enable its members to consult their respective Ambassadors was accepted by a majority of six to one. (2)

(1) A.&P. 1878-9 LXXX. Correspondence respecting European Commissions Appointed for the Delimitation of Frontiers.
 p.79. Horne to Salisbury 26 November 1878
 Müller! (F.O. to Hatzfeldt 24 November and 7 December)

(2) A. & P. 1878-9 LXXX. p.143 et sequ. particularly
 Gordon to Salisbury 2 December 1878

The abandonment of Russia by Germany was emphasised by the change in the attitude of the former Power that occurred soon afterwards. The Russian Commissioners on the Eastern Rumelian Commission suddenly showed a disposition to exchange views confidentially with Wolff. They stated indeed that if it was the intention of the Commission to establish a real autonomy in the Province, ~~that~~ it should have the assistance of Russia, although long discussions would necessarily occur on questions of detail. ⁽¹⁾ By the middle of December Wolff reported that the desire of the Russians to act amicably with the Commission was growing daily more and more evident. ⁽²⁾ It soon became possible for disputed points to be settled in private discussions between Wolff, Ring and the Russian Commissioners. ⁽³⁾

In the beginning of the following year another development became apparent. Russia began slowly to find a measure of support in France and Italy. The earliest indication that such a development was possible was given when it appeared that Russia was canvassing the appointment of Vernoni, the Italian Commissioner, as Governor General of Eastern

(1)	F.O.78/2917	Wolff to Salisbury	142	1 December 1878
(2)	F.O.78/2917	Wolff to Salisbury	163	13 December 1878
(3)	F.O.78/3035	Wolff to Salisbury	60	8 February 1879
			Confidential	
			68	9 February 1879
			81	18 February 1879

(1)
Rumelia. The appointment of a European to that position soon appeared as a ground of rapprochement also between France and Russia. (2) There was however a more fundamental cause for this development. At the beginning of February it appeared that Ring and Contouilly, with the support of Fournier the French Ambassador at Constantinople, were pursuing a policy which aimed at advancing French influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. As a result, although France was fundamentally opposed to the policy of Russia in the Balkans, her representatives now avoided taking an attitude against Russian proposals that might harm their influence with the Bulgarian population. (3) They therefore energetically put forward the Russian proposal for a European Governor General. Wolff endeavoured to check the French attitude. He saw Ring and Contouilly privately and appealed to them to lay their cards on the table and state openly what they wanted, when England would endeavour to assist them to secure it. He expressed his anxious desire that in return, they, Kallay and himself should continue to act together cordially as the

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- (1) F.O.78/3034 Wolff to Salisbury 31 19 January 1879
 F.O.45/377 Paget to Salisbury 44 8 February 1879
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 60 8 February 1879
 Confidential
- (3) F.O.78/2942 Layard to Salisbury 26 7 January 1879
 Very Confidential
 F.O.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 72 13 February 1879
 Confidential

only means of bringing moral pressure to bear on Russia. Ring eventually gave him his word to that effect and Wolff then undertook to lay before Salisbury objectively and without comment the French wishes:- the appointment of a European Governor General, and some form of mixed occupation after the departure of the Russian troops. (1)

During the course of 1879 the tendency of the French Commissioner, and eventually also of the Italian Commissioner, to associate themselves with Russia appears more and more marked, while from the tendency of Germany to draw near to Austria-Hungary and England there evolved a close Austro-German co-operation.

On the 6th March Wolff reported that the conduct of the French was daily becoming "more and more astonishing". He could only explain their attitude by a determination "to create a French influence in the Balkans sufficient to enlist the support of Russia in a future war between France and Germany." (2) This influence they were seen to cultivate with increasing energy. (3) At the same time their attitude

(1) F.O.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury Separate 15 February 1879
and Most Confidential.

(2) F.O.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 98 6 March 1879
Confidential

(3) F.O.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 117 16 March 1879
124 21 March 1879
Confidential
137 25 March 1879

to Austria-Hungary became more and more hostile. "Kallay," said Contouly, "was a very dangerous man whose only desire was to secure Salonica for Austria." The result of the work of the Commission as it was ^{then} being carried on, would only be to place Eastern Rumelia at her mercy. The co-operation, (1) however, between England and Austria-Hungary did not weaken. Thus the French separation from Austria was also a separation from England. In fact the French now began to speak of their former co-operation with ~~her~~ ^{the latter} as having merely resulted in their pulling her chestnuts out of the fire. (2) The continued French insistence on the two points which Wolff had put before Salisbury on February the 15th, and the failure of England to make any attempt to secure them, increased the ill-feeling that Ring and Contouly now began to show to Wolff. At the same time the degree of friendship between the French and Russian Commissioners had become such that the former, who were responsible for drawing up the Protocols, attempted to suppress sections of the Protocol of the 24th March, the tone of which was strongly anti-Russian. (3) The differences between England and France were seen to come to a head after the

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- (1) F.O.78/3035 Wolff to Salisbury 85 22 February 1879
 E.M.Add.MSS.39024 Wolff to Layard 19 January 1879
- (2) F.O.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 124 21 March 1879
 Confidential
- (3) F.O.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 187 28 April 1879

(1)
 Constitution had been signed and the original work of the Commission completed. Its task was now to return to Philippopolis with Aleko Pasha and to act as his advisory Council during the first months of his governorship. The French view which the Government supported was that a real control should be exercised by the Commission. Wolff, on the one hand, was of opinion that the Commissioners were no longer necessary and that any further advice should be given by the consuls. (2)
 The extreme views maintained by the French Commissioner had the full support of Russia, and brought about a deadlock during which all corporate action on the part of the Commission was suspended. France and Russia acted in close concert but apart from ~~all~~ the other Powers. (3)

Since "the manifestation of intimacy between Russia and France", Wolff reported, the German Commissioner's consultations with him had become more and more frequent. In March Braunschweig had gone so far as to inform the English Commissioner that "he was terror-struck at the conduct of the Russian authorities both in financial matters and in the execution of the Treaty engagements, which Germany was

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- (1) F.O.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 27 April reports the signature on the previous day.
- (2) F.O.78/3038 Wolff to Salisbury 219 17 May 1879
 Most Confidential
- (3) F.O.78/3039 Wolff to Salisbury 251 1 June 1879
 253 3 June 1879

determined to carry out." While he could not undertake to support England, the Russian would equally not be supported by him. Germany thereby, would achieve the complete isolation of Russia. (1) During the deadlock which occurred as the result of the French attitude in May and June 1879, the German association with Austria began to be noticeable. (2) They co-operated for instance in investigating an alleged outrage against Jews at Carlowa. (3) On the main question in dispute, the competency of the Commission and the binding character of its "advice", the instructions of the German Commissioner were seen to be brought deliberately into line with those of the Austrian. (4) Finally on the 1st of August, Mitchell who since June had taken Wolff's place on the Commission, wrote: "a great change is noticeable in the attitude of the German Commissioner. He now openly supports the Austrian and has abandoned his old position of reserve." (5)

The Italian Commissioner had for some time been "very independent" but had kept as much as possible in the back-

(1) F.O.78/3036 Wolff to Salisbury 98 6 March 1879
Confidential

(2) F.O.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 8 June 1879
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(3) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Mitchell to Layard 12 July 1879

(4) F.O.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 26 June 1879

(5) F.O.78/3044 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 1 August 1879
131

Müller: op.cit. 6th, 8th, 9th, 13th August 1879

(1)
ground. A suspicion that he might play into the hands of Russia had however existed. It seemed to be proved well-founded when the question of the right to appoint the officials for the working of the Rumelian telegraph lines was put before the Commission by Aleko Pasha. At first Germany and Italy had joined Russia in the view that the right belonged to the Governor General. Germany, however, finally gave her vote against Russia and left Italy alone on the latter's side. France wavered but finally also joined the majority.⁽²⁾

III.

By comparison with the information derived from diplomatic negotiations, whether between the Cabinets or between the members of the European Commissions, information derived from reports specifically concerned with the subject of European relations is small in amount. Its chief value is in confirming the evidence already secured from the first source. For unless the information of this type given to the Foreign Office by an Ambassador concerns some incident in the development of the relationships of the country where he is stationed, or is based upon a spontaneous declaration

(1) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Mitchell to Layard 28 June 1879

(2) F.O.78/3043 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 30 June 1879
F.O.78/3044 Mitchell to Salisbury Telegram 28 July 1879

of its Foreign Minister, it is largely the result of his observing the tendencies revealed by diplomatic negotiation and interpreting them in the light of any special knowledge or experience he may possess. There were few such incidents during 1878-9 and few authoritative communications on the subject of alliances or relationships were received by the British Foreign Office. The few reports however which were received dealing specifically with the subject of relations were not unimportant.

During the autumn of 1878 they concerned almost exclusively the problem as to whether Bismarck would attempt to bring about a revival of the Dreikaiserbund, and the degree of success with which such an attempt might meet. At the end of July the newspapers were full of reports of a projected meeting between the three Emperors designed for this purpose. Elliot, however, assured the Foreign Office that although Francis Joseph intended to visit the Emperor William at Töplitz towards the middle of August, the Austrian Government had received no intimation of the intention of the Czar to be present. (1) The meeting shortly afterwards (2) took place without the Czar. The late autumn was, however,

(1)	F.O.7/933	Elliot to Salisbury	540	3 August 1878
(2)	F.O.7/933	Elliot to Salisbury	548	6 August 1878

an important turning point in Germany's alliance policy and it was inevitable that something of the crisis that existed in respect of Germany's European relations, should be reflected in the information which reached the British Foreign Office.

It was realised that an understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia on the Eastern Question would necessarily form the basis of a renewed Dreikaiserbund. Lord Tenterden, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, in a memorandum dealing with the subject, drawn up on the 29th of December, called attention to the possibility that Austria-Hungary and Russia might effect an arrangement whereby the former would receive Salonica and the latter Constantinople. (1) Elliot in writing to Layard a little earlier, spoke of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia as "the necessary groundwork of any new understanding between the three Emperors." (2)

For this reason, the information furnished by Elliot did not indicate that such an understanding was a development likely to take place in the near future. For he repeatedly urged upon the Government that Austria-Hungary did not aim at annexing Balkan territory. "The object of the Austro-Hungarian Government" he wrote on one occasion "will not be the annexation of extensive Slav territory but the exercise

(1) F.O.365/5 Tenterden Papers Memorandum 29 December 1878

(2) B.M.Add.MSS.39022 Elliot to Layard 27 October 1878

of a preponderating influence and authority over the small independent territories on their frontier." ⁽¹⁾ He pointed to the fall of Count Taaffe and the Ministerial crisis which occurred in the autumn of 1878, as a clear indication of what might be expected if a policy of acquiring Slav territory were adopted, and as the strongest discouragement to an Austrian Minister to do so.

Moreover, from Elliot's reports the Austrian ~~district~~ ^{distrust} of Russia appeared at the moment as an impediment to an understanding between the two countries. Andrassy, he reported, continually dwelt on his dissatisfaction with the Government of St. Petersburg, on the ministerial anarchy prevailing there, and the unreliability of Russian policy. ⁽²⁾ A few weeks later he reported his annoyance and embarrassment when the Czar interpreted a courteous refusal of permission for Russian officers to go to the headquarters of the Austrian army in Bosnia, as an implied consent. He despatched two officers with a view as he said of establishing "a line" between his army in Bulgaria and the Austrian in Bosnia and Herzegovina - "the very last thing," Elliot reported, ⁽³⁾ "Andrassy wishes to establish." The British Ambassador

(1) F.O.7/933	Elliot to Salisbury	545	6 August 1878
(2) F.O.7/933	Elliot to Salisbury	548	6 August 1878
(3) F.O.7/935	Elliot to Salisbury	697	1 October 1878

Secret

had in fact never seen Andrassy show "more distrust of
Russia and less inclination to follow her lead." (1)

Meanwhile, under Bismarck's auspices an effort seems actually to have been made to revive the alliance between the three Empires. In mid-October he asked Hatzfeldt to observe at Constantinople whether there were any tendencies apparent of an Austro-Russian rapprochement on oriental questions. (2)

By the 4th of November Giers was writing to Cubril to express his pleasure at "the initiative recently taken by Prince Bismarck in the way of reviving the confidential relations and co-operated action within the Dreikaiserbund." He now stated that Russia desired to follow up this initiative. He was convinced Austria and Russia would no longer collide in their respective development. They would gain far more through co-operated action, and the best guarantee for the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin was to be found in the unity of the three Emperors. Could not Prince ^{Henry of} Reuss, the German Ambassador in Vienna, be instructed to speak to Andrassy in this sense? (3) Bismarck, however, in the memorandum on Germany's relations with Russia which he drew up at this time for the Crown Prince who was acting as

(1) F.O.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 701 2 October 1878
Confidential

(2) Müller: op.cit. p.79.

(3) Müller: op.cit. p.86.

regent for his father, did not mention either the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund or the promotion of an Austro-Russian understanding on the Eastern Question. On the contrary, he wrote "Es würde ein Triumph unserer Staatskunst sein wenn es uns gelänge das orientalisch~~e~~ Geschwür offen zu halten."⁽¹⁾

Whether Bismarck's alleged initiative was seriously intended or not, ~~now~~ ^{it} appears to have been followed up - and not without his encouragement. Schuvaloff was summoned from London to consult with the Emperor at Livadia. Salisbury was immediately on tenter-hooks when it was known that he intended to go via Vienna. It was not until his return journey that he broke his journey and stopped in Vienna and Pesth. At Vienna, he saw Reuss and requested him to inform Bismarck that "the Czar had a lively desire for the restoration of the understanding between the three Emperors." Reuss who had already received his instructions from Bismarck urged upon Schuvaloff to seek a preliminary understanding with Austria, and he enumerated certain points connected with the Balkans which might serve as the bases of such an agreement.⁽²⁾ The same evening Schuvaloff saw Andrassy at Pesth. He informed him that he came on an official visit as the envoy of the Czar. He spoke of the determination of the latter to carry out the treaty, but impressed upon Andrassy that Russia could not

(1) Müller: op.cit. p.84.

(2) Müller: op.cit. p.88.

abandon the populations to their fate if troubles occurred on the evacuation of Russian troops. ⁽¹⁾ So much appears from Andrassy's description to Elliot of what had passed. We can unfortunately only suspect without being able to prove that what Andrassy reported Schuvaloff to have said was part of, or at least ^{was} preliminary to, a deliberate overture for an Austro-Russian understanding. If so, Andrassy's attitude could have left Schuvaloff no hope that he would respond. He immediately initiated serious discussions with England on the subject of securing the prompt evacuation of Russian troops. Nothing more was heard of any fresh attempt to revive the ^eDrikaiserbund or to establish an Austro-Russian Balkan agreement.

This incident was variously reflected in British information. The reports that came from Vienna showed clearly enough that Andrassy was not disposed to relinquish the policy of friendship ^{to} ~~of~~ England for one of alliance with Russia. "Andrassy" Elliot wrote, "would seem to have expressed himself to the Russian Ambassador with a frankness that left nothing to be desired.-- I believe therefore that we may have the satisfaction of feeling assured of the complete failure of the renewed attempt to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to adopt a different line of policy from that of Her Majesty's Government." ⁽²⁾

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- (1) F.O.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November 1878
 E. Wertheimer: Graf Andrassy Vol. III p. 158 Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/935 Elliot to Salisbury 814 16 November 1878
 Confidential

Information which Waddington communicated to Lyons tended to confirm the impression given by this report that a renewal of the Dreikaiserbund was an unlikely development. He had learnt from a very good source that Bismarck had expressed great dissatisfaction with the uncertain and undecided policy of the Russian Government. Salisbury appears to have been impressed by the importance of Waddington's information. He sent the despatch immediately to Russell (1) and invited his comments.

Russell's information was of a somewhat different character. He acknowledged the hostility of Prince Bismarck to Gorehakoff but pointed out that, in spite of that, the German Chancellor had so far always found it necessary to give his moral support to Russia's Eastern policy. He had further learnt the substance of the secret Memorandum furnished to the Crown Prince by Bismarck at the beginning of November. He reported accurately the section of the Memorandum, which referred to the freedom for Germany from fear of coalitions that would result from the Powers being occupied in the East, but he gave a much developed version of the rest of the document, which referred to the necessity of maintaining good relations with Russia. "Bismarck," he wrote, "had stated his conviction that the safety of Germany with her defenceless frontiers and the peace of Europe on which

(1) F.O.27/2316 Lyons to Salisbury 924 19 November 1878
Most Confidential

her safety rests, depend principally on the maintenance of
the Dreikaiserbund."⁽¹⁾

The combined effect of these reports was then to leave the matter something of an open question, but to bias opinion in favour of the view that the combination would not at present be revived. Subsequent reports which indicated Russo-German estrangement and the tightening of Austria's hold on Servia, confirming thereby the view of her Balkan policy put forward by Elliot at the beginning of August, served to strengthen this bias.

Reports dealing with Germany's internal affairs served to prepare the way for the reports concerning her separation from Russia. They gave the detail of the new German tariff imposed in 1879 and showed that it struck a strong blow at Russia's trade with Germany, and they gave an account of the stringent quarantine regulations introduced on the Russian frontier by the latter.⁽²⁾

No reports were received which indicated the gradual development of the Russo-German estrangement, but in April ^{it became clear} ~~they showed~~ that from Bismarck's language and from the tone of the Press, ⁽³⁾ a minor war scare directed against Russia was developing. The Chancellor had expressed his apprehensions

- (1) F.O.64/910 Russell to Salisbury 643 9 November 1878
Secret
- (2) F.O.64/933 Russell to Salisbury 240 9 May 1879
Recapitulates information already given on these subjects.
- (3) F.O.71/961 Elliot to Salisbury 6 May 1879

to a friend of Russell who repeated his views to the British Ambassador. In Russia the war party was exercising greater influence over the Czar than his Chancellor and the peace party. They were preparing for war with Austria-Hungary. Nothing could be concluded from Russia's present Balkan policy; For she was playing a waiting game, ~~but~~ ^{it} only ^{in order} ~~to~~ take a longer leap in the future. Her opportunity would come when she had detached England from Austria-Hungary. The evidence that was significant was the organization in Russia of twenty-four new battalions and the ordering of military stores. ⁽¹⁾ Ten days later, Bismarck's apprehensions had considerably increased. He regarded the addition of 250,000 men ^{to her} ^{the Russian} army as confirmation of his worst suspicions. ⁽²⁾ Soon afterwards Münster the German Ambassador in London, spoke to Salisbury of Bismarck's extreme dissatisfaction with ⁽³⁾ Russia.

The effect of this body of information was somewhat diminished when a report arrived from Russell on the 12th of ⁽⁴⁾ May. He stated that it had come to his certain knowledge that Bismarck had secretly instructed Hatzfeldt to use his

(1) F.O.64/932	Russell to Salisbury	210	16 April 1879
		Secret	
(2) F.O.64/932	Russell to Salisbury	222	26 April 1879
		Secret	
(3) F.O.64/930	Salisbury to Russell	44	1 May 1879
(4) F.O.64/933	Russell to Salisbury	240	9 May 1879

best efforts at Constantinople to bring about a better understanding between Russia and the Porte, and to support his Russian colleague. Further, during another visit of Schuvaloff to Vienna from the 23rd of April to the 1st of May, Reuss had been instructed to direct his efforts to bringing about better relations between Austria and Russia.

It is doubtful, however, whether this information had any more important effect than to remind the Foreign Office that such a turn in events, as a revival of the triple friendship was still possible. For the course of diplomatic negotiations still pointed to the isolation of Russia and the weakening of her friendship with Germany.

Evidence of the energy with which Austria-Hungary was pursuing a policy of economic and political penetration in the Balkans was furnished very soon after the Congress. The foundations for this policy were laid during the discussions in Vienna at the end of February 1878, when Austria-Hungary first insisted on the ^{incorporation} ~~interpretation~~ of the Sanjak of ^{Novi} Meri Bazar in Bosnia. When this was secured by the Berlin Treaty, it was seen that she had reserved to herself as long as the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued, the control as far as Mitrovica of the line of railway that eventually was to connect Constantinople with Europe by Vienna. ⁽²⁾ Mitrovica was already important because a line

(1) F.O.7/961 Elliot to Salisbury Telegrams 22 April 1879
and 29
F.O.65/1043 Dufferin to Salisbury
Telegram 48 20 April 1879

(2) Wertheimer: op. cit. Vol. III p. 276.

connected it with Salonika on the Aegean. (1) Hitherto only important for trade with Powers - mainly England - who approached the Peninsula by sea, the line now offered opportunities for the development of Austrian trade and influence towards the Aegean. Serbia, her connection with the Ottoman Empire broken, separated from Bulgaria by racial antagonism and from Montenegro by the Austrian control of the Sanjak, deprived since 1876 of Russian friendship, her railway connections with Mitrovica, Salonika and Constantinople not yet constructed, was seen to be politically and commercially dependent upon Austria-Hungary.

Information soon reached the Foreign Office which showed clearly the determination of Austria-Hungary to exploit the situation which she had created. Crowe, British Consul-General at Düsseldorf, reported on the 18th of July that Austria-Hungary was negotiating to secure political and commercial advantages from the position she had acquired in the ^{Balkan} Turkish states. Loans, it appeared, were being floated in Berlin for the construction of railways to link Mitrovica with the lines running to the South Austrian border, and the Austrian Government had already given orders for the further extension of the Mitrovica-Salonika line into Bosnia. Finally it was positively affirmed that "before leaving Berlin Andrassy had signed a convention with Serbia for the extension of railways and the furtherance of commerce, by which the

(1) Langer: European Alliances and Alignments p.325.

whole net of lines intended to unite Mitrovica with the Servian towns of Misch and Bagiasch would become the monopoly of Austrian companies." ⁽¹⁾ Considerable importance was attached to this report by the British Foreign Office. It was seen by the Queen, and Beaconsfield, circulated in the Cabinet, and sent off immediately to Vienna, Belgrade and Constantinople instead of being sent in the usual course as part of a Confidential Print .

In July Britain was temporarily represented at Belgrade by Mr. Jerningham who was normally a secretary in the Embassy at Vienna. He was thus probably better qualified to judge accurately of Austria's policy in Serbia than a representative who was permanently stationed at Belgrade. On July 27th he telegraphed that a separate railway convention with Austria had been approved by the Skuptschina. ⁽²⁾ On the 5th of the following month he was able to forward a complete and accurate text of the Convention, which had been communicated to him confidentially. It appeared that Crowe's information had not been quite correct or complete. The Convention as the Foreign Office was now informed, provided for the connection of the Austrian and Servian railway systems within three years, stipulated for the conclusion of a Treaty to

(1) F.O. 64/917 Crowe to Salisbury 24 18 July 1878
 Confidential

(2) F.O. 105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury Telegram 27 July 1878

facilitate trade between the two countries, and the consideration of an eventual customs union. It placed Serbia to some extent under an obligation to Austria by the latter's promise not to demand from her any financial assistance in the work for the regulation of the cataracts at the Iron Gate, and it envisaged the "uninterrupted development of intimate and lasting relations between the two countries."⁽¹⁾ This despatch was again circulated to the Cabinet. A further report drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the significance of the conclusion of the Convention. Its provisions, Jerningham wrote, would place in the hands of Austria "the greatest source of Wealth, of development and of strategical strength in Serbia." If a commercial treaty were eventually concluded, Serbia already the market for all unsaleable Austrian goods, would be placed entirely at the mercy of its powerful neighbour.⁽²⁾

Very few reports dealt with the relations of France and Germany during 1878-9. Russell reported on the 12th of August 1878, that for the first time since the termination of the Franco-German war, officers of each country had been selected to attend to military manoeuvres of the other.⁽³⁾

(1) F.O.105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury 120 5 August
Confidential

B. Singer: Die Verträge mit Serbien. pp 30-31

(2) F.O.105/2 Jerningham to Salisbury 111 30 July 1878

(3) F.O.64/907 Russell to Salisbury 12 August 1878

In January he reported that the French Ambassador had been invited to visit Bismarck at Friedrichsruhe where he had consulted him on the Tunis question. (1) These reports, however, although they concerned what might be interpreted as manifestations of the improved relations between the two countries, did not specifically concern the question of their relations. In regard to Italy's desire for a rapprochement with England at the end of 1878 and beginning of 1879, there were three important reports from the British representative in Rome, directed specifically to draw^{ing} the attention of the Foreign Office to this development. (2) As for the drawing together of Russia and France two important reports came from Plunkett, the British chargé d'affaires. He wrote on the 29th of May that he had been told by one of the French Representatives that ^{Jomini} Janini who was temporarily in charge of the Russian Foreign Office had "let out to him in conversation that Russia built considerable hopes for the future on the growing coolness between Great Britain and France." The Russian Government were encouraging and flattering the French at Constantinople and Chanzy the French Ambassador at St.

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| (1) F.O.64/931 | Russell to Salisbury | 3 | 2 January 1879 |
| | | 57 | 31 January |
| | | Secret | |
| (2) F.O.45/340 | Macdonnell to Salisbury | 416 | 16 September 1878 |
| | | Confidential | |
| F.O.45/377 | Paget to Salisbury | 44 | 8 February 1879 |
| | | Confidential | |
| F.O.45/379 | Paget to Salisbury | 177 | 25 April 1879 |
| | | Confidential | |

Petersburg was condoling with Russia on the blow to her prestige inflicted by British activity in Central Asia. (1)

A few days later he reported that he had been told of Russian advances to France, and of Russia's disappointment at Waddington's coolness in meeting them. (2)

Otherwise, on these points only, the trend of diplomatic negotiations afforded any information.

An incident occurred, however, in the development of Austro-German relations which afforded valuable subject matter for reports on the development of an exclusive Austro-German friendship. On the 4th February a Convention between Austria-Hungary and Germany abrogating the fifth article of the Treaty of Prague, was published. (3)

In actual fact the conclusion of the Convention was quite independent of Austro-German relations as they existed in the Spring of 1879. For it had been negotiated secretly in the Spring of the previous year and was signed on the 13th of April 1878. Nor had its publication at this date any direct connection with the development of Austro-German relations. Already, in the summer of 1878 Bismarck, desiring to quiet the agitation in Denmark, had expressed a wish that

(1) F.O.65/1044	Plunkett to Salisbury	222	29 May 1879
(2) F.O.65/1044	Plunkett to Salisbury	232 Secret	2 June 1879
(3) F.O.64/931	Russell to Salisbury	62	4 February 1879

the agreement should be made public. Andrassy agreed on condition that it should be post dated to the 11th of October 1879, and a further interval of three months be allowed to pass before it was formally ratified and published.⁽¹⁾

Neither Andrassy nor Bismarck, however, did anything to discourage the interpretation placed upon the incident by foreign diplomats. It was regarded as evidence of the tightening up of Austro-German relations, and of ~~an~~ ^{the} anti-Russian trend that was beginning to characterise them.

This Article of the Treaty of Prague provided that the Northern districts of Schleswig should be given up to Denmark if on a plebiscite being taken, the wishes of the population were shown to be in that sense. Its abrogation then, which would settle the Northern frontier of Germany ~~and~~ at the expense of Denmark, was obviously only of value to Germany. Russell in fact referred to it as "this important concession to Germany." Diplomatic speculation immediately centred on the question as to why such a concession had been made. Andrassy's explanations on that point obviously concealed his real motive.⁽²⁾ Elliot was inclined to attribute it to Bismarck's personal influence at ^{Vienna} ~~Berlin~~,⁽³⁾ and information

(1) Friis: Die Aufhebung des Artikels v des Prager Friedens (Historische Zeitschrift, CXXV, pp.45-62).

(2) F.O.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 63 4 February 1879

(3) F.O.7/959 Elliot to Salisbury 74 6 February 1879

received from Russell that the secret negotiations had begun during the Congress of Berlin confirmed this view. (1)

Meanwhile the newspapers (2) had begun to hail the incident as a demonstration of Austro-German friendship. A typical article was forwarded by Loftus from the St. Petersburg Golos at the end of February. "Le triple alliance", it stated, "a fait place à l'alliance des deux empereurs d'Allemagne et de l'Autriche-Hongrie. --- elle ne s'inspirera pas de sentiments bien cordiaux à l'égard de la Russie. L'arrangement qui a trait à l'article du traité de Prague est venu affirmer aux yeux de tous l'alliance secrète en question." (3)

A second conversation with Andrassy had already led Elliot to ^{hold} somewhat similar views. For the Austrian Minister spoke of the fear of Germany that on the death of Alexander II his successor might use Danish claims to create difficulties for Austria and Germany. (4)

After August 1879 the whole character of British information changes. Consequent upon the meeting of the Rumanian Constituent Assembly, the assembly of a Greco-Turkish

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| (1) | F.O.64/931. | Russell to Salisbury | 62 | 4 February 1879 |
| (2) | F.O.64/931 | Russell to Salisbury | | 13 February 1879 |
| (3) | F.O.65/1042 | Loftus to Salisbury | 137 | 26 February 1879 |
| (4) | F.O.7/959 | Elliot to Salisbury | | 10 February 1879 |
| | cf. D.D.F. Ser. I. Vol.II Nos. 378, 383. | | | |

Commission at Constantinople, the predominance of the financial and technical questions in the Egyptian negotiations, and the adjournment or dissolution of the different European Commissions for the execution of the Treaty of Berlin, there was a lull in general diplomatic negotiations. It furnished the opportunity for the different trends in European relations to come to a head. At the same time the activity generated by the intense negotiation of 1878-9 was diverted to the business of forming or consolidating friendships. The result was that a series of incidents occurred in the development of European relations; ^{and} Reports specifically concerning ^{such} ~~the~~ questions became the predominant source of British information on European relations.

In treating these reports, it is proposed to make those concerning the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance our main concern, and to deal with reports on other incidents only in so far as they determined the British interpretation of the information they received on that subject.

CHAPTER II.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

OCTOBER 7TH 1879.

The fact that the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance crystallised a particular development in European relationships justifies us in treating it as the focal point for the whole of British information on European relations in the late summer and early autumn of 1879. Relations during the last year had been of a somewhat fluid character. As long as this was so, the state of British information respecting the relations between any two Powers, might affect some single diplomatic decision, but would not affect the whole character of British policy respecting questions in which they were concerned. The relations themselves might weaken or be dissolved. Action taken by the British Foreign Office, or some temporary turn given to British policy might check an unwelcome development, as soon as it was observed. For the period, however, during which it endured, the Austro-German Alliance introduced a factor of permanent importance in European diplomacy, which no action taken by the British Foreign Office could alter. The nature of British information in regard to it, therefore was a matter of real importance for future policy.

The individual decisions which make up policy cannot wait for full information to be secured, and the continual succession of diplomatic problems makes a deliberate revision of judgment unlikely. At some date then the views of the British Foreign Office in regard to such an event as the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance cease to develop further. At this point it may be acknowledged that the exact significance to be attributed to it is an open question that must be determined by subsequent events. In that case, a restraint will be imposed on British diplomacy and the doubts of the Foreign Office reflected in an indecisive policy in regard to questions in which the Powers concerned are interested. On the other hand, the information received by the Foreign Office may be accepted as an accurate and complete account of the development under consideration. In that case, it will henceforward determine British policy on those questions until some fresh incident throws a completely new light on the subject. Policy will be decided and definite, but its success conditional on the accuracy of the information.

British information on the Austro-German Alliance, except in ^{two} ~~one~~ respect, was of the latter type. Reports received by the Foreign Office on the incidents which took place in the autumn of 1879, information derived from the declarations of the Powers party to the Alliance, and

reports of statements in the continental Press, were sufficient to lead to a feeling of confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the information received. For they were supplemented by information that was authoritative and yet not open to the suspicion that it represented what Austria-Hungary and Germany desired the British Foreign Office to know, and their substance was in conformity with the information received during the last year respecting the tendencies to association that prevailed among the Powers. The date of the official Austrian communication of the Alliance - the 27th of October - seems to mark the point at which information reached its fullest limit, and British views on the subject of the Alliance ceased to develop. ⁽¹⁾

The assembling of information began at the end of September.

The announcement on the 1st of August that a meeting between the Austrian and German Emperors was to take place at Gastein aroused no particular interest. ⁽²⁾ It was known that a similar meeting had taken place at Töplitz in the previous summer without political consequences. ⁽³⁾ The relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany with other Powers

(1) i.e. during the period covered by this thesis. The text of the Austro-German Alliance was communicated privately to Salisbury in 1887. Cecil, op.cit., IV, p.72.

(2) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 478 1 August 1879

(3) See page 51.

were not so strained, and their own, though improved, not so close that a special political motive should be considered to be behind the meeting. After it had taken place, Elliot saw no cause to change his views. "The meeting," he wrote, "appeared to have very little of a political character --- It would not appear that there passed anything connected with the future policy to be followed." If politics were touched upon, it was only to enable Francis Joseph to assure the Kaiser that the resignation of Count Andrassy would not make any change in his relations with Germany. ⁽¹⁾ A little later, British information indicated that this prospect of a change in the direction of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, which was announced in the Press on the 12th and confirmed by Elliot on the 16th, ⁽²⁾ was the sole cause of the meeting which ensued between Andrassy and Bismarck on the 26th. ⁽³⁾ The German Chancellor, Elliot reported, had insisted on seeing Andrassy while he was still at the head of the Austro-Hungarian Government. It appeared, therefore, that he desired to influence "the advice the Austrian Minister might give to the Emperor in reference to the choice of

(1) F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	520	15 August 1879
(2) F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	Telegram	12 August 1879
		521	15 August 1879
	F.O.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury		16 August 1879
(3) F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	536	26 August 1879

successor."⁽¹⁾ A conversation with Andrassy concerning what had passed at Gastein did not cause the Ambassador to attribute any more important motive to the meeting.⁽²⁾ The announcement directly after it had taken place, of Haymerle's nomination, which Andrassy told Elliot had "pleased" Bismarck, seemed to justify the Ambassador's estimate of its significance.⁽³⁾ The number of reports as to the cause of Andrassy's resignation and its possible results which reached the Foreign Office from French and German, as well as Austro-Hungarian sources,⁽⁴⁾ as against a single report from Elliot on the Gastein meeting, show clearly which event was considered the more significant. Yet the value of these former reports was purely negative. They showed that the resignation was not due to any political cause, that Andrassy retained the confidence of the Emperor, and that no change in Austrian foreign policy need therefore be anticipated.⁽⁴⁾ Elliot in

(1)	F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	536	26 August 1879
(2)	F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	548	30 August 1879
			Confidential	
(3)	F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	547	30 August 1879
(4)	F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	521	15 August 1879
	F.O.64/934	Walsham to Salisbury		16 August 1879
	F.O.7/964	Elliot to Salisbury	531	23 August 1879
			Confidential	
	F.O.7/957	Salisbury to Egerton	606	23 September
			Secret	

This despatch concerns a conversation on the 19th with Waddington at Dieppe on the subject.

his weekly letters to Layard at Constantinople did not even mention the Gastein meeting. In fact having waited until the uncertainty as to Andrassy's successor had cleared, he left Vienna on the 6th September for London, confident that no important political development was likely to occur before his return. ⁽¹⁾ Again, when Egerton and Walsham, who were respectively in charge at Vienna and Berlin, reported Bismarck's intention to return Andrassy's visit at Vienna, they attached no special significance to the prospect. ⁽²⁾ Egerton was chiefly concerned with Haymerle's assumption of office, and only mentioned Bismarck's intended visit as offering the new Minister an opportunity "to become fully acquainted with the Chancellor's views." The political significance of this meeting, however, was appreciated, although not until it had taken place.

Prince Bismarck was in Vienna from the 22nd-24th of September. On the evening of the 24th a telegram reached the Foreign Office from Egerton. He regretted that he could give no information as to the understanding between Austria-Hungary and Germany. ⁽³⁾ It was taken for granted then, from

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- (1) B.M. Add. MSS.39027 Elliot to Layard 1 September 1879
 F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 6 September 1879
- (2) F.O.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 17 September 1879
 F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 447 12 September 1879
- (3) F.O.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury Telegram 24 September 1879

the start, that the meeting in Vienna had resulted in some sort of agreement. On the evening of the 27th a further report came from the same representative. ⁽¹⁾ Egerton wrote with the personal conviction that whatever had taken place at Vienna, no new phase in the relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany need be expected. He reported, however, facts in connection with the visit and theories current in Vienna as to its results which indicated that a greater significance than this was to be attached to the "arrangements" or to the "Vienna agreement" to which the report referred.

The German Chancellor, he wrote, had taken part in long sittings at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In addition he had had an hour's conversation with the Emperor and a conversation with Tizsa, the Hungarian Prime Minister. As a result, it was believed in Vienna that Bismarck had "pledged the sword of Germany to Austria in the event of certain somewhat unlikely contingencies." Egerton himself thought it possible "that a modified and strictly defined support had been promised" by Bismarck in return for an assurance

(1) F.O.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 603 25 September 1879

The report was probably not seen by Beaconsfield who was at Hughenden until the 29th, (the 28th was a Sunday), and was not seen until the following day by Salisbury who was at Puy from 15th August until the first week in October.
Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II p.1348. Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.366.

"that Austria would not swell the ranks of Germany's enemies." In view of this last statement it is unlikely that much attention was paid in the Foreign Office to his personal conviction.

The rest of the despatch which concerns the visits paid by Bismarck to the French and Turkish Ambassadors may, for the present, be neglected. For it gave only the official Austrian and German explanation of the journey to Vienna - already well worn - that it was simply the result of Count Andrassy's impending resignation, and of the German desire to ensure that his policy would be maintained by his successor.

Two days after the arrival of Egerton's report, further information came from Walsham at Berlin. ⁽¹⁾ His two despatches were seen by Beaconsfield and Salisbury at about the same time as the Vienna report. They were mainly concerned with the official explanation of the visit, in regard to which they showed some scepticism. They tended consequently to draw attention to the theories which Egerton had considered ill-founded.

This tendency was strengthened when a telegram arrived on the 1st of October from Crowe, British Consul-General at Düsseldorf. It read:- "German Emperor refuses to

(1) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 468
469 26 September 1879
Confidential

ratify the Vienna Treaty, says he will rather abdicate. In last Cabinet Council it was determined to send Stolberg to Baden to tell the Emperor that the Ministry stands or falls on the question. It is thought the Emperor will yield." (1)

The outcome of this conflict in Germany between the Emperor and his Ministers remained to be seen. Until it was known, the Foreign Office could of course form no definite conclusions. It must, however, have been clear that whether the alleged Treaty was ultimately signed or rejected by the Emperor, Austro-German relations could not afterwards be the same as during the last months. The interest of the Foreign Office in securing information on the results of the Vienna meeting was consequently considerably quickened.

The following week, however, was one of suspended judgment. Both the Press and the British representatives maintained a strict silence in regard to the subject. The only possible material for the development of British views was afforded by a series of reports which primarily concerned Russo-German relations. Before dealing with these, however, it seems a suitable opportunity to review the information indicating the probable character of the ^{understanding} ~~understand~~ if the Treaty were signed, received by the Foreign Office from other sources.

(1) F.O.64/944 Crowe to Salisbury Consular 1 October 1879
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On one point, British information was clear: that the understanding in whatever it eventually consisted would not be directed against England. Reports concerned with the diplomatic negotiations of 1878-9 had given evidence of the close association of Austria-Hungary and England. When Germany was seen to be cultivating her relations with Austria-Hungary, these reports had given no evidence of a weakening of Anglo-Austrian co-operation. The closing of negotiations on minor Balkan questions, and the increasing concern of diplomacy with the Rumanian, Greek, and Egyptian questions meant that less opportunity was afforded for the demonstration of Anglo-Austrian friendship, but did not necessarily imply that it had weakened.

On the contrary, reports dealing specifically with Anglo-Austrian relations indicated that this friendship was so far from weakening that the tightening of Austrian relations with Germany would involve an Anglo-German rapprochement. The source of this information was in the first place the statements of Count Andrassy. The British Ambassador had reported on the 30th of August that the Austrian Minister had assured him that "the maintenance of the most confidential relations" with the British as well as with the German Cabinet would be the guiding principle of Haymerle's policy as it had been of his own. Further, at Gastein Bismarck had professed "a wish to cultivate the closest understanding

with Austria and England," and Andrassy had no reason to doubt the sincerity of his professions. ⁽¹⁾ On the 4th of September when Elliot formally took leave of Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Minister again dwelt on the "satisfaction it gave him that there was no prospect of anything occurring to disturb the perfect understanding between England and Austria-Hungary." ⁽²⁾

In the second place information was derived from the British interpretation of an important incident in Anglo-German relations. A private letter ^{from} of Beaconsfield to Salisbury reported the incident to him.

On the 26th of September, that is before Egerton's report on the Vienna interview had been received, Count Münster, German Ambassador in London, came down to Hughenden on the instructions of Bismarck, ~~and~~ with a proposal of the "gravest character." According to Beaconsfield's report to Salisbury of the gist of their conversations, Münster stated: "Peace is necessary to Germany, no country desires or requires peace more. To secure it she proposes an alliance between Germany, Austria and Great Britain." ⁽³⁾ Beaconsfield was convinced

(1) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
Confidential

(2) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879

(3) Buckle: op.cit. pp.1358-1361.

According to Münster's version of the conversation Beaconsfield had taken the initiative, described the necessity to England of allies, and expressed his readiness to enter into an alliance with Germany.

Die G[rosse] P[olitik] Vol.IV No.712 (Münster to Bismarck 27 September 1879).

that such was the essence of Münster's proposal. On the 1st he wrote again to Salisbury pointing out the advantages of an alliance between the three powers in question and putting forward the suggestion of "some treaty between the three allies."⁽¹⁾ In these circumstances, it is hardly likely that an anti-English character was attributed to the Treaty that Crowe had reported to be under negotiation between Austria-Hungary and Germany.

British information also showed that it was equally unlikely that it would be directed against France. The close association between France and Germany revealed by the course of diplomatic negotiations during 1878-9, was still fresh in the memory of the Foreign Office. A recent report from Walsham showed that as soon as opportunity occurred it would again be in evidence. He had asked Radowitz on the 13th of September whether he had heard anything from Constantinople recently on the subject of the Greek question, and whether Germany was still in favour of Janina being ceded to Greece. Radowitz had replied that Germany would unquestionably consider herself bound to follow whatever course was taken by France.⁽²⁾

(1) Buckle: op.cit.^{Vol. II} pp.1361-1362.

(2) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 449 13 September
Confidential 1879

The Foreign Office had also received reports specifically dealing with the subject of Franco-German relations which equally precluded the possibility of an Austro-German agreement directed against France. Information as in the case of the effect of the arrangement on relations with Great Britain was derived from statements of the Foreign Minister concerned.

On the 19th of September Waddington paid a visit to Salisbury at Dieppe. It appeared that he had given such assurances to Bismarck as to remove every justification for an anti-French move in German policy. "He came on his own proposition," wrote Salisbury to Beaconsfield, apparently to convince me that if Russia and Italy were making plans to attack Germany and Austria, France would take no part in such ideas." He had assured Bismarck in the most positive terms of his neutrality. (1)

This information was confirmed by Beaconsfield's report of Münster's language. He had spoken of the cordiality of Franco-German relations and stated that Prince Bismarck had reason to believe that neither the present French Ministry nor Gambetta and his friends, would ^{open} ~~commence~~ a war of aggression against Germany. (2)

(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II. p.364.

F.O.27/2359 Salisbury to Adams 1169 24 September 1879
Secret

(2) Buckle: op.cit. ^{Vol. II} p.1360.
These assurances are not mentioned in Münster's report of the conversation to Bismarck. He stated, however, that Beaconsfield had said that it was self-evident that Germany would not proceed aggressively against France. G.P. Vol.IV No.712.

At about the same time as Egerton's despatch on the Vienna meeting was seen by Beaconsfield and Salisbury, an important despatch arrived concerning Franco-German relations from the British chargé d'affaires at Paris. Adams's information was again derived from a communication from Waddington. His report, in the first place, informed the Foreign Office that when Bismarck had visited the French Ambassador in Vienna, as reported by Egerton, he had given him formal assurances that "any arrangement which might have been made with the Austrian Government did not touch France in the least." In the second place the despatch disclosed the existence of an informal arrangement between France and Germany that had been concluded at Berlin and was still valid. The existence of this arrangement precluded any possibility of an Austro-German understanding directed against France. "The agreement which we came to at Berlin" said Waddington, "was that we should do all in our power to make the relations between our countries those of good neighbours; that while I on my side would discourage any idea of a war of retaliation with reference to Alsace Lorraine, and would never stir up that question, the Prince on his side would not attempt to create any trouble for France in other questions." Bismarck, he concluded, had assured T^lesserence de Bort at Vienna that he would remain true to his word. (1)

A little later Adams reported what he considered to be a distinct proof of the complete understanding between France and Germany. It was the fact that a speech made by M. Lepère, a member of the French Cabinet, ~~was~~ obviously directed against Germany, should have passed completely unnoticed by the latter Power. (1)

British information, indeed, pointed without question to the projected understanding being directed against Russia.

One source of information in this connection was again the statements of the Foreign Minister concerned. Andrassy on the 30th of August stated to Elliot that the purpose of the close understanding with England which it was Bismarck's desire to establish, was to "withstand the aims of Russia," and he described the ingenious designs of Russia which it would be the task of the three Powers to defeat. The Gastein meeting, it appeared, had left him confident that Austria-Hungary and England could rely on Germany's support in that task. (2)

Andrassy's language to Elliot on the 4th of September showed that relations between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia were of such a character as to make an understanding between the two former directed against the latter, seem a reasonable development. He had spoken of "the excessive

(1) F.O.27/2373 Adams to Salisbury 996 3 October 1879
Secret

(2) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
Confidential

bitterness against Austria at present exhibited by the Russian Government," and informed the Ambassador that German relations with Russia were being undermined by unjustified Russian complaints "that the German Cabinet had uniformly joined Austria at Berlin in threatening Russia."⁽¹⁾

Beaconsfield's report of his conversations with Münster confirmed Andrassy's statements. The German Ambassador had spoken of "Russia's complaints that Germany had thrown her over," described Panslavism as "entirely paramount" in Russia, and stated that she was preparing to attack Austria. The purpose of the triple alliance between Austria, Germany and Britain would be to guard against this attack.⁽²⁾ The alliance envisaged by Beaconsfield in his letter to Salisbury of the 1st was therefore an alliance that by its anti-Russian character would place the whole previous policy of the Government in perspective.⁽³⁾ When once such an interpretation had been placed upon Münster's overture, it is

(1) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879

(2) Buckle: op.cit.^{Vol. II} pp.1359-60 cf. G.P. Vol.IV No.712 Münster attributes to Beaconsfield the ~~statements~~ as statements to Russia being in the hands of the Panslavists. In his report the basis of the proposed Alliance appears not so much assistance against Russia ~~but~~ as rather against a Franco-Russian combination.

(3) Buckle: op.cit.^{Vol. II} pp.1361-62.

reasonable to suppose that it was concluded that even if the understanding was being negotiated on ^adual instead of a triple basis, it was designed for the same purpose.

The greater part of the information in this connection, however, was derived from the British interpretation of a number of incidents in connection with Russia's European relations. Reports dealing with the generation in Germany of an alarm against Russia's military preparations have already been mentioned. ⁽¹⁾ They were matched by reports from St. Petersburg of a violent press campaign directed against Germany. ⁽²⁾ Then there was the appointment of Haymerle. This was interpreted in England as an anti-Russian move. Egerton reported the unconcealed dissatisfaction of the Russians at his nomination. ⁽³⁾ Plunkett reported that Jomini, who was then in charge of the Russian Foreign Office, was "very little pleased" with the appointment. "Most of the annoyances" he had stated "to which Russia had been exposed in the various delimitation Commissions, have arisen from expressions insidiously inserted into the Protocols and Treaty by Baron Haymerle." ⁽⁴⁾ "This", wrote Beaconsfield

(1) See page 58.

(2) F.O.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 415 30 August

(3) F.O.7/964 Egerton to Salisbury 547 30 August 1879

(4) F.O.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 434 9 September
Very Confidential

to Lady Bradford "is an anti-Russian appointment."⁽¹⁾

There were in the next place Russian attempts to secure the alliance of France and Italy. British information indicated that these attempts were on the whole, unsuccessful. The fact, however, that they were made strengthened the impression that the projected Austro-German understanding would be directed against Russia, in so far as they suggested a justification for such an agreement. Apart from the statements of Jomini to Plunkett in the early summer, the matter of a Franco-Russian understanding had so far only been mooted in the Press. Without asserting that soundings had actually been made in Paris, the newspapers gave the impression that the conclusion of^a Franco-Russian understanding in the near future might be expected. Thus the Soleil of Paris on the 9th of September published an interview with Prince Gortschakoff, in which the latter proclaimed his sympathies for France and expressed a desire for her "relèvement."⁽²⁾ At Dieppe Waddington denied emphatically the "rumours set about by Russia" that France was likely to join an alliance with her.⁽³⁾ The first information that an actual overture had been made

(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II p.1349.

(2) D.D.F. Ser.I. Vol.II No.473 footnote.
F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 463 24 September 1879

(3) F.O.27/2359 Vol.II Salisbury to Adams 1169 24 September 1879
Cecil: op.cit. p.364. Secret

was derived from a German source. On the 7th October Macdonnell, the British chargé d'affaires in Rome reported that ^{von} ~~L.~~ Kendell the German Ambassador who had recently returned from Berlin "had informed him in strict confidence that his Government had ascertained that immediately after Prince Bismarck's visit to Vienna an overture was made by the Russian Government in Paris, but declined by the French Government."⁽¹⁾ Some measure of confirmation was obtained from Plunkett at St. Petersburg. He referred to the advances of Russia made to France in a despatch on October 8th, and mentioned "language held incautiously in certain quarters to some of my colleagues" which showed that they had been rejected. He also forwarded an article from the Golos which he considered a confirmation of the rest of his report.⁽²⁾

Russian advances^s to Italy seemed to have been of a more serious character. British information at the end of August seemed to indicate that the rapprochement between the Russian and Italian members of the European Commissions had not been the accidental result of similarity of views, but the result of a deliberate policy, if not of an understanding, on the part of the two Governments. Early in August Maffei

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- (1) F.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury 465 7 October 1879
 Secret
 Recording telegram
- (2) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 508 8 October 1879

had complained to the British chargé d'affaires of the "persecution." he suffered at the hands of the Russian chargé d'affaires in Rome, M. Schevitch "who was continually coming to urge the Italian Government, in very persistent terms to support the views of the Russian Government" in regard to the points that were still to be settled on the European Commissions. Maffei denied that Italy had responded but when Paget faced him with the Italian vote on the Telegraph question in Eastern Rumelia, he could only give an evasive reply. (1)

A report from St. Petersburg indeed seemed to offer indisputable evidence that the efforts of Schevitch had met with success. Plunkett described the Czar's language in his recent conversation with the German Emperor at Alexandrova. It seemed that he had referred to the support which the Italian Commissioners gave to their Russian colleagues, as if it were the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the Italian Government which he could rely upon to be maintained. (2)

A week after this report had been received Macdonnell furnished further evidence of the existence of an Italo-Russian rapprochement. He described the "marked exchange of civilities" that had recently taken

(1) F.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury 360 20 August 1879
Confidential

(2) F.O.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 440 10 September 1879
Confidential

place between Italy and Russia, the decoration conferred on the Russian General and his staff at the late manoeuvres, the flattering and friendly speeches exchanged on that occasion, and the valuable portrait presented by the King to the Russian generals. In spite of Maffei's repeated denials to the contrary he believed that an "uncompromising entente" was taking shape between the two Powers. (1)

Finally British information indicated that the alleged refusal of the German Emperor to sign the Vienna Treaty might be interpreted as further evidence of the anti-Russian character of the projected understanding. For it seemed to be a development of the division of opinion between Emperor and Chancellor that had first been publicly manifested when the Kaiser visited the Czar at Alexandrovka and his Chancellor returned Andrassy's visit to Gastein by journeying to Vienna. The statements of the latter to Elliot had indeed already given grounds for ^{the} suspicions that this division of opinion created. Bismarck, he had told Elliot, was having difficulties with the Emperor on account of his sensitiveness respecting German relations with Russia. (2) British reports indicated that the Kaiser's visit was the result of his

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- (1) F.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury 389 26 September 1879
 F.O.45/382 Paget to Salisbury Most Confidential 397 28 September 1879
 Confidential
- (2) F.O. 7/904 Elliot to Salisbury 548 30 August 1879
 Confidential

personal initiative. Walsham made it clear that Manteuffel's mission to Warsaw on the 29th of August which preceded it, had been undertaken as the result of the Emperor's orders alone. ⁽¹⁾ Plunkett referred to an article in the Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung as indicating that the mission was not approved by Bismarck. ⁽²⁾ On the authority of the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Plunkett reported that Manteuffel alone had been responsible for arranging the interview, and that the invitation had only been made by the Czar on the 31st, two days before the meeting took place. ⁽³⁾ It was clear, then, that it could not have been preceded by any extensive consultation between Bismarck and the Emperor, even if Bismarck who was at Gastein, had eventually approved of the meeting. Beaconsfield's report of Münster's language to him seemed to indicate that this had scarcely been the case. "The meeting of the two Emperors," Beaconsfield reported him to have said, "was an entire failure. The Emperor of Germany said and did many things on that occasion which his friends regretted, but the Emperor himself is now convinced, that these sacrifices were in vain, and that his

(1) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 439 6 September

(2) F.O.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 420 3 September
Confidential

(3) F.O.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 420 3 September 1879
Confidential

influence with his nephew has vanished." ⁽¹⁾ Plunkett's and Walsham's reports confirmed the fact that the meeting had failed and that no significance need be attached to it by the Foreign Office except as a demonstration of the Kaiser's continued desire for friendship with Russia. ⁽²⁾

During the first week of October, however, British information was exclusively concerned with an incident upon which the interpretation to be placed was at first a matter of doubt. It was an attempt on the part of Russia to bring about a rapprochement with Germany. It seemed an open question at first whether the incident should be interpreted as a serious effort to bring about an understanding, or merely as an effort to check the anti-Russian direction which German relationships appeared to be taking. A telegram arrived from Walsham on the 30th reporting the arrival in Berlin on the 28th of Orloff, Russian Ambassador at Paris, and Saburoff, prospective Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. ⁽³⁾ A despatch which arrived three days later indicated that this incident had a special significance. For it stated that the diplomats in question had come direct from Livadia. ⁽⁴⁾ Plunkett

(1) Buckle: op.cit. ^{Vol II} p.1359.

(2) F.O.64/934 Walsham to Salisbury 439 6 September 1879
 F.O.65/1045 Plunkett to Salisbury 440 10 September 1879
 Confidential

(3) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury Telegram 30 September 1879

(4) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 475 30 September 1879
 Confidential

had reported some days before to the effect that decisive discussions on policy were then taking place at the Emperor's summer residence there, and that all the leading Russian diplomats, generals and officials had been summoned to take part. ⁽¹⁾ Walsham's despatch further stated that together with Oubril, the Ambassador in Berlin, the Russians had had several conversations with Bismarck and had dined with the Chancellor before they left.

The British representative could secure no information as to the substance of these conversations. He stated, however, that the general impression in Berlin was that some effort had been made by Russia to improve her relations with Germany.

Two further rumours were current: that the object of the visit of the Russians had been to arrange an interview between the two Chancellors, and that as Gorehakoff was about to resign, the Czar had consulted Bismarck as to what fresh Ministerial appointments would be agreeable to him. Finally the fact that the Ambassadors in question were concerned respectively with French and Turkish affairs suggested that an exchange of views might have taken place. For British information, as has been shown, indicated that the causes of Russo-German estrangement lay partly in Russia's Eastern policy and partly in her advances to France and Italy.

(1) F.O.65/1046 Plunkett to Salisbury 447 17 September 1879
Confidential

Should either of these rumours or conjectures prove founded then the Foreign Office would have reason to consider that Russia had serious intentions of effecting an understanding with Germany. At first the information received encouraged the Foreign Office to expect such a development. For, Plunkett telegraphed that "private and unofficial negotiations were going on for a meeting" between the two Chancellors, and on the 3rd of October a ^{further} despatch was received from him. It reported that the discussions at Livadia had dealt with the question whether it was possible or advisable for Russia to maintain her present diplomatic position - a position where her "relations with Germany appeared to be settling down into a serious feeling of mutual ill-will;" where her advances to Italy were received half-heartedly and her advances to France rejected entirely; and where "more or less open hostility or suspicion" characterised her relations with England. (2)

A despatch received from Walsham on the 6th of October contributed nothing further to British information. It did however impress upon the Foreign Office that the incident had a political significance. For the representative refused

(1) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury
Telegram 147 2 October 1879
Secret

(2) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 472 25 September 1879
Confidential

entirely to accept Radowitz's explanations that it was the result of the Chancellor's personal friendship for the (1) Ambassadors in question. The main question, however, as to what this significance was remained open.

British information, lastly, indicated that the rapprochement between Austria and Germany was based upon a support of the Eastern policy which England and Austria-Hungary had pursued in concert during the previous year. Again information was largely derived from the statements of Andrassy. In speaking to Elliot on the 4th of September he described the object of the continued co-operation of Austria and England, as the execution of the rest of the Berlin Treaty and the combatting of the "persistent and far from creditable attempts of Russia to overthrow it." (2) Presumably these were the "aims of Russia" ^{according to his statement} which ~~he~~, on the 30th, ~~described~~ described a triple understanding with England and Germany was designed to counteract. Both on the 30th and the 4th he described the rift between Germany and Russia ^{as} ~~as~~ the result of an estrangement on the Eastern Question and Münster in speaking to Beaconsfield confirmed this. Moreover, according to Münster also, the triple understanding, if it

(1) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 482 3 October 1879
Confidential

(2) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 560 4 September 1879

came into existence was to be based upon the support in the Levant and the East generally, of the policy and interests of England."⁽¹⁾

It appeared in fact as if the conclusion of an understanding between Austria and Germany would be nothing more than the crowning point of a process in this respect that had already been initiated. Andrassy told Elliot that when Francis Joseph visited the ^{German} Emperor of Germany at Gastein, his object had in part been to express himself "in the terms of the most lively recognition for the support he had received from Germany in his Eastern policy."⁽²⁾

As far as the interpretation of incidents in this direction was concerned, there is again the appointment of Haymerle. For, British information on this point showed that it might be interpreted as indicating the continued predominance of the Eastern Question in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. Elliot reported that the principal consideration in bringing about his appointment had been the fact that as chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, Minister at Athens, and a representative of Austria-Hungary at ^{the} Berlin ^{Congress}, he had a personal knowledge of Eastern politics and Austrian

(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II p.1361. G.P.Vol.IV No.712. Münster does not mention that he had given this assurance. He only states that Beaconsfield had said if Germany would help England in the East she would be ready to restrain France from joining Russia in the event of a Russo-German dispute.

(2) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 520 15 August 1879

policy in regard to them. ⁽¹⁾ Plunkett reported that Russia's dissatisfaction on the subject was founded on "their fears that his intimate knowledge of Turkish affairs may seriously retard the success of their designs on that country." ⁽²⁾

To Layard, Elliot described the appointment as "public evidence of the intention of Austria to hold strictly by the famous Treaty." ⁽³⁾

The Foreign Office had recently received more important information of Austria-Hungary's intention to adhere to, and develop further, the policy of friendship to Turkey, and to increase of Austrian influence over the western part of the peninsula which she had concerted with England. Layard and Malet had been largely responsible for the successful negotiation of the Austro-Turkish Convention for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ⁱⁿ the previous Spring. Since the negotiation of the Treaty they had in fact spared no pains to bring about an improvement in Austro-Turkish relations. British information indicated that just before the Vienna meeting, their efforts at last had met with success and the first step towards an Austro-Turkish rapprochement had been

(1) F.O.7/964 Elliot to Salisbury 547 30 August 1879

(2) F.O.65/1046 Elliot to Salisbury 434 9 September 1879
Very Confidential

(3) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 Elliot to Layard 1 September 1879

(1)
taken.

At about the same time the British Foreign Office received information of a fresh manifestation of Austria-Hungary's determination to secure a hold on Servia. Negotiations had been going on during the summer at Vienna for the conclusion of a Convention regulating the construction of the railways envisaged by the agreement of July 1878. The conferences between Servian and Austrian Ministers had proved abortive, but an Austrian demand that Servia should ^{give an undertaking} engage to ^{begin} ~~commence~~ the construction of her railways at Belgrade towards ~~Misch~~, but not to push a line beyond that town, before Austria-Hungary had established her own railway connection with the Mitrovica-Salonica line, had served to show what the latter's aims were. (2)

Returning now to the main line of development of British information on the Austro-German Alliance: the next two weeks from the 7th-15th October were decisive for the British

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|-----------------------|---|-------------------|------------------|
| (1) F.O.78/2945 | Layard to Salisbury | 163 | 19 February 1879 |
| | | Secret | |
| | Malet to Salisbury | 177 | 26 February |
| | | Very Confidential | |
| | | 182 | 26 February |
| | | Confidential | |
| F.O.78/2946 | Malet to Salisbury | 233 | 14 March |
| F.O.78/2949 | Malet to Salisbury | 343 | 23 April |
| | | Confidential | |
| F.O.78/2953 | Layard to Salisbury | 559 | 29 June 1879 |
| | | Secret | |
| B.M.Add.MSS. 39027 | Elliot to Layard | | 6 July 1879 |
| F.O.78/2956 | Layard to Salisbury | 709 | 8 August 1879 |
| | | Secret | |
| (2) B.M.Add.MSS.39027 | Gould to Layard | 20 July, | 3 August, |
| | | | 15 August 1879 |
| | The latter concerns a private letter of the | | 10th received |
| | by Gould from Elliot on the subject. | | |

conception of the character of this combination.

The fortnight opened with the receipt of a further telegram from Crowe:-

" (Decypher)

Düsseldorf.

October 7. 3 p.m.

Emperor Wilhelm accepts Treaty of Vienna which is an offensive and defensive Treaty against all (comers?)" (sic.).(1)

Crowe was known to have extensive connections throughout Germany: among Parliamentarians, commercial men, leading officials, members of the Cabinet, and with the Crown Prince.⁽²⁾ A former foreign correspondent and foreign sub-editor of the Daily News, he had made a profession of securing and analysing information, and could tap sources not generally available to professional diplomats. He was valued accordingly. He had been employed by the Foreign Office in 1860 on a special mission of investigation designed to give it reliable information as to the possibilities of the union ^{of Germany} being achieved. This was only the first of a series of similar missions.

We may perhaps hazard the suggestion that in the present instance as well as in the case of his telegram of the 1st, Crowe's information was derived either directly or indirectly from a member of the German Cabinet.

(1) F.O.64/944 Crowe to Salisbury

(2) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 22 May 1880
12 July 1880

J.A. Crowe: Reminiscences of 35 years of my life.
Wemyss: Memoirs and Letters of Sir R. Morier.

For on his return to Berlin on the 25th, Bismarck immediately summoned a Cabinet Council for the 28th, and communicated to the eight men present what had passed at Vienna. It was a pis-aller for the public treaty which he had originally desired, as well as a manoeuvre in his struggle with the Emperor. (1) To judge by von Puttkamer's speech at Essen towards the end of October when he referred to the signature of an alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, (2) secrecy was not observed with any great strictness in regard to the communication that was made to them. Apart from the Crown Prince the only other men who seem to have known of the Treaty were members of the diplomatic corps and the Foreign Office and military men. Hohenlohe, Radowitz, Bülow and Moltke knew of the Treaty and negotiations to secure it. Crowe does not, however, seem to have had any connection with these men or their circles.

In any case the Foreign Office had here, and in the telegram of the 1st, authoritative information. Unlike other information of an authoritative character it was not open to the suspicion that it was determined by the wishes of

(1) G.P.Vol.III No.487.

G. zu Hohenlohe: Memoirs: Vol.II p.273.

J.M. Radowitz: Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen.
Vol.II p.84 et.sequ.

(2) F.O.64/935 Russell to Salisbury 456 30 October 1879
Secret

Bismarck or Andrassy as to how much they wished the British Foreign Office to know.

The Foreign Office, with the definite knowledge that a Treaty had been signed, was now free to reach some conclusions as to its purpose and conditions. Two points for consideration had been suggested up to now: that Germany "had pledged her word to Austria for some purpose still unknown", or that her promises of support and Austria's assurances in return were of a more limited character. Crowe's telegram suggested a far-reaching agreement of the first type. A further despatch from Egerton, received by Salisbury on his return to London on the 11th, suggested possibilities in the same direction. He reported, for example, on the authority of one of the Austrian Ministers, that "a discussion had taken place respecting a proposal of Prince Bismarck's for a mutual guarantee of each others possessions." He discussed the possibility of "any definite agreement in a military convention" having been reached.

^{Egerton}
~~He~~ was himself inclined to reject both these possibilities, the first on the authority of the same Minister from whom his information had originally been derived, the second on the less adequate ground that the Austrian military bill had not yet been passed by the Delegations. On the other hand, he thought "it possible and even probable that some understanding had been arrived at for mutual defence." On the whole then, the effect of Egerton's despatch was probably to weight the

scales in favour of the more limited view of the promises exchanged between Austria and Germany, though it did suggest the possible constituents of a wider agreement should such (1) prove to have been concluded.

Other indications were all in support of the view that a limited agreement only had been reached. Münster, the German Ambassador, assured Salisbury on the 13th that the relations between Austria and Germany were purely defensive. (2) Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador, speaking, as he said, without any official knowledge on the matter, went so far as to declare on the 14th, "with great confidence" that no written agreements had been interchanged, nor even any understanding (3) come to on commercial questions.

The tacit withdrawal of what ^{Beaconsfield}~~Bismarck~~ had interpreted as an overture of alliance to England, after the conclusion of the agreement with Austria-Hungary, was a matter which might also be interpreted as an indication of the limited character of the Austro-German Treaty. The withdrawal was apparent to Salisbury after a conversation with Münster at (4) Hatfield on the 13th. Had Germany been negotiating an

(1) F.O.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury 639 8 October 1879

(2) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367.

(3) F.O.7/958 Salisbury to Egerton draft 14 October 1879

(4) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367.

offensive alliance with Austria, she would not have made such a proposal to England - except perhaps for the purpose of disarming English opposition to the forward policy which such an alliance would involve. This object would have held good after the conclusion of the agreement as well as during its negotiation. The withdrawal of the proposal was in fact only explicable in the light of the knowledge that a defensive agreement had been concluded with Austria - that Germany had, in other words, secured such assurances from the latter Power as to make the proposed defensive alliance with England unnecessary.

Meanwhile, the clearing up of the question in regard to the significance of the conversations that had taken place in Berlin between Bismarck and the Russian diplomats, strengthened the view that the Treaty with Austria had probably had an anti-Russian aspect. For it was made clear that Bismarck was by no means inclined to respond to the Russian advances. Oubril, Walsham reported on the 13th, had been informed that Bismarck would see Gorchakoff if the meeting could be arranged before he left for Varzin, but that he could not return to Berlin for the Russian's benefit. Prince Bismarck left on the 9th and no interview took place. (1) It became clear, too, that an exchange of views between Germany

(1) F.O.64/935 Walsham to Salisbury 492 10 October 1879
Confidential

and Russia that would lead to a permanent improvement in their relations was not likely to occur as long as Russia's activity in the East continued ^{to be} a contributory factor in the Russo-German estrangement. For, a secret report received from Plunkett on the 15th of October indicated that that policy was to be maintained if not carried further. The discussions at Livadia, he reported, had been based on this premise. A copy of the letter by which one of the Russian officials had been summoned to Livadia had come into Plunkett's hands. Russian policy, it read, must be "to destroy Turkey, help the Bulgarians of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia to unite, compel Greece to declare war against Turkey, and to interfere in due time in their interest, and driving the Turk from Europe, assist the Greeks to occupy Constantinople and herself occupy the Bosphorus." (1)

Meanwhile no news of Ministerial changes came from Russia.

It seemed then that the incident of the conversations between Bismarck and the Russian diplomats at the end of September was to be interpreted rather as an unsuccessful attempt to check the anti-Russian trend in German policy, or at least as an effort to discover its possible scope, than a serious or successful endeavour to effect a real improvement in Russo-German relations.

(1) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 501 7 October 1879
Secret

Meanwhile Münster had repeated to Salisbury the statements which Beaconsfield reported him to have made on the 27th September. Russia, he had stated, was entirely given over to the Pan Slavists. She mediated an attack on Austria and, he added, "Germany would not allow it."⁽¹⁾ Two days later a report came from Malet, who was in charge at Constantinople. Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador, had informed him that, on instructions from his Government, he had told the Sultan: "the result of the meeting at Vienna was that the Alliance of the Three Emperors was at an end. An exchange of views had taken place between the Ministers of the two Empires resulting in an understanding which had the Treaty of Berlin for its base and the danger of Slav aggression as its motive."⁽²⁾

The information received up to date then indicated that a written agreement had been signed for mutual defence against an attack from Russia, and particularly against an attack directed against Austria as the result of Russia's policy in the East.

A speech made by Salisbury at Manchester in the course of a political visit there from the 16th-21st of October, showed that he accepted this view of the Alliance.

(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.367,

(2) F.O.78/2959 Malet to Salisbury 867 6 October 1879
Secret

The speech which was made on the evening of the 17th was for the most part a justification of the Circular of April 1st and of the policy in regard to Turkey which lay behind it. It closed with the reminder that "Europe had employed Austria "to arrest the stretching of a Slav Principality from sea to sea." "If the Turk falls," the speech continued, "no advance of Russia beyond the Balkans or the Danube can be made unless the resistance of Austria is conquered What has happened in the last few weeks justifies us in hoping that Austria if attacked would not be alone."⁽¹⁾

Thus Salisbury envisaged the possibility of a Russo-Austrian conflict arising out of Russia's Eastern policy, and expressed the conviction that Germany was now bound to support Austria in such an event. There is no indication in the speech, it is true, that Salisbury considered that the agreement was a formal Treaty. Nothing can be concluded from this. For it was, of course, necessary that he should avoid making public information which he had acquired from an independent source. As it was, there was a certain amount of uneasiness in Vienna. Reuss reported to Bismarck that ~~it was~~^{Haymerle} wished that Salisbury had waited until he had received official information from ~~them~~^{him} or from Berlin. Haymerle was in fact suspicious that Bismarck might already have given such

(1) The Times 18 October 1879. Cf. D.D.F. Serie I, Vol II, No 470
 Waddington wrote to Pothuan, French Ambassador in London that Salisbury had said that "if Austria-Hungary and Germany" s'étaient rapprochés de plus en plus sous l'influence des événements d'Orient. La consolidation de l'entente doit être envisagée comme un gage nouveau donné à l'exécution du Traité de Berlin. Il estime qu'elle opposera une digue aux envahissements de l'esprit panslaviste."

(1)
 information. There seems indeed, to be evidence in connection with the speech that Salisbury had Crowe's information in mind, when he referred to the Alliance. The Times reported him clearly enough as having said: "the newspapers say, I know not whether they say rightly that a defensive alliance has been established --- " It seems, however, possible that originally he spoke of an offensive and defensive alliance and that the phrase was subsequently corrected. The Russian papers in reporting the speech used that version, though they subsequently amended it. (2) Karolyi telegraphed privately to Haymerle that Salisbury had spoken of an "offensive and defensive alliance," subsequently correcting his statement by a further telegram. (3) St. Vallier writing to Waddington from Berlin on the 25th of October stated that Salisbury had announced at Manchester "en termes assurés ---- qu'il existe un traité d'alliance offensive et défensive" between Austria and Germany. (4)

Information during the following week was entirely of a confirmatory character. It was derived in part from articles in the Continental Press, and in part from a communi-

(1) H. Rothfels: Bismarck's englische Bündnispolitik.
 (p.130 Reuss to Bismarck 19 October 1879)

(2) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 543 22 October 1879

(3) Rothfels: op.cit. p.130.

(4) D.D.F. No.473.
 Serzh, Vol II
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cation on the subject of the Alliance from the Austrian Government.

The week was remarkable for the number of articles in the Austrian and German Press on the subject of the Alliance. The most important were reproduced^{or} summarised in The Times of the 23rd. From this paper it appeared that the Cologne Gazette in Germany and the Pester Lloyd in Austria-Hungary agreed that the Austro-German Alliance was embodied in a Protocol signed by the two Emperors. The Cologne Gazette moreover, reproduced Crowe's account of Stolberg's journey to Baden Baden to procure the Emperor's assent. The information that had reached the Foreign Office as to the written character of the Alliance was thus confirmed. (1)

On the 27th came a despatch from Lord Odo Russell, who had returned to Berlin on the 19th. His report, dated the 24th, was an extensive review of all that could be gleaned in Germany on the subject of the Alliance from Government circles, the official Press, his colleagues, and "other sound sources of information." It added, however, nothing to what the Foreign Office already knew. It was true that the official version of the agreement which it reported went further than that given to Egerton and Walsham. It now included

(1) The Times 23 October.

a promise "of future co-operation in all questions of common interest", but it still insisted that there was no written document. The report of the extreme irritation of the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, and of the fact that politicians there were "hailing an anti-Russian move in favour of Austria" was also significant. As far as any further contents went the despatch had been forestalled by The Times, for the rest of it concerned the articles in the Cologne Gazette and the Paster Lloyd. In fact the Ambassador was forced to admit "nothing was really known of the precise terms of the agreement."⁽¹⁾

On the same day came an official and secret communication made verbally by Count Karolyi, of the conclusion of a "defensive Alliance" between Austria and Germany. He made it clear that Russia was envisaged as the potential aggressor.

Prince Bismarck, he said, had proposed the Alliance "having become frightened by the attitude of the Russian Government", and if on issues connected with execution of the Treaty of Berlin "or for any other cause Russia were to attack either Empire they had agreed to treat it as an attack on both of them." He also made it clear that the two Powers in making the Alliance had had the Eastern question particularly in view. He stated that they had agreed to observe a conciliatory

(1) F.O.64/935 Russell to Salisbury 517 24 October
Secret
unnumbered

attitude in respect of the matters still outstanding after the Treaty of Berlin. Their policy in that connection would be the maintenance of the status quo. Should Turkey fall, Austria would not attempt to replace her, nor would she suffer Russia to do so. She would devote her efforts to the strengthening the "little states."⁽¹⁾

It is clear from the above account that as far as our information on the Alliance was concerned, the importance of this communication was only of a confirmatory character. The existence of a written agreement, it is true, was not confirmed, Karolyi's evasive reply to a point blank question on the matter, however, was almost equal to confirmation, in view of the precise information possessed on the matter by the Foreign Office. After this date no further information ^{was} ~~is~~ received on the subject of the Alliance. Apart from a communication from Münster on 3rd of November in identical terms to Karolyi's,⁽²⁾ the diplomatic documents do not again

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- (1) F.O. 7/958 Salisbury to Elliot ^{Unnumbered} Most Se- 31 October 1879
cret
marked "not to be printed or sent anywhere"
- F.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 531 3 November 1879
Secret
Transmits a copy of the above
- F.O.27/2300 Salisbury to Lyons 1356 8 November 1879
Secret
Transmits copy of despatch to Elliot. The delay is accounted for by the fact that the Ambassador did not return to his post until the 8th. The communication, it was stated, was for his personal information only.
- Buckle: op.cit. p.1363 (Memorandum for the Queen in ^{with} identic terms ~~as~~ the despatch to Elliot).
- (2) F.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 558 3 November 1879
Secret

touch upon the subject for its own sake. So that the communication serves to bring the development of British views respecting the Alliance to a satisfactory conclusion.

Information was not, however, either accurate or complete. The Foreign Office had received no indication that the agreement between the two Powers provided against an attack in the general sense. When Münster communicated the existence of the Alliance to Salisbury in the same terms as Karolyi had done, Salisbury asked whether the defensive alliance was confined to matters connected with the few unfulfilled parts of the Treaty of Berlin. Münster⁽¹⁾ "energetically repelled this interpretation."

His reply, however, did not necessarily affect the view formed in the Foreign Office that the object of the Treaty was primarily the defence of Austria-Hungary and Germany against Russia's activities in the East, nor did it enlighten Salisbury as to the systematised character of the obligations which a determination to treat "every attack against either of them as directed against both" actually involved.

The Treaty signed on October 7th was an instrument of five articles. It dealt exclusively with the possibility of an attack upon one of the two Powers and determined the attitude of the two Empires according to the source of the attack.⁽²⁾

(1) F.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell 558 3 November 1879
Secret

(2) A.F. Pribram: The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary.
Vol.I p.7 et sequ.

In this connection it envisaged three possibilities: an attack from Russia; from a Power other than Russia; from such a Power aided by Russia either actively or by the threatening character of military measures taken by the latter. In the first and third cases, it provided for the full military support of the one Empire to the other, in the second for the benevolent maintenance of at least neutrality by the one towards the other or attacked party.

Count Karolyi's communication, and information collected independently had touched on two aspects of the Alliance:- the Eastern Question and the Berlin Treaty; the relations of the two Empires to Russia. As a result of this gap in British information the Foreign Office tended to see the second aspect of the Alliance as governed by the first. It never seems to have been realised that the first was entirely subordinate to the second. Furthermore, the British lack of knowledge in this direction, prevented the Foreign Office from realising that both these aspects of the Alliance were subordinate to an ultimate object: the creation of a system of relationships that would relieve Germany from the fear of attack. Had the Foreign Office information on this point and had it been realised that this Treaty was the pattern for the agreements of which it was subsequently informed; then information as to the interests of the parties to them, as to the tendencies towards association and opposition

prevailing among the Powers, and as to the meetings which took place between their sovereigns and ministers and other incidents in the development of relations, would have given a very shrewd idea of the nature of the commitments undertaken.

Again, British information did not indicate that any other contingencies than war with Russia had been contemplated. Yet the Treaty imposed an obligation of neutrality for the case of any war in which one signatory might be engaged, while the addition of the phrase "at least", and the stipulation which allowed threatening military measures taken by Russia to be interpreted as assistance to the attacking Power, made it very likely that more substantial support would be given in such a case by one signatory to the other.

Lastly the Foreign Office had no knowledge of the existence of a time limit.

With regard to two points in respect of the Alliance, it was realised in the Foreign Office that British information was incomplete. The exact effect of the Alliance on the relations of the two Empires to Russia; and the question as to whether the Treaty implied an exclusive Austro-German combination, or whether it might at some stage be merged into a wider agreement, were acknowledged to be open questions.

For, Plunkett reported from St. Petersburg that Jomini believed the Austro-German Alliance to be drawn up in such a form that it could be communicated to Russia and her accession invited. The German Ambassador had, in fact, said to him

that he could not understand why the Austro-German Alliance should be regarded as the death blow to the Dreikaiserbund. (1) A series of incidents that now occurred seemed to indicate that Russia was attempting to revive that combination, and that her efforts were not being rebuffed. The Russian Press was instructed to avoid all mention of strained relations (2) between Russia and Germany or Russia and Austria-Hungary. From the 13th-17th of November the Czarewitch and Czarevna visited Vienna and Berlin on their return to Russia from Cannes. Egerton, then reported that he had been told, with conviction, by one of the Foreign Representatives in Vienna, that attempts to revive the Dreikaiserbund had been made (3) "for the last fortnight." The considered opinion, however, of the British representatives concerned, including Egerton himself, was that no political proposals were made either at Vienna or Berlin. Karolyi, who assured Salisbury with some emphasis that no political questions had been discussed, (4) confirmed this. There was general agreement, however, on

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- (1) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 569 5 November 1879
Very Confidential
- (2) F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 575 8 November 1879
Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 742 16 November 1879
- (4) F.O.7/958 Salisbury to Elliot 24 November 1879

the "personal and friendly" character of the visit as far
 as the three Emperors were concerned. ⁽¹⁾ About the same time
 it became known that Labanoff intended to travel via Vienna
 and Berlin on his journey to Russia from Constantinople. The
 rumours of a political mission which immediately began to
 circulate, ⁽²⁾ seemed at first unfounded, for he passed through
 Vienna without seeing either the Emperor or Haymerle. ⁽³⁾ The
 matter was, however, not clear. For, Layard had reported
 that Zichy at Labanoff's request had arranged for a meeting
 to take place between Haymerle and the Russian Ambassador. ⁽⁴⁾
 Shortly afterwards, it appeared that the Austro-German
 Alliance had been communicated at Livadia and St. Petersburg,

- (1) F.O.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 765 21 November 1879
 Confidential
 F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 556 21 November 1879
 Describes the visit "as the first attempt
 towards reconciliation."
 F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 1 November 1879
 Secret
 Buckle: Letters of Queen Victoria Second Series Vol.III p.58
 (Lady Emily to Russell to Queen Victoria
 5 December 1879)
 F.O.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 603 19 November 1879
 Very Confidential
- (2) F.O. 7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 18 November 1879
 F.O.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury
 Telegram 167 25 November 1879
 Very Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/966 Elliot to Salisbury 29 November 1879
- (4) F.O.78/2964 Layard to Salisbury 1127 18 December 1879

and had not been ill-received. (1) Meanwhile Government circles in Russia made as much as possible of the friendly reception given to the Czarewitch, (2) and Gorchakoff arrived in Berlin. There he was received by the Emperor and Crown Prince, while Bismarck sent civil messages and expressed (3) his profound regret that he could not come to Berlin. British information became clear as to the alleged attempts of Russia to secure the alliance of France. It appeared that, (4) besides the tone adopted by the Press on the subject, nothing more than unofficial soundings during the French army manoeuvres had taken place. In reply to a question from the British chargé d'affaires Waddington stated that no official

(1) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 547 21 November 1879
concerns a conversation with St Vallier on the latter's visit to Bismarck at Varsagen. Secret

This was confirmed by the abrupt change in Schuvaloff's language. On the 3rd he assured Salisbury that he was convinced that no defensive alliance existed.

At the end of the month he spoke of Austria and Germany having given to each other a "guarantee" and deprecated Russia's joining the Alliance.

F.O.65/1040 Salisbury to Plunkett 589 3 November
 Confidential

Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.372 (Salisbury to Odo Russell, 2 December 1879)

Sir A.Lyall: Life of Dufferin p.277.

(2) F.O.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 612 25 November 1879
 Very Confidential

(3) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury
 Telegram 1 December 1879

(4) c.f. G.P. Vol.III No.482.

overture had been made. "Many hints, however, had been thrown out from various Russian quarters and much flattery bestowed by Russian upon French officers." ⁽¹⁾ Every opportunity had been taken by General Obrutscheff, the Military Attaché in Paris reported, ⁽²⁾ to sound French Generals, and other superior officers during the manoeuvres upon the sympathies and state of preparation to take the field, of France in the event of another European War. The Russian Generals had, however, gone away disappointed with the answers they received. This information came from a German source which was important in that the report of a formal Russian overture had originated as far as the Foreign Office was concerned with Germany. ⁽³⁾ It seemed that Germany accepted this explanation of the information which had originally led to their belief that steps had been taken to bring about a Franco-Russian Alliance. The incident was now referred to by Bismarck as well as others, as "Prince Obrutscheff's secret mission to negotiate an alliance" and without anything being said of a formal overture having been made. ⁽⁴⁾ One

- (1) F.O.27/2374 Adams to Salisbury 1021 10 October 1879
Secret
- (2) F.O.27/2375 Conolly (military attaché) to Lyons
695 24 November 1879
Strictly Confidential
700 9 December 1879
- (3) F.O.45/382 Macdonnell to Salisbury
465 7 October 1879
Cf. G.P.III No.477 p.81 footnote. Secret
- (4) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 556 21 November 1879
Cf. G.P.Vol.III No.477 p.81 557 Secret
footnote. No.461 p.54 568 28 November 1879

justification put forward for German fears of Russia, appeared to be considerably weakened.

On the other hand, Salisbury after his conversation with Münster on the 3rd, was convinced that, although the original draft of the Treaty had been amended to satisfy the pro-Russian sympathies of the Emperor, the intentions of the Ministers remained unaltered. ⁽¹⁾ Further, Bismarck and the German Press were still expressing apprehension that Russia was preparing an attack against Germany or Austria-Hungary. Haymerle seemed to share their fears and spoke to Elliot of the concentration of troops in the Western Provinces of ⁽²⁾ Russia. Whether these fears were justified or simulated, ⁽³⁾ as information from St. Petersburg made them appear, with some ulterior object in view, the agitation that resulted did not augur well for a revival of close relations between Russia and the allied Empires.

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- (1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.371 (Salisbury to the Queen
3 November 1879)
- (2) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 568 28 November 1879
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.5.
F.O.64/936 Methuen (military attaché)
to Russell 20 November 1879
F.O.7/966 Elliot to Salisbury 827 24 December 1879
- (3) F.O.65/1048 Plunkett to Salisbury 623 2 December 1879
624
F.O.65/1048 Dufferin to Salisbury 683 31 December 1879
Very Confidential
F.O.65/1078 Dufferin to Salisbury 17 13 January 1879
Confidential

"What Bismarck's motive is is still mysterious"

Salisbury wrote at this time in connection with the anti-
 Russian aspect of the Treaty. ⁽¹⁾ As the month advanced,
 however, reports were received from Odo Russell stating his
 opinion that the situation ~~as to who he~~ ^{on the whole}, might be interpreted
 as indicating that the Treaty was not incompatible with a
 revival of the Dreikaiserbund. "There is in reality" wrote
 Russell on the 21st "no danger of a quarrel between the
 reigning families of Russia and Germany while the Emperor
 William lives, even though there may be little prospect of
 improved relations between the two Governments while Prince
 Gorchakoff remains in office. ²

In the event, however of the latter being replaced by a
 more congenial Chancellor --- the relations between Russia
 and Germany might speedily become more intimate and the
 Dreikaiserbund be re-established on a firmer basis than
 heretofore." ⁽²⁾ A month later he wrote again in the same
 sense:- "I am convinced that Prince Bismarck's real object
 is not to quarrel with Russia, but on the contrary to compel
 her by temporary isolation to reflect and to re-enter the
 Dreikaiserbund on his own terms, and not on those of Prince

(1) Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II p.371 (Salisbury to Odo Russell,
 5 November 1879)

(2) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
 Secret

Gorchakoff which have more or less prevailed since 1875." (1)

It is unfortunate that Russell had nothing more to offer in this direction than his personal conviction. For, he had made what was in fact a very accurate estimate of Bismarck's intentions.

"Mit der Österreichischen Assekuranz versehen," wrote Bismarck to the Kaiser, "können wir ^{uns} aber erneuten russischen Freundschaftsversicherungen, ohne Gefahr ^{en} ~~zu~~ und, neben den vertragsmässig gesicherten Beziehungen zu Österreich, die russischen Freundschaft mit aller Sorgfalt und Friedensliebe pflegen. Das Drei-Kaiser-Bündnis ----- bleibt ein ideales Ziel der Politik, zu welcher ich Eurer Majestät ehrfurchtsvoll rate." (2)

British information, however, was too incomplete to enable Russell's opinions to be substantiated. The Foreign Office knew nothing of the Protocol and Memorandum which had

(1) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 613 19 December 1879
Very Confidential

(2) G.P.Vol.III No.458 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 5 September 1879
p.41)
See also No.455 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 31 August 1879
p.30)
No.461 (Bismarck to the Kaiser, 7 September 1879
p.58)

^{op.cit.} Hohenlohe: Vol.II p.273.

W. Schüssler: Bismarck Zwischen England und Russland in der Krise von 1879-80 (Historische Vierteljahrschrift J.G. 27. 1932)

Bismarck to Bülow 5 September and Bismarck to Manteuffel 7 September.

been signed by Bismarck and Andrassy on the 24th of September
(1)
at Vienna.

The Protocol recorded the form of the original proposal for the Alliance made by Bismarck and rejected by Andrassy. This proposal envisaged an undertaking to cultivate friendly relations with Russia and an obligation for co-operated defence against an attack from any Power whatsoever - not only against an attack from Russia. It further stated that the German Chancellor accepted the final Treaty as conforming to the spirit, if not to the letter, of this original proposal.

The Memorandum guarded carefully against the Alliance assuming an entirely anti-Russian character. It expressed the conviction of the two Empires that the conflicting interests of the different Powers should be subordinated to the demands of world peace. Applied to the particular circumstances of the moment, this meant that none of the questions left over by the Treaty of Berlin was important enough to become a casus belli. The two Powers, therefore, would treat these questions in a conciliatory way, and would not threaten or attack Russia, either on their own account or in agreement with other Powers, on issues arising from the non-execution of the Treaty. A beginning was thus made towards the removal of what was, according to British information

(1) Pribram: op.cit. Vol.IX p.3 et sequ.

the main cause of ill-feeling between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and a contributory cause of the Russo-German estrangement.

Again, nothing was known of the negotiation of the Alliance. When British information on the subject began to collect, the Protocol and Memorandum had been signed and the draft of the Treaty agreed upon.

At Gastein on the 26th of August Bismarck accepted Andrassy's proposals for an Alliance providing for common defence against attack from Russia or from a fourth Power aided by Russia. ⁽¹⁾ The matter was then raised with the Kaiser. In an audience on the 2nd v. Bülow, the Foreign Minister, read to him a report from Bismarck of the conversations at Gastein. The Kaiser refused, however, to give a decision until after the meeting at Alexandrovka. ⁽²⁾ In two audiences on the 6th and 8th at Königsberg, where the Kaiser had now arrived to attend the military manoeuvres, Bülow ⁽³⁾ returned to the subject. Though furnished with a long exposition of German policy from Bismarck, he made no headway. On the 9th, however, matters came to an issue. A telegram from Bülow to the Foreign Office in Berlin definitely

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.449.

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.456.

(3) G.P. Vol.III No.460, 462.

instructed Bismarck to carry the negotiations no further,
though it sanctioned a visit to Vienna.⁽¹⁾ A despatch from
Bismarck to the Foreign Office announced his intention to
resign if the Emperor did not agree to the proposed Treaty.⁽²⁾
Anticipating that this threat would have the desired result,
Bismarck on the 13th furnished the German Ambassador in
Vienna with a draft for discussion with Andrassy.⁽³⁾ At last
on the 14th came the Emperor's consent.⁽⁴⁾ It was, however,
conditional. The Treaty must make provision for the cultiva-
tion of peaceful relations with Russia, stipulate for mutual
support against attack from one or more foreign Powers
without naming Russia specifically, and be communicated to
the Czar. Knowledge of this resistance and then conditional
consent on the part of the Emperor would not have altered in
any way the British interpretation of the Alliance. We were
informed clearly enough of the Emperor's attitude. The
knowledge, however, of the efforts made by Bismarck to secure
the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by the Kaiser, and
so to prevent the Treaty from assuming an anti-Russian
character, and of his partial success would indeed have been
enlightening.

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.463.

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.464.

(3) G.P. Vol.III No.467.

(4) G.P. Vol.III Nos. 472, 475, 476.

To fulfil the first of the Emperor's conditions Bismarck devoted his efforts to securing the abandonment by Andrassy of his draft for the preamble of the Treaty. It was drawn up in terms unfriendly to Russia and seemed even to go so far as to preclude the restoration of the Dreikaiserbund. For, it stated that whereas "ein freundschaftliches Einverständnis" between the sovereigns of Austria, Germany and Russia had previously afforded all possible securities for the interests of the three Empires, it no longer seemed to do so. Moreover, it described the Treaty as a substitute for military measures that might otherwise be taken in reply to the recent increases in the Russian army and to the posting of Russian troops on the frontiers of the two Empires. (1) Bismarck's efforts were so far successful that the preamble was abandoned. A section of the memorandum, already referred to, announced the friendly intentions of the two Powers towards Russia, and a reference in Article 4 to Russian troop movements was coupled with an expression of confidence that they were not intended to threaten Austria and Germany.

In fulfilment of the second condition, Bismarck instructed Reuss on the 17th to propose to Andrassy a redaction of

(1) E. Heller: Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische Bündnis in Bismarcks Aussenpolitik. p.145.

the Treaty which should bind the two Powers to support each other against any attack whatsoever. If Andrassy objected to this he might propose the wording: "bei jedem Angriff ... des alten Bundesgebietes von ~~1806~~¹⁸¹⁵" and a mutual guarantee of their Polish territory. (1) Andrassy, however, rejected this proposal outright and made it clear that insistence might endanger the whole Treaty. (2) Bismarck, however, writing to Andrassy on the 20th to confirm the arrangements for the meeting at Vienna, held to the proposal for a general defensive alliance. (3) At Vienna itself there were stormy scenes between the two Ministers on the subject before Bismarck finally yielded the point. (4)

In fulfilment of the third condition Bismarck was so far successful as to secure the drawing up of the Memorandum for communication to Russia. (5)

Further the British Foreign Office was very badly informed on the subject of Russo-German relations. So far

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.478 (Bismarck to Reuss 17 September 1879)

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.480 (Reuss to Bismarck 19 September 1879)

(3) E. Heller: op.cit.

(4) T. Sosnosky: Die Balkanpolitik Österreich Ungarns Seit 1866 pp.47-52.

L.Dóczi: Andrassy und Bismarck (Neue Freie Presse 25 November and 2 December 1906).
Dóczi was in the Press department of the Austrian Foreign Office and had been taken by Andrassy to Gastein.

(5) G.P. Vol.III No.482 p.95.

from disapproving of the Manteuffel mission Bismarck saw in it "eine Reservedeckung für den Fall dass Andrassy's Rücktritt den Übergang der österreichischen Politik in das russische Lager bedeuten konnte."⁽¹⁾ The invitation to the Kaiser from the Czar had been telegraphed already on the 30th of August and Bismarck had immediately been consulted.⁽²⁾ Although the Chancellor telegraphed back the advice that the Kaiser should not accept, and although his advice was not followed, there was no question of an open difference of opinion respecting Russo-German relations.⁽³⁾ The Emperor made it clear that he regarded the visit as a personal affair, and gave his word that he would not engage in political discussions.⁽⁴⁾ Bismarck was not opposed to an interview on that basis. Moreover, the Kaiser went to Alexandrovka^o furnished with a full account of the Gastein conversation and an exposition of arguments in favour of an Austro-German Alliance.

The Foreign Office knew nothing of the Saburoff-Giers party in Russia which aimed at a revival of the Dreikaiserbund as keenly as Schuvaloff aimed at an understanding with

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.458 p.40.
Radowitz: op.cit p.90.

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.450.

(3) G.P. Vol.III No.451.

(4) G.P. Vol.III Nos.452, 456.

England, and Gorchakoff and Jomini at an understanding with
 France. ⁽¹⁾ Saburoff was known to the Foreign Office except
 as Russian Minister at Athens, until the rumour of his appoint-
 ment as Ambassador at Constantinople drew attention to him.
 His conversations with Bismarck at Kissingen in July, con-
 versations with Gorchakoff and Schuvaloff that followed, and
 two days spent in Berlin during August when he saw Radowitz,
 and went through all the communications on Eastern affairs
 made by Russia to Germany, passed completely unnoticed. ⁽³⁾ No
 information was received as to the close relations which
 began to develop between Schweinitz and Giers. ⁽⁴⁾ The fact
 that Giers on the 27th of August invited the German Ambassador
 to his country estate was not reported. Yet in Saburoff's
 activities at Kissingen and Berlin, and in Schweinitz's
 conversations with Giers lay the roots of Russia's advances
 to Germany in September. Saburoff, as a result of the
 Kissingen conversations, drew up a memorandum in which he
 stated that Russia could not maintain a position of isolation
 and must choose between an alliance with France and an

(1) J.Y. Simpson: The Saburoff Memoirs.

(2) Simpson: op.cit. pp.50-55.
 G.P. Vol.III No.461 p.54 and No.514 (Radowitz to Bismarck
 15 August 1879)
 Radowitz: op.cit. p.88.

(3) G.P. ^{Vol III} No.514 p.140.

(4) v. Schweinitz: Denkwürdigkeiten: Vol.II p.72.

alliance with Germany. He put forward arguments on both sides and reached a conclusion in favour of Germany. (1)

Giers discussed this memorandum, as well as reports from London and Constantinople, with Schweinitz on the 27th.

The latter immediately reported to Berlin the Russian desire for an improvement in their relations with Germany. (3)

The Council at Livadia discussed and approved the memorandum.

Saburoff as a result was instructed to carry the matter further at Berlin. (4)

Because of the lack of information on these points, then, the Foreign Office made the fundamental mistake of connecting the visit of the Russian diplomats to Berlin on the 28-29th of September with the Vienna meeting between Bismarck and Andrassy and with the tendency of the Livadia discussions which appeared from Plunkett's information, towards a forward policy in the East.

Finally, the Foreign Office had no information as to the substance of the conversations which took place in Berlin between Bismarck and Saburoff. These conversations actually initiated negotiations for the revival of the Dreikaiserbund

(1) Simpson: op.cit p.56.

(2) Schweinitz: op.cit. p.72.

(3) Schüssler: op.cit. (Private letter of Schweinitz to Bülow 29 August 1879).

(4) Simpson: op.cit. pp.66 et sequ.

Saburoff's instructions had been based upon the arguments of his memorandum and had enumerated the points to be covered by an understanding with Germany, which he might propose if Bismarck took the initiative. In his first conversation with Bismarck the establishment of such an understanding was agreed upon. In their second conversation its possible terms were discussed and three articles provisionally drafted. ⁽¹⁾ There is no evidence that the question of a meeting between Gorchakoff and Bismarck was raised. ⁽²⁾ Saburoff on the contrary regarded Gorchakoff as his enemy. There is no indication that the question of Ministerial changes in Russia was broached. Orloff's presence in Berlin and Saburoff's position as prospective Ambassador at Constantinople seem to have been entirely without significance.

The Austro-Hungarian share in future negotiations was also provided for in the course of these conversations. Not only did one of the projected articles provide for a Russian promise to respect the integrity of the Austrian dominions and in return an Austrian promise not to extend her influence in the Balkans without previous consultation, but Radowitz was instructed immediately to draft a letter

(1) Simpson: op.cit. pp.70-83.
Radowitz: op.cit. Vol.II pp.97-98.

(2) Schüssler: op.cit.

to Andrassy informing him of the Russian readiness to come
to an agreement with Austria-Hungary on that basis. ⁽¹⁾

British information also indicated that the question as to whether the Austro-German Alliance implied an exclusive understanding between the two countries, or whether it might later be merged in a wider agreement could only be determined by subsequent information.

Münster's overture on the 27th of September made it seem very likely at one time, that the English adhesion to the Alliance might be asked. The overture was not formally withdrawn and it was only the German delay in inviting British adhesion which led to the impression that it was not likely to be requested. ⁽²⁾ Yet the matter did not seem entirely settled. For, Russell reported that Moltke in conversation with him had stated that "an important bulwark had been secured by the Alliance with Austria, but in his opinion the peace of Europe could best be secured by a Tripartite Alliance between England, Germany and Austria which could alone inspire sufficient confidence to enable the armed Powers of Europe to disarm." ⁽³⁾

(1) Radowitz: Vol.II p.102.
E.Wertheimer: Graf Julius Andrassy. Vol.III pp.290 et sequ.

(2) c.f. Cecil: Vol.II p.371 (Salisbury to Russell, 5 November 1879).

(3) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 568 28 November 1879

Further, on ^{the} 12th of October a despatch reached the Foreign Office from Macdonnell at Rome which reported that von Kendell the German Ambassador, had said that it was open to Italy to join the Austro-German Alliance and that "if they were wise they would do so."⁽¹⁾ A few days later he sent an article from the Opinione of the 3rd to the same effect, written by its correspondent at Vienna.⁽²⁾

By December the Foreign Office had, however, received certain indications that the Treaty was designed to revive the connection between the two Powers as German Powers, as well^{as} to establish commitments between them as members of the European states system. Russell on the 21st of November reported that "Bismarck's friends" speak of the Alliance as designed to revive the state of affairs that existed in the Germanic Confederation.⁽³⁾ Dufferin who passed a day with Bismarck at Varzin on his way from London to St. Petersburg at the beginning of December was informed by the Chancellor that he had originally intended to establish an "organic" alliance between the two Empires that could only have been altered with the consent of the Legislatures of the two countries.⁽⁴⁾

(1) F.O.45/383 Macdonnell to Salisbury 406 8 October 1879
Secret

(2) F.O.45/383 Macdonnell to Salisbury 13 October 1879

(3) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
Secret

(4) Lyall: op.cit. p.277 et sequ.
c.f. G.P.Vol.III No.455 p.30, No.477 p.82, No.509.
No.467 p.72 (instructions to Reuss as to the terms of the proposed agreement to be suggested to Andrassy: notice of a wish to abrogate the Treaty was only to be given with the consent of their respective Parliaments).
Schüssler: op.cit.

The Foreign Office had no information, however, that the purely diplomatic agreement which was known to have been concluded had any wider significance. Nothing was known of the reference in the preamble of the Treaty to the former Confederation. Münster's overture of the 27th of September was misinterpreted. From the instructions sent by Radowitz on Bismarck's orders to Münster, it seems that Bismarck's object was primarily to secure information and not to offer an Austro-German English alliance. Münster was to find out what England's policy would be in the event of Russo-German difficulties. ⁽¹⁾ On the 9th of September the differences between the Emperor and Bismarck came to a head. Discussions were, however, suspended during the next three days, while the final instalments of the Kaiser's account of the Alexandrovka meeting which he concluded in a leisurely fashion at Stettin on the 12th, arrived at Gastein. Bülow, who was still in attendance on the Kaiser telegraphed that the Emperor would accept the proposed Alliance, if the Treaty did not name Russia as the potential aggressor. ⁽²⁾ Andrassy had rejected the proposal once. It was more than likely

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.709 (Bismarck to Radowitz 14 September 1879)
No.710 (Radowitz to Münster 16 September 1879)

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.468.

(1)
that he would do so again. In these circumstances, the question then faced the Chancellor whether, if he did not resign, he should consent to Andrassy's proposals and fight the matter out with the Emperor or whether he should risk the whole Treaty by insisting on a generalised redaction and face the possibility of being forced to adopt, temporarily at least, the Emperor's pro-Russian policy. In these circumstances he telegraphed on the 14th to Radowitz the instructions for Münster. It was necessary for the Chancellor to have some indication of the strength of the Anglo-Austrian friendship based on opposition to Russian ambitions in the East. Was this friendship strong enough to enable Austria-Hungary to rely on England's associating herself with Austria and Germany and not with Russia, if the anti-Russian direction of the Treaty, exaggerated as it would appear by the inevitable publicity of a conflict between himself and the Emperor, should cause a serious strain on Russo-German relations? Was the friendship between England and Austria strong enough to enable Andrassy to refuse the Treaty if Bismarck insisted on a general redaction? Was it strong enough ~~to~~ ^{to} seriously endanger German relations with Austria, if she were compelled to adopt for the time a pro-Russian policy?

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.469.

Saburoff's overture of the 28th-29 of September removed the necessity of a decision between a pro-Austrian and a pro-Russian policy, even before Münster's report of his
(1)
conversation with Beaconsfield was received.

(1) G.P. Vol..IV No.712 (Münster to Bismarck 27 September 1879)

CHAPTER III.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS

JANUARY 1880 - JUNE 1881.

After 1879 the course of diplomatic negotiations ceased for the time, to be the most valuable source of British information on European relations. It does not again become of real importance until after the agreements, on the preparation of which during 1880-81 it might have thrown some light, had been concluded. It was then inevitable that it should reveal some of their results.

The two factors which brought this about were first, a change in the diplomatic position of Great Britain and second, a change in her diplomatic methods.

The close contact that Britain had maintained with European affairs during the last years was necessarily interrupted by the General Election that took place at the end of March. From the time when the question of dissolution was first raised in mid-February, and especially after the decision was finally taken on March 6, ⁽¹⁾ attention tended to be concentrated to an increasing degree on internal affairs,

(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II pp.1383, 1386.

while Britain's diplomacy and the relations of other Powers towards her, were hampered by an element of uncertainty as to the outcome of the Elections. The normal effect of these factors was increased. Salisbury was disabled by illness from the last weeks of January, with short intervals, until March. From March 22 he was on holiday at Biarritz, and Tenterden was in sole charge until Granville took over the Foreign Office on April 29. ⁽¹⁾

The result of this state of affairs was well-illustrated by the negotiations on the Greek frontier question. After the French had been kept waiting a month for a reply to a fresh proposal for European mediation, Salisbury formulated a counter-proposal to the French Ambassador in London on January 15. ⁽²⁾ In spite of hints from Paris as to the dangers of delay, ⁽³⁾ it was not until February 29, that the proposal was formally made. ⁽⁴⁾ Although the assent of the Powers when the proposal was made to them on the 3rd, was given almost immediately, the question hung fire throughout

(1) Buckle: op.cit. Vol.II p.1378.
Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II pp.377-379.

(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.II Nos. 3, 7.

(3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.16.
F.O.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 115 9 February 1880
Confidential

(4) F.O. 27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury
Telegram 13 1 March 1880
D.D.F.Series I Vol.III No.144.

(1)
 March. When the proposal was formally put before the
 Porte, no pressure was exercised to secure a reply. (2) When
 Granville came into office the matter was still open. Again
 Great Britain exercised no influence whatever on the nego-
 tiations on the Montenegrin frontier question which were
 taking place at the same time. The Convention of April 18
 between Turkey and Montenegro, which provided for a cession
 of territory to the latter other than that originally
 stipulated for in the Berlin Treaty, was due entirely to
 the efforts of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. (3) The
 result was that the development in Austro-German relations

(1)	F.O.7/984	Salisbury to Elliot	Telegram	3	March	1880
			Russell			
			Dufferin			
			Paget			
			Layard			
			Corbett			
	F.O.45/403	Paget to Salisbury		87	5	March 1880
(2)	F.O.27/2429	Lyons to Salisbury			28	April 1880
(3)	F.O.65/1040	Salisbury to Plunkett		663	3	December 1879
	F.O. 7/966	Elliot to Salisbury			17	December 1879
	F.O.65/1048	Dufferin to Salisbury		675	26	December 1879
	F.O.65/1078	Dufferin to Salisbury		4	4	January 1880
	F.O.45/402	Paget to Salisbury		31	27	January 1880
	F.O.45/400	Salisbury to Paget			29	January 1880
	F.O.7/984	Salisbury to Elliot			12	February 1880
	F.O.7/989	Elliot to Salisbury			9	April 1880
	F.O.45/404	Paget to Salisbury		160	12	April 1880

taking place at this time, which effectually broke down the intimate friendship between Austria-Hungary and Britain, was unobserved.

It necessarily took Granville some time to re-establish contact with European affairs. It was never re-established on the same basis and never became so close.

In the first place, British influence at Constantinople which had been visibly declining since the summer of 1879 was never recovered. The seeds of Anglo-Turkish mistrust had, indeed, been sown at Berlin. Britain had proposed the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had herself taken possession of Cyprus, while the advice she gave in return in the matter of Turkish reforms seemed to the Porte an infringement of ^{its} her sovereignty. Subsequently, the uselessness of Great Britain as an ally was again and again demonstrated to Turkey. She could secure no money from her self-constituted protector, ⁽¹⁾ nor support of her authority in those parts of the Balkans which the Treaty of Berlin had left to her. On the contrary, Great Britain reached an agreement with Russia which prevented a Turkish occupation of the Balkan line, ⁽²⁾ while largely due to the influence of the British Commissioner, a constitution was

(1) F.O.78/2943 Layard to Salisbury 98. 26 January 1879
Cecil: op.cit. Vo..II p.314. Secret

(2) See p.10.

given to Eastern Rumelia which effectually cut it off from other Turkish Provinces and made it virtually independent. (1)

At the beginning of the year, the British representative promised to see that Turkey was not compelled to give up Janina and Larissa to Greece. (2)

In September Layard (3) advised the Porte to cede Janina. The failure to remove oppression in Asia Minor, the war against Afghanistan, and the disorders in Egypt weakened the position previously held by Great Britain in Turkish public opinion. Already in January 1879 there was a spasmodic outbreak of anti-British feeling in the Turkish Press. (4)

In May the attention of the Foreign Office was first drawn to the state of British influence at Constantinople as a matter for serious concern. (5)

By July, Salisbury acknowledged that the state of our relations with Turkey was critical. (6)

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- (1) F.O.78/2942 Layard to Salisbury 20 6 January 1879
- (2) See p.25.
- (3) F.O.27/2373 Adams to Salisbury 1003 6 October 1879
Confidential
- F.O.78/2958 Layard to Salisbury 806 6 September 1879
- (4) F.O.78/2943 Layard to Salisbury 98 26 January 1879
Secret
- (5) F.O.78/2949 Malet to Salisbury 375 4 May 1879
- (6) Brit.Mus.Add.MSS.39139
Salisbury to Layard 10 July 1879

In January, the Sultan had immediately informed Layard when Russia made an overture to him for a "secret alliance."⁽¹⁾ Later, Layard reported that the Russian efforts which had continued, were proving successful. The Sultan made no communications on the subject.⁽²⁾ In November the British Ambassador had very definite and apparently well-founded fears that a rapprochement, if not a formal alliance, was being negotiated between Russia and Turkey.⁽³⁾ At the same time, the improved relations between Austria-Hungary and Turkey,⁽⁴⁾ and between Germany and Turkey helped to destroy

(1) F.O.98/2942	Layard to Salisbury	44	12 January 1879
		Secret	
(2) F.O.78/2953	Layard to Salisbury	559	29 June 1879
		Secret	
(3) F.O.78/2961	Layard to Salisbury	975	11 November 1879
		986	13 November 1879
		Secret	
	Brit.Mus.Add.MSS.39029 Col.Swaine (Military attaché) to Layard		15 November 1879
F.O.78/2962	Layard to Salisbury	1016	22 November 1879
		Secret	
		1017	
		Secret	
F.O.65/1048	Plunkett to Salisbury	597	18 November 1879
		Very Confidential	
F.O.64/938	Russell to Salisbury	42	22 January 1880
		Secret	
(4) F.O.78/2956	Layard to Salisbury	709	8 August 1879
		Secret	
F.O.7/964	Egerton to Salisbury	578	16 September 1879
F.O.7/989	Elliot to Salisbury	167	13 April 1880
F.O.78/2953	Layard to Salisbury	534	21 June 1879
		Very Confidential	

the exclusive influence which Salisbury had aimed at securing for England at Constantinople by the Convention of June 4.

The anti-British trend at Constantinople was at last definitely established by the crisis in Anglo-Turkish relations of November 1879. Since the Congress Layard had subjected the Porte to a long course of pressure in the matter of reform. In the Spring it had been accompanied by insistence on the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish Convention respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the autumn after a journey through Syria Layard took up the question of reforms with increased energy. The Porte was rashly threatened with the summoning of the fleet to Besika Bay. ⁽¹⁾ A good deal of agitation at once occurred in the European capitals and the ships remained at Malta. ⁽²⁾ It was a false move, however, and seriously weakened the British position at Constantinople. ⁽³⁾ It was not improved by the appearance at this juncture of the Koelle case. ⁽⁴⁾ The papers of a certain Dr. Koelle, a German national

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- (1) F.O.78/2957 Layard to Salisbury Secret 735 23 August 1879
 F.O.78/2959 Layard to Salisbury Secret 891 19 October 1879
 Very Confidential
- (2) F.O.78/2961 Layard to Salisbury 951 5 November 1879
 F.O.65/1047 Plunkett to Salisbury 568 5 November 1879
 G.P. Vol.III No.511 p.131.
- (3) F.O.7/958 Salisbury to Egerton 8 November 1879
 F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 557 21 November 1879
 Secret
 H.S.Edwards: Sir William White. p.198
 (Layard to White December 1879)
- (4) A. & P. 1880 LXXXI p.1 The Case of Dr. Koelle.

employed by a London Missionary Society, were confiscated and his Turkish collaborator arrested. Layard took the matter up, but could secure no redress. Then, at the British invitation all the Powers with the notable exception of Russia made representations at Constantinople. The matter was satisfactorily settled, but as Tenterden minuted on the draft of a despatch to Russell asking for German support, "Layard seems to have got himself into rather a mess."⁽¹⁾ His influence as Salisbury later told Granville, was "worn out."⁽²⁾ British influence was not recovered when Goschen took Layard's place in May 1880. Influence depended very largely on personal ascendancy, which Gosch^{en} had first to acquire. Moreover, he came to Constantinople charged with the definite mission of securing the execution of the unfulfilled parts of the Berlin Treaty.

British influence with the Porte had given her some control over decisions taken at Constantinople. As long as this influence existed, other Powers would tend to seek an exchange of views with Great Britain before any decision affecting policy in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Egypt or Tunis

(1) F.O.64/930 Salisbury to Russell

27 December 1879

(2) Letters 2nd series Vol.III p.93 footnote.

was taken, whether merely to secure information or in order to obtain British support. In doing so, another Power in order to get a quid pro quo of any value, had to reveal something of its own intentions and the support it expected to secure from other countries. Further, by comparing the substance of the exchange of views with one Power with that of the conversations with another, a good deal of information could be acquired on European relations. To quote only one example, the exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and England on the question of the peaceful evacuation of Russian troops in the previous Spring, supplemented by an exchange between England and Russia, had shown the relations that existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia and between Austria-Hungary and Russia and Germany. These exchanges of views had been the direct result of British influence at Constantinople, both Powers as has been seen, depending upon it to secure the Turkish assent to whatever arrangement, whether European occupation or restrictions on Turkish occupation, resulted. The fact that in all the main questions which came under discussion during the next four years, Turkey was concerned, emphasises still further the importance of the loss of British influence at Constantinople as far as regarded information derived from diplomatic negotiations.

At the same time the British connection with Austria-Hungary was broken down. The intimacy of Anglo-Russian relations began to weaken when the final settlement of the

organisation of Eastern Rumelia, the arrangements for the garrisoning of the Province by Turkish troops, the departure of the Russian army, and the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish Convention respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, liquidated the different questions upon which the co-operation of the two Powers at the Berlin Congress had been based.

After the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance Austria-Hungary began under Bismarck's influence ^{deliberately} ~~consciously~~ to draw apart from England. Haymerle originally intended that the conclusion of the alliance should make no difference to Anglo-Austrian relations. It was he who suggested the communication to England. He had also proposed that England's "Zustimmung and Unterstützung" should be requested. Bismarck, however, replied that he desired an alliance à deux and not a coalition à trois. ⁽¹⁾ He did not object to the communication, but he insisted that no request for British "support" should be made. ⁽²⁾ Again Karolyi's communication was so worded that it encouraged the impression that the alliance would result in a strengthening of the Austrian support of British policy in the East. Münster, ⁽³⁾ as has been seen, took pains to destroy this impression. Haymerle,

(1) Rothfels: op.cit. p.57.

(2) Rothfels: op.cit. pp.130-31
 (Reuss to Bismarck 19 October 1879)
 (Bismarck to the Foreign Office 23 October 1879).

(3) See p. 110

however, did not relinquish his intentions. At the beginning of November he proposed that a fuller communication should be made to England and suggested "dass wir den Kabinett von St. James in etwas deutlicherer Weise unserer Unterstützung seiner Politik im Orient in Aussicht stellten." This proposal Bismarck also rejected. It was not Germany's task, he said, to quarrel with Russia on England's account, nor to make herself the tool of England's aggressive purposes." Haymerle⁽¹⁾ did not return to the subject. Bismarck had successfully taken the first step in separating England and Austria.

The overtures of Sabaroff made further progress in the same direction easy. Although Bismarck for the moment did not press for Austrian adhesion to the plan of a revived Dreikaiserbund, it became clear in Austria-Hungary that the discouraging influence of the Austro-German Alliance on Russian chauvinism had again made Bismarck master of the situation and had in fact cut the ground from under the Anglo-Austrian friendship.⁽²⁾ It was not until February, after a long conversation with Kalnoky on the relations of the two Empires to Italy⁽³⁾ when Austria again suggested the induction

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.510 (Reuss to Bismarck 6 November 1879)
 No.511 (Bismarck to the Foreign Office
 10 November 1879)

(2) Schüssler: op.cit.

(3) A. Pribram: The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary. Vol.II p.5.
 Schüssler: op.cit. (Bismarck to Schweinitz
 10 February 1880)

of England into the political councils of the Central Powers, that Bismarck's efforts were finally successful. On the 28th, Reuss reported that Haymerle would subject himself to Bismarck's wishes and desired to avoid everything that could be interpreted as an approach to England. (1)

Accordingly Haymerle wrote to Karolyi that Austria would put a stop to her confidences to England, in order to please Bismarck. The Austrian action shortly afterwards in regard to the ^{new} ~~old~~ Agrarian Law in Servia, when she consulted Germany but not England, afforded her an opportunity to prove her good faith to Germany. (2)

The advent of the Liberals in England gave a fresh impulse to the drawing apart of the two Powers, and it becomes as much a matter of deliberate policy in England as in Austria-Hungary. In January, the Emperor had already said to Elliot that after Gladstone's recent language in speaking of Austria-Hungary "it would be difficult to feel confidence in the maintenance of the present relations if he returned to power." (3)

(1) Rothfels: op.cit. pp.131 et seq.
 (Bismarck to Reuss 11 February 1880)
 (Reuss to Bismarck 28 February 1880)
 (Haymerle to Karolyi 3 March 1880)

(2) F.O.64/956 Salisbury to Russell 109 18 March 1880

(3) F.O.7/988 Elliot to Salisbury 8 January 1880

Similar remarks at the time of the Elections caused a crisis in Anglo-Austrian relations. They were made to Elliot casually at a charity ball. He had not thought them worth reporting. On the following morning, however, the Vienna papers had the news that the Emperor had spoken to the British Ambassador against Gladstone and the Liberals. (1) When it was ^{reported} ~~repeated~~ ⁱⁿ ~~to~~ the Standard, the Emperor's language was much exaggerated, and it appeared that Elliot had been sent for by the Emperor who had spoken to him formally on the matter. The result was that Gladstone speaking at Edinburgh on March 17, accused Austria-Hungary of interfering in the British elections. (2) Attacks upon Austria-Hungary in Parliament had already made it clear that the return of the Liberals would mean the abandonment of what Gladstone described as an "Austrian foreign policy." Gladstone now insisted on that point. Then, with Austrian policy in the first half of the century in mind, he made a generalization: "There is not an instance, there is not a spot upon the whole map where you can lay your finger and say: There Austria did good." Karolyi was extremely angry and told Granville that if the Liberals came into power, he would leave England.

(1) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 22 March 1880

(2) E. Fitzmaurice: The Life of Lord Granville Vol.II pp.200-207.

Elliot telegraphed from Vienna asking that the words (1)
 attributed to the Emperor should be publicly corrected.
 Northcote read the telegram with the correct version of the (2)
 Emperor's language at a public meeting the following day.
 Three weeks later the Liberals had won the Elections and
 Hartington had refused to form a Government. The Queen sent (3)
 for Gladstone. The latter's accession to power, while it
 meant that a reconciliation would have to be brought about,
 also meant that a similar confidence to that which had
 existed between the two Governments since 1878 would not be
 re-established. Gladstone's refusal to give a voluntary
 declaration made matters more difficult. It was not until
 Karolyi had taken the first step, and informed Granville
 officially that the Emperor had not spoken against him as
 the Standard alleged, and had declared Austria's intention
 to carry out the Treaty of Berlin to the full, that Gladstone (4)
 drew up a letter of explanation. Even then he hesitated,
 and was prepared to hold it back when a telegram arrived from
 Elliot stating that Austria-Hungary could not urge the Porte

(1) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 22 March 1880

(2) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. p.203.

(3) Letters. 2nd Series Vol.III p.82. (Memorandum by
 the Queen 23 April).

(4) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. p.206.

to cede the territory to Montenegro in accordance with the Convention of April 18, as she would not be in a position to carry out any threats, nor to allow any other Power to do so. Gladstone ^{interpreted} ~~interrupted~~ this as an Austrian effort to break away from the Concert in order to pursue her own (1) aggressive ambitions. The letter, however, was finally sent and did something to remove the ill-feeling between the two countries. Close co-operation on the basis of community of political objects in the Balkans did not, however, again come into existence.

No close co-operation with any other Power compensated for the loss of intimate relations with Austria-Hungary, as far as the opportunities offered by the latter for securing information were concerned.

The Foreign Office was inclined to estimate the value of Italy as an ally very low. Her policy was regarded as one of restless intrigue and no serious or consistent purpose was thought to guide her activities. She appeared to be intriguing against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and Albania, against France in Tunis and against England and France in Egypt.

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- (1) F.O.7/940 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 47 3 May 1880
Gladstone to Granville 4 May 1880
P.R.O. Gifts and Deposits, Granville Papers: G.D.29/123.
- (2) F.O.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury Telegram 28 October 1879
F.O.45/383 Paget to Salisbury 435 15 November 1879
F.O.105/8 Gould to Salisbury 16 November 1879
F.O.7/958 Salisbury to Egerton 719 8 November 1879
F.O.78/2955 Layard to Salisbury Secret 604 11 July 1879
F.O.45/403 Paget to Salisbury Secret 139 27 March 1880
Secret

A more solid cause for the British attitude was the conviction that Britain could always exercise some control over Italy by means of her superior sea-Power. "Italy" as Egerton worded it in October 1879, "from her extended seaboard must always remain amenable to any serious pressure on the part of Her Majesty's Government."⁽¹⁾ The result was that the British representative in Rome was inclined to adopt a somewhat superior and domineering attitude towards the Italian Government. Her overtures for a close understanding with England were regarded as "these somewhat effusive assurances" to which a "polite" rejoinder⁽²⁾ had to be made. Paget continually overstepped the normal limits ^{imposed by} of a diplomat's position to administer a strongly worded criticism of Italian policy. At the time of the Congress, he warned the Italian Government in very strong terms against offering any opposition to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even Salisbury regarded his language on that occasion as too impetuous, "but the policy was right."⁽³⁾ Again in October 1879, Paget spoke very strongly against the whole conduct of

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- (1) F.O.7/965 Egerton to Salisbury 18 October 1879
- (2) F.O.45/379 Paget to Salisbury 177 25 April 1879
Confidential
Minute by Salisbury
- (3) F.O.45/334 Paget to Salisbury 332 5 June 1878
Most Confidential
and minute by Salisbury

Italian foreign policy. Her object of remaining aloof from European combinations in the hope that her alliance might eventually be sought, when she could give it in return for a substantial quid pro quo, he told Maffei, was very dangerous. "He did not see any sign that any Power would stand in need of an Italian Alliance."⁽¹⁾ When Granville came into power Italy was still considered in the Foreign Office as "Italie la remuante."⁽²⁾ Rebukes were still freely administered to her Government, when the Foreign Office⁽³⁾ thought fit.

There were more fundamental reasons which prevented the development of any close understanding between Italy and England. In the Franco-Italian rivalry in Tunis England was pledged by Salisbury's declarations at Berlin to the support, if only by inaction, of the French views. England was bound to oppose any efforts of Italy to obtain an equal footing with England and France in Egypt. Thus, as soon as Italy wished to include these subjects in an exchange of views with

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| (1) F.O.45/382 | Paget to Salisbury | 400 | 3 October 1879 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.27/2432 | Lyons to Granville | 545 | 29 June 1880 |
| | Minute by Tenterden | | |
| F.O.45/405 | Paget to Salisbury | 272 | 14 June 1880 |
| | | 281 | 16 June 1880 |
| | | Secret | |
| F.O.7/989 | Elliot to Granville | | 29 April 1880 |
| (3) G.D.29/123 | Gladstone to Granville | | 17 August 1880 |

England, attempts to reach an understanding were at once checked. In the early months of 1879, the co-operation of England and Italy on the Eastern question had been drawing gradually closer. On May 26 the Italian Ambassador stated to Salisbury that he wished to discuss the matters with which Italy was really preoccupied. He then referred to the ambitions of France to turn the Mediterranean into a French lake by the acquisition of the whole North African coast. Salisbury in reply expressed no opinion on this point, but stated that he welcomed the desire recently shown by Italy for an understanding with Her Majesty's Government on questions connected with the East. ⁽¹⁾ A similar conversation occurred on June 7 and again on June 24. Menabrea failed on both occasions to secure any satisfaction. ⁽²⁾ The result was, that when Cairoli replaced Depretis as Minister for Foreign Affairs at the end of July, Italy abandoned her policy of seeking a rapprochement with England. She reached an understanding with France on the Greek question and agreed with her to recommend to Turkey the cession of Janina, ⁽³⁾

(1) F.O.45/376	Salisbury to Paget	303	26 May 1879
(2) F.O.45/376	Salisbury to Paget	317	7 June 1879
		398	24 June 1879
(3) F.O.45/383	Paget to Salisbury	380	17 September 1879
		393	27 September 1879
		400	3 October 1879

and she made difficulties in the negotiations on the
 Egyptian question. (1) When Depretis returned to the Ministry
 in November, she separated herself from the other Powers and
 recognised Rumanian independence. (2) In matters connected
 with the Balkans she appeared to adopt a pro-Russian attitude.
 The Italian Press began to adopt a hostile tone towards
 England. (3) In January of the following year a new impediment
 to an Anglo-Italian understanding emerged. It was the result
 of the British attitude in regard to Italian activities at
 Assab Bay. News reached the Foreign Office that Italy was
 attempting to establish a coaling station there. Salisbury
 having made sure of his ground, informed the Italian Govern-
 ment unofficially that there could be no doubt that the
 territory belonged to Egypt. (4) He then drew the attention

(1) F.O.45/376	Salisbury to Paget	534	8 November 1879
		594	22 December 1879
F.O.27/2427	Lyons to Salisbury	168	28 February 1880
F.O.7/963	Elliot to Salisbury	467	26 July 1879
			Confidential
(2) F.O.45/376	Salisbury to Paget	569	8 December 1879
		591	20 December 1879
F.O.45/383	Paget to Salisbury	471	13 December 1879
			Confidential
(3) F.O.45/402	Paget to Salisbury	7	6 January 1880
(4) F.O.45/400	Salisbury to Paget	23	9 January 1880

of the French Government to the matter, and asked for their support. Malet, British Consul-General at Cairo, was instructed to induce the Egyptian Government to send a ship of war there and to hoist the Turkish flag. ⁽¹⁾ As a result, the Foreign Office was assured that the enterprise was private and purely commercial. ⁽²⁾ Salisbury was not, however, satisfied until Paget at the beginning of April obtained a promise that the Italian Government would not now or at any future time create a Government settlement there, or erect fortifications or other works of a military character. ⁽³⁾

Granville on coming into office assured Menabrea of the British desire to continue to co-operate with Italy on the Eastern Question. ⁽⁴⁾ The co-operation that had existed at the beginning of 1879 was revived. ⁽⁵⁾ Again, however, it could be carried no further. At the crucial moment when the Italian Cabinet was divided as to whether a policy of closer understanding with Austria-Hungary and Germany or with Great Britain should be pursued, Granville failed entirely

(1) F.O.27/2426	Lyons to Salisbury	22	10 January 1880
	and minute by Salisbury	Secret	
(2) F.O.45/400	Salisbury to Paget	26	17 January 1880
(3) F.O.45/404	Paget to Salisbury	155A	7 April 1880
(4) F.O.45/405	Paget to Granville	219	11 May 1880
(5) F.O.45/406	Paget to Granville	341	17 July 1880
		393	24 August 1880

(1)
to respond to Italy's overtures.

With France the relations of the Granville Government were closest. "Although Great Britain as a general rule did not favour special alliances", Granville told the French chargé d'affaires, "he could not emphasise sufficiently the importance attached by her to co-operation with France." (2)
Relations, however, became less rather than more intimate than those which had existed between Waddington and Salisbury. The reason for this was the attitude of the Gladstone Government on the question of Tunis. Shortly after his arrival in London as French Ambassador, Léon Say, sought to ascertain the view of the new Government in regard to the declarations of Salisbury and Beaconsfield at Berlin. Granville made it clear that England had no right to express an opinion in the matter and insisted that Salisbury had ~~made~~ distinctly reserved the opinion of Her Majesty's Government respecting the position of Italy. (3) Freycinet had meanwhile approached Lyons on the question to know if the new Government held "the same liberal and enlightened views" as their predecessors on

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| (1) F.O.45/407 | Paget to Granville | 439 | 28 September 1880 |
| | | Secret | |
| | | 440 | |
| F.O.45/408 | Paget to Granville | 577 | 23 December 1880 |
| | | Very Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.27/2421 | Granville to Lyons | 447 | 1 May 1880 |
| (3) F.O.27/2422 | Granville to Lyons | 698 | 17 June 1880 |

the subject. Granville in reply merely expressed the hope "that any difference of opinion on the subject between Italy and France would be discussed in a conciliatory spirit."⁽¹⁾

Freycinet then told Lyons that he had been led to expect more than that England would hold aloof in any conflict between France and Italy on the matter. He had thought that England might be relied upon to express her disapproval to Italy. Nothing more, however, could be secured from Granville.⁽²⁾ Friendship with England then was useless to France. Her policy must be to cultivate a better understanding with Italy. This policy Barthélemy St. Hilaire pursued after the dispute with Italy in connection with the Tunis-Goletta railway had been settled, and the relations between England and France grew less close.⁽³⁾ In August, Freycinet

(1) F.O.27/2432	Lyons to Granville and minute by Granville	545	29 June 1880
(2) F.O.27/2433	Lyons to Granville	579	8 July 1880
(3) F.O.27/2435	Adams to Granville	921	28 September
	Most Confidential		
		924	29 September 1880
	Confidential		
		929	30 September 1880
	Secret		
F.O.45/407	Macdonnell to Granville		
		458	8 October 1880
G.D.29/182	Macdonnell to Sanderson		19 September 1880
	" "		

Concerns the activities of M. Binz confidential agent of Gambetta's in Rome.

W.L. Langer: The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis (American Historical Review, Jan. 1926 pp.252-65.

began to show signs of reserve towards England on the
 Montenegrin ^{and} Greek ^{frontier} questions (1) In September, when Granville
 informed Chaillet ^{em} Lacour that he desired to consult the
 French Government in ~~full~~ confidence before communicating
 with the other Cabinets as to the best method of treating the
 Greek question, Barthélemy St. Hilaire replied curtly ^{that} he
 must decline to take the initiative on the question or to
 discuss it separately with any Power. (2) ~~He~~ ^{He} refused her ^{is}
 support ~~to~~ the extension of the naval demonstration to deal
 with the Greek frontier question as well as the Montenegrin
 although in July she had made this a condition of taking
 part in the Dulcigno demonstration. (3)

One of Granville's first objects when he took charge of
 the Foreign Office was to effect an improvement in Anglo-

(1)	F.O.27/2433	Adams to Granville	728	23 August 1880
			Very Confidential	
			775	23 August 1880
			Very Confidential	
			780	25 August 1880
			Confidential	
(2)	F.O.27/2436	Lyons to Granville	939	3 October 1880
		and minute of Granville's		
	G.D.29/176	Lyons to Granville		4 October 1880
(3)	F.O.27/2436	Lyons to Granville	963,964	9 October 1880
	G.D.29/176	Lyons to Granville		9 & 11 October

Russian relations. It was an object he was prepared to pursue in spite of the Queen's opposition, and he instructed Dufferin to mark his communications on the subject personal. "We wish to be good friends with Russia" he wrote to the Ambassador. "We do not think there need be any ostentation about it, and we do not propose to make any concessions excepting with a view to our interests as well as hers."

Russia was fully prepared to respond. Labanoff told Granville repeatedly that his mission was to come to an understanding with England on all matters. (1) The Czar made a point of assuring Dufferin of his conviction that there would now be no difficulty in establishing a good understanding between the two countries. (2) Russia showed herself very ready to co-operate with England in the Montenegrin question. (3) As soon, however, as any real attempt was made to reach an understanding England at once drew back. Thus, Labanoff speaking unofficially though with the knowledge of the Russian Government, said that Russia would be ready to send a contingent of 20,000 to assist an English contingent in coercing

(1) G.D.29/209	Granville to Dufferin Telegram	18 May 1880	
		24 May 1880	
		2 June 1880	
(2) F.O.65/1080	Dufferin to Granville	226	19 May 1880
		229	20 May 1880
		256	15 June 1880
(3) F.O.65/1076	Granville to Dufferin	187	6 May 1880
F.O.65/1080	Dufferin to Granville	277	29 June 1880
		303	22 July 1880

the Albanians to give up Dulcigno. It was a secret proposal and seems to have been designed rather to secure some clarity as to England's ultimate intentions in the Montenegro question in particular and in Eastern affairs in general, than to lead to an immediate Anglo-Russian intervention. Granville, however, did not treat it in that way. He gave no expression of opinion and much to Russia's discomfiture, allowed the proposal to become public. ⁽¹⁾ When Russia and Italy alone showed themselves favourable to Granville's proposal to follow up the European naval demonstration off Dulcigno, by the seizure of the port and customs house of Smyrna, ⁽²⁾ in the

- (1) F.O.65/1076 Granville to Dufferin 272 21 June 1880
 F.O.65/1080 Dufferin to Granville 293 15 July 1880
 G.D.29/209 Granville to Dufferin 7 July 1880
 G.D.29/185 Dufferin to Granville 15 July 1880
 F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 377 7 July 1880
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/995 Elliot to Granville
 Telegram 170 8 October 1880
 F.O.64/962 Walsham to Granville
 Telegram secret 9 October 1880
 F.O.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 963 9 October 1880
 report the refusal to participate.
 Austria-Hungary, Germany, France.
 F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
 Telegram 140 5 October 1880
 F.O.45/1082 Plunkett to Granville 451 5 October 1880
 report Italian and Russian acceptance.
 F.O.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 475 12 October 1880
 Confidential
 491 19 October 1880
 Very Confidential
 502 23 October 1880
 Confidential
 G.D.29/123 Gladstone to Granville 6 & 14 October 1880
 concern remarks by Jomini as to the impossibility of
 Russia acting alone with England unless there is some
 understanding as to subsequent events.

interests of the Greek frontier question, Russia once more attempted to make an opportunity to bring about an understanding with England on all points connected with the East. If such an understanding could be effected, Jomini told Plunkett, who believed he spoke on instructions from Livadia, Russia would be prepared to go forward alone with England, or with England and Italy, in the Smyrna project. (1) Jomini was engaged at the time in a controversy with Saburoff as to the merits of a Russian alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany. (2) Had England returned a favourable reply, it would have given Jomini just the weapon that he lacked to influence the Emperor to check at least for the moment Saburoff's negotiations with Bismarck, before they reached the point as they did at the beginning of the following month, when a text of the proposed agreement could be drafted. Granville, however, instructed Plunkett: "We desire to be on friendly terms with Russia and to avoid all unnecessary antagonism, but we have no wish for special alliances with any particular countries, which would prevent us from using ^{our} ~~an~~ influence to maintain good relations with all." (3) The opportunity was lost. The

(1) F.O.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 525 8 November 1880
Secret

(2) J.Y. Simpson: The Saburoff Memoirs pp.166-67
(Jomini to Saburoff 23 November)

(3) F.O.65/1082 Plunkett to Granville 525 8 November 1880
Secret
Minute by Granville

Smyrna demonstration abandoned. The negotiations for the Dreikaiserbund agreement proceeded with and no further reference to a separate understanding with England made. (1)

Any advantages as far as ^{the} securing ^{of} information on the relations between the Powers from the course of diplomatic negotiations ^{was concerned,} that might have resulted from an effort on Granville's part to show confidence in Bismarck, were counter-balanced by the change in British methods of negotiation. It was in respect of Anglo-German negotiations that this change (2) was most apparent.

During Salisbury's tenure of the Foreign Office the Powers were faced with a continuous series of propositions in connection with one question or another, respecting which they had either to take a favourable or unfavourable decision or to put forward a counter-proposition. The majority of those proposals were either put before the Powers by the British Foreign Office or, as in the case of the later negotiations, ^{on the} ~~into~~ evacuation of the Balkans by another Power after an agreement with England. We were thus in a position to judge from the replies received, the tendencies towards co-operation between the Powers. Granville did not as a rule take the initiative in putting proposals before the Powers.

(1) F.O.65/1083 Plunkett to Granville 547 17 November 1880
Confidential

(2) G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 13 October 1880
12 January 1881

When he did so, they were either of a general character and demanded further development by subsequent proposals, or they dealt with matters which touched the interests of all the Powers, so that in no case was their decision determined previously by their alliance policy. The invitation issued to the Powers immediately on his assumption of office, to call upon the Porte by means of an identic note, to execute the remaining portions of the Treaty of Berlin, was an example of the first type of proposal. (1) The proposals for the naval demonstration off Dulcigno, (2) and for the seizure of Smyrna were examples of the second. (3) The British part tended more and more to become that of a Power called upon to take decisions on proposals put forward by Austria-Hungary, as in the Montenegrin question, or by France in the Greek question, after these Powers had assured themselves of the support of the remaining Powers as far as the British Foreign Office was concerned, tendencies towards co-operation were, therefore, concealed. Again, although as during Salisbury's administration of the Foreign Office Great Britain initiated exchanges of views with other Powers in regard to the questions

(1) F.O.65/1076	Granville to	Lyons	452	4 May 1880
		Russell	183	
		Elliot	194	
		Paget	195	
		Dufferin	176	
(2) F.O.65/1077	Granville to	Lyons		6 July 1880
		Russell		
		Elliot		
		Paget		
		Dufferin		
(3) F.O.65/1077	Granville to	Lyons		3 October 1880
		Russell		
		Elliot		
		Paget		
		Dufferin		

under general negotiation, they were not calculated to throw any light on the relations existing between the Powers. Thus, on May 1, Granville initiated an exchange of views on the Montenegrin question. He sent a Circular to the Ambassadors at the different European capitals instructing them to enquire of the Governments to which they were accredited "what view they take of the matter."⁽¹⁾ In the first place it was not a case of a confidential consultation with any single Power which could have drawn from it some information as to its intentions and expectations of support. In the second place, as Granville himself made no proposal it was unlikely to produce anything but vague assurances, or alternatively, as in the case of Russia, a proposition on the matter calling for a British decision,⁽²⁾ and not in itself throwing any light at the time on European relations. Again, on two occasions Russell was instructed "to thoroughly talk out the matter with the Chancellor",⁽³⁾ and on one occasion Goschen was similarly instructed. In these instances a confidential and limited exchange of views did take place, but Russell was asked to find out what step Bismarck thought should be taken

(1) F.O.65/1084 Granville to Lyons Telegrams 1 May 1880
 Russell
 Elliot
 Paget
 Dufferin

(2) F.O.65/1085 Dufferin to Granville
 Telegram 65 8 May

(3) G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 13 October 1880
 12 January 1881

next - the first instance was just after the Montenegrin question reached a solution, and the second after the failure of a French proposition for the settlement of the Greek question - he was now^t instructed to secure Bismarck's support for an English proposal, which could then be put before the Powers. The result was that Bismarck himself suggested a ^{Solution} combination, and himself secured the support of the other Powers for it. (1) The tendencies towards co-operation which the latter process revealed, were then hidden from the British Foreign Office.

British information then during 1880-81 ^{was} is derived in the main from reports concerned with the subject of relationships. It ^{was} ~~is~~ based upon ^{with few exceptions} the interpretation of incidents which occurred in the development of relationships, ^{upon} ~~and from~~ the declarations of the Ministers of the different countries, and ^{upon articles in} ~~from~~ the Press.

These reports revealed the isolation of Italy brought about by Germany, when Italian efforts to seek an understanding with England in the early part of 1879, and with France in the later months had failed. Secondly, they revealed Italian efforts to escape from isolation by reaching an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary, when attempts to reach an understanding with England had again failed, and the Tunis

(1) G.D.29/189 Goschen to Granville

7 February 1881

question baulked the efforts of France, in the autumn of 1880, to improve her relation with Italy.

At the beginning of 1880, British information seemed to point more and more clearly to the conclusion that Germany was fomenting ill-feeling between Austria and Italy. In January the prominent part taken by Cairoli and other members of the Italian Government in the ceremonies connected with the funeral of General Avezzana, former president of the "Irredenta", and their association on that occasion with Imbriani, was used as the opportunity for an outbreak of violent agitation in the Austrian and German Press. It was directed first against the Irridentist Societies, and then against the whole policy of the Italian Government. During February Paget's conversations with Maffei turned almost entirely upon the subject of Italo-Austrian relations. By then, the existence in Austria of a party hostile to Italy had been acknowledged both by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments and reported by the British Ambassadors accredited to them. Paget reported that Maffei believed a strong section of Austrian opinion desired to pick a quarrel with Italy while she was weak, to prevent her from being a source of strength to Russia in an eventual Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans. (1) Elliot from Vienna reported that everybody

(1) F.O.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 37 31 January 1880
Confidential

"from the extreme conservatives to the extreme liberals, the ministers, military men and the Emperor himself, looked upon Italy with mistrust." Any sign of aggressive intentions on her part would mean immediate war. For aggression on the part of Italy would be met "with a unanimous alacrity which would be wanting in the case of a rupture with any other country."⁽¹⁾ Soon afterwards the Foreign Office was informed that four detachments of Austrian troops had been moved into the Tyrol.⁽²⁾ A fortnight later the reports of Robilant were still "anything but reassuring."⁽³⁾

Another aspect of the question, however, had now appeared. The attitude of the Austrian Government was not consistent with a desire, or even readiness, to seek a quarrel with Italy. Paget's reports showed that Haymerle had taken great care to reassure Italy in regard to the troop movements. He had informed Robilant that they were intended some time before they took place, and had stated frankly that Austria-Hungary must be prepared against a sudden raid organised by the Irredentists. At the same time he insisted that he had full confidence in the intention of the Italian Government

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| (1) F.O.7/988 | Elliot to Salisbury | | 4 February 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.45/402 | Paget to Salisbury | Telegram | 13 February 1880 |
| | F.O.45/403 | 115 | 14 March 1880 |
| (3) F.O.45/402 | Paget to Salisbury | 77 | 28 January 1880 |

to repress any overt act on their part, and was anxious that the Austrian action should not be misinterpreted. (1)

Shortly afterwards an article appeared in the Neue Freie Presse urging the maintenance of the most friendly relations between the two countries. (2)

The possibility that the agitation in the German and Austrian press was artificially promoted then began to be suggested.

For the irredentists whose activities were still denounced, were unusually quiet. The Italian Government appeared to be doing everything possible to remove any grounds for Austrian fears of Italian aggression. Already on the 22nd February the Times published a telegram from Vienna reporting information derived from the Politische Correspondenz, that a circular had been issued by the Italian Government to the Prefects of the provinces bordering on Austria. It instructed them to repress with "vigorous severity" anything calculated to disturb the friendly relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy. A week later, the Foreign Office was informed that these instructions had in fact been sent. (3) At the same time, Paget reported articles

(1) F.O.45/402	Paget to Salisbury	51 & 52	13 February 1880
(2) F.O.45/402	Paget to Salisbury	72	26 February 1880
(3) F.O.45/402	Paget to Salisbury	47	7 February 1880

in the Government Press, notably in the Diritto, which declared that the Italian Government would do everything in their power to control the activities of the irredentists. (1) Maffei continually urged on the Ambassador the desire of Italy to maintain the most friendly relations with Austria. The tone of the reports of the British Ambassadors changed. Instead of dwelling now on the mistrust felt by Austria-Hungary towards Italy, Paget pointed out that Maffei was inclined to attach too much importance to a mere newspaper agitation, (2) while Elliot informed the Government that Robilant was mistaken in believing that everything in the Austrian press was inspired by the Austrian Foreign Office. Finally, it appeared from Elliot's report, that the Vienna correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, (3) who had been largely instrumental in spreading an impression that Austria and Italy were on the verge of war, had not, as had been assumed in Italy, derived his information from the Press Bureau of the Austrian Foreign Office. (4)

It was the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, however, who first suggested that the German Government was possibly

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- (1) F.O.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 39 2 February 1880
52 13 February 1880
77 28 February 1880
- (2) F.O.45/402 Paget to Salisbury 77 28 February 1880
Confidential
- (3) Daily Telegraph 26th January and 9th February.
- (4) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 124 15 March 1880
Confidential

the instigator of the whole agitation. Already, on January 26 the paper published a telegram which stated that the "Representative of a Foreign Power notoriously on the most friendly terms with Austria-Hungary" had made a communication in Rome, warning the Italian Government against the marked hostility manifested by Italy towards Austria-Hungary, and pointing out the disastrous consequences of war. At the time, both Maffei and ^UKendell denied that any such communication had been made. ⁽¹⁾ By the end of February, however, Paget reported that Maffei had begun to speak as if he were seriously apprehensive that Austria was being urged to seek a cause of quarrel with Italy by Germany. ⁽²⁾ A despatch just received in the Foreign Office from Odo Russell seemed to indicate that he was not far wrong. ^{Russell} He reported that Bismarck was surprised that Austria did not resent more openly the attitude assumed by Italy, and that Germany was urging the Austrian Government to strengthen the defences of her Italian frontiers and to be prepared to resist an invasion which he believed the Italian Government "will have neither the prudence nor the strength to prevent." ⁽³⁾ Paget's comments on the

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| (1) F.O.45/402 | Paget to Salisbury | 37 | 31 January 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.45/402 | Paget to Salisbury | 77 | 28 February 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (3) F.O.64/958 | Russell to Salisbury | | 20 February 1880 |

despatch which Salisbury forwarded to him on the 27th, pointed out that Prince Bismarck's suspicions were entirely unfounded, and encouraged the impression that they were made public with some ulterior political object in view. (1)

As suddenly as the agitation had arisen, it again died down. On March 17 Cairoli declared in a speech before the Italian Chambers that the Government would show itself inexorable in repressing any attempt to disturb the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary. (2) Extracts from the speech were communicated officially to Berlin and Vienna. Both Austria-Hungary and Germany showed themselves ready to accept Cairoli's statements as completely re-assuring. (3) Bismarck's language in speaking of Italy to Russell a week later, was unexpectedly moderate. (4) During the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Austrian Chambers, the relations of Austria-Hungary to Italy were scarcely mentioned. (5) A little

- (1) F.O.45/403 Paget to Salisbury 86 4 March 1880
Confidential
cf. D.D.F. Series I Vol.III Nos. 32,33,36,38,47,54.
Pribram: op.cit. pp.6-7.
Simpson: op.cit. p.105.
- (2) F.O.45/403 Paget to Salisbury Telegram 17 March
129 and 130 21 March
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.63.
- (3) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 143 22 March 1880
F.O.45/404 Paget to Salisbury 166 20 April 1880
Confidential
- (4) F.O.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 148 26 March 1880
Secret
- (5) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 15 April 1880

later an incident at Trieste showed clearly the confidence (1) between the two countries had been fully restored. The ~~incident~~ ^{events of January and February} had, however, left Italy in a position of marked isolation.

The next reports of importance in regard to Italian relations reached the Foreign Office in the late summer of the same year. Articles in the Italian Press made it clear that Italy was becoming increasingly preoccupied with the question of her relationships to other Powers. (2) Meanwhile, Macdonnell who was then in charge of the Italian Foreign Office, had secured a very valuable source of information. An employé in the Italian Foreign Office, who had once been "under a very heavy obligation to him" had offered to assist him "with a few scraps of information." These Macdonnell tested carefully by discreetly cross-questioning his (3) colleagues. The result was that he secured valuable information on the Conference that took place from August 26-28 at Cairoli's summer residence at Belgirate, on the shores of Lake Como. It was after this Conference that the first tentative overtures were made by Italy to Germany of a (4) closer understanding.

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- (1) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 177 18 April 1880
 (2) F.O.45/406 Macdonnell to Salisbury 388 22 August 1880
 (3) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Granville 23 August 1880
 (4) G.P. vol.III No.533 footnote.

On August 16 the Foreign Office received a telegram from Macdonnell, with information derived from this source. It was sent privately to Sanderson, the Assistant Under-Secretary. (1)

"In a conversation last night with the German Ambassador," it read, "Count Maffei expressed deep regret that since 1866 certain minor questions should have cooled the relations between Italy and Germany and that he personally thought it most desirable that the former friendly understanding be revived!"

The German Ambassador who had intended to leave Rome for Germany on the following day, postponed his departure and the Foreign Office expected developments. For "every possible overture," it appeared, "had been made with a view to bringing about a more intimate entente with Germany." Macdonnell could not yet, however, report the result. (2) Further, the chargé

d'affaires reported that Cialdini, the Italian Ambassador at Paris, and Maffei were to be the guests of the Italian Prime Minister at Belgirate in order to discuss the course of policy to be adopted towards France. (3) Meanwhile, Dilke the Under

Secretary, had established a connection in London, with a foreigner who had access to the telegrams received by the Turkish Ambassador from his Government. ^{From this source Dilke} He received two batches of decyphers in August. From one of them he learnt

(1)	G.D.29/182	Macdonnell to Sanderson	Telegram	16 August	1880
(2)	G.D.29/182	Macdonnell to Granville		23 August	1880
(3)	Ibid and F.O.45/406	Macdonnell to Granville	393	24 August	1880
	F.O.45/407	Macdonnell to Granville	404	3 September	1880

that Maffei had informed the Turkish Ambassador in Rome of the efforts that Italy was making to secure a close friendship with Germany. Macdonnell's information was fully confirmed. (1)

Here, then, was a type of information comparable to that furnished by Crowe, Consul-General at Düsseldorf, in regard to the Austro-German Alliance, and by Plunkett in regard to the discussions at Livadia in September 1879.

The Foreign Office was then able to appreciate the full significance of the information in regard to the result of the Belgrate Conference, which Macdonnell derived from Maffei. The latter prefacing his remarks by asking the British representative to consider them as private and personal, did not make any direct communication to him, but drew his attention to an article in the Popolo Romano of September 2, dealing with Tunis, which he said would give Great Britain some idea of Italian policy. The article concluded as follows:- "It is probable that, after our bitter experience in Tunis, the sympathies of Italy will turn towards Germany If Italy draws closer to Germany, more cordial relations with Austria will be the immediate result, and that such relations may not again be interrupted is a wish too often expressed by us to need repetition to-day." (2)

(1) G.D.29/121 Dilke to Granville 30 August 1880

(2) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Salisbury 404 3 September 1880

An article in the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna on September 4, was the means of providing the Foreign Office with further information in this respect. For the article believed to be inspired by the Austrian Foreign Office, created a stir in Rome and was commented on in all the papers. It drew from the Italian Foreign Office an expression of opinion which was published in the Diritto. The Neue Freie Presse recommended the idea of an alliance with Germany and Austria to the serious attention of the Italian Government. "In case of a general European war", it read, "Italy could not possibly remain neutral. In alliance with France she would have everything to lose and nothing to gain; in alliance with Germany and Austria the opposite would probably be the case." The Opinione, a paper of the moderate liberal party, while proclaiming the policy of liberty of action, welcomed the prospect of a rapprochement between Italy and the two Empires. The Diritto, at the direction of the Foreign Office, agreed with the Neue Freie Presse's views as to the relative disadvantages of an alliance with France and an alliance with Germany, but wished to know what were the relative advantages of the two policies. A little later the Neue Freie Presse, supported now by the German Press, returned to the subject. It maintained that Italy could not remain without allies and it asserted that Cairoli was ardently in favour of the triple combination which it recommended. No comment was offered in the Government papers, and no attempt made to deny its

(1)
 assertions. Indications were thus favourable to the view that as a result of the discussions at Belgirate, the idea of an alliance with Austria and Germany was at least being considered, if not acted upon. At that point, Macdonnell's informant in the Italian Foreign Office told him that advances had been made to both Austria and Germany. They had not, however, met with much success. The Italian Government he said was "too greedy."⁽²⁾

A week later a telegram reached the Foreign Office from Macdonnell. It stated that Maffei had authorised him to assure Granville "that no secret negotiations whatever were going on for more intimate relations with Austria and Germany."⁽³⁾ It appeared in fact that there was a division of opinion on the question of alliance policy among the Italian Ministers. Maffei described himself as having urged upon the Italian Cabinet that efforts should be made to reach a more complete understanding with England. He believed that he had the support of a section of the Cabinet, and that, if the British Government showed a desire to respond and took "Italy into their confidence as to the policy they intend to pursue" and gave such explanations through Menabrea, the policy he

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- (1) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville 414 8 September 1880
 427 19 September 1880
- (2) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson 19 September 1880
- (3) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
 Telegram 23 September 1880
 134 Private

(1)
 recommended would prevail. The minor Italian papers now took up the idea and pointed to the advantages of an Italian alliance with England. (2)
 Macdonnell had, however, advised the Foreign Office a little earlier not "to reckon too implicitly on all the fine assurances of the Italian Government. Italy was ready to fish in troubled waters. She would cease her support to England on the Greek and Montenegrin question, at the first favourable opportunity for doing so. Such an opportunity would be offered if the Albanians in the near future resisted the ^{cession to Greece} ~~annexation~~ of territory in Epirus to ~~Greece~~. The Foreign Office, then, made no response to Maffei's invitation. The Montenegrin question which had afforded an opportunity for a demonstration of Italy's desire to act with England was settled by the cession of Dulcigno.

Already, however, the Diritto had returned to the subject of an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, which was now advocated without the reserve that characterised the attitude of the paper, when the subject was first agitated

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- (1) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville
 Telegram 136 28 September 1880
 440 28 September 1880
 Secret and Confidential
- (2) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville 449 2 October 1880
- (3) G.D.29/182 Macdonnell to Sanderson 8 September 1880

at the beginning of September. It further pointed out the dangers of attempting to secure a close understanding with England. Italy by such an attempt would be drawn into the vortex of Balkan politics in a pro-Russian and anti-Austrian direction: "there is nothing less stable than Russian policy, nothing more precarious than the policy of Gladstone."⁽¹⁾

The ^{development events} ~~decision~~ in regard to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance was, however, no longer primarily dependent on decisions taken in Italy. Maffei had made advances to Kendall, while through Hirling, an agent of Crispi's, who possessed Haymerle's confidence,⁽²⁾ Vienna had been sounded. Maffei, after the Belgirate Conference, had called in a correspondent of the Diritto, Gronert Goercke, to inform Vienna and Berlin of the course that the discussions there had taken. When the latter reached Vienna, Haymerle, contrary to his original plan had not yet returned from his holiday on Nordeney. Through Reuss, therefore, Gronert Goercke approached Bismarck. The next stage in the development of the negotiations depended on the German and Austrian replies. By October it was clear that neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany was prepared to respond unreservedly to Italian advances should they be made officially. Gronert Goercke

(1) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Salisbury 459 12 October 1880

(2) F.Crispi: Memoirs Vol.II pp.118 et sequ.

was, thereupon disavowed. ⁽¹⁾ In mid-October, Haymerle raised the matter with Kenn^Udell, who was then in Vienna. He was evidently ready for an understanding with Italy. Wimpffen, however, had merely been instructed to cultivate the tendencies in Rome favourable to an agreement. Haymerle was not prepared to take the initiative. The Italian Ministers also refused to make the next move, and fell back upon the policy of the free hand. ⁽²⁾ Discussions were restricted to an exchange of views between Germany and Austria-Hungary. ⁽³⁾

On the German and Austrian side of the negotiations, however, the Government received at this time no information whatever. The result was, that the Foreign Office received a false impression as to the final outcome of the conflict between the different tendencies influencing Italian alliance policy. Macdonnell before relinquishing control of the Embassy, sent home an analysis of Italy's policy in regard to foreign relations, and of the conclusions which he had reached as a result of the events of the last months. The report ended by stating his belief that the advances to Germany had failed, and that as a result Italy now hoped to be drawn into closer relations with England - "the only Power whose friendship and support is sought and valued by all

(1) Crispien: op.cit. ^{Vol II} p.118 et sequ.
G.P. Vol.III No.533 footnote.

(2) G.P. Vol.III Nos.533, 534.

(3) G.P. Vol.III No.535.

parties." The report was put before the Cabinet on October 29, so that some considerable importance was probably attached to it by the Foreign Office. ⁽¹⁾ For sometime after this there were no further reports on Italy's foreign relations, and when, at the end of December, Paget again reported on the subject, they seemed to be much the same as in the early part of the year. It appeared that while Italy had no special relations with any Power, her relations with England were sufficiently intimate to arouse the suspicions of the French Ambassador in Rome that special engagements existed between the two countries. ⁽²⁾

It soon became clear, however, that the Foreign Office was not justified in forming any final opinion as to Italy's relations. For, it appeared from a report of the British representative at Belgrade that Haymerle had recently addressed "very vehement reproaches" to Count Robilant on account of the intimate relations existing between the British and Italian Governments. ⁽³⁾ Shortly afterwards, Paget reported that the Austrian and German Press was again referring to the danger to be apprehended from the ambitions and

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- (1) F.O.45/407 Macdonnell to Granville 471 16 October 1880
 (2) F.O.45/408 Paget to Granville 577 23 December 1880
 Very Confidential
 (3) F.O.45/426 Paget to Granville 44 26 January 1881
 Confidential

quarrelsome designs of Italy in connection with the Italia Irredenta Society. The Austrian Ambassador had spoken to Maffei on the subject. (1)

Austria-Hungary and Germany then seemed prepared to repeat their procedure of the previous Spring.

Meanwhile, France was proceeding from Algiers against the Kroumirs of Tunis. Italian efforts to act with England on the question failed. Malvano, the Political Director of the Italian Foreign Office, informed Paget on May 2, that the Italian Government "were determined strictly to follow the course which Her Majesty's Government may deem expedient to pursue for the protection of its subjects and interests in the Regency." Paget replied that the British Government intended to send an Ironclad into Tunisian waters. Malvano thereupon asked that Italy should be informed of the name of the ship and its date of sailing, so that the Italian Government could conform their action to that of the British. (2) Menabrea, however, was told that the latter would object to anything like a combined movement, and no information in regard to British intentions was given to the Italian Government. The Italian Ministers were considerably disconcerted when they learnt that a British vessel had arrived in Tunisian waters,

(1) F.O.45/426	Paget to Granville	50	29 January 1881
(2) F.O.45/428	Paget to Granville	169	2 May 1881
(3) F.O.45/428	Paget to Granville	169	2 May 1881

while their own which had been held back while a reply from England was awaited, had not sailed. It at once appeared that there was again a sharp division of opinion in the Italian Cabinet as to the policy to be pursued. (1) The Government organ, the Diritto, took the opportunity to revive the subject of Italian relations with Austria-Hungary. (2) Depretis and his organ, the Popolo Romano, urged that no action should be taken by Italy and adopted a moderate and conciliatory tone towards France. (3) Cairoli was extremely excited and insisted on the necessity of Italy's finding some support against France. (4) The divisions among the Ministers were reflected in the public opinion of Rome. The overtures made by England in March 1878 for, as it was described, an understanding on all matters relating to their *commercial and political interests* in the East and in the Mediterranean, was remembered and its rejection by Italy regretted. (5) At the same time the

(1) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 170A 3 May 1881
 176 5 May 1881
 Most Confidential
 190 12 May 1881
 188 11 May 1881
 Confidential

(2) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 181 9 May 1881

(3) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 190 12 May 1881

(4) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 184 9 May 1881
 Confidential

(5) Dwight E. Lee: The Proposed Mediterranean League of 1878
 (Journal of Modern History III pp.33-45, March, 1931).

Government was attacked for having allowed the irredentist agitation to produce a coolness in the relations of Italy to Austria-Hungary and Germany. ⁽¹⁾ The publication in the Standard at the end of March of Salisbury's language to Waddington at Berlin respecting Tunis, which was apparently confirmed when the Times on April 11 published a despatch from Salisbury to Lyons of July 1878, was no encouragement for an attempt to retrieve the advantages lost by the rejection of English overtures. This was now pointed out by the Opinione and the Italie. ⁽²⁾ Then the formal denial in the Commons by Dilke that Salisbury had made any promises to Italy in regard to Tripoli ⁽³⁾ *further increased* the irritation against England. ⁽⁴⁾ Shortly afterwards the fall of the Ministry and the appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mancini, who had been Minister of Justice at the time of Crispi's mission to the European capitals in the autumn of 1877, when British information showed ^{that an} ~~one~~ attempt to negotiate an under-

(1) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 188 11 May 1881
Confidential

(2) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 213 & 214 26 May 1881

(3) F.Crispi: Memoirs Vol.II pp.114-117.

(4) F.O.45/428 Paget to Granville 219 28 May 1881

(1)
 standing with Germany had been made, seemed also to indicate that relations with Germany and Austria would be drawn closer rather than those with England. Further, Depretis was now President of the Council as he had been during the Autumn of 1877 and Spring of 1878. The moderate tone adopted by Depretis towards France was also more favourable to any attempt at an understanding with Germany and Austria-Hungary, should it be made, proving successful. For British information indicated that Germany gave her full support to ~~local~~ ^{French action} enterprise in Tunis. (2)

In the second place, reports on the subject of diplomatic relations led the Foreign Office to believe that a revival of the Dreikaiserbund was slowly being prepared in accordance with Russell's reports of November 21 and December 19, the views of which the Ambassador had repeated to Granville in forceful terms in May. (3)

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- (1) F. Crispi: op.cit. Vol.II pp.8-89.
 F.O.45/339 Paget to Salisbury 351 2 July 1878 (87)
 368 22 July 1878 (87)
 F.O.45/315 Paget to Derby 340 27 September 1877
- (2) F.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury 18 3 January 1879
 Most Confidential
 F.O.64/980 Russell to Granville 88 18 February 1881
 Secret
 concern occasions since the Congress when the French Ambassador was known to have received assurances of support from Bismarck.
 G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 17 January 1881
 14 May 1881
- (3) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. Vol.II pp.209, 211-212.
 G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 1 May 1880
 G.D.29/206 Granville to Russell 5 May 1880
 G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 8 May 1880
 15 May 1880
 22 May 1880
 29 May 1880

In January information was received to the effect that serious intentions to bring about an improvement in Russo-German relations had been behind Saburoff's journey to Berlin in September, and that it was not merely the result of Russia's anxiety lest the meeting at Vienna indicated an anti-Russian trend in German policy. The Czar, determined to revive the former relations between Russia and Germany, had chosen the summer of 1879 as the moment to comply with Bismarck's request, made as early as 1876, that Oubril should be replaced by an Ambassador who was less pro-French and less pro-Gorchakoff. He had consulted Bismarck as to whom he should appoint. Bismarck, on Radowitz's recommendation had suggested Saburoff, and asked that he might make the latter's personal acquaintance before the final decision was taken. Russell also reported that Saburoff had had conversations with Bismarck at Kissingen. On the all-important question as to the substance of these conversations he could, however, give no information. ⁽¹⁾ In February 1880, the introduction of the army bill in the Reichstag explained the outcry which ⁽²⁾ still continued against Russian troop movements.

The estrangement that took place in the Spring between

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|----------------|------------------------------------|---|------------------|
| (1) F.O.64/958 | Russell to Salisbury | 1 | 1 January 1880 |
| (2) F.O.64/958 | Russell to Salisbury | | 20 February 1880 |
| | D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV Nos.21, 31. | | |
| | F.O.64/959 | | 3 March 1880 |

France and Russia afforded a further indication to the Foreign Office that a revival of the former intimacy between Russia and Germany might reasonably be expected. The Foreign Office had seen in ^{the} pro-French tendencies of Russia ^{an important} ~~a prime~~ factor in bringing about the Russo-German estrangement of 1879.

One of the principal agents in planning the explosion of the train in which the Czar was thought to be travelling in November 1879, was alleged to be Leon Hartmann. He was arrested in Paris in February 1880. Russia applied for his extradition. The nature of the charge prevented the request from being of purely legal importance. The strong opposition that broke out among Republican Deputies and in the Radical Press, made it clear that it would become a question of considerable political importance. (1) Orloff on the 27th, told Lyons that he had not as yet, made any threats as to the consequences of the decision of the French Government on the political relations between Russia and France. (2) On March 6, the Havas Agency announced the refusal of the French Government to grant the extradition. (3) On the 15th it announced that

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- (1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.29 note.
F.O.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 163 27 February 1880
Confidential
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.55.
- (2) F.O.27/2427 Lyons to Salisbury 163 27 February 1880
Confidential
- (3) F.O.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 196 9 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.53.

Orloff had left for St. Petersburg. ⁽¹⁾ Lyons drew the attention of the Government to the importance of his departure. For Orloff had pointed out to him that the same procedure was used when Russian relations with the Vatican were suspended. ⁽²⁾ Freycinet's language to Lyons held out no hope that France would make any attempt to conciliate Russia. ⁽³⁾ From St. Petersburg came the information that the Czar had publicly treated General Chauzy, the French Ambassador, with marked coldness. Dufferin considered that he might ask to be relieved of his post. ⁽⁴⁾

It was then made clear to the Foreign Office that the possible reaction of these events on Russo-German relations was fully appreciated in Germany. The German Press made no effort to conceal that it welcomed the incident as preventing for some years at least the conclusion of a Franco-Russian Alliance. ⁽⁵⁾ If France ^{it was said} had been prepared to show herself

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- (1) F.O.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 225 16 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.62.
- (2) F.O.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 227 17 March 1880
- (3) F.O.27/2428 Lyons to Salisbury 228 17 March 1880
- (4) F.O.65/1079 Dufferin to Salisbury 146 25 March 1880
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.69.
- (5) F.O.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 123 12 March 1880
Secret
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III Nos. 37 & 58.

disposed to give adequate guarantees to Russia against the development of socialism, Russia's tendency to cultivate her relations with Germany would have been checked. France had, however, given a demonstration of her republican feelings. Russia would now be compelled to fall back upon Germany's friendship. From Bismarck himself Russell could, however, derive no information. His language at the end of March made it appear that Russo-German relations were in the same strained state as in the early summer of 1879. ⁽¹⁾ It was clear, however, that Bismarck was determined not only to welcome the estrangement that had taken place, but if possible to increase it. The Chancellor chose what was in fact the turning point of the crisis - the moment when the outcry of the French radicals had subsided and the legal aspect of the question been examined, but the decision of the Government not yet announced - to demonstrate the friendly feelings of Germany towards France. The Emperor and Empress, for the first time since 1871, attended a dinner given by the French Ambassador. An unusual degree of publicity was given to the event in the French and German Press. Hohenlohe was appointed to the dual position of permanent Ambassador at Paris, and provisional Minister for Foreign

(1) F.O.64/959	Russell to Salisbury	146	25 March 1880
		Secret	
		148	25 March 1880
		Secret	

(1)
Affairs.

Soon afterwards an incident significant for the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as those between Germany and Russia, was reported. On April 29 Austrian and German Generals arrived in St. Petersburg on a mission of congratulation to the Czar on the occasion of his birthday. Continental, especially Austrian, papers alluded to it as an unprecedented event and the forerunner of a new Dreikaiserbund. Dufferin and Elliot agreed, however, that the incident had no immediate political significance. "The renewal of the Dreikaiserbund", reported Elliot, "was the last thing the Austrian Government would wish." Yet, both Ambassadors saw in it a demonstration of Austria-Hungary's desire to keep the way open to Russia. Dufferin had Kalnoky's authority for this opinion. (2)

Incidents followed which indicated that the improved relations between the three Emperors which this mission marked, was supported at least as far as Germany was concerned, by an improvement in the relations of the two Governments.

In the second week of May, Orloff returned to Paris. On his way he stayed two days in Berlin. He was received by

(1) F.O.64/959	Russell to Salisbury		4 March 1880
		123	12 March 1880
		Secret	
	D.D.F. Series I Vol.III Nos.42 & 81.		
(2) F.O.7/990	Elliot to Granville	205	4 May 1880
		Confidential	
F.O.65/1080	Dufferin to Granville	197	5 May 1880

the Emperor and by Bismarck, and Russell reported that he was the bearer of conciliatory assurances designed "to gradually re-establish the friendly relations which formerly existed between Russia and Germany."⁽¹⁾ His mission, according to Russell, was in fact but a symptom of a general attempt on the part of the Russians to ingratiate themselves at Berlin - an attempt which considerably gratified the Chancellor.⁽²⁾

On June 1, Prince Gorchakoff arrived in Berlin on his way to Baden. He was received on this occasion by Bismarck as well as by the Emperor. Russell informed the Foreign Office that the visit signified a reconciliation between the two Chancellors and the re-establishment of "those confidential relations between Germany and Russia which had formerly prevailed."⁽³⁾

Reports, based upon statements of the Emperor to Russell, that were received in August, showed that the Eastern Question - the one question which offered the basis for any real improvement in Russo-German relations - afforded the basis for the rapprochement that was seen to be taking place.

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| (1) F.O.64/960 | Russell to Granville | 211 | 17 May 1880 |
| | | | Confidential |
| (2) G.D.29/177 | Russell to Granville | | 15 May 1880 |
| (3) F.O.64/960 | Russell to Granville | 239 | 2 June 1880 |
| | | | Most Confidential |

In April Russia had presented Prince Alexander ^{of Bulgaria} with
 a small warship. ⁽¹⁾ Shortly afterwards the Foreign Office
 was informed that Russian non-commissioned officers were
 being admitted into the Bulgarian army and Russian rifles
 supplied to it. ⁽²⁾ Meanwhile Eastern Rumelia was falling
 into a state of complete disorder. ⁽³⁾ By June 1880, a
 formidable unionist agitation had broken out both in the
 Province and the Principality. Alarm was widespread that
 Russia was about to precipitate matters and to take the
 first step towards overthrowing the Berlin Treaty. ⁽⁴⁾ —

— It appeared, however, that an exchange of views had
 taken place on the subject between the German Emperor and
 the Czar. The former told Russell on August 17, that he
 had received the most positive assurances from the Czar that
 he would do all in his power to prevent the union of Bulgaria
 and Eastern Rumelia. Hohenlohe, in reply to Russell's
 questions, took care to avoid giving him any further informa-
 tion, but he went so far as to state that Germany felt full

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- (1) F.O.7/990 Elliot to Granville 217 8 May 1880
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/985 Granville to Elliot Telegram 7 May 1880
 F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 382 10 July 1880
- (3) F.O.7/990 Elliot to Granville 248 20 May 1880
 Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 307 12 June 1880
 Confidential
 F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 320 17 June 1880
 Very Confidential
 concerns a conversation between Elliot and Prince Alexander.
 F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 355 29 June 1880
 Confidential

confidence in the Czar's intentions to prevent the union. (1)

Hitherto, British information had shown that the Austro-Hungarian Government was little affected by the disposition of Russia to improve her relations with Germany. On the contrary, Russell wrote that Bismarck showed more readiness to respond to Russian advances "than the Austrians will quite like when they find it out." (2) Elliot reported that "he could detect no corresponding change or modification" in the feelings of Austria-Hungary to Russia, such as was reported to be taking place in the relations between Germany and Russia. (3)

The Czar, however, shortly after the Kaiser's visit to the Emperor of Austria, conferred upon the latter the rank of commander in a Russian regiment. An act of courtesy which indicated that the intimate relations between the German and Austrian Emperors recently demonstrated by a meeting between them at Ischl (4) were balanced by the friendly feelings of the Czar towards the Austrian Emperor. (5)

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- (1) F.O.64/961 Russell to Granville 385 17 August 1880
Secret
370 18 August 1880
Secret
- (2) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 15 May 1880
- (3) F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 350 28 June 1880
Confidential
- (4) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.237.
- (5) F.O.65/1081 Plunkett to Granville 375 3 September 1880

It now appeared that the ~~Austrian Emperor~~, Francis Joseph, ~~at least~~ had had some part in the exchange of views that had recently taken place between the Kaiser and the Czar. No particular importance had been attached at the time to the Ischl meeting by the British representatives, and no report on the subject was received by the Foreign Office. Russell ^{however} now reported that the Kaiser had informed Francis Joseph on that occasion of his own views on the Bulgarian question and of the Czar's assurances. The question, that is, upon which Austro-Russian relations had hinged since 1877, had come under discussion. (1)

The information brought into focus both previous and subsequent reports received respecting Austria's Eastern policy. British information indicated that Austria had been showing an increasing preoccupation with the possible results of a collapse of Turkey. In speaking to Count Corti in the Spring, Haymerle, according to Paget, had expressed the opinion that the Turkish Empire was gradually and surely breaking up, and had dwelt on the attitude that the Powers should adopt in such an event. (2) Elliot reported that

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- (1) F.O.7/961 Russell to Granville 370 18 August
Secret
- (2) F.O.45/405 Paget to Granville 214 8 May 1880
Most Confidential
- G.D.29/182 Paget to Granville 8 May 1880

Haymerle repeatedly expressed the opinion that "the process of decomposition was so far advanced in Turkey as to render it impossible effectually to stay it." The Austrian Minister was concerned only with the conditions under which the dissolution might best take place. ⁽¹⁾ On September 11, Elliot endeavoured to give a reasoned account of Austrian policy in the East. He reached the conclusion that Austria-Hungary would endorse the observation recently made by Gladstone in the Commons, ⁽²⁾ that Turkish independence and integrity must learn to shift for themselves, ^{but} without Gladstone's qualifying phrases, unless the Porte reformed its administration. Austria-Hungary would only stop short ⁽³⁾ of encouraging the agitation of discontented subjects.

Moreover, when in July Granville had proposed the signature of a self-denying protocol before the Dulcigno naval demonstration was carried out by the Powers, Haymerle insisted that the agreement should be strictly "applicable only to what might arise out of the measures which were the cause of its being made." ⁽⁴⁾ Elliot had then pointed out

(1) F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 297 9 June 1880
Confidential

(2) Hansard: 3rd Series Vol.CCLVI pp.1318 et sequ.

(3) F.O.7/994 Elliot to Granville 554 11 September

(4) F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville
Telegram 111 24 July 1880
F.O.7/986 Granville to Elliot 431 24 July 1880
F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 428 27 July 1880
Confidential

that Austria-Hungary desired to keep herself free from all embarrassing engagements if events should bring about an "unsettlement" of Turkey. Although he did not believe that Austria desired to extend the territory which she controlled in the Balkans, he said in guarded language that circumstances, such as an extension of Russian influence in Bulgaria, might arise which would induce them to push on to the Aegean. (1)

Another report stated that Austria-Hungary might be disposed to favour a limited form of union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. (2)

On the other hand, there were indications that symptoms of a Rum-Bulgarian movement would effectually prevent the reestablishment of anything like cordiality or a good understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and might revive the co-operation that had formerly existed between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. (3) The latter in fact These two Powers exchanged information on the subject and together - though not in identic terms and not through their Ambassadors at St. Petersburg - demanded explanations from Russia, and exchanged views

(1) F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 436 31 July 1880
Confidential

(2) F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 412 22 July 1880
Very Confidential

(3) F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 350 28 June 1880
Confidential

as to the validity of the explanations. ^{they received (1)} Austria-Hungary, however, did not show herself disposed to take any serious step in the matter.

Russell's information as to the discussions at Ischl seemed to indicate that the Bulgarian question would be settled between the three Empires. The suspicions aroused by Elliot's reports on Austria-Hungary's Eastern policy, that she was more disposed than hitherto to come to a "squaring" agreement with Russia, such as Russell had suggested in May might come about, ⁽²⁾ were encouraged. The Kaiser's statement, reported by the Ambassador, that Francis Joseph had listened to his account of Alexander II's assurances in ⁽³⁾ silent embarrassment further confirmed these suspicions.

At this point a telegram arrived from Mr. Stephen, British Consul-General at Philippopolis. It read:-
Secret. I am informed on good authority that Russian Government proposed to Austria about a fortnight ago to secure to her full possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided she agrees to a Bulgarian union. ⁽⁴⁾ Soon afterwards

(1) F.O.7/992	Elliot to Granville	424	26 July 1880
		Confidential	
		426	27 July 1880
		Confidential	
		478	13 August 1880
		Confidential	
		486	17 August 1880
F.O.7/996	Elliot to Granville	655	15 October 1880
F.O.7/996	Elliot to Granville	691	27 October 1880
		Confidential	
(2) G.D.29/177	Russell to Granville		29 May 1880
(3) F.O.64/961	Russell to Granville	370	18 August 1880
		Secret	
(4) F.O.78/3127	Stephen to Granville		
		Telegram 86	27 August 1880

The Crown Prince of Austria arrived in Berlin. There he stated ~~his personal opinion~~ in confidential conversation among his friends, ^{that he was} in favour of sharing with Russia the fruits of a concerted policy of aggression. "The possession of Salonica" he ~~had~~ said, "might compensate Austria for the preponderance of Russia at Constantinople." (1)

No confirmation of Stephen's report reached the Foreign Office, nor information as to the result of the overture, if it had in fact been made. Together with the language of the Crown Prince, it was important as an indication of the trend of Austro-Hungarian and Russian policy rather than as information on an event which had actually taken place.

The Press now afforded an opportunity for securing further information on the subject. At the end of October a series of articles appeared in the English and continental Press, calling attention to an alleged tendency on the part of Austria-Hungary to pursue a pro-Russian policy in the East, and to a weakening of the Austro-German friendship. (2) The assertions in the latter respect were soon disproved. A good deal of publicity was given to a letter from Francis Joseph to Moltke congratulating him on his eightieth birthday.

(1) F.O.64/962 Russell to Granville 430 17 September 1880
Secret

(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.287.

The Austrian and German papers denied the statements in this sense which they had originally made. ⁽¹⁾ The declaration of Haymerle to the Austrian Delegations that Austria-Hungary was, above all, constant to the Alliance with Germany, published in the Wiener Zeitung of November, finally disposed of the assertions of the Press. No attempt, however, was made to deny the pro-Russian tendency of Austria's Eastern policy. ⁽²⁾ Walsham, who was in charge of the Berlin Embassy was disposed to interpret the incident as the result of the fact that Germany was pursuing, and advising Austria-Hungary to pursue, a policy favourable to the revival of the Dreikaiserbund. For the visible effect of such a policy would naturally be more noticeable in the case of Austria than in the case of Germany. and might reasonably account for the observations of the Press on the subject of Austro-German relations. ⁽³⁾

No information on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian-Russian rapprochement could be secured in Vienna. Haymerle's public declarations and private statements to Elliot were both directed to encourage the impression that Austria-Hungary was opposed to a revival of the Dreikaiserbund, and desired

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- (1) F.O.64/964 Walsham to Granville 515 6 November 1880
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/996 Elliot to Granville 713 5 November 1880
- (3) F.O.64/964 Walsham to Granville 515 6 November 1880
Confidential

Russia might be expected in the near future. (1)

Meanwhile, an incident that occurred in September seems to indicate that Germany was now sufficiently confident of the friendship of Russia to allow the suspicions and distrust, such as had led to the "Scare" of 1875, to generate again against France. Gambetta, in a speech at Cherbourg on August 12, expressed the hope that France would soon again take her place in the world and referred to the inherent justice in

human affairs. (2) A series of articles in his organ France, boasted of the strength of France and raised the question of

Alsace Lorraine. (3) Agitation immediately broke out in the German Press. The semi-official Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung played a prominent part. The celebration of the victory of Sedan organised, Russell reported, on Bismarck's instructions, (4) and the speech of von Varnbühler, a supporter of Bismarck in the Reichstag, which revived again the subject of the Russian overtures to France in the autumn of 1879, marked the peak point of the agitation. (5) It died

(1)	G.D.29/189	Goschen to Granville		5	October	1880
	G.D.23/123	Gladstone to Granville		13	October	1880
(2)	F.O.27/2434	Adams to Granville	719	12	August	1880
			744	17	August	1880
(3)	F.O.27/2434	Adams to Granville	781	25	August	1880
			Confidential			
(4)	F.O.64/962	Russell to Granville	409	3	September	1880
(5)	F.O.27/2435	Adams to Granville	855	17	September	1880
			Secret			
			861			
	F.O.64/962	Russell to Granville	430	17	September	1880
			Secret			

down as suddenly as it had arisen and the relations between
the two countries appeared to be unaffected. ⁽¹⁾

Towards the end of the year, largely from the statements of Russian diplomats and officials, a certain amount of information was secured as to the use to which Bismarck was turning the improved relations between Russia and Germany, in connection with the conclusion of an Austro-Russian arrangement respecting the Eastern Question.

The diplomatic centre in Germany in the autumn of 1880, was at Friedrichs^{rue}~~square~~. At the beginning of September, Elliot and Russell reported that Haymerle had visited Bismarck there. His visit was not, however, connected with that of Saburoff which took place at the beginning of December. For both Russell and St. Vallier visited Bismarck during the intervening months. It seemed, moreover, to have too informal a character to be the occasion for any decisive discussions. It was made unexpectedly on Haymerle's return from a three weeks' holiday on Mordeney, and appeared as an act of courtesy only. ⁽²⁾ Its main importance did not appear to be political. Bismarck was at the moment primarily concerned with internal affairs. ⁽³⁾ He had, in fact, recently

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- (1) F.O.27/2437 Lyons to Granville 1019 1 November 1880
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/993 Elliot to Granville Telegram 5 August 1880
121
F.O.7/994 Elliot to Granville 526 2 September
- (3) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 4 September 1880

taken over the duties of the Minister of Commerce. His object in doing so, Russell reported, was to bring into being the customs union with Austria-Hungary, and he had made proposals for this purpose to Haymerle at Friedrichs^{ruhe} (1) ~~seule~~. So far as political matters were discussed, only the diplomatic negotiations under general European consideration, seemed to have been touched upon. Haymerle informed Elliot of Bismarck's anxiety as the result of Gambetta's Cherbourg speech, and of his desire to see the pending questions in the East settled. (2)

Neither Elliot nor Russell were, however, satisfied that the information they had secured from official sources represented a complete account of what had taken place. Elliot had informed Granville privately before Haymerle's return to Berlin, that he had probably raised with Bismarck the question of the agitation in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, with a view to finding out what support he might expect from Germany, should he be compelled to take measures against it. (3) Russell also wrote privately to Granville. He stated that to judge by the language of Bismarck to a friend, he thought it likely that the Chancellor

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| (1) F.O.64/962 | Russell to Granville | 430 | 17 September 1880 |
| | | Secret | |
| F.O.64/963 | Russell to Granville | 600 | 31 December |
| | | Secret | |
| (2) F.O.7/994 | Elliot to Granville | 563 | 15 September 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (3) G.D.29/155 | Elliot to Granville | | 4 September 1880 |

had advised Haymerle at Friedrichs^{ruhe}seule, not to resist the agitation⁽¹⁾ in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. Secondly, Elliot informed Granville that he believed the execution of the Berlin Award on the Greek frontier question had also been discussed. Bismarck, he thought, had suggested to Austria that she should not oppose the use of coercion. Without taking part in actual military measures, she might advance her Bosnian garrisons as far as Mitrovica, when she could control the course events might take. The Chancellor, Elliot wrote, and Russell later agreed with him, was actively pursuing the policy of encouraging the extension of Austrian influence in the western part of the Peninsula. (2)

Shortly afterwards a report arrived from Plunkett at St. Petersburg to the effect that Germany was trying to bring about an understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Information which had reached him confidentially that a secret understanding had been come to in regard to the Eastern Question, he believed was, as Stephen's information had been, "a precursor of the turn which a collapse in the unity of action of the Powers at Constantinople might bring about."

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| (1) G.D.29/177 | Russell to Granville | | 11 September 1880 |
| (2) G.D.29/155 | Elliot to Granville | | 17 September 1880 |
| F.O.64/963 | Russell to Granville | 100 | 31 December |
| | | Secret | |
| (3) F.O.65/1081 | Plunkett to Granville | 496 | 20 October 1880 |
| | | Very Confidential | |

Bismarck's language to Russell when he visited the Chancellor at Freidrichs^{ruhe}seule in the second week of October amply confirmed Plunkett's information. "The only real interest Germany had in the Eastern question", he said, "was the preservation of peace among the Powers directly interested. . . . It was his policy to exert all his influence to keep the peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and to harmonize, as far as benevolent neutrality in the future fate of Turkey could do so, their respective aspirations, ambitions and interests." (1)

British information indicated that Jo^mini's overture to Plunkett for a "general alliance" with England was a further indication of the efforts which Bismarck was making to induce Russia to come to an agreement with Austria. Plunkett had several times recently reported that Jo^mini was guided by anti-Austrian and anti-German motives. As the tendency towards an improvement in Austro-Russian relations became more and more clear, Jo^mini's distrust^s of Austria increased. (2)

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| (1) G.D.29/177 | Russell to Granville | | 13 October 1880 |
| (2) F.O.65/1082 | Plunkett to Granville | 475 | 12 October 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| | | 496 | 20 October 1880 |
| | | Very Confidential | |
| | | 502 | 23 October 1880 |
| | | Confidential | |
| | | 513 | 3 November 1880 |
| | | Very Confidential | |

Walsham, therefore, informed the Foreign Office that ^{the} overture to England might be interpreted as an attempt on the part of one of the political ^{groups} ~~parties~~ in Russia to check the trend of Russian policy towards a revival of the Dreikaiserbund. The alliance of England would enable Russia to resist "Prince Bismarck and his combinations." She could not do so single-handed and she fretted under the obligation of having to

(1) accept them. The alarm raised in Germany against Russia in December, seemed to be the result of German fears that Russia's attempt to shake herself free from Germany might be successful. The accusations that Russia intended to attack Germany or Austria-Hungary, the Foreign Office was informed, were as usual completely unjustified, and were made on

(2) Bismarck's instructions. The extreme anxiety which the German and Austrian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and London were showing as to the possible existence of an Anglo-Russian alliance seemed to offer the only clue to the reason why they were made.

(3)

At first the visits of St. Vallier and Saburoff to Friedrichs^{ruhe}le, appeared only to be concerned with the attitude that France and Russia might take up in regard to the settle-

(1)	F.O.64/964	Walsham to Granville	525	13 November	Confidential
(2)	F.O.64/965	Russell to Granville	575	18 December 1880	Most Confidential
	F.O.65/1083	Plunkett to Granville	595	8 December 1880	Most Confidential
(3)	F.O.65/1082	Plunkett to Granville	517	3 November 1880	
			525	8 November 1880	
	F.O.7/986	Granville to Elliot	718	6 November 1880	Secret
	F.O.7/996	Elliot to Granville	723	10 November 1880	Confidential

ment of the Creek frontier question which became urgent after the Montenegrin question had been concluded, and upon which Russell himself had recently consulted Bismarck. Saburoff, however, seems deliberately to have attempted to give the Ambassador some inkling of the negotiations he was conducting. Thus, he hinted to Russell that the question of the Straits had been discussed at Friedrichs^{ruhe}~~ruhe~~ between himself and Bismarck. British information indicated no ordinary explanation for Saburoff's remarks. The Russo-British antagonism respecting the Straits had not been mentioned since November 1879, when there had been a question of Layard's summoning the fleet to Constantinople. (1) Again, on returning to Berlin in January, Saburoff told Russell clearly that Russia was working to secure "practical" relations with Austria and had the cordial support of Bismarck in so doing. (2) The meeting that had recently taken place in St. Petersburg between himself and Oubril, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, had been concerned with these efforts. Information received from Elliot and from Dufferin showed that Saburoff's statements on that point were probably accurate. (3) When he spoke, however, of the projected

(1) F.O.64/963	Russell to Granville	600 Secret	31 December
(2) F.O.64/979	Russell to Granville	20 Secret	14 January 1887
(3) F.O.7/997	Elliot to Granville	799	11 December 1880
G.D.29/185	Dufferin to Granville		30 December 1881

rapprochement as based upon the Berlin Treaty and the European Concert and as precluding any alliance, he was deliberately misleading.

Yet suspicions had already been formed that the discussions at Friedrichs~~ruhe~~^{ruhe} had touched upon the subject of an Austro-Russian understanding, and Saburoff's statements appeared as confirmation. Thus, on December 18, Russell had reported: "there is reason to apprehend a practical understanding between Germany, Russia and Austria in regard to Eastern Affairs, which may prove fatal to Turkish rule in the Balkan Peninsula." (1) Lyons reported that Gambetta in speaking to Sheffield, second secretary in the Paris Embassy, had expressed his conviction that the three Emperors had come to an understanding. (2) Dufferin perceived signs of a "friendlier understanding" (3) between the three Powers. Granville felt uncomfortable to think that "the secret understanding between the three Emperors had gone very far." (4) By February 12 Russell was writing of Bismarck's "allies", Austria and Russia. (5) Goschen on his

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- (1) F.O.64/963 Russell to Granville 576 18 December 1880
Very Confidential
- (2) G.D.29/176 Lyons to Granville Private, Personal and Secret 8 February 1881
- (3) G.D.29/185 Dufferin to Granville 12 January 1881
- (4) G.D.29/209 Granville to Dufferin 9 February 1881
- (5) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 12 February 1881

return to Constantinople from London, was instructed to visit Haymerle and to discover what truth, if any, there was in the different rumours which had been circulating. He reached the conclusion that no agreement had as yet been formally concluded.

Before any information was received to the effect that the suspected agreement had actually come into being, British information put before the Foreign Office another feature that would probably belong to any understanding between the three Empires. On March 13 the Emperor Alexander II died, the victim of a Mihilist conspiracy. It was at first thought that the accession of Alexander III would check the development of the Dreikaiserbund. (1) It soon became clear, however, that full and satisfactory assurances had been exchanged between the three Emperors. (2) By April the newspapers were spreading the rumour that the Czar intended shortly to go to Berlin and then to Vienna and to bring about the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund. (3) Meanwhile, on

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|-----|---------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|
| (1) | G.D.29/210 | Granville to Goschen | 18 March 1881 |
| | G.D.29/206 | Granville to Ampthill | 16 March 1881 |
| (2) | G.D.29/177 | Ampthill to Granville | 19 March 1881 |
| | G.D.29/185 | Dufferin to Granville | 24 March 1881 |
| | F.O.64/980 | Ampthill to Granville | 22 March 1881 |
| (3) | F.O.7/1014 | Elliot to Granville | 11 April 1881 |
| | D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.444. | | |

March 31, Russia had addressed a circular to her representatives at the courts of the five Powers, proposing that an international Conference should assemble in order to discover means for dealing effectively with revolutionary plots throughout Europe. The proposal immediately split the Powers into two groups. Italy rejected the proposal outright, Great Britain softened her refusal by alleging Parliamentary reasons.⁽¹⁾ France adopted the same attitude and insisted on acting with England. The three Empires were grouped together on the basis of their constitutional principles. References to the revival of the Holy Alliance and to the plans of the three Northern Courts to suppress political liberty were frequent.⁽²⁾ The proposal of France to codify her extradition treaties with Germany, and to conclude a new extradition treaty with Russia,⁽³⁾ and the British proposal that a general exchange of views should take place between the Cabinets in order to remedy any deficiencies in their extradition laws eventually settled the question satisfactorily.⁽⁴⁾ The fundamental

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- (1) G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 12 April 1881
 G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 16 April 1881
- (2) F.O.27/2491 Lyons to Granville 358 17 April 1881
 Very Confidential
- (3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III.
 F.O.27/2492 Lyons to Granville 377 25 April 1881
- (4) F.O.65/1111 Wyndham to Granville 174 27 April 1881

sympathies between the three Empires had, however, been made clear. The attitude assumed by Germany, who immediately took the lead in the agitation against the socialist danger, made it clear that Bismarck intended to exploit the incident to the advantage of the political understanding which he had for some time been endeavouring to bring about.⁽¹⁾ Granville suspected that Bismarck was endeavouring to create a sore between Russia and England and between Russia and France.⁽²⁾ It was to Germany that Granville made his proposals for the settlement of the question.

British information, then by the early summer of 1881 had shown certain principles to be established in connection with the relations between the three Empires. It had not however, brought matters to a conclusion by showing that an agreement embodying these principles had in fact been signed.

In this it was an accurate reflection of the true situation. The three articles provisionally drafted by Bismarck and Saburoff in September had envisaged an exchange of pledges between Austria-Hungary and Russia.⁽³⁾ Bismarck, as has been seen, had at once begun to prepare the way towards the entrance

(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville 14 April
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No. 16 April

(2) G.D.29/206 Granville to Ampthill 13 April
G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 13 April

(3) J.Y. Simpson: The Saburoff Memoirs pp.70-83.

of Austria into the agreement as a separate party.⁽¹⁾ After further references between Saburoff and Bismarck in January and February the principle of a Triple understanding had been accepted by Russia.⁽²⁾

In September 1879, the third article had envisaged an understanding between the three Powers in the event of a threat of an alteration in the status quo in the Balkans. After the discussions of January and February the principle of an Austro-Russian agreement respecting the interests of the two Powers in the Balkans, to be negotiated independently of the question whether the status quo, were threatened or not, had been accepted by Saburoff.⁽³⁾ In October, 1880 when British information first began to be considered on the point of a possible Austro-Russian understanding, Haymerle had got so far as to express his readiness to enter its *pourparlers* with Russia and Germany with a view to giving practical form to the Russo-German views in regard to the Straits.⁽⁴⁾ In the first months of 1881, when information again accumulated in the Foreign Office as to the possibility of an Austro-Russian understanding, negotiations with Vienna

(1) See p.128.

(2) G.P.Vol.III 515 p.142.
Simpson: op.cit. p.127.

(3) G.P. Vol.III No.515, p.141. Simpson, op.cit., pp.156-60.

(4) Simpson: op.cit., p.165.

were formally opened, and the discussions which eventually led to the addition of a supplementary Protocol to the agreement signed by the three Powers initiated. ⁽¹⁾ This Protocol was the form which the "squaring" agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia that the Foreign Office was led to anticipate, in fact took.

Thirdly, the position of Germany in the new triple friendship had in fact been determined in the course of the year, in the manner that the information received by the Foreign Office indicated. During the Conferences of January and February, Saburoff proposed that Germany should take the responsibility for bringing about an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia. At the time, Bismarck refused. ⁽²⁾ In the summer, however, as the information of the British Foreign indicated, the Chancellor did in fact assume the rôle that that Saburoff had sought to assign to him. In the course of his conversations with Haymerle at Friedrichsoule he took

(1) Simpson: op.cit., pp.184 et sequ.

G.P. Vol.III Nos. 519, 520, particularly No.522:-
 Reuss described Haymerle's view as to the object of the projected agreement as "die Möglichkeit eines Interessenkonfliktes zwischen Österreich, Deutschland und Russland auf Jahre, hinaus auszuschliessen," and enumerated the points, afterwards included in the supplementary Protocol, of an understanding designed for that purpose (Reuss to Bismarck, 25 December 1880).

No.524 encloses the draft agreed upon between Saburoff and Bismarck (Bismarck to Reuss, 14 June, 1881).

(2) G.P. Vol.III No.515.

the first step towards bringing about an Austro-Russian
(1)
understanding.

Elliot's information that the question of the agitation in Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, had been discussed between Bismarck and Haymerle at Friedrichsoule, was accurate. So too, was Russell's report that Bismarck had advised the Austro-Hungarian Minister not to oppose the agitation, and Elliot's report that Haymerle would agree to a limited union. The Foreign Office, however, lacked such information as would have enabled it to feel confident that this information was accurate, and that Stephen's report that an understanding, based on the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the union of Bulgaria, had been formally proposed, was entirely unfounded.

The last aspect of the projected Dreikaiserbund, upon which British information had touched, that of the common monarchical sympathies of the three Empires, had also in fact influenced the negotiations. In April Bismarck urged upon Saburoff the necessity of some agreement between them, on the grounds that the advent of the Gladstone Government was a sign that the republican spirit was rousing itself throughout Europe.
(2) In July he pointed out the advantages of a

(1) Simpson: op.cit., pp.145-147.

(2) Simpson: op.cit., p.128.

Triple understanding as "securing the solidarity of the
 monarchical square, and relieving it from anxiety in regard
 to the less stable West."⁽¹⁾ The character of the alliance
 as essentially an understanding between the three Emperors
 was preserved. It had originally been intended that the
 Grand Duke of Saxony should negotiate with Francis Joseph
 while Reuss conducted the negotiations with Haymerle. When
 the Grand Duke refused the opening of negotiations with
 Austria-Hungary in January, was signalised by a personal
 letter from the German Kaiser to Francis Joseph⁽²⁾ and Reuss
 was charged to negotiate with the Emperor as well as his
 Minister.⁽³⁾

While the information received by the Foreign Office
 in regard to these aspects of the future Dreikaiserbund
 was fairly complete, it did not touch at all upon two other
 aspects of equal importance.

The first two of the three articles sketched out in
 September had dealt with the problem of a war in which either
 of the signatory parties might become engaged. In the event
 of a Russo-English war, Germany would remain neutral, and
 direct her efforts to keep the conflict localized. Russia

(1) Simpson: op.cit., p.137.

(2) G.P. Vol.III No. 524, p.161.

(3) Simpson: op.cit., pp.184 et sequ.

would do the same for Germany in the event of a Franco-German war. (1) During the January and February Conferences, these articles had been much developed. Russia had sought to extend Germany's obligation of neutrality to an obligation to prevent the passage of the English fleet through the Straits, incumbent on both Germany and Austria-Hungary. (2) The general obligation was as a result of January-February Conferences, condensed and formed a single article in the project drafted by Saburoff. In spite of the fact that in the conversation of February 5, the possibility of an interchange of pledges of support against France, between Russia and Germany, had been mentioned, (3) this general obligation of neutrality was not further developed.

The second aspect of the relations between the three Empires, not covered by British information was that of their eventual co-operation on all diplomatic questions - "The Caucus principle" as Elliot described it in speaking of the Dreikaiserbund as it existed from 1873-75. (4) This aspect

(1) Simpson: op.cit., pp.70-83.

(2) Simpson: op.cit., p.105.
 G.P. Vol.III, No.516.
 G.P. Vol.III, No.518 (Saburoff to Bismarck, 6 February, enclosing a draft for the projected agreement).
 Simpson: op.cit., pp.177-79 (draft of agreement drawn up at Friedrichsruhe by Bismarck and Saburoff).

(3) G.P. Vol.III, No.516, p.144.

(4) G.D.29/155 Elliot to Granville 28 April 1880

did not emerge very clearly in the course of the negotiations of 1880. It was seen, however, when Bismarck on February 7, recommended to Saburoff the inclusion in the proposed agreement of an article providing that in the event of a dispute between two members of the Alliance it should be referred to the third for mediation,⁽¹⁾ and when this purpose was achieved by Article I of the December draft. Due to Russia's insistence this provision was omitted in the final text. Very close diplomatic co-operation nevertheless, characterised the relations of the three Empires after the agreement had finally been concluded.

The Foreign Office, however, had no information such as would enable them to appreciate that the information they possessed reflected the course of actual negotiation between the three Powers. It appeared only that they had been led to expect an agreement to be concluded in one direction, and then in another, and that on every occasion their expectations had proved groundless. The result was that when, after the Dreikaiserbund had been concluded, information was received of an agreement on the Eastern question between Austria-Hungary and Russia it was mistrusted. The Foreign Office in connection with the Dreikaiserbund lacked information derived from a reliable and independent source, such as they

(1) Simpson: op.cit., p.120..

received in connection with Italy's alliance policy, and from Crowe in connection with the Austro-German Alliance.

The course of diplomatic negotiations as a source of information cannot be neglected entirely. It revealed most in connection with French relations. For British relations during the year were closer with France than with any other Power. Before the advent of the Liberal Ministry they also served to confirm, to some extent, the impression derived from reports on Italian relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany, of the isolation of Italy and of Germany's endeavours to foment ill-feeling between her and Austria-Hungary. The attitude of Germany appeared to be one of the factors in separating Austrian from Italian action in regard to Egypt. Salisbury on the 5th November had found it necessary to represent to Monteglas, secretary in the Austrian Embassy, that it was "somewhat hard, that we should find Austria heading a combination of Italy and Germany against us." (1) On the 11th the Foreign Office learnt that after repeated applications St. Vallier had at last secured an invitation to visit Bismarck at Varzin. (2) It appeared that

(1) F.O.7/956 Salisbury to Elliot 8 November 1879

(2) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 545 8 November 1879
Confidential

he had been instructed to press upon the Chancellor, that it was impossible to admit any other Powers to an equal share of influence with England and France in Egypt, and to point out to him the consequences of the claims raised by Austria-Hungary. ⁽¹⁾ A week later, Lyons informed the Foreign Office of Bismarck's reply. The Chancellor had stated that he was not prepared to support the Austro-Hungarian claim for a third controller to represent the interests of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany, and had advised the Austrians to withdraw it. ⁽²⁾ Odo Russell confirmed and amplified this information, and was able to inform the Foreign Office that this advice had in fact been given. ⁽³⁾ Before this despatch was received, it was already clear that Austria-Hungary would not maintain her extreme pretensions. ⁽⁴⁾ She did not abandon her position entirely. On December 6, Karolyi urged more distinctly than before that Austria-Hungary should obtain some share, even though a small one, in the future Government.

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- (1) F.O.27/2375 Lyons to Salisbury 1127 11 November 1879
Very Confidential
- (2) F.O.27/2375 Lyons to Salisbury 1150 19 November 1879
Very Confidential
- (3) F.O.64/936 Russell to Salisbury 26 November 1879
G.P. Vol.III, No.661.
- (4) F.O.27/2360 Salisbury to Lyons 410 24 November 1879

Egypt after the Liquidation Commission had reported, but he suggested that such a share might be accorded to Austria-Hungary exclusively, and the demands of Italy rejected. ⁽¹⁾

Formal proposals were made in London and Paris for this purpose. ⁽²⁾ Italy continued to devote her efforts to

securing that international control of Egyptian affairs which had been the aim of the policy hitherto concerted with Austria-Hungary. ⁽³⁾ The Austro-Hungarian and German

acceptance of the arrangements for the Commission of Liquidation determined upon between Britain and France made the separation of Austria-Hungary and Italy still dearer. For Italy acting in isolation, insisted on far-reaching amendments on the line of previous Austrian proposals. ⁽⁴⁾ Bismarck

immediately let Odo Russell know that he supported Britain in withholding her assent to the Italian proposals. ⁽⁵⁾ Austria-Hungary showed no signs of giving Italy any encouragement. ⁽⁶⁾ Yet the latter refused her adherence for another three weeks.

(1) F.O.7/958	Salisbury to Elliot		25 November 1879
(2) F.O.27/2376	Lyons to Salisbury	1215	15 December 1879
(3) F.O.45/376	Salisbury to Paget	594	22 December 1879
(4) F.O.27/2427	Lyons to Salisbury	168	28 February 1880
(5) F.O.64/959	Russell to Salisbury	Telegram	4 March 1880
(6) F.O.27/2428	Lyons to Salisbury	247	23 March 1880
F.O.7/984	Salisbury to Elliot		23 March 1880

When the negotiations on the Greek question were re-opened, it was at once apparent that the tendency towards co-operation with France no longer existed. When Waddington renewed his proposal for European mediation on December 18, he had consulted England and Germany, but not Italy. ⁽¹⁾ When Salisbury having rejected the French plan put forward a counter-proposition, Freycinet, Lyons reported, had communicated the British proposal to Austria-Hungary and Germany, but not to Italy. ⁽²⁾ The separation of Italy from both Austria-Hungary and France was again brought out, when the British proposal was accepted with reserves by France, Germany and Austria-Hungary and unconditionally by Italy. Austria let it be known that distrust of Italy was her sole motive in thus supporting the French views on the Greek question. ⁽³⁾

The tendency of France to co-operate with Austria-Hungary and Germany indicated to some extent by the negotiations just touched upon, was the main feature in European relationships revealed by the negotiations of 1880. Granville's Circular of May 1, asking for the views of the Powers in

(1) F.O.64/936	Russell to Salisbury		26 November 1879
F.O.27/2376	Lyons to Salisbury	1206	12 December 1879
		1233	18 December 1879
			Confidential

G.P. Vol.III No.660.

(2) F.O.27/2427	Lyons to Salisbury	133	18 February 1880
(3) F.O.7/989	Elliot to Salisbury		18 March 1880

regard to the Montenegrin question, ⁽¹⁾ led to no indications being given as to tendencies of co-operation. It resulted in an Austro-Hungarian proposition for a further modification of the cession of territory originally promised to Montenegro at Berlin, and the negotiation, without any consultation of the other Powers taking place, as far at least as the Foreign Office was aware, between the Austrian and British representatives at Cettinje of a new line of frontier to be recommended to Turkey. ⁽²⁾ When final agreement was reached at Cettinje the proposal was accepted by all the Powers. ⁽³⁾ France had taken the initiative in the Greek question in the same way as Austria-Hungary in the Montenegrin question, and on April 28, proposed that the international Commission which Salisbury had proposed should meet in Greece to settle the Turko-Greek boundary question, should meet at Berlin or Paris in the first place. The proposal was similarly

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- (1) F.O.65/1084 Granville to Lyons 77
 Paget 51 Telegram 1 May 1880
 Elliot 74
 Russell 41
 Dufferin 71
- (2) F.O.7/985 Granville to Elliot 220 8 May 1880
 Secret
 221 10 May 1880
 221A 11 May 1880
 Confidential
 263 31 May 1880
- (3) F.O.65/1084 Granville to Lyons 117 & 118
 Paget 89 & 90 3 June 1880
 Russell 64 & 65
 Dufferin 126 & 127

accepted by all the Powers and no distinction in their several attitudes was perceptible to the Foreign Office. (1) Thus the British Circulars of May 4 and May 11, the one a general proposal for identic action at Constantinople calling upon the Turk to give a statement of its intentions in regard to the Greek and Montenegrin frontier question, and the question of Armenian reforms; the other proposing that the alternative of a Conference at Berlin or Paris should be offered to the Porte instead of the international Commission to meet in Greek territory - caused no light to be thrown on European relations.

Something, however, was shown by the reaction of the Powers to minor proposals. Thus Münster proposed to Granville that Turkey should be represented on the international frontier Commission if it met. Granville thereupon consulted the French Ambassador. It soon afterwards appeared that France had expressed her disapproval of that arrangement in Berlin. Bismarck immediately disavowed Münster. (2) A further ^{proposal} Circular from Granville ~~proposing~~ that the Conference should assemble immediately at Berlin and Turkey and Greece be invited to send delegates, (3) was accepted by all the Powers. France and

(1) F.O.27/2430	Lyons to Granville	336	28 April 1880
(2) F.O.64/960	Russell to Granville	219	21 May 1880
		Secret	
(3) F.O.65/1084	Granville to Russell	71	
	Paget	78	
			Telegram 22 May 1880
	Dufferin	107	
	Elliot	102	

Austria-Hungary informed the Foreign Office, however, that they wished to adopt a German suggestion that delegates from Turkey and Greece should not be formally invited, but that it should be left to the initiative of these Governments to lay their arguments before the Conference. (1) France took the initiative in effecting an agreement as to the basis of discussion in the Conference. (2) Russell advised Granville to attempt to arrange with France the line of to be put forward there, as the line whatever it was, put forward by France, would have Austro-Hungarian and German support. Granville on June 17, issued a further Circular asking the opinions of the Powers as to the rejoinder to be made to the Porte's reply in regard to the Identic Note. (3) Elliot reported that Haymerle could give no reply until he had consulted Germany. (4) Lyons reported that Freycinet had already consulted Bismarck and had agreed with the Chancellor that no rejoinder should be sent. (5) Soon after-

(1) F.O.27/2430	Lyons to Granville	221	29 May 1880
F.O.7/990	Elliot to Granville	265	29 May 1880
F.O.64/960	Russell to Granville		
	Telegram	45	28 May 1880
(2) F.O.27/2421	Granville to Lyons	879	31 May 1880
G.D.29/177	Russell to Granville		5 June 1880
(3) F.O.65/1084	Granville to Dufferin		
	Telegram	173	17 June 1880
(4) F.O.7/991	Elliot to Granville		
	Telegram	80	18 June 1880
(5) F.O.27/2432	Lyons to Granville		
	Telegram	39	19 June 1880

wards Austria-Hungary expressed an opinion in the same
 (1)
 sense. A further Circular from Granville stating that
 Britain accepted the view of these three Powers closed the
 matter.

When the question of a Naval Demonstration off the
 coast of Albania arose, the co-operation between France,
 Germany and Austria-Hungary was seen to weaken. France
 made her participation conditional on all the Powers taking
 part, and on similar measures being employed, if necessary
 for the Greek question. (3) Hohenlohe, Russell wrote to
 Granville "yielded cheerfully to your wishes about sending
 ships to Dulcigno." (4) Austria-Hungary, on the other hand,
 at first insisted that the demonstration should be confined
 to British and Austrian vessels. (5) When Granville refused,
 she gave a conditional assent to the British proposal as
 France had done, but her reserves were not entirely the same
 as the French reserves. They were that there should be
 no launching force, and that the Powers should not call upon

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- (1) F.O. 7/991 Elliot to Granville 330 21 June 1880
- (3) F.O.27/2432 Lyons to Granville
 Telegram 51 14 July 1880
- (4) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 17 July 1880
- (5) F.O.7/991 Elliot to Granville 362 30 June 1880
 Confidential

the Prince to occupy the territory in question.⁽¹⁾ The reaction to this weakening of the co-operation of the three Powers was seen to be a French attempt to improve her relations with England. Adams reported a French desire to act in particular unison with Her Majesty's Government.⁽²⁾ Courcel, head of the political department of the Foreign Office, told the British representative that the instructions to the French Admiral taking part in the Naval Demonstration would be communicated to England alone.⁽³⁾ When, however, the question of further coercion, and the seizure of Smyrna arose,⁽⁴⁾ the three Powers were again seen to act together. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, who had now succeeded Freycinet, had at first stated that he had no objection to the Smyrna plan.⁽⁵⁾ When he learnt that both Germany and Austria-Hungary rejected it, the French views changed and only Italy and Russia accepted the British proposal.⁽⁶⁾ Again, while Russia

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- (1) G.D.29/121 Dilke to Granville 7 July 1880
(reports a conversation with Karolyi)
- (2) F.O.27/2434 Adams to Granville 728 23 August 1880
Very Confidential
- (3) F.O.27/2435 Adams to Granville 845 13 September 1880
- (4) F.O.7/992 Elliot to Granville 383 13 July 1880
- (5) F.O.27/2436 Lyons to Granville
Telegram 111 5 October 1880
- (6) F.O.27/2436 Lyons to Granville 963 & 964 9 October 1880

and Italy accepted the project of the self-denying Protocol as ^{soon as} it was made, Germany, France and Austria-Hungary made their acceptance conditional on its being limited to the Greek and Montenegrin questions. (1) After the settlement of the Montenegrin question, (2) the co-operation of the three Powers in insisting that coercion should not be used was again evident. (3) They seemed to be acting upon the principles which Bismarck advised Russell at Friedrichsoule should guide the action of the Powers - for the present to devote their efforts to preventing the outbreak of Greco-Turkish conflict and for the future to rely solely on diplomatic pressure. (4) The first indication of this tendency came when simultaneously Austria, Germany and France replaced their representatives at Athens by more experienced diplomats. Radowitz, who had been at Paris while Hohenlohe was in charge of the Berlin Foreign Office, was sent back to his old post. (5) Wrede, the Austrian representative in Rome, was transferred to Athens. (6) France sent Molé, who had

(1) F.O.78/3076 Granville to Goschen
Telegram 455 1 September 1880

(2) Fitzmaurice: op.cit. Vol.II pp.221-224.

(3) D.D.F. Series I, Vol.II No.284.

(4) G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville 18 October 1880

(5) F.O.27/2437 Lyons to Granville 1018 1 November 1880

(6) F.O.7/996 Elliot to Granville 712 5 November 1880

previously been Secretary in the Vienna Embassy and chargé d'affaires in the absence of the Ambassador, to replace Ternaux-Courfans.⁽¹⁾ Elliot reported that Austria had concerted with France in sending instructions to her representative at Athens that Greece could expect no assistance if she attacked Turkey. The Powers were acting in a mediatory capacity and could not enforce the Berlin Award.⁽²⁾ The German representative was similarly instructed.

Diplomatic negotiations did not reveal the Russian rapprochement to Austria-Hungary and Germany until the beginning of 1881, when a good deal of information on the subject had already reached the Foreign Office. The three Powers then appeared to act together and Germany took the initiative, which had hitherto been left to France, in putting proposals before the Powers, turning to the profit of her relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia, such tendencies as had existed in Russia to seek an understanding with England, and Granville's desire that Germany should commit herself to some definite attitude on the question and cease to determine her attitude according to the decisions taken by other Powers. The principles of pressure on Turkey rather than on Greece, and of active pressure rather than

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.297.

(2) F.O.7/997 Elliot to Granville 782 4 December 1880
Very Confidential

purely diplomatic pressure which had furnished a basis for Anglo-Russian co-operation in regard to the Smyrna proposal, and the principle of compensation to Greece by the cession of Crete for the territory promised to her at the Berlin Conference in Epirus, which Giers had recently suggested might form the basis of an Anglo-Russian agreement on the Greek question (1) were now taken up by Bismarck and formed part of a far-reaching proposal for the settlement of the whole question. The Ambassadors were to agree upon a new cession to include Crete or not, as may seem best to them. They were then to secure Greek acceptance. The proposals were then to be put before Turkey. If Turkey refused coercion was to be used. Goschen to whom the plan was explained when he visited Bismarck on his way back to Constantinople after leave in England, reported that Bismarck had "Austria and Russia in his pocket" and that their consent was assured. (2) Bismarck also proposed that in the event of coercion being necessary, it might be delayed until Greece attacked Turkey; all then might take the shape of the Powers joining together to prevent Turkey from attacking Greece by sea. Both Elliot and Russell informed the Foreign

(1) F.O.65/1110 Dufferin to Granville 12 3 January 1881
Confidential

(2) G.D.29/189 Goschen to Granville 7 February 1881

Office that they had evidence ~~in that~~ ^{the} proposal ~~of what he~~
~~suspected to have taken place some time before~~ ^{was the result of} in an exchange
of views between Russia, Austria and Germany as to the means
to be taken to localize a Greeco-Turkish war should it
break out. ⁽¹⁾ ~~The present proposal was a development from that~~
~~exchange of views.~~ ⁽¹⁾

The result of this proposal was completely unexpected
as far as the British Foreign Office was concerned. Goschen
prepared to concert with Hatzfeldt at Constantinople, and
to bring about a settlement of the question on the lines
of Bismarck's proposals. Hatzfeldt, however, on his way
to Constantinople had had two long conferences with Haymerle
at Vienna and some agreement was apparently reached in
accordance with Haymerle's views that Turkish acceptance of
whatever cession the Ambassadors agreed upon should be
secured first, and the Greek acceptance afterwards. ⁽²⁾ For
under Hatzfeldt's leadership, and in spite of Goschen's
attempts to adhere to Bismarck's plan, and of British complaints
to Bismarck, ⁽³⁾ that course was adopted at Constantinople.

(1) F.O.7/1013	Elliot to Granville	50	29 January 1881
		Confidential	
F.O.64/979	Russell to Granville	55	30 January 1881
		Secret	
(2) F.O.7/1013	Elliot to Granville		
		Telegram 23	11 February 1881
		Telegram 24	12 February 1881
		Telegram 26	15 February 1881
G.D.7/1014	Elliot to Granville	117	1 March 1881
(3) F.O.7/1014	Elliot to Granville	125	8 March 1881
		Confidential	
D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.400			
F.O.64/980	Russell to Granville	119A	6 March 1881
		122, 123	8 March 1881

When discussion arose on the actual line to be recommended, Corti, the Italian, and Tissot, the French Ambassador, adopted a line of their own. Goschen and Hatzfeldt were separated by a sharp division of opinion, and Bismarck refused to give the latter instructions to reconcile his views with those of the British representative. ⁽¹⁾ Hatzfeldt, Calice and Novikoff, were thus left in concert and separated from the other Powers. It was not until March 6 that an agreement was reached. It was then only reached as the result of the Italian and French adhesion to their views, which caused Granville to instruct Goschen to abandon the position he had taken up.

The only source of information on European relations comparable to negotiations on the Balkan Commissions of 1878-79, was the negotiation in the Berlin Conference on the Greek Frontier which assembled on June 16, and the negotiations in the Madrid Conference from May 6 to July 3, 1880, on the question of the protection of nationals in Morocco. The one was too short to afford more than the smallest amount of information, the other was too much concerned with purely technical questions, to throw much light on political relations. So far as either gave any evidence on this subject, it was

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.III 409.
G.D.29/177 Russell to Granville

14 March 1881

to show the closeness of French relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany. These two Powers fulfilled the promise of support which they had given for any line that France might propose in the Berlin Conference, in spite of an effort made by Saburoff to secure their support of an entirely different line which he put forward on Russia's behalf. At Madrid, the Protocols show that whenever a division of opinion occurred that could not be settled by technical considerations, the representatives of the three Powers (2) voted together.

Some contribution, then, was made by information respecting the developments of 1880-81, towards closing the two questions left open in connection with the Austro-German Alliance. As to the exclusive character of the Alliance, in February 1880 the speech from the throne at the opening of the German Reichstag referred to "the League of Peace" of which the Austro-German Alliance ^{was} designed to be the basis. Germany aimed at the maintenance of peace and at securing (2) "the co-operation and guarantee of Powers similarly disposed."

(2) British and Foreign State Papers Vol.71 pp. G.P. Vol.III Nos.664, 665.

(2) F.O.64/958 Russell to Salisbury 14 February 1880

The Neue Freie Presse advocated an Italo-Austrian German Alliance on the terms of an Italian adhesion to the Austro-German Alliance. (1) Russell reported that it was hoped in Germany, that France might gradually be induced to join the Austro-German Alliance. (2) Beginning with an officially inspired article in the Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, provoked by an electioneering speech of Hartington's, which stated that it was neither Germany's nor Austria-Hungary's interest to gain England over to the Austro-German "system," (3) slowly matters were seen to change. Only in connection with Italy was an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany spoken of. Italian adhesion to the ^{Austro}~~Anti~~-German agreement was not mentioned and the Italian approach to Germany began to have an anti-French aspect, that was not entirely compatible with the commitments which the Foreign Office considered to exist between Austria and Germany.

In regard to the relations of the Allied Empires, with Russia, it had been made very clear that the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance did not necessarily involve a

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| (1) F.O.45/402 | Paget to Salisbury | 72 | 26 February 1880 |
| (2) F.O.64/958 | Russell to Salisbury | 83 | 20 February 1880 |
| (3) F.O.64/959 | Russell to Salisbury | 154 | 29 March 1880 |
- D.D.F. Series I Vol.III No.78.

permanent estrangement between Russia and her neighbours. It was not yet clear whether tendencies towards a revival of the Dreikaiserbund would be actualised.

The information on European relations in the following years concerned two main topics in the relations between the three Empires and between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany. It afforded, however, scarcely sufficient evidence to settle the doubtful points in regard to the Austro-German Alliance. It was only by the cumulative effect of information acquired over a period of three years that these points were finally settled, and that at the same time some definite conceptions were at last acquired in regard to the Dreikaiserbund and Triple Alliance. For, unlike the case of the Austro-German Alliance the formation of these combinations did not appear as diplomatic events, upon which, within a limited time a certain amount of information was collected, and a definite notion formed. There were a series of events upon each of which information was so collected. Definite and credited information, however, that an agreement had actually been concluded was in both cases lacking. Until, therefore, some event gave confirmation to the conclusion which the course of events had begun to force upon the Foreign Office, that some agreement must exist, there was nothing to give logical sequence to the information that was acquired. In

the case of the Triple Alliance this did not occur until April 1883. In the case of the Dreikaiserbund it seemed about to occur in December 1881, but did not do so finally until 1884.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DREIKAISERBUND, JUNE 18, 1881.

The signature of the Treaty and supplementary Protocol which re-established the Dreikaiserbund coincided with a complete break in the series of reports which reached the Foreign Office concerning the relations between the three Empires. For over two months the British representatives were completely silent on the subject. Both the Continental and British Press began then to assert that Russia was now less friendly towards Germany. (1) Reports from Vienna, moreover, spoke of the Austro-Hungarian determination to maintain the status quo in the Turkish Empire against Russian efforts to disturb it, and increased vigour in the war for predominance which it was asserted was going on throughout (2) the Balkan Peninsula between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Rumours that the Panslavist leader, Count Ignatieff, who had replaced Lord Melikoff as Minister of Interior in May, (3) was now to be appointed Foreign Minister, furnished the Press with grounds for the assertion that Austro-Russian relations

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| (1) F.O.7/1016 | Elliot to Granville | 354 | 26 July 1881 |
| (2) F.O.7/1016 | Fraser to Granville | 380 | 24 August 1881 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (3) F.O.65/1112 | Wyndham to Granville | 222 | 18 May 1881 |

were about to deteriorate.⁽¹⁾ The appointment was not,
 however, made⁽²⁾ and the alarm of the Press soon died down.
 It had probably exercised very little influence upon the
 views of the British Foreign Office. It serve to emphasise
 the complete lack of evidence that any development in the
 relations of the three Empires had taken place.

The quiet signature in Berlin by Bismarck and the
 Austrian and Russian Ambassadors of the Treaty and Protocol,
 when the terms of the latter had been decided upon in prin-
 ciple, as far back as September 1880,⁽³⁾ and the terms of the
 former agreed upon in detail three months before, was not an
 event likely to be observed by diplomats.⁽⁴⁾ The more limited
 number, especially in Berlin, of those who knew of the
 existence of the agreement as compared with the number of
 those who knew of the Austro-German Alliance, was a further
 factor in ensuring its secrecy. Again, no communication
 concerning it was made to the Press or to any Foreign

(1) F.O.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 305 23 June 1881

(2) F.O.65/1113 Wyndham to Granville 383 20 July 1881
 Confidential

(3) Simpson: op. cit., pp.145-147.

(4) Simpson: op.cit., pp.235 et sequ.

Government. The Foreign Office, therefore, was compelled to rely upon the independent resources of the diplomatic machine for any information that might be secured. These resources were already more limited than in 1879 as a result of the facts just mentioned. The absence of Crowe in Paris, where he was a member of the commission for the negotiation of a commercial treaty between England and France,⁽¹⁾ and the absence of Ampthill who was on leave,⁽²⁾ still further diminished the chances of securing reliable information. From St. Petersburg nothing could be expected. Dufferin had been recalled in April, to become Ambassador at Constantinople. Plunkett, who had had some experience in managing the affairs of the Embassy and valuable connections in St. Petersburg, had left Russia in the previous December⁽³⁾ and was now Secretary in the Paris Embassy. Wyndham, who was chargé d'affaires until the arrival of Sir E. Thornton, the new Ambassador in October, had no experience of Russian politics, and had his connections still to establish when he arrived in St. Petersburg on April 26.⁽⁴⁾

(1) G.D.29/121	Dilke to Granville		25 May 1881
(2) F.O.64/982	Ampthill to Granville	282	2 June 1881
(3) F.O.65/1083	Dufferin to Granville	614	17 December 1881
(4) F.O.65/1111	Gosselin to Granville	166	21 April 1881

Meanwhile, the Emperor and his court remained at the Palace of Gatchina, and Wyndham had little opportunity to establish close contact with some of the most important influences in Russian policy. ⁽¹⁾ Elliot, it is true, was at his post in Vienna, but of all the capitals, Vienna was the least likely to afford any valuable information. The confidence between the Emperor and his Ministers, and in turn between Haymerle and other members of the Government or Haymerle and the subordinates of the Foreign Office, made it unlikely that differences of opinion on the question of policy, any more than the necessity of justifying policy before Parliament or country, would offer an opportunity for securing information. Further, Haymerle himself left Vienna on holiday shortly after the signature of the Treaty and did not return until ⁽²⁾ September 2.

The break in the series of reports concerning the relations of the three Empires caused the connection between their relations and diplomatic questions of current importance to be lost. The result was that when in September, the Foreign Office again received information on the relations of the three Empires, it had no knowledge of any specific questions which could at that time form the subject of an

(1) F.O.65/1111 Wyndham to Granville 170 26 April 1881
 (2) F.O.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 308 24 June 1881

agreement between them. Moreover, the Eastern Question which the information received by the Foreign Office during 1880-81 had indicated as a possible subject of any agreement between the three Powers, was at the moment completely in the background. By the end of May 1881, all the matters left outstanding by the Treaty of Berlin had been settled, with the exception of the question of Armenian reforms. That question was regarded as concerning England and Russia alone. The other Powers agreed to instruct their representatives at Constantinople to support whatever recommendation England and Russia made to the Porte on the subject.⁽¹⁾ The unionist agitation in Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia, which had seemed to be about to re-open an issue which had up to now been very closely connected with the question of the relations between the three Empires, was put into the background in the Spring of 1881 by a constitutional crisis in Bulgaria.⁽²⁾ In regard to that matter, Russia and Austria-Hungary made a similar, although according to the information received by the Foreign Office, not concerted proposal that the Great Powers should act in unison and give

(1) F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	387	26 August 1881
F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	393	17 September 1881
		Secret	

(2) F.O.7/1015	Elliot to Granville	246	10 May 1881
		257	14 May 1881
		262	17 May 1881
		Confidential	

assurances of support to the Prince. The proposal was accepted and no occasion was therefore offered for evidence to be given of a separate understanding between any of the Powers.⁽¹⁾ Only the question of socialism in fact seemed to afford a suitable subject for an exchange of views between the three Powers.

The agreements signed by them, however, embodied the principles which had been established in the course of the negotiations of 1879-81.⁽²⁾ They dealt, therefore, as the Austro-German Treaty had dealt, with the problem of the attitude of the others if one of the Contracting Parties were engaged in war. A short preamble described the object of the Treaty as to assure the defensive position of the three Empires. Article I imposed a general obligation of benevolent neutrality in the event of war between one of the Contracting Parties and a non-Signatory. No precise obligation was provided for in regard to active assistance in any specific case. By Article I the non-combatants undertook to devote their efforts to localizing the conflict. It was not stated

(1) F.O.7/1015 Elliot to Granville 294 15 June 1881
 F.O.65/1113 Wyndham to Granville 347 29 June 1881
 F.O.7/1076 Elliot to Granville 328 4 July 1881
 D.D.F. Series I Vol. IV No.61.

(2) Pribram: op.cit., vol.I, pp.11 et sequ.

whether forcible measures were to be used to prevent the entry of other Powers. Article III was designed to prevent the passage of enemy ships through the Straits in the event of a war between Russia and a fourth Power - particularly England. It did not state whether the warning which in the event of an infraction of the London Treaty the three Powers bound themselves to deliver to Turkey, to the effect that she had put herself in a state of war respecting the injured party, and deprived herself of the security of her territorial status quo, assured to her by the Treaty of Berlin, was to be followed by more active measures if it failed to achieve its purpose.

The documents of the Dreikaiserbund were, however, primarily concerned to establish principles of policy respecting certain specific issues. The principle of co-operation in regard to the Eastern Question was accepted by the three Powers. A mutual recognition of their position and interests in the Balkans, provided for by Article II was a necessary preliminary to this. The same Article then provided that changes in the territorial status quo of Turkey should not come about except by virtue of an understanding between the three Powers. The fifth paragraph of the supplementary Protocol stipulated that the agents of the three Powers in

the East should be furnished with general instructions enjoining them to smooth away divergences of opinion by friendly explanations, and when this proved impossible to refer the matter home.

The attitude of the Signatories was determined on a number of specific issues connected with the Eastern Question. By Article III of the main agreement, they bound themselves to accept the principle of the closure of the Straits, and its interpretation as binding on all the European Powers in respect of each other as well as in respect of each separately and Turkey, Russia and Germany by paragraph 1 of the Protocol acknowledged Austria-Hungary's right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The remaining stipulations of the Protocol favoured the eventual union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The three Powers agreed not to oppose that development, and undertook to dissuade Turkey from occupying either the Balkan line or Eastern Rumelia itself - from using, that is, the one means she possessed to prevent the union from taking place. It was also stipulated that the united state, if it came into existence, should not extend beyond the present limits of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and that neither Bulgaria nor Eastern Rumelia should be allowed to attack Macedonia or any other Turkish province.

Article V of the main agreement stipulated for a time limit of three years, and Article VI provided for secrecy.

At the end of July and the beginning of August, Berlin and Vienna temporarily ceased to be important diplomatic

centres. Bismarck was at Kissengen, the Emperor William at Gastein and Ampthill still on leave in England. Haymerle had not returned to Vienna, Francis Joseph was at Salzburg and Elliot left for England on August 2.⁽¹⁾ It had already been announced in Vienna and Berlin that Francis Joseph would visit the Emperor William at Gastein on the 4th.⁽²⁾ Elliot, however, did not attach sufficient importance to the projected meeting to defer his departure, and Mr. Hugh Fraser who had only lately joined the Embassy was left in charge. He did not consider the meeting of sufficient importance to justify any attempt to discover what had taken place.⁽³⁾ When the Press took the matter up and pointed to a political motive for the meeting, Walsham reported from Berlin that he was convinced that its sole object was to give a public manifestation of the firmness of the Austro-German Alliance. The absence of both Haymerle and Bismarck was conclusive evidence, that there had been no other motive. Walsham then pointed out how close the relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany in fact were. He quoted an article in the official German National Zeitung and pointed

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- (1) F.O.7/1016 Fraser to Granville 359 2 August 1881
 (2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.70.
 F.O.64/982 Walsham to Granville 338 30 July 1881
 (3) F.O.7/1016 Fraser to Granville 360 5 August 1880

to the attitude of the two Governments, in face of a recent quarrel between Czechs and Germans at Prague, as evidence
(1)
in support of his views.

Throughout August the reports received by the Foreign Office from its representatives at the five capitals, were very few. No information had been received such as would put the meeting between the two Emperors and Walsham's interpretation of it into the background when a report arrived from Ampthill who had returned to Berlin on the 24th,
(2)
to the effect that a meeting between the Emperors of Russia and Germany was to take place during the following week.
(3)
Three days later he telegraphed that Saburoff had left Berlin to take part in the meeting and that Bismarck and Moltke would also be present.
(4)
On the same day the Foreign Office received a telegram from St. Petersburg announcing that the Czar had left unexpectedly that morning for Danzig.
(5)
Walsham's report then as to the strength of the Austro-German friendship was of considerable importance. For when coupled with information that the Danzig meeting marked the

(1) F.O.64/983	Walsham to Granville	345	6 August 1881
		Confidential	
		348	13 August 1881
(2) F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	364	24 August 1881
(3) F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	377	5 September 1881
(4) F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	379	8 September 1881
(5) F.O.65/1114	Wyndham to Granville	459	8 September 1881

renewal of the Russo-German "Alliance" it pointed to the development of a triple friendship dependent upon Germany.

Russian sources furnished the earliest information in this connection. Immediately on his return to Berlin Saburoff called on Ampthill and described in detail the meeting on the yacht in Danzig harbour. The motive of the meeting, he asserted, had been the Russian Emperor's desire to relieve himself of the general accusation of anti-German tendencies and to revive the traditional ties which had hitherto united the Royal Houses of Russia and Germany. The Emperor William and Prince Bismarck had responded most cordially. During the course of the meeting, general assurances of goodwill and of moral support in the interests of peace had been exchanged and the "Austro-German Alliance strengthened by the addition of Russia to it."⁽¹⁾ At first Wyndham's personal impression was that the meeting had very little significance. He believed it had been a mere act of courtesy. The presence of Bismarck, Giers, the German military attaché at St. Petersburg, and the two brothers of the Czar who held high commands in the army and navy, he stated was due to the desire of the Czar to convince Europe that he intended to pursue a peaceful policy not only towards Germany but towards

(1) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville

12 September 1881

all other states. (1) On the following day, however, the Official Gazette of St. Petersburg published a Circular to the Russian representatives abroad, informing them of "the renewal of the close relations and the hereditary friendship" between Russia and Germany. (2) On the same day the semi-official Journal de St. Petersburg spoke of the union of the three Empires that had been established as the result of the meeting. (3) The Novoe Vremya alluded to the "agreement" that had been reached between Russia and Germany. The Novosti welcomed a new Russo-German Alliance. (4) A conversation with Giers, moreover, confirmed the evidence of the Press as to the significance of the meeting for the revival of a close Russo-German friendship. Wyndham indeed inferred from the latter's language that the meeting was so far from a mere general demonstration of Russia's peaceful intentions, as to have roused the resentment of France. (5)

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- (1) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 462 13 September 1881
Confidential
- (2) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 463 14 September 1881
D.D.F. Series I Vol. IV No.118.
- (3) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881
Cf. D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.137 (The Chargé d'affaires
at St. Petersburg to Barthélemy St. Hilaire)
describing a conversation with Giers.
- (4) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 472 15 September 1881
- (5) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881

From German sources Ampthill could secure no information. Bismarck was at Varzin, where he remained during the rest of the winter. Berlin Society was still out of town and informed circles, still largely occupied with the manoeuvres, were not accessible. "I have knocked at every friendly and confidential door," he wrote to Sanderson, "and have found nobody at home."⁽¹⁾ Busch, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom Ampthill spoke a week later, professed to know nothing about the meeting.⁽²⁾ A "friend" who had been present was also unable to give him any further information.⁽³⁾ Only the Press, which hailed the meeting as the "sensational renewal of the Russo-German Alliance" afforded some slight confirmation of Saburoff's statements.⁽⁴⁾

Further information indicated that the triple friendship was not only dependent upon Germany, but that the close relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and between Germany and Russia, were supplemented by a Russo-Austrian friendship.

(1)	F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Sanderson		10 September 1881
(2)	F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	391	17 September 1881
			Secret	
(3)	F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	393	17 September 1881
			Secret	
(4)	G.D.29/177	Ampthill to Granville		12 September 1881
	F.O.64/983	Ampthill to Granville	391	17 September 1881
			Secret	

authenticity of these documents was indisputable. Fraser pointed out that no official announcement had been made that the documents were spurious or inaccurate, which he considered would have been made, if that were the case. Giers and a member of the Austrian Embassy vouched for their accuracy ⁽¹⁾ to Wyndham. Some time later it appeared that an official enquiry in Vienna had revealed that copies of the documents sent on to the Emperor at Pesth had been found in his wastepaper basket and sold by the finder to the newspaper. ⁽²⁾

The exchange of courtesies between the Czar and Francis Joseph had indicated the existence of friendly relations between the two countries. The Austrian Emperor had been clearly associated with the meeting, both by the Czar's telegram and by the reported communication of the Kaiser to the Czar. The persistence, in spite of repeated denials of the rumour that a meeting between Francis Joseph and Alexander III was to take place in the near future, further confirmed the information that had then been received respecting the increased friendliness between Austria-Hungary and Russia. ⁽³⁾

(1) F.O.65/1114	Wyndham to Granville	487	28 September 1881
(2) F.O.7/1017	Fraser to Granville	434	25 October 1881
(3) F.O.65/1014	Wyndham to Granville	484	26 September 1881

Confidential

Kallay indeed, who on account of Haymerle's death was in charge of the Foreign Office under the nominal direction of Slavy, the Finance Minister⁽¹⁾, informed the Austrian Delegations that although there neither was nor had been any question of such a meeting "it was not impossible that it might take place at some future date."⁽²⁾

The appointment of Kalnoky, who since January 1879 had been Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to succeed Haymerle, shortly afterwards appeared as further evidence of Austro-Russian friendship. His appointment was reported as likely by Fraser within two weeks of Haymerle's death.⁽³⁾ There was no opportunity for speculation as to possible successors. The decision of the Emperor and his advisers appeared to have been taken without hesitation. Yet little or nothing, Fraser reported, was known of Kalnoky's political views or abilities, and those whom public opinion considered most eligible for the position were to be passed over.⁽⁴⁾ All that was known in regard to Kalnoky was that

(1) F.O.7/1017	Fraser to Granville	418	14 October 1881
(2) F.O.7/1018	Fraser to Granville	468	11 November 1881
(3) F.O.7/1017	Fraser to Granville	428	22 October 1881
		Confidential	
(4) F.O.7/1018	Fraser to Granville	482	24 November 1881

he was supposed to be particularly friendly to Russia and was well looked upon by both Russia and Germany. When the Neue Freie Presse announced the probable appointment of Kalnoky, and reported, prematurely as it proved, that he had had a long conference with Bismarck recently on his way from St. Petersburg to Vienna, Fraser informed the Foreign Office that he believed Germany would use Kalnoky to bring about closer relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. (1) The official announcement of the appointment on the 22nd afforded the opportunity for this view to be substantiated. (2) Articles in the Russian Press which Thornton stated were officially inspired, described Kalnoky's future policy as one of friendship to Russia and looked forward to the consolidation of the relations between the two Empires. Kalnoky left St. Petersburg for Vienna again on December 5, after presenting his letters of recall. (3) On his way he stayed in Berlin. There he was received by the Emperor and had two long conferences with Bismarck. "It is firmly hoped and believed in Berlin," Ampthill then reported, "that Kalnoky will be even better able

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| (1) F.O.7/1018 | Fraser to Granville | 478 | 18 November 1881 |
| | | Confidential | |
| F.O.65/1015 | Thornton to Granville | 548 | 16 November 1881 |
| (2) F.O.7/1018 | Fraser to Granville | | |
| | Telegram | 76 | 22 November 1881 |
| D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.192 | | | 30 November 1881 |
| (3) F.O.65/1115 | Thornton to Granville | 570 | 7 December 1881 |
| | | 575 | 7 December 1881 |

to cement and consolidate the alliance between Austria,
 Germany and Russia than his predecessor."⁽¹⁾ In a private
 letter to Granville he wrote: "He clings to the alliance with
 Bismarck and to the Dreikaiserbund."⁽²⁾ Elliot on returning
 to his post had a conversation with Kalnoky. The new Minister
 insisted on the necessity for cordial relations between the
 Governments of Austria-Hungary and Russia and his determina-
 tion to remove the distrust between the two peoples.⁽³⁾

There had not as yet been a single mention of the possible
 existence of a written agreement. Kallay's declaration
 before the Delegations on November 10, that "the Danzig
 meeting had not led to any alliance verbal or written", seems
 to have been accepted without question.⁽⁴⁾ The present
 diplomatic situation appeared to afford no subject for such
 an agreement. That possible subjects were only looked for
 among questions of immediate interest, was shown by the fact
 that whenever it was suggested that the discussions at Danzig
 had been of a less general nature, the only subject in regard
 to which it was thought some agreement might thus have been

(1) F.O.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 464 9 December
 D.F. D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.205,210 (St. Vallier to
 Gambetta. St. Vallier's information is much fuller
 than Ampthill's in the same direction).

(2) G.D.29/177 Ampthill to Granville 5 10 December 1881

(3) F.O.7/1018 Elliot to Granville 507 23 December 1881
 Confidential

(4) F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 467 11 November 1881

planned, was that of Socialism. For, in spite of the lull in affairs during the summer this subject had been kept open since the failure of Russia's proposal for an international Conference to deal with Nihilism. The Journal de St. Petersburg alluded to the Danzig meeting as above all a guarantee against the revolutionary party. (1) Kalnoky, according to the telegram in the Egyptertes, informed Haymerle that the conversations at Danzig had turned principally upon the struggle with the Socialist danger. The Times believed that if any other discussions had taken place, they were a mere screen for the problem of combatting Nihilist activities. (2) The issue shortly afterwards of a series of Ukazes imposing what amounted to martial law in certain districts of Russia, again suggested that some agreement might have been reached on the subject.

Moreover, the idea survived that the Austro-German Alliance involved German acceptance and support of Austria-Hungary's mission in the East as a bulwark against the Russian advance. Only if Austria-Hungary abandoned this policy was an Austro-Russian agreement possible. The antagonism between their interests in the Balkans precluded any agreement

(1) F.O.65/1114 Wyndham to Granville 466 14 September 1881
D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV Nos.129, 137.

(2) The Times, 10 September.

between them except on the basis of a forward policy. Thus, the Times in a leader on the Danzig interview asserted that the tightening of Russo-German relations involved at the most, only the weakening of Russian opposition to the German and Austrian policy of maintaining the existing conditions in the East. As long as Austria-Hungary and Germany remained true to that policy, the antagonism between their interests and those of Russia would be so strong that "England could remain indifferent to the degree of warmth infused into their relations and the methods they chose to guarantee each other against endeavours to snatch an unfair advantage."⁽¹⁾ The Times was confident that Austria and Germany would not abandon their policy. "England," it wrote, "might confidently entrust the representation of her interests in the new system of relations brought about between the three Imperial courts, to Austria."⁽²⁾ She should encourage the extension of Austrian influence in the Balkans.

The language of Bismarck to the British Ambassador at this time confirmed the view that Germany intended to support the policy and interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary in the East. Towards the end of December Bismarck asked Ampthill to come and see him as he wished to speak to him of

(1) The Times, 10 September 1881.

(2) The Times, 23 and 29 September.

the mission of Mizami Pasha and Rishid Bey who were then in Berlin. The frank manner in which Bismarck communicated to Ampthill the overtures that they had made appeared in itself as an indication of Bismarck's desire to act with Britain in Turkish affairs. The Chancellor, however, went further. He stated that he proposed to reply by urging the Sultan to place implicit confidence in the good faith and friendly advice of England with whom he himself wished to act at all times in harmony and cordial concert. Germany, he said, had every reason to support the policy of England, which he described as based upon the absolute necessity to keep the road to India free, and the earnest desire to maintain the political status quo in Turkey, Asia, and Egypt, because it was conducive to the maintenance of peace and order in Europe. (1) Meanwhile the Panslavist Press in Russia began a violent campaign against Austrian activity in the Balkans. (2) The Neue Freie Presse took up the challenge. Russia, it insisted, must grow accustomed to find the "moral and commercial influence" of Austria in the Balkans. She had begun to recover her old predominance, and Russia had no cause for anger if her progress continued. (3) In St. Petersburg the Russ attacked the Treaty

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| (1) F.O.64/984 | Ampthill to Granville | 481 | 20 December 1881 |
| | | Secret | |
| (2) F.O.65/1115 | Thornton to Granville | 543 | 10 November 1881 |
| (3) F.O.7/1018 | Elliot to Granville | 484 | 25 November 1881 |

of Berlin and was supported by the more moderate Novoe Vremya.⁽¹⁾
 The German Press notably the Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
 came in on the side of Austria and the Berlin Treaty.⁽²⁾

It was in the atmosphere created by this Press campaign, that the Foreign Office received information which if it had been confirmed or had been received under other circumstances, might have convinced it of the existence of a formal agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia. For a leakage in regard to the Protocol signed by the three Powers seems to have occurred in St. Petersburg. In the second week of December Thornton, who had now taken up his post as Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had heard rumours that "some agreement had been arrived at and signed by Count Kalnoky and M. de Giers."⁽³⁾ At about the same time the Volnoe Slova, a proscribed journal published in Geneva, printed the full text of a Protocol, which it asserted had been signed by Kalnoky and Giers. The Times, when it published the Protocol on the 23rd, described Geneva as the source of its information.⁽⁴⁾ The Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung when it printed the Protocol, acknowledged clearly that the Volnoe Slova was the source of its information.

(1) F.O.65/1115	Thornton to Granville	581	13 December 1881
(2) F.O.64/984	Amphill to Granville	459	6 December 1881
(3) F.O.65/1115	Thornton to Granville	590	21 December 1881

Confidential

(4) The Times, December 23, 1881.

The Novosti of St. Petersburg copied the news from the Vienna paper. (1) At the same time Thornton received a copy of the alleged Protocol from "one of his colleagues" - probably the Turkish Ambassador. (2) For Dufferin soon afterwards reported from Constantinople the rumour of "an arrangement between Russia and Austria as to the Balkans" directed to bring about a partition.

The alleged Protocol was a secret document which touched upon all the issues that might arise in the Balkans, and determined the policy to be pursued by the two Powers in regard to them. The adhesion of Germany was to be invited. There were eleven points in all. The chief of which provided that the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be permanent; that every possible assistance should be given to Bulgaria to consolidate her Government and if union with Eastern Rumelia became inevitable, that it should be effected without disturbance; that the two Governments should take measures of protection if complications arose which threatened communications through the Peninsula and Straits, and the preservation of good order at Constantinople. Other paragraphs dealt with the maintenance of the indepen-

(1) F.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 599 28 December 1881

(2) F.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
Confidential

dence of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania; and good order in Albania. Lastly, the two Powers would resist the ambitions of all other States in the Balkans. ⁽¹⁾

Gladstone took the matter seriously. He hoped there was nothing in it, but urged Granville "to place on record that we would not view with approval any arrangement between foreign Powers which either directly or indirectly tended to undermine the liberties of the Balkan states." ⁽²⁾ Giers, however, categorically denied the truth of the report. ⁽³⁾

Labanoff told Granville that "it was an absolute canard," and the latter was "inclined to believe" him. ⁽⁴⁾ Thornton wrote privately to Granville that he had no faith in it. He believed that nothing had been put down in writing during the discussions between Giers and Kalnoky. ⁽⁵⁾ The fact that, as far as can be seen from the documents available, the Protocol was not again mentioned nor any attempt made to secure further information seems to indicate that Thornton's opinion was accepted by the Foreign Office.

(1) F.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
Confidential

599 28 December 1881
The first transmits the text of the Protocol as reported to Thornton by one of his colleagues. The second transmits the text as published in the Novosti and the Times. There are verbal differences between the two.

(2) G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 28 December 1881

(3) F.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 21 December 1881
Confidential

(4) G.D.29/124 Granville to Gladstone 30 December 1881

(5) G.D.29/185 Thornton to Granville 22 December 1881

It was some time before any such definite information on the subject of the relations between the three Empires was again received by the Foreign Office, not indeed until the Imperial meeting at Skiernewirce in 1884. Meanwhile the only indication that some agreement might perhaps exist was afforded by a series of incidents which revealed the existence of a greater confidence between the three Empires than the assurances reported to have been exchanged at Danzig, or the feelings of the three peoples warranted. The first of these was a violent recrudescence of panslavist and anti-German agitation in Russia at the beginning of 1882. The signal for the outbreak was given by a speech of General Skobeleff, who had commanded the Russian troops in Bulgaria, and subsequently the Russian expedition against the Akkal Turcomans. After referring to Russian victories in Central Asia, he spoke in passionate terms of the aggressive ambitions of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Aksakov in the Russ then urged the Government to place itself at the head of the struggling Herzegovinians and Bozniaks. The Austrian campaign to quell their revolt was a "campaign against ourselves."⁽¹⁾ Other papers took up the cry.⁽²⁾ The German and Austrian Press replied with accusations against Russia, and Elliot reported a good

(1) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 55 7 February 1882
 (2) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 45 2 February 1882

deal of excitement among the public in Vienna. ⁽¹⁾ By mid-February Skobeleff was in Paris. There, on the 16th, he addressed a body of Servian students. His speech was a violent attack upon Germany. Her sinister influence was everywhere apparent in Russian affairs. It was she who prevented Russia from fulfilling her patriotic duties. "L'ennemi, c'est l'allemand". ⁽²⁾ In still stronger terms he repeated his views to the editor of the Voltaire who ⁽³⁾ reported them in his newspaper on the 17th. The attacks on Austria-Hungary meanwhile continued in the Russian Press. By the 22nd the Novoe Vremya was discussing the probable position of Russia in a war against Austria and Germany. Thornton thought it significant that the question should thus be under discussion, when there seemed to be no intention on the part of either Austria-Hungary or Germany to provoke or engage in war with Russia. ⁽⁴⁾ The Austrian-Press fully appreciated the apparent significance of the article. It accused Russia openly of aggressive designs against Austria and Germany, while the degree of public indignation was sufficient to cause Elliot considerable anxiety as to the future relations between the two Empires. ⁽⁵⁾ Questions were asked both in the

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- (1) F.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 65 11 February 1882
 (2) F.O.27/2560 Lyons to Granville 150 17 February 1882
 (3) D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.259 Note.
 (4) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 73 28 February 1882
 (5) F.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 82 24 February 1882
 D.D.F. Series I Vol. IV No.260 (Courcel to Freycinet: reports the existence of the opinion in Berlin, that a Russo-German war was imminent).

Lords and Commons, as to the possibility of war. (1) At the beginning of the following month Thornton reported a speech by the President of the St. Petersburg Slavonic Benevolent Society, who used similar though less violent language to that used by Skobelev. (2) A little later, he wrote that there were serious apprehensions of war in St. Petersburg sufficient to have a depressing influence on trade. (3) Colonel Gonne, the British military attaché, was instructed to investigate whether there was any real danger of Russia being involved in war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. (4) Skobelev meanwhile had gone from Paris to Warsaw. There he delivered on March 7, a further inflammatory speech. He spoke of the indissoluble bonds which united Poland and Russia and the danger to Poland of German ambitions. (5) A new outcry in the German Press followed (6) and the commander of the German troops at Posen made a speech in reply. It was not until the end of March that the agitation began to die down and Thornton could report a renewal of confidence in the maintenance of peace. (7) There was a final

(1) F.O.65/1133	Granville to Thornton	64	27 February 1882
		Confidential	
(2) F.O.65/1135	Thornton to Granville	78	9 March 1882
(3) F.O.65/1135	Thornton to Granville	84	11 March 1882
(4) F.O.65/1135	Thornton to Granville	138	21 April 1882
	enclosing Gonne (military attaché)		
	to Thornton	No.1	17 April 1882
(5) F.O.65/1135	Thornton to Granville	86	13 March 1882
(6) F.O.64/1005	Amphill to Granville	84	11 March 1882
		Very Confidential	
(7) F.O.65/1135	Thornton to Granville	102	23 March 1882

flicker when Skobeleff spoke at a regimental dinner on
 the 21st. ⁽¹⁾ In April an injunction was issued by the Govern-
 ment forbidding persons serving in the army from making
 public speeches or engaging in political discussions. ⁽²⁾
 At the end of the month when a body of Russian peasants
 attacked a colony of Germans in the South of Russia, Thornton
 again saw reason to fear a break in the friendly relations
 between Russia and Germany. ⁽³⁾ There was, however, no
 revival of anti-German or anti-Austrian agitation. Skobeleff's
 death at the beginning of July checked for the time any
 further developments. ⁽⁴⁾

In spite of the alarming proportions which British
 information showed the agitation to have reached, the reports
 received from the Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna made it
 clear that the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments were
 completely unmoved by it. Their complacency was all the
 more striking in view of the attitude of Germany to Russia
 in 1879, and to Italy in 1850. On both occasions there had been
 less provocation.

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- (1) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 108 27 March 1882
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 140 21 April 1882
- (3) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville No.166 13 May 1882
- (4) Sosnosky: op.cit. Vol.II p.68.

as purely imaginary; and the Emperor had spoken laughingly to him of the difficulties of Russia in controlling the Pan-slavists. ⁽¹⁾ Prince Bismarck, Ampthill reported, was not in the least apprehensive, and says himself that the Powers were never more ⁽²⁾ pacific than under the present order of things in Europe. A few days later the Ambassador reported a more signal proof of Bismarck's complacency. The Emperor, it appeared, had called on Prince Bismarck who was ill and urged that some warning should be given to the Czar of the danger to his dynasty and Empire if he did not make an example of Skobelev and take strong measures against the Panslavists. "Prince Bismarck reiterated the advice he had all along tendered to His Majesty, which was not to interfere in the internal concerns of Russia ... but to leave the Skobelev incident to settle itself unaided, and ignored by His Majesty and His Majesty's Government, who had otherwise no official complaint to make of the Czar and of his Govern-⁽³⁾ment since the Danzig interview."

(1) F.O.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 147 24 March 1882
Confidential

(2) F.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 84 11 March 1882
Very Confidential

(3) F.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 95 18 March 1882
Very Confidential

arrival in Vienna of the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Vladimir. They stayed three days as the guests of the Emperor. They were treated with great distinction and the assurances they brought of the Czar's friendship to Austria-Hungary were "listened to with pleasure and willingly credited."⁽¹⁾ Finally, with complete disregard of the Pan Slavists who wished for Ignatieff's appointment, Giers was made Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁽²⁾ He had, reported Ampthill, all along enjoyed the confidence both of the German and Austrian Governments.⁽³⁾ Much satisfaction was expressed at Berlin and Vienna.⁽⁴⁾

It appeared, moreover, that the Russian Government was so confident that nothing could disturb the good relations between the three Powers, that it could afford to humour the Pan Slavists. Thus, Thornton reported that no attempt was made to suppress the newspapers in which inflammatory and offensive articles appeared. Yet the Government was well

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| (1) | F.O.7/1033 | Elliot to Granville | 153 | 29 March |
| | | D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.286, 287. | | |
| (2) | F.O.65/1135 | Thornton to Granville | 127 | 10 April 1882 |
| | | and 130 | | 12 April 1882 |
| (3) | F.O.64/1006 | Ampthill to Granville | 116 | 12 April 1882 |
| (4) | F.O.7/1033 | Elliot to Granville | 173 | 12 April 1882 |

able to do so as the recent suspension of the Golos and
Panadok ⁽¹⁾ and the change of tone adopted by the Novoe
Vremya, when at the end of March a warning was at last
given to it ⁽²⁾ showed. Again, Skobeleff was summoned to
Gatchina on his return from Paris and Warsaw and severely
reprimanded. But as Thornton noted, there was no
suggestion of his resignation or dismissal. ⁽³⁾

During the winter of 1882-83, there was a repetition
of the situation: violent recriminations in the Press
of the three Powers, alarmist rumours and an attitude of
absolute complacency and indifference on the part of the
Governments. At the end of November, Elliot reported, that
without warning or any apparent cause, the Austro-Hungarian
Press had raised the alarm of an imminent rupture between
Austria-Hungary and Russia. ⁽⁴⁾ This development was the
more unexpected in that Kalnoky had recently declared before
the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Delegations
that no breach of the European peace was to be expected

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- (1) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 62 15 February 1882
(2) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 102 23 March 1882
(3) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 84 11 March
(4) F.O.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 545 22 November 1882

(1)
 from Russia. At the beginning of December, again without any apparent cause, the German Press suddenly began to stress the existence of alliance obligations between Austria-Hungary and Germany. By the middle of the month a further series of articles had appeared which purported to give the substance of the Austro-German Treaty. The Grenzboten and Cologne Gazette made the earliest and fullest disclosures. The different articles contradicted each other especially on the point of the duration of the Treaty and actually revealed nothing new to the British Foreign Office. They served, however, to arouse an agitation that was reflected in all the continental newspapers. The simple explanation that an indiscretion had occurred or that Bismarck, having recently given a demonstration of friendship to Russia by inviting Giers to see him at Varzin, (2) was anxious to show that his friendship to Austria-Hungary was in no way diminished, were (3) rejected as inadequate. It was stated, instead, that

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| (1) | F.O.7/1036 | Elliot to Granville | 535 | 10 November 1882 |
| (2) | F.O.64/1008 | Ampthill to Granville | 392 | 20 October 1882 |
| | | | Confidential | |
| | | | 418 | 16 November 1882 |
| (3) | F.O.64/1008 | Ampthill to Granville | 466 | 15 December 1882 |

Bismarck intended, with some unknown purpose in view, to give a warning to France or to Russia, or even to Austria herself. Corroboration was considered to have been given to the more extreme views when it was learnt that Herbert Bismarck had paid a visit to Vienna and had seen Kalnoky. Both the German and Austrian Press, the Foreign Office was informed, stated that he had been charged by his father with a communication too secret and important to be entrusted to the ordinary diplomatic channels. The German National Zeitung saw war between Austria and Russia "looming on the horizon." Elsewhere, it was stated, that he had been instructed to warn Austria to mobilize immediately. Direction was given to these alarmist rumours when the Cologne Gazette on the 15th, published an article denouncing Russia's armaments. (1) Its accusations were immediately taken up by other papers. The Vienna Press professed to have found the real explanation of the disclosures in regard to the Austro-German Alliance. It had been a warning from Prince Bismarck to Russia provoked by a knowledge of her hostile designs. The papers were soon filled with accounts of the preparations which were being made against Austria and Germany. There was a general feeling of uneasiness,

public securities were depressed, the traditional Hungarian hatred and distrust of Russia found vent in innumerable intemperate and offensive articles. ⁽¹⁾ The Russian Press now took up the challenge. The Golos on the 27th, insisted that the Austro-German Alliance could only be looked upon as a menace to Russia. ⁽²⁾ In January other papers asserted that Germany was making an opportunity to annex the Baltic Provinces. ⁽³⁾ On February 9, the Golos stated that Austria-Hungary was spending large sums on the establishment of armed camps and on the repair of fortresses on her North Eastern frontier. She was concentrating troops there, and re-organising the militia in Galicia. She was rapidly acquiring that military ascendancy over Russia, which Germany already possessed. It urged the Government ⁽⁴⁾ to take measures to paralyse her activities.

Once more the Foreign Office were informed that the Governments of the three Empires were unperturbed. Giers

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| (1) F.O.7/1036 | Elliot to Granville | 580 | 22 December 1882 |
| | | and 583 | 26 December 1882 |
| | | Very Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.65/1137 | Thornton to Granville | 386 | 29 December 1882 |
| (3) F.O.7/1048 | Elliot to Granville | 7 | 11 January 1883 |
| (4) F.O.65/1155 | Thornton to Granville | 39 | 16 February 1883 |

stayed on quietly at Pisa, where he had gone on leave. Adhering to his original intention, he stopped at Vienna on his return in January, as he had stopped at Berlin on his outward journey, and visited Kalnoky as he had visited Bismarck. British information indicated that neither visit was at all connected with the agitation provoked by the disclosures in regard to the Austro-German Alliance. Giers' language to Ampthill indicated that Russia's "need for peace to devote herself to internal development and progress" had been the subject of his conversations with Bismarck. Ampthill's confidential information that Giers had consulted certain leading bankers in Berlin with a view to the development of Russia's financial interests corroborated this information. Ampthill furnished no other information and he seemed to be satisfied that there was nothing of greater interest to report. (1) Kalnoky told Elliot that his conversations with Giers had concerned the question of the Kilia mouths of the Danube, and Egypt.

(1) F.O.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville 421 22 November 1882
Confidential

Elliot also seemed satisfied that nothing more important
 (1) had been discussed. Russia had made no protest against
 the attitude of the Austrian and German Press. Austria-
 Hungary and Germany, it appeared, had offered no explanations.
 Bismarck by making an exception in favour of the Russian
 Ambassador, when he refused to see anyone or conduct any
 business on his return to Berlin in December, on the plea of
 illness, (2) and Kalnoky by the warmth of the reception accorded
 to Giers in Vienna, dissociated themselves from the anti-
 Russian agitation of Press and Public. Articles believed to
 have been officially inspired appeared in the Nord deutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung, on two occasions, (3) and in the Austrian
Fremdenblatt, designed to prove the accusations against
 Russia and the rumours in regard to Herbert Bismarck's visit
 to Vienna unfounded. (4) Kalnoky spoke to Elliot in the same
 sense. (5)

(1) F.O.7/1048	Elliot to Granville	32	26	January	1883
			34	29	January 1883
			Confidential		
		35	29	January	1883
(2) F.O.64/1008	Ampthill to Granville	471	16	December	1882
			Secret		
(3) F.O.64/1008	Ampthill to Granville	479	23	December	1882
			489	30	December 1882
(4) F.O.7/1048	Elliot to Granville	7	11	January	1883
(5) F.O.7/1036	Elliot to Granville	583	26	December	1882
			Very Confidential		

It seemed that Germany was so confident of Russia's friendship that she could afford to let the agitation take its course, if not to encourage it. Kalnoky informed Elliot that while Bismarck had not authorised the divulgations in regard to the Austro-German Alliance, he did not disapprove of them. ⁽¹⁾ The Cologne Gazette and the Grenzboten were both believed to be closely connected with the German Government. Ampthill's information seemed to afford positive evidence that Bismarck had inspired the agitation. The military authorities, he reported, had for a long time urged that a vote of money for the building of barracks and strategic railways should be sought from the Reichstag. Bismarck had at last agreed, but ⁽²⁾ in doing so, had said "We must begin by rattling our swords." ⁽³⁾ The agitation against Russia was presumably the result.

- (1) F.O.64/1024 Ampthill to Granville 54 9 February 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1036 Elliot to Granville 583 26 December 1883
Very Confidential
- (3) F.O.64/1608 Ampthill to Granville 474 19 December
Secret

There was evidence that an equal confidence existed where specific questions of policy were concerned. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary imposed in November 1881 a fresh law respecting military service and the disorder that had been prevalent since the summer became open rebellion. (1) Russia showed no signs of suspicion either then, or in the following January, when a large Austrian force advanced into the Provinces. Yet technically at least, Austria in imposing compulsory military service was going beyond the position assigned to her at Berlin, while Russia might reasonably have been expected to sound the alarm at the fresh advance of Austrian troops. The departure from Odessa of volunteers under Russian officers to assist the rebels was announced but did not in fact take place. (2) The panslavist Novoe Vremya appealed for a European Congress to take the settlement of the question out of Austria's hands. The Russian Foreign Office immediately dissociated itself from the views of that newspaper. (3)

(1) T.Sosnosky: Die Balkanpolitik Österreich Ungarns. Vol.II
Seit 1866 p.33 et sequ.

(2) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 124 5 April 1882

(3) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 95 15 March 1882

Austria-Hungary, on her part, showed no traces of suspicion that the insurrection was fomented by Russian agitators. Opportunity was continually afforded for her Ministers to voice such suspicions. Elliot for instance, asked Slavy, the Minister in charge of the matters connected with the occupation, what classes of persons were behind the insurrection. ⁽¹⁾ Kalnoky was directly questioned in the course of the discussion in the Committee of the Hungarian Delegations on the vote of credit for which the Government had asked, whether Russia was encouraging the rebellion. Kalnoky both then and before the Committee of the Austrian Delegations, testified to the correct bearing of Russia. ⁽²⁾ Kalnoky was satisfied, Elliot also reported that the Novoe Vremya did not represent the views of the Russian Government. In mid-April, when the rebellion had been quelled, Kalnoky again informed the Delegations that, although there had been evidence of English agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there had been no Russian agitation. ⁽³⁾ Yet there seemed valid enough grounds for suspecting Russian activity. Elliot himself drew Kalnoky's attention to reports received by the

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| (1) F.O.7/1032 | Elliot to Granville | 52 | 8 February 1882 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.7/1032 | Elliot to Granville | 37 | 1 February 1882 |
| (3) F.O.7/1033 | Elliot to Granville | 191 | 20 April 1882 |

British Foreign Office from their Consul General at Sophia, that armed bands under Russian leaders were crossing from Bulgaria into Macedonia and marching into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kalnoky appeared to be aware of it, but saw no cause for uneasiness. ⁽¹⁾ A few days before, the Wiener Extrablatt had published a conversation with Hitrovo, the Russian Consul at Sophia. He was alleged to have said that as Russia could not forcibly dispute with Austria the supremacy over the Slav nations, she must endeavour to raise "the spark of discontent" wherever Austrian influence predominated. The Panslavist committees were putting that policy into practice and would not allow the disorders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to subside. Elliot considered that the Foreign Office might regard the information of the newspaper as correct. ⁽²⁾ At the same time, British information indicated that Yonine, Russian Consul General at Ragusa, was openly supporting the rebels. ⁽³⁾ Again, when the insurrectionary movement was revived in the early summer of 1882, Freeman, British Consul at Bosnia-Serai reported, and

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- (1) F.O.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 201 26 April 1882
 (2) F.O.7/1033 Elliot to Granville 187 17 April 1882
 (3) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 204 24 July 1883

Confidential

Refers to information received by the Foreign Office from Kirby Green, British Consul at Cettinje in the Spring of 1882.

Elliot confirmed, the ^{presence} ~~pressure~~ among the rebels, of Bulgarians
(1)
under Russian leaders.

Although the Austro-Hungarian Press became very alarmed when in September 1882 Prince Nicholas of Montenegro paid a three weeks' visit to St. Petersburg, the Government was to Elliot's surprise undisturbed. "An exhibition of the sympathy between Russia and Montenegro", he wrote, "neither surprises nor irritates Count Kalnoky."⁽²⁾ Yet it took place just at the time when documents had come to light proving the participation of Montenegrins in the rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁽³⁾ and when a personal quarrel between the Austrian representative at Cettinje and the Montenegrin Government had resulted in a temporary suspension of relations.⁽⁴⁾ Kalnoky still showed no signs of uneasiness when the Prince repeated his visit in September 1883. Demonstrations of sympathy were even more marked on that occasion than previously. He was the guest of the Emperor for practically the whole month. Orders were conferred upon him. A deputation of the Slav Benevolent Society waited upon him

(1) F.O.7/1035	Elliot to Granville	356	14 July 1882
(2) F.O.7/1035	Elliot to Granville	469	29 September 1882
(3) F.O.7/1035	Elliot to Granville	434	31 August 1882
			Confidential
(4) F.O.7/1036	Elliot to Granville	503	20 October 1882
			Very Confidential
	referring to Kirby Green	80	29 September 1882
	to Granville		Confidential

and he delivered a speech to them enlarging upon the affinities of the Slav race. At Moscow the Prince again made a speech and showed clearly his acquiescence in Pan-slavist ambitions.⁽¹⁾

The progress of Russian influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia appeared also to be a matter of indifference to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Kalnoky, when Elliot spoke to him on the matter, showed no disposition to protest against the overbearing attitude assumed by the Russian consul at Philippopolis towards ^{Aleko} ~~Akko~~ Pasha,⁽²⁾ When in January 1883 the struggle at Sophia between the Bulgarian and Russian members of the Prince's Government came to a head, Kalnoky's uneasiness was caused not by the fear that the Russian group would probably secure the victory, but by the anxiety lest the Prince's refusal to appoint a Russian Minister of Public Works, and his attempt to rely on Bulgarian Ministers only, should result in the collapse of his authority in the Principality. The Prince, he told Elliot, could not have a Government without a certain Russian element. In so far as he disapproved of the Russian insistence on the appointment of a

(1) F.O.65/1137	Kennedy to Granville	277	6 September 1883
		288	14 September 1883
		301	27 September 1883
(2) F.O.65/1155	Thornton to Granville	2	3 January 1883
	F.O.7/1048	Elliot to Granville	1 3 January 1883

Russian Minister for Public Works, he made it clear to Elliot that his disapproval was not directed against Giers but against Sobeleff and Kaulbars, Alexander's Minister of Interior and War respectively. ⁽¹⁾ The fact that he had spoken frankly and unofficially to Labanoff, now Russian Ambassador in Vienna in that sense, appeared rather as a mark of confidence than otherwise. ⁽²⁾ He expressed no opinion when in June, in spite of appeals to the Czar, Alexander failed to secure the recall of Sobeleff and Kaulbars and the appointment of General Entroth in the latter's place, ⁽³⁾ nor, when Yonine was appointed to succeed Hitrovo as Consul-General at Sophia. When the Prince passed through Vienna, Kalnoky spoke to him of the dangers of the military organisation of the Principality, but from Elliot's report it did not appear that his remarks had had an anti-Russian tone. ⁽⁴⁾ In August Elliot had a long conversation on the question with Kalnoky, but could get nothing from him and the discussion became purely academic in character. When Yonine on the way to his post, stopped at Vienna and saw Kalnoky, the latter informed Elliot that he

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- (1) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 6 11 January 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 92 21 March 1883
Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 204 24 July 1883
Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 202 24 July 1883
Confidential

"was perfectly satisfied."⁽¹⁾ Yet the newspapers at the moment were full of reports that Russia was sending large quantities of arms into Bulgaria.⁽²⁾ In September Yonine's arrival at Sophia caused a crisis. He delivered what was virtually an ultimatum to the Prince in the shape of a project for a new constitution which was to replace the absolute powers assumed by the Prince in May 1881. Alexander rejected it and dismissed Sobeleff and Kaulbars from the Ministry. Sobeleff then paraded the army and appealed to the people.⁽³⁾ Kalnoky appeared to take the incident very seriously, but it was soon clear that he was more concerned by the disorders which seemed inevitable than by the probable outcome of the struggle. In any case, Elliot reported he was not prepared to take the initiative in protesting against the action of Russia.⁽⁴⁾ As soon as the crisis had passed Kalnoky expressed himself "as satisfied"⁽⁵⁾ with affairs in Bulgaria.

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- (1) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 229 22 August 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 218 13 August 1883
Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 262 11 September 1883
encloses a detailed account of the whole incident
by Col. Primrose, military attaché at Vienna.
- (4) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 249 4 September 1883
- (5) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 250 5 September 1883
257 10 September 1883
Confidential

Busch, who was in charge of the German Foreign Office, made clear to Amthill that Germany shared the Austrian point of view. As the Prince had submitted, he said, events must be allowed to take their course. ⁽¹⁾ Yet the submission of the Prince and the re-instatement of Soboleff and Kaulbars closed the incident by a confirmation of the Russian control over the Province. Giers made it clear that Russia intended to maintain that control. Bulgaria was a creation of Russia and the Emperor intended to see that her Government was conducted in accordance with his views. ⁽²⁾ The attitude of the non-official Berlin and Austrian Press, which asserted that Germany and Austria were much irritated against Russia for her action in Bulgaria and raised the cry that Europe should unite against Russia's ambitions, contrasted sharply with the attitude of the two Governments and seemed to point very clearly to the existence ^{of} ~~for~~ some cause for confidence on their part which was not possessed by the general public. ⁽³⁾

The state of affairs outlined above was exactly repeated when Alexander's abandonment of the Yonine constitution and ^{second} dismissal of Soboleff and Kaulbars re-opened the question. ⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) F.O.64/1027 Amthill to Granville 266 13 September 1883
- (2) F.O.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 206 10 September 1883
Confidential
- (3) F.O.64/1027 Amthill to Granville 266 13 September 1883
- (4) F.O.65/1157 Kennedy to Granville 221 24 September 1883
Confidential

Austria-Hungary's only concern appeared to be that Russia should do everything to sustain the authority of the Prince. The determination of Russia to turn the incident to the advantage of her own position in Bulgaria was obvious. An officially inspired article in the Journal de St. Petersburg declared that Bulgaria owed everything to Russia, and showed why she would find it impossible to free herself from Russian influence. (1) M. Vlanguy^{ely}, who was temporarily in charge of the Russian Foreign Office told the British chargé d'affaires that the dismissal of Sobeleff and Kaulbars could not diminish Russian influence or prestige. The people and army were thoroughly Russian. (2) Sobeleff returned to Russia but Kaulbars, though he resigned his position, remained in Bulgaria, where 200-300 Russian officers of the Bulgarian army were under his command. At the end of November, he negotiated an agreement with the Prince whereby the Minister of War was still to be a Russian appointed by the Czar and the Russian officers serving in Bulgaria were to remain there, though he himself left the country. Strict regulations were issued prohibiting these men from taking part in politics, but (3) Russian influence in the Principality was not thereby checked.

(1)	F.O.65/1157	Kennedy to Granville	212	15 September 1883
(2)	F.O.65/1157	Kennedy to Granville	221	24 September 1883
				Confidential
(3)	F.O.65/1158	Thornton to Granville	270	1 November 1883
			296	21 November 1883
			314	11 December 1883

Elliot during these events had sounded Kalnoky again and again with a view to securing some expression of opinion from him that was not of mere academic importance. He secured nothing but a statement that Austria-Hungary was convinced that Russia would not abandon her policy in Bulgaria. (1) There was nothing to show that this caused the Austrian Minister any alarm. In December Calice at Constantinople told Dufferin, and Kalnoky in Vienna told Elliot, that Bulgaria was a British rather than an Austrian interest. (2) Amphill reported from Berlin that Bismarck was prepared to be as "accommodating as possible" to Russian ambitions in Bulgaria. (3)

Again the attitude of the two Governments was in marked contrast to the attitude of the Press and public of the three countries. The Russian Press accused Austria-Hungary and Germany of supporting the Prince. By November, the resulting agitation had developed such proportions that rumours were current of Russian military preparations on the Austrian and German frontiers. (4) Giers, however, impressed upon Kennedy, the British chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg

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| (1) F.O.7/1051 | Elliot to Granville | 277 | 3 October 1883 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.7/1051 | Elliot to Granville | 329 | 4 December 1883 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (3) F.O.64/1027 | Amphill to Granville | 308 | 17 November 1883 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (4) F.O.65/1158 | Thornton to Granville | 274 | 7 November 1883 |
| | | 281 | |
| | | 285 | 10 November 1883 |
| F.O.64/1027 | Amphill to Granville | 319 | 23 November 1883 |

that his whole object was to prevent the Bulgarian question from developing from a purely local into a European issue. (1) Mohrenheim, now Russian Ambassador in London, told Granville during a visit he paid to Walmer Castle in October, that "the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany recognised the legitimate interests of Russia in the Principality and did not attempt to interfere with her action in the matter. (2)

The tour of the Balkan States made by the Crown Prince and Princess of Austria from April 14-29, 1884, afforded another occasion for a demonstration of confidence between the three Empires. Travelling by Budapest, Rustchuk and Varna, they reached Constantinople. There they stayed five days. On the return journey the Prince of Bulgaria met them at Varna and conducted them to Rustchuk, where they stayed a day. The courts of Bucharest and Belgrade were then visited in turn. (3) Although it was denied that the visit had a political object, no secret was made of the political results it was expected to achieve. It would consolidate the good

(1) F.O.65/1157	Kennedy to Granville	232	4 October 1883
		Confidential	
		241	7 October 1883
		Confidential	
F.O.65/1158	Thornton to Granville	285	10 November 1883
(2) F.O.65/1154	Granville to Thornton	289	24 October 1883
(3) F.O.7/1062	Paget to Granville	62	23 February 1884
		74	5 March 1884

relations of Austria-Hungary with Rumania and Servia, and win over the Prince of Bulgaria who was at present entirely controlled by Russia. The German Press attached considerable importance to the mission as a demonstration of the influence of the Austro-German Alliance in South Eastern Europe. ⁽¹⁾ Yet Thornton could report no trace of suspicion, anxiety or irritation in Russia.

Very little importance was attached by the British representatives to the meetings which took place during 1882 and 1883 between the Austrian and German Emperors, and between Giers, Kalnoky, and Bismarck. In August 1882 the Austrian and German Emperors met at Ischl. ⁽²⁾ No report was received by the Foreign Office with information either upon the substance of their discussions or upon the significance of the meeting. The journey of Giers to Varzin, Berlin and Vienna followed. The Foreign Office received no information such as would lead them to interpret this visit as a demonstration of a triple friendship. As long as British information showed that the Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany

(1) F.O.7/1062 Paget to Granville 30A 30 April 1884

(2) D.D.F. Series I Vol.IV No.504 (Courcel to Duclerc, 11 August 1882, concerns the Eastern policy of Austria-Hungary and Germany and the strength of the Austro-German Alliance of which the recent imperial meeting afforded a fresh manifestation).

had not weakened, it was not likely that information respecting a Russian initiative in drawing closer her relations with the two other Empires would be considered in the same light as a German initiative in the same direction. Thus Giers's visit to Varzin from November 18-19, and his subsequent conversations in Berlin with the Emperor and Count Hatzfeldt, were reported by Ampthill as significant only in so far as they produced a very favourable impression on public opinion. Yet a long, if desultory, conversation with Giers had afforded the Ambassador a certain amount of information on the Russo-German discussions and offered the opportunity to secure more. (1) The Foreign Office was not informed that any connection existed between this visit and the visit to Vienna which followed on January 24-28 on the return of Giers from Italy. (2) Further, it did not appear that the subjects which had been discussed were subjects of major importance for Austro-Russian relations. Kalnoky told Elliot that he had urged on Giers the necessity of some clarity as to Russia's intentions on the Danube

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- (1) F.O.64/1008 Ampthill to Granville .392 20 October 1882
 Confidential
 418 16 November 1882
 421 22 November 1882
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 32 26 January 1883

question, while Giers had expressed to him some dissatisfaction in regard to the British Circular of January 3, (1) respecting the Egyptian question. The meeting, however offered an opportunity for a demonstration of marked civility on the part of Austria-Hungary towards Russia. (2) Giers had, in fact, come to Vienna at the special request of Francis Joseph. (3) Information reached the Foreign Office a little later that Amthill believed Bismarck appreciated and encouraged Kalnoky's desire for friendly relations with Russia. (4) Yet no information was received that any substantial step in the direction had been taken. When the Austro-Hungarian and German Emperors met at Gastein on August 8, 1883 the British Foreign Office again received no information as to the discussions that had taken place between them or as to the significance of the meeting. (5)

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| (1) F.O.7/1048 | Elliot to Granville | 34 | 29 January 1883 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.7/1048 | Elliot to Granville | 35 | 29 January 1883 |
| (3) F.O.7/1048 | Elliot to Granville | 32 | 26 January 1883 |
| (4) F.O.64/1024 | Amthill to Granville | 54 | 9 February 1883 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (5) F.O.7/1050 | Elliot to Granville | 222 | 13 August 1883 |
| F.O.64/1026 | Walsham to Granville | 238 | 10 August 1883 |
| C.f. D.D.F. Series I Vol.V No.73 (Montmarin, chargé d'affaires at Vienna to Challemel Lacour, points out the significance of the meeting as a demonstration of the continued "solidarity" of Austro-German relations). | | | |

On August 30, Kalnoky visited Bismarck at Salzburg. The Foreign Office received no report containing information as to the substance or significance of the discussions between them. The only report that mentioned the subject gave no information as to the significance of the meeting for the relations of the two Powers. At the end of September Elliot reported that Kalnoky had told him that at Salzburg he had agreed with Bismarck that the decline of British influence at Constantinople was much to be regretted. ⁽¹⁾ Hengelmüller, the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in London on Kalnoky's instructions made a communication to Granville on the subject of the meeting but it added nothing to the information of the Foreign Office. For he stated that the meeting had been occasioned by no special occurrence and that no decisions had been taken. It had served only to confirm the friendly relations existing ⁽²⁾ between the two countries.

When Giers again visited Bismarck, this time at Friedrichsruhe on November 18, the only information received by the British Foreign Office was derived from a statement by Kalnoky that Bismarck was satisfied with the Russian ⁽³⁾ assurances. Yet the French chargé d'affaires in Berlin had received information that Bismarck had proposed to Russia "that she should ask to be included in the Austro-German Alliance,"

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- (1) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 271 26 September 1883
 (2) F.O.7/1047 Granville to Elliot 205 3 October 1883
 (3) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 323 30 November 1883

Confidential

and that Bismarck had especially requested Giers to visit him, both because he wished to make that proposal and because he wished to discuss the Eastern Question with him. ⁽¹⁾ The Berlin visit was again followed by a visit to Vienna. Again, no connection between the two visits was apparent from the information in possession of the Foreign Office. Paget, who arrived in Vienna to replace Elliot as Ambassador, the day before the meeting took place, was not in a very favourable position to secure complete information. He reported, however, that he had reason to believe that Giers' visit to Vienna was significant only in so far as it indicated the desire of Austria-Hungary, to whose initiative it was due, to maintain friendly relations with Russia. The discussions had not gone further than an exchange of assurances ⁽²⁾ for this purpose.

At the beginning of February, however, the Foreign Office was informed that Bismarck had now taken the initiative towards the further development of the relations between the three Empires. He had taken practical measures to bring about closer relations between Germany and Russia. Amptill had been privately informed that Count Herbert Bismarck who had

(1) D.D.F. Series I Vol.V No.85.

(2) F.O.7/1062 Drummond to Granville 23 14 January 1884
 Paget to Granville 32 22 January 1884
 D.D.F. Series I Vol.V. No.183 (Foucher de Careil to Jules Ferry, 2 January, reports that an entente was on the point of being established between Austria-Hungary and Russia and that Giers' visit was designed to bring it about).
 No.193.

been sent to St. Petersburg in January to learn the duties of first Secretary, ⁽¹⁾ had been instructed to "insinuate in High Quarters that the re-establishment of the former friendly and intimate relations between Russia and Prussia might be facilitated and promoted by the appointment of an Ambassador who enjoyed the full confidence of the Czar, and would be in a position to communicate Prince Bismarck's views directly to His Majesty." Orloff was particularly mentioned ⁽²⁾ as fulfilling these requirements.

Amphill reported that considerable importance was attached to Orloff's appointment by political and financial circles in Berlin, and it was talked of "as an earnest attempt to re-establish the close and intimate relations existing between Russia and Germany before the Treaty of Berlin brought about an estrangement." The Emperor had informed Lady Amphill ⁽³⁾ that he believed "much good would come of the appointment."

(1) G.P. Vol.III Nos.617,619,622; show that Giers' fear of the increase of Saburoff's influence, and the latter's efforts to remodel the Dreikaiserbund, for the renewal of which negotiations were then going on, to Russia's advantage, were the causes of his recall.

(2) F.O.64/1049 Amphill to Granville 30 11 February 1884
Secret
D.D.F. Series I Vol.V No.234 (Courcel to Jules Ferry,
19 February
describes Bismarck's efforts to secure the removal of Russian cavalry regiments from her South Western frontiers as the subject of the discussions between Giers and Bismarck at Friedrichsruhe, and negotiations which Orloff had been appointed to conduct).

(3) F.O.64/1049 Amphill to Granville 35 16 February 1884
Secret

Prince Dalgorouki, Russian military attaché in Berlin, came from St. Petersburg where he had been on leave, and announced the appointment to the Kaiser, and afterwards visited Bismarck at Friedrichs^{rue}oule. This was considered a further indication of the tightening of Russo-German relations. Paget's sources of information were limited to the public press and the views "generally held in Vienna". He reported that there were two currents of thought. It was asserted that a tightening of Russo-German relations was taking place with some unknown object in view, and at the expense of some third Power. It was also stated that the tightening of Russo-German relations and the indications that Austria-Hungary welcomed that development, portended the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund. Paget believed that the latter development was scarcely desired. His only ground for that belief, however, was that the antagonism between Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in the Balkans still existed. (1)

Shortly afterwards a further demonstration of Russo-German friendship was given when a Delegation more impressive than the circumstances warranted, arrived from Russia to congratulate the Emperor on the seventieth anniversary of the

(1) F.O.7/1062 Paget to Granville 60 23 February 1884

with Austria-Hungary. The Austro-German Alliance remained unaffected. "Si d'autres puissance se rapprochement de cette alliance, c'est là une nouvelle garantie pour que la paix ne soit pas troublée." (1) The speech from the throne at the opening of the German Reichstag referred to the strengthening of the hereditary friendship between the three Imperial Courts. (2)

The negotiation in Berlin of a loan of fifteen millions for the Russian Government partly through the firm of Bleichröder, and partly through the Royal Prussian Financial Institution, which was under the direct control of the Prussian Minister for Finance, afforded a further demonstration of the Russo-German rapprochement, and a guarantee of the solidarity of future relations between the two countries. (3)

On the 25th April the Foreign Office received information that the necessity of a meeting between the three Emperors had been agreed upon, and that steps were being taken to bring it about after the following June. (4) In

(1) F.O.7/1062	Paget to Granville	86	15 March 1884
(2) F.O.64/1049	Amphill to Granville	55	6 March 1884
(3) F.O.64/1050	Amphill to Granville	99	18 April 1884
(4) F.O.7/1063	Paget to Granville	123	21 April 1884
	enclosing Col. Primrose (military attaché)		
	to Paget	524	20 April

reply to a question from Paget, Kalnoky stated in guarded terms that it was possible that the Czar might pay a visit to Francis Joseph some time during the tour he intended to make through his Dominions on the proclamation of the majority of the Czarewitch.⁽¹⁾

When the Emperor of Germany paid his annual visit to Francis Joseph, there was more interest shown on this occasion by the British Ambassador. Paget had himself gone to Gastein, arriving there at the same time as the German Emperor. The meeting actually took place at Ischl on August 6, but Paget had been received by the Kaiser in Gastein, before the meeting took place. Paget was, however, unable to secure any substantial information. The Austrian Press, which spoke of the meeting as "a fresh proof of the cordiality of the relations between the two Empires" alone afforded some indication as to its significance.⁽²⁾ A subsequent conversation with Kalnoky revealed only the latter's desire to divest the meeting of all political importance. The visit of the Emperor to Ischl for a few hours, attended only by aides-de-camp, could not be considered

(1) F.O.7/1063	Paget to Granville	127	25 April 1884
		Confidential	
(2) F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	207	27 July 1884
		221	9 August 1884

a fitting occasion for the transaction of affairs of State. His own presence and that of the Hungarian Prime Minister could be explained by non-political reasons. ⁽¹⁾

In regard to Kalnoky's visit to Bismarck at Varzin, which followed immediately ⁽²⁾ upon the meeting of the Emperors at Ischl, Paget was again able to furnish the Foreign Office with more information that had been received respecting the Salzburg meeting. A conversation with Kalnoky showed that the object of the visit was an exchange of views on "matters of general policy." ⁽³⁾ As the result of a further conversation Paget learnt that the outcome of the visit "had been to place the relations of the two Empires on an even more intimate footing than before if that were possible." He then asked Kalnoky "whether there was anything new in regard to the relations between the Allied Empires and Russia." The Austrian Minister replied that

- (1) F.O.7/1064 Paget to Granville 222 10 August 1884
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1064 Paget to Granville
Telegram 10 11 August 1884
11 14 August 1884
F.O.64/1051 Ampthill to Granville 219 11 August 1884
221 15 August 1884
- (3) F.O.7/1064 Paget to Granville 222 10 August 1884
Confidential

nothing new had occurred and repeated to Paget the statements he had made in the Spring in regard to a possible interview between the three Emperors. He then said: "A good understanding with Russia was a very desirable object for both Austria and Germany, and it was the best guarantee of her pursuing a peaceful policy in the East."⁽¹⁾ In Berlin Ampthill was seriously ill and Scott, who had now taken Walsham's place as first Secretary, was in charge.⁽²⁾ He had no authoritative information on the Varzin meeting. He reported, however, the general opinion of the diplomatic corps in regard to it "that a meeting of the Emperors of Austria, Germany, and Russia is in contemplation, and that the date and details of the meeting have been settled by Count Kalnoky and Prince Bismarck." He added that a meeting of the three Emperors could only be intended to celebrate the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund.⁽³⁾

The meeting of the three Emperors took place at Skiernerwirce from the 15th to the 16th of September. Giers,

(1) F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	Separate and Secret	24 August 1884
(2) F.O.64/1051	Ampthill to Granville	222	16 August 1884
(3) F.O.64/1051	Scott to Granville	227 Confidential	19 August 1884

Kalnoky, Bismarck, and Counts Herbert and William Bismarck, as well as the Russian Ambassadors accredited to the three courts, were also present. ⁽¹⁾ British information in regard to it was derived from articles in the Continental Press, and from statements made in public or in private conversation with the Ambassador, by Francis Joseph and Kalnoky. Lord Ampthill died in Berlin just before the meeting took place. The Foreign Office, therefore, had no expression of opinion from him on the subject. Malet, however, who arrived as Ambassador at Berlin in October ⁽²⁾ was able to furnish the Foreign Office with important information, which was derived from an independent source.

Complete secrecy had been maintained in regard to the preparation for the interview, and little information had been available as to the objects of the meeting before it took place. An article in the Vienna Correspondence Politique which Paget believed to have been officially inspired, put forward views in accordance with language already held to

(1) F.O.64/1051	Scott to Granville	274	15 September 1884
	and Telegram	16	
		281	20 September 1884
F.O.65/1183	Thornton to Granville	267	6 September 1884
		274	10 September 1884
		296	29 September 1884
F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	246	12 September 1884
		253	20 September 1884
	D.D.F. Series I Vol.V Nos.388, 392, 394.		
(2) F.O.64/1152	Malet to Granville	310	10 October 1884
	D.D.F. Series I Vol.V No.403 pp.419-420.		
F.O.64/1051	Scott to Granville	284	23 September 1884

the Ambassador by Kalnoky. "L'entrevue", it asserted, "n'aura pas de caractère politique proprement dit." It was intended as an act of courtesy and a public manifestation of the close relations which existed between the three courts. (1) Similar information came from Berlin. Scott reported that the object of the meeting "was understood in Berlin, to be to give an outward and visible sign of the perfect understanding which had been arrived at between the three Governments." (2)

For some time after the meeting no information reached the Foreign Office as to its results. The Novoe Vremya (3) believed that it had prepared the way for an agreement. There was nothing, however, to confirm these assertions and the effects of the meeting were not immediately evident. Paget could not ascertain anything with precision, but suspected that something more than a public manifestation of friendship had been involved. (4) His task was not made easier when the

(1) F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	Separate and Secret	24 August 1884
F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	241	7 September 1884
(2) F.O.64/1151	Scott to Granville	268	13 September 1884
		Confidential	
(3) F.O.65/1183	Thornton to Granville	281	18 September 1884
(4) F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	253	20 September 1884

Emperor in the speech at the opening of the Hungarian Parliament omitted any reference to the meeting.⁽¹⁾ The Press, however, had now taken up the matter. It maintained the view that some understanding had been reached at Skiernerwirce and all differences between the three Empires removed. It asserted, however, that no written Treaty existed. Articles to this effect appeared in the Pester Lloyd, the Moscow Verdomosti and in Bulgarian papers. The Nord deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Scott informed the Foreign Office, furnished evidence that "the Imperial Government wished them to be considered as containing an authentic resumé of the discussions at Skiernerwirce."⁽²⁾ A little later the Novosti of St. Petersburg described what it considered were the possible points of the agreement that had been reached.⁽³⁾ The Address drawn up by the Liberal Majority of the Hungarian Parliament, in reply to the speech from the throne, expressed approval of the existence of less close relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia than those between Austria-Hungary and Germany, which the speech seemed to indicate. As a result it drew from the Vienna Press further statements as to the "closer alliance" between the three Empires which the Skiernerwirce meeting had established.⁽⁴⁾

(1) F.O.7/1064	Paget to Granville	262	30 September 1884
F.O.7/1065	Paget to Granville	266	3 October 1884
(2) F.O.64/1052	Scott to Granville	305	7 October 1884
(3) F.O.65/1183	Thornton to granville	302	10 October 1884
(4) F.O.7/1065	Paget to Granville	277	14 October 1884

These statements, Tisza confirmed during the Debate on the Address. He stated that a definite understanding for the maintenance of peace had been reached, but denied the existence of written documents of any sort. ⁽¹⁾ Ten days later Paget informed the Foreign Office that the speech of the Emperor on the occasion of his reception at Buda Pesth of the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations, showed "the complete agreement between the three Emperors and their Governments for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the territorial status quo." ⁽²⁾

Kalnoky in the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Delegations spoke of the "consolidation" that had taken place in the relations between the three Empires. ⁽³⁾ A report, however, was received from Malet on November 1, of a conversation with a "Gentleman whose position enables him to be well informed." ⁽⁴⁾

The Foreign Office as a result had precise information as to the conclusion of an informal agreement between the three Empires, and as to the points which it covered.

Information as to the probable character of any agreement between the three Empires, had been accumulating, as has been seen, since 1880. The course of events during 1881-83 suggested that the information already received was still generally valid, but indicated that in certain

(1) F.O.7/1065 Paget to Granville 279 19 October 1884

(2) F.O.7/1065 Paget to Granville 286 30 October 1884
C.f. D.D.F. Series I Vol.V 399 (Courcel to Jules Ferry
15 September
pp.411-12)
and 400

(3) F.O.7/1065 Paget to Granville 290 6 November 1884

(4) F.O.64/1152 Scott to Granville 340 1 November 1884
Confidential

directions the conceptions of the Foreign Office should be modified. The basic factor in any such triple agreement was still seen to be an Austro-Russian understanding in regard to the Eastern question. The conception of a "squaring" agreement which resulted from British information during 1880-81, was modified in so far as the course of events during 1881-83 indicated that it would assume not the form of a division of the spoils resulting from a concerted forward policy, but a division of the Balkans, to use a later term, into Austrian and Russian spheres of influence. The existence at the same time of rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of constitutional troubles in Bulgaria, was the opportunity which first enabled the Government to secure information in this connection. As has already been seen there was no effort on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia to use the opportunity to pursue in concert a forward policy, while on the other hand neither Government showed any serious concern as to the activities of the other, Russia did not interfere when the Austrian hold on Bosnia and Herzegovina was strengthened by the successful action of her troops against the rebels and the imposition of compulsory military service. Austria-Hungary did not protest against the extension of Russian influence in Bulgaria. The outbreak of constitutional difficulties in Serbia, coincident with the renewal of Bulgarian troubles afforded a further opportunity for the

securing of information on this point. Kalnoky, in speaking to Elliot in March 1883, referred to the Russian policy in Bulgaria and the Austrian policy in Serbia as if Bulgaria was exclusively a Russian and Serbia exclusively an Austrian

(1) question. Later Mohrenheim visited Granville at Walmer Castle and made an important declaration on Russian policy in the Balkans. In Serbia, he said, the Russian Minister had been instructed to maintain an attitude of absolute reserve. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, Austria and Germany recognised the legitimate interests of Russia and did not attempt to interfere with her action. (2) Giers had already spoken in the same sense to Thornton. (3) Calice in January used to Paget similar language to that used by Kalnoky to Elliot comparing the policy of Russia in Bulgaria with the policy of Austria-Hungary to Serbia. (4) On two occasions the King of Greece, who was the brother-in-law of the Czar, informed Elliot of the possibility of a division of Balkan territory between Austria-Hungary and Russia, insisting at the same time on the Austrian desire to

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- (1) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 107 27 March 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.65/1154 Granville to Thornton 289 24 October 1883
- (3) F.O.65/1157 Thornton to Granville 233 4 October 1883
Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/1062 Paget to Granville 39 27 January 1884
Confidential

maintain Turkish integrity. (1) Elliot reported then that in the event of Russian aggression, Austria-Hungary would annex territory towards Salonica, but otherwise her policy would be limited to extending her commercial influence. (2)

The Foreign Office during 1881-3 were informed of the cessation, at least as far as the two Governments were concerned, of the rivalry for predominance in the Balkans. Finally, when in the late autumn of 1884 British information indicated that an actual if informal agreement existed between the three Empires, Malet reported that he had been clearly informed that the agreement provided that the rival intrigues of the three Powers in the Balkans should cease; that the influence of Russia should be predominant henceforth in Bulgaria, and that of Austria-Hungary in Servia. (3)

Thus, the article of the Protocol of June 1881 providing for the general instruction to the representatives of the three Powers in the Balkans, was reflected in British information.

The Foreign Office during 1880 and 1881 had received information that the basis of any Austro-Russian agreement

(1)	F.O.7/1036	Elliot to Granville	488	11 October 1882
			Confidential	
	F.O.7/1051	Elliot to Granville	255	13 October 1883
			Confidential	
(2)	F.O.7/1051	Elliot to Granville	533	14 December 1883
			Confidential	
(3)	F.O.64/1152	Malet to Granville	340	1 November 1884
			Confidential	

concerning the Balkans would be an Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Austrian acquiescence in the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The course of events during 1881-83, as has already been seen, indicated that Russia was in fact prepared to allow Austria-Hungary a free hand in regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Austria-Hungary was prepared to acquiesce in the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The indications in this connection were confirmed by the statements of the respective Ministers. Giers already in December 1881 told Thornton that he believed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would become permanent. (1) Kalnoky informed Paget in November 1884 that he would not be absolutely opposed to the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, provided that it would be distinctly proved that such was the general wish of the population. Union might in fact be the means of stabilising the Balkan situation. (2)

Again, when the Foreign Office was informed in the autumn of 1884 of the existence of a triple agreement, it received information on this point. The Novosti, the Nord of Brussels, and the Pall Mall Gazette reproduced a version

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- (1) F.O.65/1115 Thornton to Granville 590 31 December 1881
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1065 Paget to Granville 203 21 November 1884
Confidential

of the agreement which provided for the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.⁽¹⁾

Two other points covered by the Protocol of June 1881 were thus reflected in British information.

A third point to be included in an Austro-Russian understanding in regard to the Eastern Question emerged in the course of 1881-84. In May 1883 the Movoe Vremya unexpectedly raised the question of the Straits. Until Russia could close the Bosphorus to the fleets of hostile Powers, it stated, she could make no further progress in her Eastern policy.⁽²⁾ Malet reported in November 1884 that permission to re-open the Straits question had been accorded to Russia by the agreement that resulted from the Skiernerwirce meeting.⁽³⁾

Here then the Foreign Office had information on a further provision of the Dreikaiserbund Treaty of June 1881.

In another direction British conceptions respecting the character of an agreement between the three Empires had been modified in the course of 1881-84. The monarchical principle as a factor in drawing the three Powers together had fallen into the background. The meeting of Skiernerwirce preserved

(1) F.O.65/1164	Thornton to Granville	302	10 October 1884
(2) F.O.65/1156	Thornton to Granville	115	8 May 1883
(3) F.O. 64/1152	Malet 16 Granville	340	1 November 1884
		Confidential	
F.O. 7/1165	Paget 16 Granville	309	30 November 1884
		Confidential	

the character of the agreement as essentially an understanding between the three Emperors and Scott believed that the internal security of the three Empires against subversive or anti-monarchical agitation had formed an object of their understanding in 1884. ⁽¹⁾ Otherwise, however, the monarchical principle does not seem to have been mentioned after 1881 as a factor in their relations. On the other hand, co-operation in regard to all questions that might come under general diplomatic discussion emerged during 1881-84 as a probable element in any agreement between the three Empires. The Joint Note of January 8, 1882, which re-opened the Egyptian Question, had initiated a period of close co-operation between the three Empires. The Porte communicated the Anglo-French Note to them and asked for an expression of opinion. The three Powers consulted together and identical verbal communications were made to ^{Assim} ~~Asseno~~ Pasha in reply. ⁽²⁾ Amphill reported that Germany, with the support of her "allies Austria and Russia" was about to pursue a policy favourable to Turkish intervention in Egypt. ⁽³⁾ The reply of the three

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- (1) F.O.64/1151 Scott to Granville 268 13 September 1884
Confidential
- (2) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 50 6 February 1882
51 7 February 1882
- (3) F.O.64/1005 Amphill to Granville 9 9 January 1884
Most Confidential
F.O.64/1006 Amphill to Granville 137 22 April 1884
Secret

Russia in offering their mediation. They accepted the invitation and their representatives acted together at Belgrade and the question was settled with the Dreikaiserbund. (1) The "caucus principle" to which Elliot referred in 1880, had been re-established.

The Foreign Office by the end of 1884 was in possession of materials which would have enabled it to form a generally accurate conception of the relations between the three Empires, except in two particulars. Nothing at all was known of their pledge to observe neutrality in the event of one of them being engaged in war with a Power outside the Alliance. Nothing was known in regard to the existence of a written Treaty. No information was received, however, such as would indicate that the evidence respecting the existence and character of an agreement between the three Empires was any more reliable than the information received in December 1881 as to the conclusion of a written agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia. No further information was received such as would set the information received in 1883-84 in its correct relationship with that received in 1881 and show that the first information was the result of the conclusion

(1) F.O.7/1063 Paget to Granville 167 11 June 1884
 F.O.65/1182 Thornton to Granville 188 18 June 1884
 F.O.7/1063 Paget to Granville 171 15 June 1884

of the agreement and the second of its renewal. (1) The
indecisive character of British information in regard to
the re-establishment of the Dreikaiserbund was preserved.

(1) G.P. Vol.III No.582.

. CHAPTER V

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE -
May 20, 1882.

The assembling of information in regard to the Triple Alliance illustrates the important part played by the Press in the process of securing diplomatic information. The importance of other sources is also illustrated, notably the course of diplomatic negotiations, the statements to the British representative by the Foreign Minister of the Government to which he is accredited, and the declarations in Parliament by the Foreign Ministers. The Press is seen to have been the most important factor on this occasion. It supplied information that was of value in itself and it afforded material on which enquiries that led to important revelations, were based. No spontaneous communication in regard to the Alliance was made by the three Powers concerned. The Foreign Office did not have the advantage of any important information derived from an independent source. Although thus practically dependent for authoritative information upon such disclosures as the three Governments considered it in their interests to make to Great Britain, the Foreign Office was more completely informed in regard to the Triple Alliance than in regard to any other agreement of the period. Its information, moreover, was such as to lead it to feel entire confidence both in its completeness and accuracy, and in fact was not to

any serious degree deficient in either respect, except in so far as the actual wording of the Treaty was concerned. It gave the Triple Alliance obligations a somewhat less formal character than they in fact possessed, and it was not received until almost a year after its conclusion. When it was received however, it was decisive and was assembled within a short space of time. Knowledge of the existence and character of the obligations between the three Powers was not as in the case of the obligations between the three Empires, the result of the cumulative effect of imperfect evidence derived from different sources over the space of four years. The Foreign Office was able to form a precise conception within a limited time, after which the question as to the nature of the relations between Italy and the German Empires was not re-opened within the period of this thesis.

The result of the dependency upon these sources was that the British Foreign Office during the months immediately following June 1881 had no information as to the true situation in regard to Italian Foreign policy. It was in fact a period of critical importance. King Humbert was convinced of the necessity of joining the Central Powers. Depretis still insisted upon the policy of the free hand, and Mancini appeared entirely passive. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office, Baron Blanc, led the partisans in favour of the King's view.⁽¹⁾

(1) Pribram op.cit.Vol.II pp.10-11.

Upon the outcome of the conflict between these views depended the future relations of Italy with the other Powers. The British Foreign Office had no information on this state of affairs. Mancini in June and July had four conversations with the British Ambassador which the latter reported to the Foreign Office. None of them threw any light upon the policy that Italy might adopt in regard to her relations with European Powers. In the first, he spoke of the deep impression which the Tunis affair had made upon Italy. The policy of Italy, however, he said would be one of complete passiveness, and she would do nothing else which would imply in any way a recognition of the French position. The Government on the other hand was about to open negotiations with France respecting a new commercial Treaty to which Mancini attached great political importance. Mancini's language in the second conversation was largely a repetition of his language in the first. In the third he appealed to England for assistance to "regularise the Italian position in Assab Bay." In view of the attitude assumed by the British Foreign Office on this question, Mancini's appeal was no indication that an Italo-British rapprochement was about to take place. Tenterden minuted on Paget's dispatch

(1) F.O.45/429	Paget to Granville	232	3 June 1881
	D.D.F. Series I. Vol.IV. No.81.	Confidential	
(2) F.O.45/429	Paget to Granville	239	10 June 1881
(3) F.O.45/429	Paget to Granville	252	15 June 1881
		Confidential	

that he considered it an act of political blindness to be cajoled into allowing the Italians to establish their sovereignty over Assab Bay. "In case of war we should be compelled to secure the alliance of Italy, or at once to capture the place with torpedoes, and as a naval station it would be fatal to our control over the Red Sea."⁽¹⁾ On July 21, Mancini again raised the subject. The Foreign Office referred the case to the India Office and maintained that it could not agree to Italy's claim to territorial sovereignty.⁽²⁾ Macdonnell while charge d'affaires when Paget was on leave, reported only one conversation with Mancini. On that occasion the Italian Foreign Minister informed the British representative that he had addressed identic notes to the French and British Government's proposing that the difficulties in Egypt resulting from Arabi's revolt should be dealt with by the exercise of "joint moral pressure" by Italy, France and England to be followed, if necessary, by Turkish intervention controlled by the three Powers, and if that failed by their joint occupation of Egypt. He reminded

(1) F.O.45/429 Paget to Granville 252 15 June 1881
Confidential

Minute by Tenterden 22 June 1881.

G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 30 August 1881
Concerns a discussion between Granville and Gladstone as to recommending a settlement by arbitration, or alternatively the sending of a British ship to assist the Turkish Government to keep the Italians out.

(2) F.O.45/430 Paget to Granville 309 21 July 1881.

Macdonnell that had Italy been allowed to co-operate previously in the administration of Egypt the solution of the present crisis would have been in the hands of Her Majesty's

(1)
Government. Again in view of the policy in regard to Egypt adopted by Granville the conversation was no indication of an eventual Italo-British rapprochement.
(2)

Mancini's statements to Parliament were of no greater value as far as concerned the information which they afforded in regard to Italian alliance policy. On the 19th, Paget reported that Mancini had informed the Chambers that France sympathised with Italian conditions in regard to Assab Bay.
(3)
Three days later, he reported that Mancini had described the relations between Italy and France as friendly and conciliatory and had cited facts to prove the goodwill of the latter such as the recent opening of negotiations for a commercial treaty.
(4)
These declarations gave no indication that the policy of rapprochement with the Central Powers was under consideration. Taken in conjunction with incidents

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- (1) F.O.45/431 Macdonnell to Granville 357 16 September
Confidential 1881.
- (2) G.D.29/124 Gladstone to Granville 12 September, 13 September, 2 October, 4 October and 5 October.
Granville to Gladstone 7 October.
This correspondence established the formula for dealing with Egypt of "co-operation with France alone, a minimum of interference, and to work for the good of Egypt only."
- (3) F.O.45/429 Paget to Granville 256 19 June 1881.
- (4) F.O.45/429 Paget to Granville 260 22 June 1881.

which were then going on they proved of very little value as an indication of an Italian desire for good relations with France. Throughout Italy in the summer of 1881 demonstrations broke out against France, and were answered by French demonstrations against Italy particularly at Marseilles. ⁽¹⁾

The Press alone gave some indication that the policy of rapprochement with the Central Powers had not entirely been given up. During August it revived the idea of an alliance with Italy and Germany. The National Zeitung took up the matter. While insisting upon the sympathy between Germany and Italy and the community of interests between the two countries, it pointed out that relations had recently cooled and expressed the fear that Italian policy was too restless to allow of any firm alliance. The Italian Press in reply generally denied that any coolness existed between Italy and Germany and insisted on Italy's desire for a German alliance. The Popolo Romano which, as Macdonnell informed the Foreign Office, represented the views of the Italian Government adopted a similar attitude although it denied the necessity of a "formal alliance in the ordinary acceptance of the term." ⁽²⁾

(1) F.O.45/430 Paget to Granville 203 22 June 1881.
 277 30 June 1881.
 286 8 July 1881.

D.D.F. Series I. Vol.IV. No.38.

(2) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 320 3 August 1881.
 Confidential

Throughout the month, frequent articles on the same subject appeared. The Opinions Macdonnell reported, in insisting that the action of France in regard to Tunis rendered it impossible to maintain friendly relations with her, and that relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany should be cemented so that when a critical moment arrived a favourable Treaty could be concluded with these Powers, represented the views expressed by a number of papers. ⁽¹⁾ These press articles were important on their own account in that they indicated that an Italian alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany was still a possible diplomatic development. They were also important because they drew an expression of opinion on the subject from Macdonnell based upon the interpretation of the articles in question in the light of his general knowledge of Italian foreign policy, and further information from Fraser, charge d'affaires at Vienna to whom Granville sent a copy of Macdonnell's report of August 17. Macdonnell stated his belief that Italy was again turning her eyes towards Austria-Hungary and Germany. ⁽²⁾ Fraser reported that the Viennese newspapers had spoken favourably

(1) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 332 17 August 1881.

(2) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 320 3 August 1881.
Confidential

for some time past of the idea of intimate relations with Italy but expected Italy to take the initiative. They believed that Italy would choose a visit of her King to Vienna as the means to do this. (1)

The reports however, concerning information in regard to Italy's alliance policy derived from the Press illustrated the deficiencies of this source of information.

Articles of different newspapers and articles of the same newspapers ^{reported by the British representative} did not point in the same direction. Thus the Popolo Romano on July 1 printed a communication from the Stefani Agency to the effect that the French Ambassador in Rome had been instructed to thank Mancini for his tranquillising declarations in the Chambers, and to assure him of the French desire to establish cordial relations between the two countries. (2) The Opinione, Macdonnell reported on August 30, stated that Gambetta had written to some of the leaders of the party now in power in Italy, warning them not to bind themselves by any alliance with Germany or Austria-Hungary and offering "reparation" from France after the elections which he expected would bring him to power. (3)

(1) F.O.7/1017	Fraser to Granville	389	1 September 1881
(2) F.O.45/430	Paget to Granville	280	1 July 1881
(3) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	343	30 August 1881.

After Gambetta had come into power the Opinione stated that intrigues to secure an Italian Alliance were being energetically carried on. (1)

Again it was from the Press that information was derived by the British representative in regard to the attitude of the Italian Government respecting an outbreak of anti-clericalism - an attitude which in view of British information on German and Austrian relations with the Vatican did not augur well for an Italo-German or for an Italo-Austrian rapprochement.

British information in regard to the relations between Germany and the Vatican had been exceptionally full since the ^{accession} ~~occasion~~ of Leo XIII in 1878. In April, Crowe had sent a long report on the effect which Leo' XIII's election might be expected to have on German relations with the Vatican. He ^{had} pointed out that a marked change had occurred in the public demeanour of the ultramontane party in Germany and that a desire to avoid all provocation was general. The Cologne Gazette he had said, had published a series of articles outlining a possible modus vivendi. The report had

(1) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 460 22 December 1881
Secret and
Confidential.

left the impression that Germany would be ready to respond to an initiative in this direction taken by the Vatican.⁽¹⁾ By a correspondence published in July in the German newspapers of the Kaiser, and later^{ly} the Crown Prince acting for his father, with the pope conducted through the agency of the Bavarian court, the possibility of an understanding had been clearly established.⁽²⁾ On July 27, 1878, Crowe had written privately to Salisbury that the Pope had declared his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with Germany for the purpose of establishing a modus vivendi, and had given instructions to Cardinal Franchi for that purpose.⁽³⁾ The Prussian envoy, von Werthern, at the Bavarian Court had also entered into communication with Mascella the Papal nuncio at Munich, who had been invited to Berlin. In August, both Crowe and Odo Russell had reported that Mascella had had important conferences with Bismarck at Kissingen.⁽⁴⁾ Dering, who was in charge at Berlin while Russell was on leave in the autumn of 1878 had obtained detailed information from some private source as to Mascella's instructions and as to the outcome of the discussions at Kissingen.⁽⁵⁾ At that

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| (1) F.O.64/917 | Crowe to Salisbury | Political | 1. 29 April 1878. |
| (2) F.O.64/906 | Russell to Salisbury | 410 | 2 July 1878. |
| (3) F.O.64/917 | Crowe to Salisbury | Private & Confidential. | 27 July 1878. |
| (4) F.O.64/917 | Crowe to Salisbury. | Political | 2. 1 Aug. 1878. |
| F.O.64/907 | Russell to Salisbury. | | 2 Aug. 1878. |
| (5) F.O.64/907 | Dering to Salisbury | | 12 Aug. 1878. |

point Radowitz who was then in charge of the German Foreign Office, had confirmed the information so far received by informing Dering that an agreement was about to be reached on minor points. ⁽¹⁾ During 1879 and 1880 British information had indicated a change in the Parliamentary situation favourable to an abandonment of the Kulturkampf. Early in 1879, Windhorst the leader of the Centre party, ⁱⁿ the Reichstag, introduced a motion for the re-establishment of these parts of the Prussian constitution which had been abrogated in 1875 - the articles assuring to the Catholic Church independent administration of property, and the uncontrolled nomination to ecclesiastical appointments. ⁽²⁾ The motion was lost, but the reception with which it met, together with the resignation soon afterwards of Dr. Falk, had led Walsham to believe that Bismarck was willing to allow the May laws to fall into abeyance. ⁽³⁾ He had been encouraged in this view when it had been learnt that Bismarck had been promised the support of the Conservative and Ultramontane parties in the Reichstag. ⁽⁴⁾ During 1881, Amthill had kept Granville

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- (1) F.O.64/907 Dering to Salisbury 17 August 1878.
 31 August 1878.
 F.O.64/909 Russell to Salisbury 616. 12 November 1878
Provincial Zeitung urges all parties to co-operate in
 effecting an understanding with the Vatican.
- (2) F.O.64/931 Russell to Salisbury, 68 4 February 1880.
- (3) F.O.64/934 Walsham to Granville 545 5 July 1879.
- (4) F.O.64/934 Walsham to Granville 16 August 1879.

privately informed in regard to the secret mission of von
 Schlözer to the Vatican. ⁽¹⁾ Paget had at first been unable to
 secure any information to confirm Amphill's statements.
 Kendell had told him that the matter was at rest and Paget
 believed that he knew nothing of Schlözer's ⁽²⁾ activities.
 Depretis had also appeared to know nothing. ⁽³⁾ A little later
 however, Paget discovered that Schlözer had in fact been in
 Rome. ⁽⁴⁾ Public evidence was soon afterwards given of the change
 in German relations with the Vatican by the consecration of
 Dr. Korum, Canon of Strasburg as Bishop of T^rèves. The German
 chargé d'affaires in Rome was present and the occasion
 attracted considerable attention as Dr. Korum was the first
 Bishop appointed by common accord between the Vatican and the
 German Government. ⁽⁵⁾ The event was moreover, brought into
 connection with information received by the Foreign Office
 from Amphill respecting Schlözer's activities, by a report
 from Macdonnell that the appointment of Dr. Korum had been

(1) F.O.45/423	Granville to Paget	333	13 July 1881.
(2) F.O.45/430	Paget to Granville	303	16 July 1881.
	Very confidential.		
(3) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville.	316	30 July 1881.
(4) F.O.45/430	Paget to Granville	310	22 July 1881.
	Confidential		
(5) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	330	15 August 1881.
	Confidential		

the first result of the negotiation of which he had been
 in charge. ⁽¹⁾ At the beginning of September, it was publicly
 known that Schlözer had resumed negotiations and that they
 were directed to fill the existing vacancies in the German
 Sees agreeably to both the Vatican and the German Government. ⁽²⁾
 At the end of the month Walsham on the authority of the
 German Foreign Office and Macdonnell on that of the German
 charge d'affaires in Rome, reported that the resumption of
 diplomatic relations had been agreed upon and that Schlözer
 was to be appointed German representative at the Vatican. ⁽³⁾

Just at the moment when the secret negotiations between
 Germany and the Holy See were thus being brought to a
 successful conclusion and the consecration of Father Dolbauer
 as Archbishop of Vienna was being pointed out as calculated
 to strengthen the relations between Austria-Hungary and the
 Vatican, ⁽⁴⁾ the Italian Press indicated a serious worsening of
 Italian relations with the Pope. On the night of July
 12-13, the body of Pius IX was removed from the tomb in St.
 Peter's to the Basilica of San Lorenzo with a good deal of
 ceremony. The anti-clericals saw their opportunity and

(1) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	335	18 August	1881
(2) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	351	12 Sept. ^r	1881
(3) F.O.45/431	Macdonnell to Granville	361	23 Sept. ^r	1881
F.O.64/983	Walsham to Granville	404	30 Sept. ^r	1881
(4) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	318	2 August	1881

(1)
 disorders broke out. The Clerical party made the most of the incident and propogated the idea that the Guarantees Law was no protection to the Pope and that he was nothing less than a prisoner in his Palace. The first indications of the Government's attitude were given by the Press were not considered by Paget as trustworthy. It was stated that the Government had been informed before the Procession took place that it would be conducted with a good deal of ostentation, and that it had failed entirely to take the necessary precautions. (2) These indications that the Government was not prepared to take any extraordinary measures against the activities of the anti-clericals were ~~however~~ confirmed. At the end of the month the Italian papers published a communiqué from the Minister of the Interior stating that the Government had decided to stop all manifestations against the Holy See for the abolition of the Law of Guarantees, "but those who seek its abolition are at liberty," the notice continued, "to petition Parliament and with that object may form societies and clubs and hold meetings." (3) The newspapers during the next days reported that anti-clerical clubs were being formed throughout Italy, and referred to the encourage-

(1) F.O.45/430	Paget to Granville	297	13 July 1881.
(2) F.O.45/430	Paget to Granville	298	14 July 1881.
(3) F.O.45/430	Macdonnell to Granville	318	2 August 1881.

-ment derived from anti-clerical attitude of the Government
 by the promoters of the disorders of the 13th. The Diritto⁽¹⁾
 insisted that the situation was becoming so serious that the
 Pope had decided to leave Rome for Malta.⁽²⁾ Throughout August
 the Papers continued to announce demonstrations against the
 Law of Guarantees.⁽³⁾ A notice published in the Official
 Gazette on August 20th, to the effect that the Government
 "disapproved and deplored the recent formation of clubs"
 and that it was "fully resolved to assure the safety of the
 Pontiff and the independence of his Spiritual sovereignty,"
 put an end for the time being to the danger of a serious
 conflict.⁽⁴⁾ It did not however indicate the strain in
 Italian relations with the Vatican which had resulted from
 the attitude at first assumed by the Government would be
 removed.

No information in regard to Italy's relations with
 other Powers was received at the time from diplomatic nego-
 tiations. "There is a complete lull in political affairs,"
 Paget wrote to Granville on his return to Rome in October.

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- (1) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 318 2 August 1881
 326 8 August 1881
- (2) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 328 10 August 1881
 Confidential.
- (3) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 333 17 August 1881
 Confidential.
- (4) F.O.45/430 Macdonnell to Granville 340 21 August 1881.

It has already been shown that the chief questions which had furnished subjects for negotiations during 1880-81 had been settled by the summer of 1880. Only from Walsham at Berlin was information received as the result of conversations between the British representative and his colleagues. The Italian Ambassador, Count de Launay, had told Walsham plainly that recent events must necessarily weaken the confidence felt by the Italians in France. A desire was therefore gaining ground in Italy, he had said, to use every opportunity to improve the relations with Germany and Austria "as a matter of expediency and self-defence."⁽¹⁾ This information however was received just at the time when Mancini's language in private to the British Ambassador and in public to the Italian Chambers seemed to indicate that Italy was prepared to ignore the Tunis episode and ^{about} to attempt to improve her relations with France. The interpretation to be put upon it was not therefore entirely clear. The Foreign Office was then furnished with no authoritative information as to the real attitude of the Italian Minister towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary and Germany, ^{but} and was supplied with evidence as to the intentions of the Italian Government respecting their relations with France and Great

(1) F.O.64/982 Walsham to Granville 336 30 July 1881
Confidential

Britain, and with evidence as to Italo-German relations not favourable to the view that an Italo/^{German}Austria combination was likely to be constituted. In these circumstances the visit of King Humbert to Vienna from October 27-30 1881 was likely to appear as the first step towards a *détente* with those Powers rather than as the occasion for the conclusion of an agreement. Information received concerning the interview encouraged this impression.

Conversations of the British representative in Rome and Vienna with members of the Italian Government, and with Kallay who was temporarily in charge of the Austrian Foreign Office, conversations of the British representative in Rome with his colleagues, the Press, and the bare facts respecting the visit, furnished evidence in this respect.

Thus the Austro-Hungarian *chargé d'affaires* in Rome informed Paget privately that the visit was to take place. Two days later he called upon the British Ambassador and informed him that the Italian Government had realised that if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy were to be placed on a friendly footing, Austria-Hungary must be reassured in some formal manner against further outbreaks of irredentist agitation. It had been decided that King Humbert, whose influence on Italian politics lasted longer than that of his Ministers, should give personal assurances to Francis-Joseph. In response to Paget's enquiries,

Janera stated categorically that the meeting was unconnected with any political object apart from that of removing the obstacles to complete cordiality between the two countries. (1)

The only information derived from Kallay and Mancini concerned the time and place of the meeting. (2) From Blanc however, Paget secured exact confirmation of the statements of the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires. Blanc asserted in the most distinct terms that while the statements of part of the Italian Press during the summer as to the desire of Italy to draw closer to Austria-Hungary and Germany, might have led to the suspicion that the meeting was the first step towards the realization of an Austro-German Alliance, such was not the case. The object of the meeting was to efface all reminiscences of the past and to remove all cause of mistrust for the future. Foreign Alliances were of no advantage to Italy. She desired only to place her relations with Austria-Hungary "sur un pied régulier." Depretis assured Paget that the meeting would not effect any change in Italian policy and that he remained true to his policy of alliance with the Western Powers and with

(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 391 19 October 1881
Confidential.

(2) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 397 24 October 1881.
Confidential.

F.O.7/1017 Fraser to Granville 424 21 October 1881.

(1)
 England in particular. After the meeting Mancini's language to Paget was directed mainly to support Depretis' statements. He spoke chiefly of the Commercial Treaty with France and the beneficial effect which he expected it to have upon the political relations between Italy and France. In reply, however, to a question from Paget as to which Italy might now be considered to have joined the Austro-German Alliance, Mancini replied that no specific questions had been discussed and no engagements entered into. He had "assured Kallay that Italy would act with Austria-Hungary for the maintenance of peace and on questions to which the interests of the two countries were the same." While the fact of the King's visit was a pledge for the removal of the distrust which had recently characterised Italy's relations with her neighbour, a strictly private conversation with "a gentleman who holds a high position with the Italian Government", afforded more precise information as to the assurances that had been exchanged. Austria-Hungary it appeared had been assured that she need fear no attack from Italy, and Italy that she need not fear that in the event of any question arising with the Vatican, Austria would take an active part

(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881
 Most Confidential.

(2) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 404 6 November 1881
 Confidential
 405 6 November 1881
 Confidential

(1)
in it. There was no indication in all this that anything more positive had resulted from the meeting.

Paget as a result of his experience of Italian policy in the past and his knowledge of the nature of Austro-German relations informed the Foreign Office that the Italian Government "who" have in view the object of removing the mistrust and dislike of Italy which Prince Bismarck is well known to entertain." (2) Information derived from Mancini

confirmed this view. In reply to a question from Paget, the Foreign Minister admitted that the German Government had expressed its satisfaction at the rapprochement that was taking place between Italy and Austria-Hungary and had said that what was done at Vienna would be considered as having been done at Berlin also. He further stated that a visit of King Humbert to Berlin might take place in the near future. (3)

The Parliamentary declarations first of Kallay and then of Mancini generally confirmed the information received from other sources. Kallay's explanations to the Committee on

(1) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 466 22 December 1881.
Secret and Confidential.

(2) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881.
Most Confidential.

(3) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881.
Confidential.

Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegations during its private session, indicated that no agreement and nothing positive had resulted from the meeting. "Austria-Hungary" he said¹ had nothing either to ask or to fear from Italy. Italy had realised that it was in her interest to remove the difficulties in the way of complete cordiality between the two countries and had taken steps to do so. Mancini⁽¹⁾ during the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Italian Chambers, in the course of which it had, significantly, been urged that the removal of distrust between Italy and Austria-Hungary should be followed up by an effort to secure an Austro-German Alliance, stated that the visit to Vienna had been approved by the Berlin Cabinet, and made public the information he had given privately to Paget respecting the assurances received from Berlin that what was done in Vienna would be considered as done also in Berlin. All coolness and indifference he concluded had been entirely removed from Italo-Austrian relations.⁽²⁾

The facts in connection with the visit reported by Fraser indicated that no agreement had been reached, ~~and~~ that the meeting was significant as involving a détente in Austro-

(1) F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 464 11 November 1881.

(2) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 441 7 December 1881.

Italian relations, and confirmed the impression which Mancini had taken pains to convey that it did not indicate the consolidation of their relations in an anti-French sense. Although Depretis and Mancini accompanied the King to Vienna, in view of the fact that there was no Minister for Foreign affairs in Austria-Hungary at the time, and that Kallay was only a subordinate official, it was concluded that no positive ~~or instructive~~ political decision had been taken during the visit. ⁽¹⁾ Secondly the marked attention which Fraser reported King Humbert to have paid to the French Ambassador, appeared as the counterpart of Mancini's efforts to secure the signature of the Italo-French commercial Treaty at the exact time of the King's visit to Vienna. ⁽²⁾

The Press also played its part in determining the nature of British information on the meeting. Its most important contribution on this occasion was to afford material for Paget to frame his questions to Mancini on the subject. The Riforma, the organ of Crispi, who ~~ever~~ since 1877, had been the protagonist of the Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, gave the substance of a conversation between

(1) F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 447 31 October 1881.
 F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881
 Confidential

(2) F.O.7/1018 ,Fraser to Granville 446 31 October 1881.

Mancini and its Vienna correspondent. The Italian Minister it alleged had stated that the adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German Alliance was a fait accompli. The German Government had made known to the Government of Italy before the departure of the King for Vienna that it would look upon what was done at Vienna as having been done at Berlin. (1) It was with this information in his possession that Paget was able to draw from Mancini the information described above, when the Italian Minister in speaking of the meeting limited himself to statements as to the improvement in Franco-Italian relations and as to the cordial reception which had been given to King Humbert. The British Ambassador thus secured more precise statements respecting the nature of the discussions at Vienna, and confirmation of information which otherwise would have rested on the doubtful authority of a newspaper article.

In the second place, an article in the Vienna Fremdenblatt which Fraser described as reflecting exactly the views of the Austrian Government, (2) and an article in the Opinione confirmed the view of the meeting as directed rather to remove the obstacles in the way of good relations between

(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 402 1 November 1881.

(2) F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 429 24 October 1881.

the two countries than to establish any understanding
 (1)
 between them. In this respect, however, the fact that no
 evidence in the contrary direction appeared in the Press,
 which if a pretext offered to report a far-reaching devel-
 opment would generally use it, was more significant.

Lastly the Italian papers partly controlled by, or
 favourable to the Government gave important indications of
 the reality of Italy's desire to remove the difficulties
 in the way of her relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany
 They exhibited no irritation whatsoever at Kallay's state-
 ments to the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian
 Delegations which as they were reported in the Press were
 (2)
 offensive to Italy. Again no irritation was shown when
 Bismarck in the Reichstag cited the political development
 of Italy as an example of the insidious and dangerous nature
 of revolutionary doctrines. The Popolo Romano at once
 explained away the unfortunate aspect of Kallay's declara-
 tions. It insisted that no apprehensions need be excited
 by Bismarck's references to revolutionary doctrines. He

(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 406 9 November 1881

(2) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 406 9 November 1881
 F.O.7/1018 Fraser to Granville 472 14 November 1881
 464 11 November 1881

(The discussions of the Committee being confidential,
 the Press reports were liable to be inaccurate.)

had acted only ~~on~~^{for} expediency. The Italie and the Opinione
 (1)
 expressed similar views. In this connection information
 derived by Paget from von Kendell that Mancini was completely
 satisfied with the assurances he had given on the subject
 only confirmed the information secured from the Press.
 (2)

Although Paget was fully prepared to credit the information
 that he had given to the Foreign Office to the effect
 that the Meeting was only important as removing the causes
 of mistrust between the two countries, he believed that it
 might prepare the way for the negotiation of an alliance.
 (3)
 Articles in the Italian Press and a conversation with the
 Russian Ambassador in Rome gave suggested the form which
 such an alliance might take. Thus the Riforma presumed
 that on all questions of the East and the Mediterranean
 a perfect agreement between Italy and Austria-Hungary would
 be established.
 (4)
 Baron Uxkull the Russian Ambassador in
 Rome told Paget that he had asked Mancini whether Egypt
 had been discussed at Vienna and had been told in reply

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- (1) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 435 3 December 1881.
 439 6 December 1881.
- (2) F.O.45/432 Paget to Granville 442 7 December 1881.
 Confidential.
- (3) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 400 25 October 1881.
 Most confidential.
- (4) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 402 1 November 1881.

"that it had been agreed on both sides that the status quo should be respected" and Paget was prepared to see in that agreement the first step towards the realization of Italy's aim to induce Austria-Hungary and Germany to join with her in claiming a share in the administration of Egypt. ⁽¹⁾ A little later the Opinione in an article on Italian relations with France made the important statement that the closer bonds of sympathy between Italy and Austria entailed for Italy the obligation of permitting Austria to reinforce herself on the Adriatic, the Aejean and the Danube. In return Italy must recover the balance of power in the Mediterranean. ⁽²⁾

The course of diplomatic negotiations was the main source of information on Italy's relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany during 1882. It indicated that in accordance with these suppositions their relations were being drawn closer upon the basis of co-operation in regard to Turkey and the Eastern Question, and more particularly in regard to Egypt. In January, a report from Paget drew the attention of the British Foreign Office, if it had not already observed it, to the identity of language used by Italy and Austria-Hungary in speaking of the execution by Turkey of

(1) F.O.45/431 Paget to Granville 405 6 November 1881
Confidential

(2) F.O.45/430 Paget to Granville 408 10 November 1881.

(1)
 the conditions of the Greek frontier arrangement. At about the same time the Porte addressed a telegram to its representatives at the Courts of Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, describing the action of the British and French Governments in addressing the Joint Note of January 8, to the Khedive as uncalled for and an infringement of Turkish sovereignty, and instructing them to elicit an expression of opinion from the respective Governments. Mancini informed Paget that the Italian policy was to respect the present state of things in Egypt as long as it continued to exist, but that in the event of a disruption occurring, they would consider the Egyptian question as having assumed a European character and themselves as entitled to claim participation in its settlement. This statement led Paget at once to suspect that an exchange of views had taken place between the Cabinets of Vienna, Rome and Constantinople.⁽²⁾

His suspicions were in part confirmed by information from Vienna. Elliot reported on January 19 that Robilant in speaking to him in regard to Egypt, "concluded his remarks by saying 'enfin vous avez réussi à nous mettre tous d'accord' - the 'tous' being Italy and the three Empires."⁽³⁾ Then Mancini, on the 31st told Paget that it had been decided that

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|----------------|---------------------|----|----|--------------|
| (1) F.O.45/452 | Paget to Granville | 16 | 17 | January 1881 |
| | | | | Confidential |
| (2) F.O.45/452 | Paget to Granville | 16 | 17 | January 1882 |
| | | | | Confidential |
| (3) F.O.7/1032 | Elliot to Granville | 25 | 19 | January 1882 |
| | | | | Confidential |

the four Powers would make an identic reply to the Turkish communication, and informed him of the instructions that had accordingly been sent to the Italian Ambassadors at the three courts. (1) On February 19, Blanc expressed to Paget the same general view respecting Egyptian affairs as that which Amphill reported from Berlin, (2) and Elliot from Vienna (3) to be held respectively by the German and the Austro-Hungarian Governments; if armed intervention in Egypt became necessary it should be undertaken by Turkey ^{under} ~~and~~ the supervision of the Powers. (4) Blanc denied that any communication had taken place between Rome, Vienna and Berlin since the exchange of views preceding the identic replies to the Turkish circular, but he admitted that communications had taken place on that occasion, that the reply had been drawn up by the Vienna and Berlin and that the Italian Government had been invited to give its adherence and had done so. A further opportunity for the co-operation of the three Powers respecting the Egypt^{ian} question to be shown was afforded

(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 30 1 February 1882

(2) F.O.64/1005 Amphill to Granville 32 3 February 1882
Confidential.

(3) F.O. 7/1032 Elliot to Granville 53 8 February 1882.

(4) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 38 9 February 1882
Secret.

when Granville issued the circular of February 11 inviting a general exchange of views between the Powers for the event of further action being necessary in Egypt. Mancini stated plainly that before replying he wished to communicate with the other Powers. ⁽¹⁾ Again, the Italian Minister refused to reply to the British and French communications respecting the proposed changes in the Organic Law concerning the powers of the Chamber of Notables, until he had communicated with Austria-Hungary and Germany. ⁽²⁾ The same situation arose when the British Government communicated its intention to send a squadron to Egypt, and when a request was made to the different Governments that their representatives at Constantinople should join Lord Dufferin in inviting the Porte to refrain from interference in Egypt. ⁽³⁾ In every case the reply that was ultimately given by the Italian Government was similar to or identical with the replies of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Paget moreover believed that communications were going on between Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary respecting the course to be pursued if ⁽⁴⁾ circumstances arose which called for some interference.

(1) F.O.45/452	Paget to Granville	46	16 February 1882.
		55	23 February 1882.
(2) F.O.45/453	Paget to Granville	88	22 March 1882.
(3) F.O.45/454	Paget to Granville	147	16 May 1882.
(4) F.O.45/454	Paget to Granville	142	11 May 1882.

Confidential

These suspicions were confirmed when Mancini acknowledged some time later that the Italian representatives at Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg had been instructed to suggest that the English and French Governments should be asked to make known ^{to the other Powers and to the Porte} the measures which they contemplated ~~to the other Powers and the Porte~~, in the event of not ^{their} securing a pacific solution. (1) The co-operation of Italy with Austria-Hungary and Germany was again shown by the replies of the three Governments to the series of British and French proposals respecting the Conference at Constantinople in June and the conditions of Turkish intervention. By the end of July when the Conference had failed to arrange successfully for a Turkish intervention under European control, Paget believed that Mancini "had in view the probability that Italy would be delegated to represent the four Powers which had been acting together in any armed intervention which might be decided on, as a consequence of the possible refusal of the Sultan to send troops." (2)

Paget recapitulating at the time the evidence that the Egyptian negotiation afforded in regard to Italy's relations with other Powers wrote that the basis of Mancini's policy

(1) F.O.45/454 Paget to Granville 166 29 May 1882.

(2) F.O.45/455 Paget to Granville 248 5 July 1882
Confidential

was an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and that as far as regarded the Egyptian question he had succeeded in establishing it. If the British Government requested Italy's co-operation in Egypt, it was likely to be refused unless the request were backed by the German Powers.⁽¹⁾ The Ambassador's views were proved to be justified. Some days later Granville asked Menabrea informally whether he thought the Italian Government would be willing to join England in military operations in Egypt.⁽²⁾ A formal invitation to co-operate with the British and French Governments in taking measures for the protection of the Suez Canal followed.^(2a) At the same time it was intimated that Her Majesty's Government would also welcome the co-operation of Italy "in a movement in the interior for which they were then making active preparations."⁽³⁾ Mancini informed the British Government that he could make no reply until he had ascertained the view that would be taken by the other Powers.⁽⁴⁾ His reply when it came was a refusal.⁽⁵⁾ He stated however,

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- (1) F.O.45/455 Paget to Granville 290 18 July 1882
Confidential.
- (2) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 246a 22 July 1882
Confidential.
- (2^a) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 260 24 July 1882
Telegram.
- (3) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 250 26 July 1882
- (4) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 250 26 July 1882
- (5) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 260 29 July 1882.

that if Italy could secure the formal sanction of Europe, for the joint intervention he would be prepared to reconsider the British invitation. Both Mancini and Depretis in speaking to Paget sought to give the impression that fear of France was the cause of the attitude assumed by Italy. ⁽¹⁾ When however, the British invitation had been finally declined, Menabrea came down to Walmer Castle to explain Italy's motives to the British Minister. "In the first place," he said, "some delay although not insurmountable would have been necessary in consequence of Italy's engagements towards other Powers, to wit Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the necessity of first obtaining their assent." ⁽²⁾

During 1882, practically the only source for general information as to the relations of Italy with other Powers was the Press. It confirmed the impression that in general the relations between the three Powers were being drawn closer. In January The Popolo Romano, which it will be recalled, was believed to have connections with the Italian Government, advocated "an intimate alliance" between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany on the Egyptian question. The

(1) F.O.45/456 Paget to Granville 325 2 August 1882
Most Confidential

(2) F.O.45/451 Granville to Paget 316 27 September 1882.

-sion was revived in the Continental newspapers as to the possibility of providing for the greater security and independence of the Papacy either by modifying the Guarantees Law or by giving to it an international character. The Cologne Gazette unexpectedly suggested that "without touching the Guarantees Law the Italian Government would act in a manner conformable to its own and to the interests of the Powers with whom it was desirable to cultivate better relations, to wit Germany." The Law, it continued, only protected the Pope in the exercise of his spiritual functions. As a man the Pope if he conspired against the Italian Government was within the reach of the Italian Penal Code. ⁽¹⁾ When the Secolo of Milan published the instructions sent by Mancini to Launay to the effect that the Roman question was a purely internal question and could not be discussed with any Foreign Government, Paget was inclined to expect a worsening of Italian relations with Germany. ⁽²⁾ An important article in the Rassenga, an independent paper of moderate views convinced the Ambassador that the disclosures of the Secolo by drawing Ministerial and public attention to the "tendency of the Government to be nothing more than the weak instrument of partizan groups

(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 5 5 January 1882.

(2) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 31 2 February 1882.
Confidential.

in Parliament - any member of it considering himself bound to prove by the production of the most confidential documents that the sacred rights of the popular cause were not being betrayed by the Cabinet in concert with Bismarck and Kalnoky" - might remove some of the weaknesses in the Italian policy of drawing closer to Austria-Hungary and Germany, always provided that such was the serious intention of the Govern-
 (1)
 ment.

Again, articles in the Italian papers provided information as to a counter-current towards alliance with France, and as to its eventual elimination as a factor in Italian alliance policy. Thus the Capitale announced that agents of Gambetta were again in Rome seeking to improve the relations between France and Italy. A little later the newspapers published the information that a certain M. Obleicht had sold his title of ownership of several of the oldest Italian newspapers to French financiers. The Riforma contained an authentic account of the transaction on Obleicht's authority and the Opinione drew the attention of the public to its
 (2)
 significance for Italian foreign policy. Again it was to the Press that Paget drew the attention of the Foreign Office as showing that Gambetta's fall eliminated the possi-

(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 34 4 February 1882
 (2) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 17 19 January 1882

bility that plans for a Franco-Italian alliance would be realized. The pro-Government papers, the Popolo Romano and the Opinione, he reported, pointed out that the constitution of Freycinet's Government made the maintenance of friendly relations between Italy and France compatible with the Italian object of still further cementing her relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany. (1)

Lastly, information derived from the Press convinced the Foreign Office of the impossibility of an Anglo-Italian rapprochement developing from the British invitation to Italy to co-operate in Egypt. After the bombardment of Alexandria at the beginning of July, the Italian papers were ~~plied~~^{filled} with virulent abuse of the British Government. As a result Paget began to suspect that while the official language and official conduct of the Italian Government had been more or less favourable to Great Britain, encouragement and instigation had been given to Arabi. "During my experience in this country," Paget wrote, "I have generally found that when important questions have arisen, there has been one organ at all events, which has undertaken on behalf of the Ministry to correct misapprehensions. On the present occasion all has been abuse and nothing but

(1) F.O.45/452 Paget to Granville 28 1 February 1882

abuse of their oldest and most constant ally. I think that for the future it may be permitted to accept with a certain amount of caution the profuse professions of friendship of Italy towards England which are so abundantly lavished upon us." ⁽¹⁾ The hostility of the Press towards England had not in any way diminished by October. Fraser, who had joined the Embassy at Rome in the early Summer was now in charge while Paget was on leave. He thought it necessary to attempt to explain the attitude of the newspapers and expressed the belief that it was largely due to the number of papers published in Italy by Frenchmen, and stated that one paper at least had been established in the interests of official French policy. He was forced to admit however, that the native Press without exception was equally hostile to England. ⁽²⁾ Blanc attempted to convince Paget that the activity of French journalists which Fraser had described, was the only reason for the attitude of the Italian Press. A great part ^{he said} had been bought up by Gambetta's party ~~he said~~, and spoke as the result of a mot d'ordre issued by it. He asserted in the most earnest terms that the Consulta had no connection with any paper

(1) F.O.45/455 Paget to Granville 283 14 July 1882

(2) F.O.45/456 Fraser to Granville 379 3 October 1882.

whatever either directly or indirectly. Paget was not inclined to credit his statements and again drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the marked unanimity of the Italian press.⁽¹⁾ In November, the publication in the Diritto of information to the effect that Chevalier Migra would be proposed by Italy as Ambassador to London, which Blanc had only just given privately to the British Ambassador, gave the latter the opportunity to say pointedly to Blanc that "it would now be difficult to persuade anybody that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had no relations with the Press."⁽²⁾

Very little information on the subject of the general relations between Italy and other European Powers was derived directly from statements of the Foreign Ministers or Ambassadors of the countries concerned. Menabrea in September, in describing Italy's motives for declining to co-operate in Egypt, stated that Italy's military forces were adequate for the protection of her own interests and "for the support of her allies on the Continent if occasion arose."⁽³⁾ Blanc in conversation with Paget in October,

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|----------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| (1) F.O.45/456 | Paget to Granville | 388 | 27 October 1882 |
| | | Confidential | |
| (2) F.O.45/457 | Paget to Granville | 405 | 15 November 1882 |
| (3) F.O.45/451 | Granville to Paget | 316 | 27 September 1882 |

alluded to the "Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany."⁽¹⁾

The Election speeches of Mancini and other members of the Government in October referred to the existence of an intimate understanding between Italy and the German Empire.⁽²⁾

On two occasions Mancini made important declarations on foreign policy in the Chambers. In January, he informed

them that Italy's relations with Austria-Hungary and

Germany "were excellent".⁽³⁾ In June he stated that since September 1881, the Italian Government had communicated to

the Cabinets of Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg, the

programme of their policy in Egypt. The four Cabinets

had been perfectly agreed throughout.⁽⁴⁾ These communications

public and private however, added nothing material to the

information already possessed by the Foreign Office, and

seem to have attracted no attention.

In this connection only the statements of Kalk^{no}sky in the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Delegation

were important.⁽⁵⁾ In reply to a question whether the reasons

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| (1) | F.O.45/456 | Paget to Granville | 388 | 27 October 1882 |
| | | | Confidential | |
| (2) | F.O.45/456 | Fraser to Granville | 384 | 20 October 1882 |
| (3) | F.O.45/452 | Paget to Granville | 24 | 25 January 1882 |
| (4) | F.O.45/454 | Paget to Granville | 195 | 13 June 1882 |
| (5) | F.O.7/1036 | Elliot to Granville | 524 | 1 November 1882. |

eager to facilitate the visit of Francis Joseph to Italy. It had been intimated to Count Robilant in August, Ludolf stated, that the Emperor desired to return the King's visit at some time between the 1st and 15th of September at any place in Italy except Rome. It was thought the Italian army manoeuvres and the time of year would offer a plausible excuse for the meeting taking place at a provincial town. Robilant on instructions from his Government had insisted that the meeting must take place in Rome. (1) When Depretis in speaking to Paget insisted that the Austrian Government alone was to blame for the meeting not having taken place, as strongly as Kalnoky had insisted that the Italian Government was responsible, and went so far as to deny that any proposal for a visit during the army manoeuvres had been made by Austria-Hungary, the (2) impression was further strengthened that no change had taken place in Italian relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany since October 1881. Information that any development had taken place was confined to indications that relations had been drawn closer on the basis of co-operation in the Eastern and Egyptian questions.

(1) F.O.45/457 Paget to Granville 400 11 November 1882
Confidential.

(2) F.O.45/457 Paget to Granville 407 15 November 1882
Confidential.

The paucity of information directly concerning the relations between Italy and the Empires derived from communications from the Governments of the three Powers, and complete lack of any information from independent sources, brought it about that the Foreign Office had no knowledge whatsoever of the negotiations that began in December 1881 and resulted in the signature of the Triple Alliance in May 1882.

In December Blanc first raised the matter of a formal Treaty with both the German and the Austro-Hungarian
(1)
Ambassadors in Rome. Both Ambassadors reported that the Italians aimed at securing a territorial guarantee. An exchange of views at once followed between Bismarck and Kalnoky. As a result, agreement not to discourage the Italian advances, but to avoid a Treaty of guarantee, and to make the undertaking of obligations on their part dependent upon the maintenance of the present relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany towards Russia, was reached. Bismarck's suggestion that the Austrian and German reply to Italy's overtures should propose that she should first

(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.538. (Kendell to Bismarck
16 December 1881),
and No.540. (Reuss to Bismarck,
23 December 1881),
referring to a dispatch from Wimpffen to
Kalnoky.
Pribram op.cit.Vol.II pp.11. (refers to Wimpffen to
Kalnoky, 9 December 1881).

reach a settlement of her difficulties with the Papacy, was
 rejected by Kalnoky. ⁽¹⁾ On January 18, Robilant made a formal
 overture to Kalnoky, and on January 31, Launay did the same
 with Bismarck. ⁽²⁾ Italy it was stated had decided to associate
 herself closely with the policy of Austria-Hungary and
 Germany and proposed that the decision should be formulated
 in a written document. The Italian overture was received
 in a friendly spirit, but Bismarck referred Launay to Vienna
 and Kalnoky told Robilant that there was no hurry - "on en
 causera." ^{no} When/further step was taken by Italy in spite
 of the fact that Launay had informed Bismarck that instruc-
 tions had been sent to Robilant to open formal negotiations
 at Vienna, Kalnoky himself raised the matter with the Italian
 Ambassador and made it clear that Austria-Hungary could not
 accept a Treaty of Guarantee. She was ready to accept a
 Treaty of Neutrality for a limited period. Robilant then
 touched upon that other potential aspect of any alliance
 agreement. Obligation he said might be undertaken for
 certain specific cases such as the Egyptian question.
 Kalnoky seems to have made no reply. ⁽³⁾

(1) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.540, 541, 542.

(2) G.P.Vol.III. Nos.543 and 545.
 Pribram op cit.Vol.IIpp.13-14.

(3) G.P.Vol.III. No.547.

Before formal proposals came from Italy, the idea of a Treaty of Neutrality put forward by Kalnoky had been further developed by a suggestion from Bismarck for a pledge of mutual support in the event of an unprovoked attack upon either party by France. ⁽¹⁾ It then appeared, however, that Italy herself contemplated nothing more than an unsigned Promemoria which should record, first a declaration by Italy that in all important political questions which arose she desired to come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary, and a counter-declaration to the same effect from Austria-Hungary, and second a mutual promise that if the European peace appeared to be threatened by any Power, an understanding for common defence should be negotiated. ⁽²⁾ Kalnoky was convinced that such an agreement did not answer the needs of either Austria-Hungary or Italy and stood firm by his original plan for a Neutrality Treaty, developed as it now was by Bismarck's proposal for pledges of support against France, and a further Austrian proposal that these pledges should be generalised to apply to Russia as well though Russia should not be formally named. ⁽³⁾ He

(1) G.P.Vol.III.No.548.

(2) G.P.Vol.III.No.549 (Kendell to Bismarck, 26 February 1882) and No.552.
 Pribram op.cit.Vol.II p.19 (refers to Wimpffen to Kalnoky 3 March 1882).

(3) G.P.Vol.III.No.552 (Reuss to Bismarck 10 March 1882).
 and No.553 (Busch to Reuss 16 March 1882).

accordingly drew up a draft embodying the ideas⁽¹⁾ which
 was accepted by Germany.⁽²⁾ On March 22 formal proposals
 were at last made by Robilant to Kalnoky. They differed
 from the latter's project in that Italy was only prepared
 to promise armed neutrality in the event of a war between
 Russia and the German Powers, whereas Austria-Hungary
 desired a promise of active assistance. The Italian
 proposals also included a mutual promise of support in
 general political questions. The Treaty was to be signed
 by all three Powers.⁽³⁾ In a conference on April 12, Kalnoky
 and Robilant discussed a draft for the proposed Treaty.⁽⁴⁾
 Bismarck's acceptance followed on the 17th.⁽⁵⁾ In a further
 conference on the 27th, Robilant informed Kalnoky of
 certain amendments desired by his Government and proposed
 the signature of a secret protocol which should leave the
 way open for England to accede to the Alliance either in all
 its stipulations or at least in the provision for neutrality
 in the event of a war between a non-signatory and one of
 the Parties to the Treaty.⁽⁶⁾ At Bismarck's suggestion the

(1) G.P.Vol.III.No.554 (Reuss to Bismarck, 18 March 1882)
 Pribram op.cit: Vol.11 pp.21-22.

(2) G.P.Vol.III. No.555.

(3) G.P.Vol.III.No.556 (Reuss to Bismarck, 24 March 1882).
 Pribram op.cit.Vol.I, pp.22 et seq.

(4) G.P.Vol.III.No.559 (Reuss to Bismarck, 13 April 1882).

(5) G.P.Vol.III.No.560.

(6) G.P.Vol.III.No.561. Pribram op.cit.Vol.I, p.33.

latter proposal was modified and a Ministerial Declaration to the effect that the Treaty was not directed against England agreed upon. ⁽¹⁾ Final agreement was reached by ⁽²⁾ the middle of May and the Treaty signed on the ⁽³⁾ 20th.

The Treaty of the Triple Alliance followed more closely than the Dreikaiserbund agreement, the type of the Austro-German Treaty. It was concerned primarily to determine the attitude of the contracting parties in the event of an attack upon one or more of them by a non-signatory and only secondarily with the question of policy. As the Austro-German Treaty had done, it determined the attitude of the Signatories according to the source of the attack. In the event of an attack from France directed against Italy, the two other signatories undertook to give Italy full military support. In the event of attack from France directed against Germany, Italy alone undertook to give full military assistance against the aggressor. In the event of an attack from two or more great Powers non-signatories to the Treaty, presumably France assisted by Russia, the three Powers undertook to give full military assistance to the attacked Power or Powers. Article V

(1) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.562, 563.

(2) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.567, 568.

(3) G.P. Vol.III. No.570.

stipulated for concerted military measures, and the conclusion of an armistice or of peace by common agreement only.

A new factor was introduced. The defensive character of the Treaty was considered to cover the case where one of the Signatories though technically the aggressor, in fact made war as the result of a threat to its security by a Great Power outside the Treaty. In this event the two non-combattants undertook to maintain benevolent neutrality while reserving to themselves the right to give active assistance.

The question of policy was touched upon in the preamble and in Article I. The former affirmed the desire of the Contracting Parties to strengthen the monarchical principle and to ensure the maintenance of the present political and social order of their respective states. Article I imposed an obligation to engage in an exchange of ideas respecting the principal questions of political and economic policy and a promise of mutual support "dans le limite de leur propre interets."

The stipulations of the Treaty were to be kept secret and to last for five years. A ministerial declaration to the effect that the Alliance could not in any circumstances be considered as directed against England, supplemented the Treaty.

As the Treaty dealt to such a limited degree with the question of policy and no casus foederis occurred in connection with its other stipulations, British information as to its existence could be secured from the course of events only in so far as they indicated an unexpected confidence between the Governments of the three countries. Otherwise information could only be secured as the result of some unintentional leakage or of deliberate disclosures on the part of the three Governments.

At the beginning of 1883, there was one incident which Paget reported as indicating the existence of confidence between the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Italy that was not shared by the people of the two countries. At the end of December 1883 Oberdank, an Italian, was executed in Austria-Hungary for political activities against the Austrian Government. Anti-Austrian demonstrations were made at Turin, Milan and Rome. ⁽¹⁾ In January shots were fired at the residence of the Austrian Ambassador in Rome and at the consulate in Rimini. ⁽²⁾ Both Paget and Elliot drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact that

(1) F.O.45/457 Paget to Granville 447 23 December 1882.

(2) F.O.45/476 Paget to Granville 6 5 January 1883.
D.D.F.Series I. Vol.IV. No.593.

these manifestations had produced no irritation between
 (1)
 the two Governments.

In March and April important disclosures on the subject of the Alliance by Mancini and someone who was presumably either a member of the Italian Government or employed in the Foreign Office, with the assistance of information derived from the Press, enabled the British Foreign Office to form a conception of the commitments existing between Italy and the German Empires that fell little short of the actual situation created by the Treaty.

The necessity of defending his policy before a critical and largely hostile Chamber drew from Mancini a statement as to the relations existing between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany. "He replied to those who had twitted him with having knocked in vain at the doors of Berlin and Vienna in search of the alliance of these two Cabinets," Paget reported, "by referring them to the published official documents in proof of the good understanding which exists between the three Powers. At present His Excellency said there was no danger of an external aggression, but should one arise, Italy would be able to appreciate the solidity

(1) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 28 24 January 1883.
 F.O.45/476 Paget to Granville 17 12 January 1883.

(1)
of the intimate union which had been established." This
hint at the existence of commitments between the three
Powers to meet the case of an attack upon one of them by
a fourth Power was favourably received at Vienna and
Berlin, and was considered as an indication of the close
friendship between the three Powers rather than as giving
grounds for the supposition that a formal agreement existed
between them.
(2)

Further disclosures would possibly not have followed had
it not been for the attitude now taken by the Press. The
Continental Papers professed to see in Mancini's ~~statements~~^{statements}
an indication of the existence of formal commitments and
"revelations" as to their exact character soon followed.
The chief of these was contained in a Reuter telegram
from Rome published in the English papers on April 1, and
later reproduced in the Italian, Austrian and German papers.
It stated that a formal Treaty existed which bound the
three Powers to do everything possible to avoid a war
with France. "But if one of the three Powers should be
attacked by France, the other two will support their Ally
and make common cause with her. If one of the three Powers

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- (1) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 87 4 March 1883.
(2) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 99 23 March 1883.
F.O.7/1048 Drummond to Granville 86 16 March 1883.

should be constrained to declare war against another Power other than France, then the other two will be free to remain neutral." This disclosure was incomplete and its accuracy was denied by an officious communication in the Fremdenblatt, somewhat less categorically by the Diritto, and by Depretis who told Paget that no written "engagements whatever existed between the three Powers."⁽¹⁾ It was however, sufficient to cause Mancini to make further disclosures in the Senate when the Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was debated there on April 11. No official summary being published of the proceedings the first report respecting them disclosed nothing.⁽²⁾ Paget however, learnt two days later from one of the members that Mancini had clearly admitted the existence of formal agreements. "I will neither confirm nor contradict the suppositions which are found in the Press, Mancini was stated to have said" with respect to the agreements of Italy with the two Empires, but agreements do exist having for object an entirely pacific end, with full reciprocity of rights and obligations."⁽³⁾ Furnished with this informa-

(1) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 109 6 April 1883.

(2) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 115 12 April 1883.

(3) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 116 13 April 1883.
Cf.D.D.F.Series I.Vol.V.No.17 footnote; the French Ambassador only knew of Mancini's statements from the Press report.

and with the full knowledge of the alleged revelations of the Press, Paget questioned Mancini. As a result he informed the Government that he was convinced that "a real Alliance, though purely defensive and pacific in its objects has been concluded between the three Powers - - - by direct negotiation as much with Berlin as with Vienna." Mancini refused to confide in the Ambassador respecting the precise form in which the engagements were taken. From a source which Paget described as equally authentic, he had learnt however, that the engagements had been undertaken by the communication of copies of despatches addressed by the respective Governments to their Ambassadors at the three Courts. From this source also he learnt that the Alliance was contracted for five years.

From Mancini Paget learnt further that the three States had bound themselves "to defend each other in the event of an attack by any other Power; no other Power whatever is named, and the Alliance would come into effect, quite as much if the attacking Power were Russia as if it were France." In the second place Mancini stated that "he had made a distinct stipulation that under no circumstances would Italy ever contemplate the case of finding herself in hostility with England."

From the other source already mentioned the information was made complete except ^{that not} ~~for any~~ ^{was made} mention of the substance

of the Preamble and of Article IV. which provided for the neutrality of the other signatories in the event of one of them declaring war as a result of a menace to its security by a fourth Power. For Paget's informant stated that in addition to the undertakings referred to by Mancini, the three Powers had agreed that in the event of any important question arising "They will concert together with the view of establishing a common line of policy." The negotiations he further informed Paget had begun during Gambetta's tenure of office and had been concluded some time after his fall.

Two unfounded pieces of information came from this source however: first that Italy had undertaken to pursue "une politique correcti vis a vis l'Irredentisme ", and secondly that "in the event of circumstances ever leading to a practical realization of the Alliance, England should be invited to join it."⁽¹⁾ The British conception of the literal contents of the Treaty but not of the spirit behind it, ^{not of the general results to be expected from it} was rendered less accurate by this information.

No confirmation of Paget's information was received from other sources. Elliot stated plainly that he could secure no information and that he could only give a personal

(1) F.O.45/477 Paget to Granville 119 13 April 1883.
Most confidential.

opinion that no specific Treaty obligations had been taken. On the other hand he considered it possible that a Declaration of a more or less formal character as to the principles upon which the three Governments propose to guide their policy had been made (1) Kalnoky had stated (2) only that no undertaking directed against France existed.

(1) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 119 14 April 1883
Confidential

(2) F.O.7/1048 Elliot to Granville 19 April 1883.

CHAPTER VI.

SERVIA, RUMANIA and TURKEY.

The policy pursued by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, by imposing upon her the necessity of seeking support against Russia, had made it possible for Bismarck to bring into being the Austro-German Alliance. It had also furnished him with a basis upon which the Dreikaiserbund would be renewed. Again, it had emphasised for Austria-Hungary the necessity of a guarantee of Italian neutrality in the event of a conflict between herself and another European Power. Italian efforts, therefore, to bring about a Triple Alliance had been encouraged and had finally succeeded. The Alliance concluded between Austria-Hungary and Servia on June 28, 1881 ensured that this policy would be continued.

The Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, to which Germany acceded, and the relations cultivated by Austria-Hungary and Germany with Turkey, counteracted as far as the pursuit of a forward policy in the Balkans was concerned the advantages which Russia might have derived from the existence of the Dreikaiserbund. They ensured that the collapse of that combination would not be brought about by the same factors which caused the failure of a similar combination during the Eastern crisis 1875-8.

The relations with Turkey cultivated by all three

Empires at a time when British and French influence at the Porte was at its lowest ensured the control of the Eastern Question by the Dreikaiserbund and encouraged Russia to remain faithful to that combination.

British information on these relationships, crucial for the success and continued existence of the system of Alliances established by Bismarck was comparatively full, but where it touched upon the existence of definite commitments, and especially when it concerned those designed to meet the contingency of an attack upon one of the parties, was indecisive.

As has been shown, the Foreign Office were fully informed in regard to Austria-Hungary's policy of increasing her influence in the Western part of the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly in Servia. The geographical position of Montenegro between Bosnia and Herzegovina, controlled by Austria-Hungary, and a hostile Albania diminished the political importance of the Principality.

During 1879-80 British information showed that the development of Austria-Hungary's influence in Servia, was not uninterrupted. In the first place, it was informed of considerable resistance in Servia to Austrian efforts. In the late summer of 1879 Ristic, the Servian Prime Minister, was prepared to resign rather than yield to the Austro-Hungarian demand that Servia should engage to construct the

railway connections between Nisch and Belgrade and the
 Austrian lines, before those between Nisch and Salonica. ⁽¹⁾
 He devoted his efforts to securing the establishment of the
 latter connections, believing that they would save Serbia
 from the commercial domination of Austria-Hungary. ⁽²⁾ When
 the latter refused to open commercial negotiations with
 Serbia until the Railway Convention had been concluded,
 relations became seriously embittered, but Ristic showed no
 signs of giving way. ⁽³⁾ In February 1880 Gould, British
 Minister at Belgrade, reported that his resignation was a
 matter of days, as he could not agree to a new Austrian demand
 that Serbia should build the line from Nisch to Pirot immed-
 iately, without waiting for Bulgaria to engage to effect a
 junction with it. ⁽⁴⁾ Austro-Hungarian pressure was seen by
 the Foreign Office to be finally successful, though not

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- (1) B.M.Add Mss.39027. Gould to Layard 20 July 1879
 (2) B.Singer: die Verträge init Serbien Chapt.II.
 (3) F.O.105/18 Gould to Salisbury 20 December 1879
 (4) F.O.105/12 Gould to Salisbury
 Telegram 27 February 1880

B.Singer: op cit. Chapt.II.

G.D.29/123. Gladstone to Granville 4 May 1880
 contains a long Minute by Granville as to information
 received on the Railway Convention, signed on April 9.

entirely so. A convention, Gould reported on May 12th, had been concluded, which satisfied the Austrian demands in regard to the building of the Nisch-Belgrade line before the construction of the connections with Salonica, but not those in regard to the Servo-Bulgarian railways.⁽¹⁾

In the second place the development of British commercial influence in Servia was seen to act as a check upon the success of Austria-Hungary's policy. Thus, Gould in the interests of British trade with Servia, which accounted for one third of the latter's imports of manufactured goods,⁽²⁾ had encouraged Ristic in his attempts to open communication with Salonica rather than with Austria-Hungary.⁽³⁾

Again the conclusion of a commercial Treaty with Servia weakened the force of the measures taken by Austria-Hungary to secure Servian pliancy on the Railway question.⁽⁴⁾ Austria-Hungary's refusal to open negotiations for a commercial Treaty was not important when Servia was assured of an agreement with Great Britain. Gould moreover was instructed to assist the Austrian representative in the railway negotiations, but

(1) F.O.105/12	Gould to Granville	30	12 May 1880
		42	22 June 1880
		47	23 June 1880
			Confidential
(2) F.O.105/4	Gould to Salisbury	8	31 October 1878
			Commercial
(3) Add Mss.39028	Gould to Layard	15	August 1879
G.D.29/123	Gladstone to Granville		4 May 1880
F.O. 7/996	Egerton to Granville	721	10 November 1880
			Confidential
(4) F.O.105/12	Gould to Salisbury	10	10 February 1880
		12	16 February 1880

not to allow them to interfere with his own negotiations for
 the Commercial Treaty. ⁽¹⁾ After the Railway Convention had
 been successfully concluded, the existence of the Commercial
 Treaty with England encouraged Serbia to refuse for some time
 the terms which Austria-Hungary proposed for the Austro-Servian
 Treaty. Immediately after the conclusion of the British
 Treaty the Servian Minister in Vienna had, in fact, informed
 the Austrian Government that Serbia could not engage in any
 negotiations for a treaty with Austria-Hungary. ⁽²⁾

Lastly, during 1879-80, Austria-Hungary had to contend
 with Russian rivalry for predominance to Serbia. At the
 beginning of 1879, the mission of the Servian Minister for
 Education to St. Petersburg had attracted a good deal of
 attention. ⁽³⁾ Later, Russian contractors apparently backed by
 the Russian Government, were making repeated efforts to obtain
 the concession of the projected lines of railway through
 Serbia. ⁽⁴⁾ It then appeared that Russia was also attempting to

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| (1) F.O.105/12. | Salisbury to Gould | 1 | January 1880 |
| | Telegram | | |
| (2) Singer: op.cit. Chapt.II. | | | |
| (3) F.O.105/6. | Gould to Salisbury. | 1 | 2 January 1879 |
| (4) F.O.105/6. | Gould to Salisbury. | 5 | 7 January 1879 |
| F.O.105/6. | Gould to Salisbury. | | 10 January 1879 |
| | Telegram | | |
| F.O.105/6. | Gould to Salisbury. | 20 | 19 January 1879 |

(1)
 negotiate a commercial Treaty. By the Summer, however,
 Russian influence in Serbia had begun to decline,⁽²⁾
 A conflict on a question connected with the Servian frontier
 between the Servian Government and the Russian representative
 caused relations to become considerably strained.⁽³⁾

At the beginning of 1880, the Foreign Office was
 informed that the first step towards an improvement in the
 political relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was
 about to be made. Elliot reported from Vienna on May 20,
 that Prince Milan proposed to visit Vienna in the course of
 the following month. He believed the opportunity would be
 taken to convince Serbia of the friendly disposition of the
 Austrian Government towards her.⁽⁴⁾ Gould reported on the 25th,
 that it was almost decided that Milan was to proceed to
 Vienna. "It is hoped," he wrote, "that this will place the
 relations between Serbia and Austria on a more friendly
 footing.⁽⁵⁾ The visit actually took place June 26 - 30. Milan

(1) F.O.105/6	Gould to Salisbury	21	20 January 1879.
(2) F.O.105/6	Gould to Salisbury	156	4 June 1879
(3) F.O.105/6	Gould to Salisbury	164 172	12 June 1879 20 June 1879
(4) F.O. 7/990	Elliot to Granville	247	20 May 1880.
(5) F.O.105/12	Gould to Granville	36	25 May 1880.

went on to Franzensbad, Ischl and Gastien, returning to Vienna on September 13 and to Servia on the 22nd. He saw the Emperor of Austria again at Ischl and again at Vienna in September, and visited the Emperor of Germany at Gastien. ⁽¹⁾ The Prince was given a cordial reception and appeared to be fully satisfied with the friendly disposition of the Austro-⁽²⁾ Hungarian Government.

British information gave more substantial evidence as to the significance of the visit. Colonel Catargi, Milan's uncle, and confidential adviser had had a long conversation with Haymerle and he gave Gould the gist of what had been said. Catargi had informed the Austrian Minister that Prince Milan would feel himself obliged to assume the title of King if Prince Charles of Rumania did so. Haymerle had replied that he saw no objection to the proposed change in Milan's title. ⁽³⁾ In the second place the visit caused the struggle, which Ristic had led against Austria-Hungary, to be brought slowly to a clear issue. On August 18, Gould informed the Foreign Office of the increasing ill-feeling

(1) F.O.105/12	Gould to Granville	48	23 July 1880
F.O.105/13	Gould to Granville	75	8 September 1880
		88	22 September 1880.
(2) F.O. 7/995	Elliot to Granville	701	29 October 1880.
F.O.105/13	Gould to Granville	60	31 July 1880.
(3) F.O.105/13	Gould to Granville	63	3 August 1880.
			Confidential

prepared to acquiesce completely with anything she might
 demand. ⁽¹⁾ When Milan formed a new Ministry and Ristic fell,
 the Foreign Office had full information as to the significance
 of the event for the extension of Austrian influence in
 Servia. ⁽²⁾ The new Ministry, strongly supported by a newly
 elected Skuptchina accepted the Austro-Hungarian demands
 and her influence was paramount in the Principality. ⁽³⁾
 Elliot, meanwhile had commented on Gould's despatch of
 October 23, which went through Vienna under Flying Seal, that
 Ristic's views as to the domination of Austria-Hungary over
 Servia, which would result from the Servian acceptance of
 the Austrian demands, was exaggerated. He admitted however,
 the general affect of the outcome of the recent crisis upon
 the Austrian influence in the Principality. ⁽⁴⁾

The negotiations for a commercial Treaty were then
 formally opened. ⁽⁵⁾ It was not, however, until April that the
 difficulties in the relations between the two countries were
 finally removed. In January, the Servian Skuptchina began

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- (1) F.O.105/13 Gould to Granville 96 23 October 1880
 Confidential
- (2) F.O.105/13 Gould to Granville Telegram
 7 1 November 1880
- (3) F.O.105/13 Gould to Granville Telegram
 11 17 November 1880
 115 4 December 1880
 116 7 December 1880
 Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/995 Elliot to Granville 701 29 October 1880
- (5) F.O.7/996 Egerton to Granville 724 11 November 1880

to grow restless at further unreasonable demands of Austria-
 Hungary and in March there was a revulsion of feeling in
 favour of Russia. Even Elliot spoke now of Austria-Hungary's
 "monstrous pretensions."

In April, the negotiations in the Commercial Treaty which was finally signed on May 6, were practically concluded, the Foreign Office was informed and steps were at once taken to bring about closer political relations. The question of Milan's assumption of the title of King which had been broached in June 1880, was again raised. Mijatovich, who was now foreign Minister of Servia, told Gould that confidential communications had taken place on the subject between the Governments of Servia and Austria-Hungary, and that he had been assured that no objection would be made by the latter. Elliot on receiving Gould's despatch, asked both the Emperor and Haymerle whether any such communications had taken place.

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| (1) F.O.105/19 | Baker (Vice-Consul) | | |
| | to Gould | 1 | 22 January 1880 |
| G.D.29/155 | Elliot to Granville | 8 | January 1880. |
| (2) F.O.105/19 | Gould to Granville | 27 | 12 March 1880. |
| (3) G.D.29/155 | Elliot to Granville | 24 | February 1881. |
| (4) F.O.105/19 | Gould to Granville | 35 | 1 April 1881. |

Confidential

He was told that nothing had been said. Later it seemed
 clear that Austria-Hungary contemplated "with less repugnance
 than formerly the probability of the change being eventually
 made." (2) The question meanwhile appeared to be under discussion
 among the Servian Ministers. (3)

Information was then received that Milan was preparing
 for a visit to Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg. (4) The visit
 took place according to plan, Milan arriving in Vienna on
 June 6, going on to Berlin and St. Petersburg and returning to
 Vienna on June 12.

British information at first indicated that only the
 question of the eventual assumption by Milan of the title of
 King had been discussed. It did ^{not} appear, however, that the
 matter had been formally raised or that an agreement had been
 reached. Elliot reported that the matter had been lightly
 touched upon and Austria-Hungary had made no objections. (5)
 Mijatovich told Gould that the matter had been mentioned at
 Berlin and St. Petersburg, and no objections raised. The

(1) F.O.7/1014	Elliot to Granville	197	14 April 1881
		Confidential	
(2) F.O.7/1015	Elliot to Granville	271	25 May 1881
(3) F.O.105/19	Gould to Granville		14 April 1881
		Telegram 3	
(4) F.O.105/19	Gould to Granville	60	29 April 1881
		74	31 May 1881
		75	1 June 1881
(5) F.O.7/1015	Elliot to Granville	289	8 June 1881
		309	14 June 1881
F.O.65/1113	Wyndham to Granville	307	15 June 1881
		325	22 June 1881

(1)
Prince had not himself introduced the subject.

In reality a formal agreement had already been come to on the matter between Austria-Hungary and Servia when Mijatovich spoke to Gould.

Milan returned to Belgrade on June 25. Three days later a Treaty of Alliance was signed by Mijatovich and the Austrian Minister at Belgrade. (2) Article II provided that Austria-Hungary would recognize Milan as King whenever he saw fit to take the title, and would use her influence with other Powers to secure their recognition.

Furthermore by Article III Austria-Hungary bound herself to direct her efforts to maintain and strengthen the Servian dynasty. In return Servia pledged herself not to tolerate political, religious or other intrigues within her territory directed against Austria-Hungary. The Alliance which was a secret agreement to remain in force for ten years, provided also for the furtherance of that control by Austria-Hungary over Servia which Gould had informed the Foreign Office ought to be expected to result from Ristic's fall. Article I bound the two Governments to pursue a "mutually friendly policy." Article IV provided "that Servia should neither negotiate nor

(1) F.O.105/19 Gould to Granville . 95 6 July 1881

(2) Pribram: op.cit Vol.I.
pp.51 et seq.

conclude any political treaty with another Government" and not admit a foreign armed force within her territory, without a previous understanding with Austria-Hungary. Lastly in accordance with the example of the Alliance agreements already concluded, it dealt with the attitude of the two States in the event of war. Article V bound each to observe friendly neutrality in the event of the other being engaged in war. Article VI envisaged eventual military assistance and provided that a military convention should be concluded for that purpose when the case arose. By Article VII, Austria-Hungary bound herself not to oppose territorial acquisitions should Serbia be in a position to make them. The engagement under Article IV was the subject of further negotiation and eventually it became a personal undertaking on the part of Prince Milan alone, while the Servian Government recognised only an engagement not to negotiate or conclude any political treaty contrary to the spirit and tenor of the Alliance Treaty. ⁽¹⁾

With regard to these subsequent negotiations, only the facts of the journey to Vienna of Mijatovich, and of Pirochanats, ⁽²⁾

(1) Pribram: op.cit.Vol.I.pp.55 et seq.

Pribram Milan IV von Servien und die Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns mit Serbien 1881-1889, (Historische Blätter 1, 1921-22, pp.464-94).

(2) F.O.105/19 Gould to Granville

6 July 1881
8 September 1881

(1)
 and of the second visit of Milan, which they involved were reported to the Foreign Office. In regard to the existence of an Alliance Treaty, some information was received, but it was not such as to lead the Foreign Office to feel any confidence in its accuracy. Early in June, an English paper contained information to the effect that Milan had been informed in Vienna that Austria-Hungary would agree to his assumption of the title of King, on condition that Serbia concluded a military alliance with her, putting her army at Austria-Hungary's disposal, and command in the event of war. When, however, Gould asked Mijatovich if this information was correct, he replied that no Servian Minister would consider
 (2)
 the proposal. In September, the Servian Press insisted that a military union between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was in contemplation. Mijatovich assured Gould that there was
 (3)
 positively no foundation for such information.

Subsequent information received before 1885, reflected only that part of the Austro-Servian Alliance which dealt with the assumption by Prince Milan of the title of King, and the Austro-Hungarian promise of support to Milan's dynasty against revolutionary movements. Milan was proclaimed King early in

(1) F.O.105/19	Gould to Granville		9 October 1881
(2) F.O.105/19	Gould to Granville	82	13 June 1881
(3) F.O.105/20	Gould to Granville	123	12 September 1881

March 1882. Elliot reported that the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade had been directed to intimate the Austrian recognition as soon as he was proclaimed. The Emperor of Austria desired to be the first to recognize him. ⁽¹⁾ The Emperor in person later confirmed to Elliot that he welcomed the step taken by Milan. ⁽²⁾ Elliot in guarded language hinted that Serbia had probably done something in return for Austria-Hungary to account for her marked readiness to recognize the Prince as King, which contrasted strongly with what Elliot had previously reported the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government to be in the matter. ⁽³⁾

The present Servian Government he wrote had found some means to achieve the dearest ambitions of the Principality without arousing the misunderstanding with Austria-Hungary that might have been expected. The Ambassador's language, however, did not give the impression that a formal agreement had been concluded. ⁽²⁾ The correct attitude of the Servian Government during the troubles in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the necessity that the Principality should continue to maintain strict neutrality, afforded a sufficient explanation of the Austrian attitude.

The Austrian recognition of the title thus assumed by Milan, afforded an opportunity for the British Foreign Office to secure information in regard to Austria-Hungary's readiness

(1) F.O.7/1033	Elliot to Granville	103	8 March 1881.
(2) F.O.7/1033	Elliot to Granville	104	8 March 1881.

to maintain his dynasty and to protect him against any revolutionary movement. The motive for her readiness to recognize the King was alleged by Austria-Hungary to be the desire to "strengthen his position" or to "strengthen the monarchical principle and lessen the chance of revolution."⁽¹⁾ The actual threat of revolution three months later, and the constitutional difficulties in the Autumn of the following year afforded a further opportunity for the British Foreign Office to secure information. Locock, who was now Minister at Belgrade, reported positively that Austria-Hungary had given assurances of support to Milan, amounting even to an offer of military aid if it should be necessary, in the event of insurrection breaking out. Kalnoky, however, assured Elliot that "A question of sending troops to the support of the King had never been entertained."⁽²⁾ When Elliot spoke to him again on the subject, he repeated this assertion more emphatically.⁽³⁾ When Milan visited Vienna in August 1883, it appeared, however, that he looked to Austria-Hungary for assistance if the rival Servian dynasty - the Karageorgavitch - should obtain a footing in Eastern Rumania, which the King considered likely.⁽⁴⁾

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- (1) F.O.7/1033. Elliot to Granville 103 & 8 March 1882.
104.
- (2) F.O.7/1034. Elliot to Granville 294 18 June 1882.
- (3) F.O.7/1034. Elliot to Granville 297. 20 June 1882.
Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/1050. Elliot to Granville 236. 25 August 1883.
Confidential

In the autumn, the recent dismissal by the King of the Metropolitan Bishop of Belgrade brought about a constitutional crisis, and the election of a Skuptchina ~~hostile to him~~.

Milan appealed to Austria for assistance in appointing a new Bishop, and intended to prolong his stay in Vienna while with the assistance of Kalnoky's advice he took the decisions necessary to deal with the hostile Skuptchina. When, however, insurrection actually broke out in November, Austria-Hungary made no move, and the outbreak was crushed without Austrian assistance.

British information then did not indicate clearly that any formal agreement either upon this point or concerning other matters, existed. The truth of any evidence that was received in the opposite direction had been denied but had not been corroborated. ^{British information} ~~It~~ revealed the close relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but not such close relations that the existence of an Alliance was suspected. Kalnoky's repeated denials that Austria exercised any influence on the internal

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- (1) F.O.65/1057 Thornton to Granville 233 4 October 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 275 3 October 1883
Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 310 15 November 1883
314 17 November 1883
Confidential
322 28 November 1883
Confidential

(1)
 affairs of Servia, coupled with complaints that Milan made a
 parade of his friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, ⁽²⁾ were
 sufficient to counteract the impression which the events of
 1880-81 had encouraged, to use the expression of Pirochanats,
 that Austria-Hungary was "seeking to control Servia as France
 controlled Tunis." Subsequent events did not afford a
casas foederis under any article of the Treaty, apart from
 those articles dealing with the assumption by Milan of the
 title of King, and Austrian support of the Servian dynasty.
 The Foreign Office derived no information from independent
 sources, nor from communications of the Ministers concerned,
 nor from the Press. They were left therefore, with the
 impression that a close political friendship between Austria-
 Hungary and Servia supplemented Austria-Hungary's commercial
 control of the Principality, but that no formal commitments
 existed.

The British information on Rumanian relations with the
 two Empires, at the end of the Salisbury Ministry may be
 summed up as follows. Austria-Hungary could probably rely
 on Rumanian support in the event of war with Russia. Rumania
 could rely upon the support of the two Empires if she were
 compelled to face an unprovoked attack from Russia. A formal
 agreement, however, was not shown to exist, although the

(1) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 266 20 September 1883.
 F.O.7/1062 Paget to Granville 39 27 January 1884
 Confidential

(2) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 288 17 October 1883
 Confidential

conclusion in the near future of a Military Convention between Austria-Hungary and Rumania appeared probable. In addition there was a tendency of the Rumanian Government towards political dependency upon Germany brought about by the German handling of the question of Jewish Emancipation and of the Rumanian determination to purchase their railways from the German company.⁽¹⁾

This information had begun to assemble in August 1879, when Archduke Albert visited Bucharest. The visit confirmed the existence of a tendency on the part of Austria-Hungary, which her promptitude in recognising Rumanian independence had first indicated, to cultivate the friendship of Rumania. On the Archduke's return, Egerton reported that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania were "most cordial."⁽²⁾ In January, Colonel Primrose, the Military Attaché at Vienna, informed the Foreign Office that Austria-Hungary was taking more substantial steps to bind Rumania to her. She was supplying the Principality with arms, inviting Rumanian officers to join Austrian military colleges and offering inducements to the Rumanian Government to study and imitate the Austrian military system. "As a result," General Beck, chief of the Emperor's Military Chancery, had informed Primrose, "Austria-Hungary could count on Rumanian assistance in the

(1) See pp.18-21.

(2) F.O.7/966 Egerton to Salisbury 740 17 November 1879

(1)
event of a war with Russia.

The idea that Rumania had received assurances of support from Vienna and Berlin originated with information from these capitals respecting M. Bratiano's mission to Austria-Hungary and Germany in the latter half of March 1880. (2) The Rumanian Prime Minister stated to Odo Russell that the object of his visit was partly connected with the Railway Convention recently concluded with Germany, but that he had also a secret mission. He was instructed "to sound the German Government secretly as to the prospects for the future since the geographical position of Rumania between Austria-Hungary and Russia exposed her to great dangers and complications in the event of war." (3) Elliot could confirm Bratiano's statements. For, Haymerle had told him that the Rumanian Minister had sought to ascertain what would be the position of the Principality in the event of a war of Russia against Austria-Hungary and Germany. It appeared from the reports of both Ambassadors that he had been given satisfactory assurances. Bratiano told Russell nothing more than that he left Berlin with the conviction that the Austro-German Alliance was a

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- (1) F.O.7/988 Primrose (military attaché) to Elliot. 15 January 1880
- (2) D.D.F. Series I, Vol.III No.81.
- (3) F.O.64/959 Russell to Salisbury 131 20 March 1880.
Most Confidential.

(1)
 guarantee for the Peace of Rumania. From some other source, however, the Ambassador was confidentially informed that Bismarck now wanted Rumania to join the Austro-German Alliance. He had therefore promised to support and advocate at Vienna the plan whereby the Rumanian Chambers were to confer upon Prince Charles the title of King, on Bratiano's return to Bucharest, upon which the Prince had written personally to Bismarck to ask his advice. (2) Elliot reported that he had learnt from Haymerle that the Rumanian Minister had "obtained from the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany assurances of support in the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Principality by Russia." (3)

British information indicated however, that no formal understanding had been reached. Egerton in November had written that Austria-Hungary did not appear to have any scheme in contemplation to bind Rumania indissolubly to her. (4) General Beck in speaking to Primrose in January had given a similar impression. (5) In March, Haymerle informed Elliot that "no clear engagement" had been entered into by either Austria-

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- (1) F.O.64/959. Russell to Salisbury 131 20 March 1880
 Most Confidential.
- (2) F.O.64/959. Russell to Salisbury 141 23 March 1880
 Secret
 145 25 March 1880
 Most Confidential
- (3) F.O.7/989. Elliot to Salisbury 157 29 March 1880
 Confidential
- (4) F.O.7/966. Egerton to Salisbury 740 17 November 1879
- (5) F.O.7/988. Primrose to Elliot 15 January 1880.

Hungary or Rumania, and that the admission of Rumania to the Austro-German Alliance could not come about. The Rumanian Minister in Vienna, confirmed this information. (1)

The idea that a formal understanding might yet be established was not discouraged by the information which the Foreign Office received. In October, Egerton had informed the Foreign Office that the Archduke Albert had been sent to Rumania to negotiate a military convention. No confirmation of this report was received. Egerton however considered that this showed rather that the convention had not yet been signed, than that negotiations to bring it about had not been opened. (2) In November, he still hoped that he might be mistaken when he admitted that it did not seem that any such convention was about to be concluded. The clarity of Egerton's ideas as to what such a military convention would involve - the building among other things of fortifications at Galatz on the frontier of Russian Bessarabia - encouraged the impression that he had good grounds for believing that the negotiation of some such agreement had been seriously contemplated. (3) General Beck told Primrose indeed, that efforts had been made during the last two years to bring about a military convention. (4)

(1) F.O. 7/989	Elliot to Salisbury	158	1 April 1880
			Very confidential.
(2) F.O.7/965	Egerton to Salisbury		9 October 1880
(3) F.O.7/966	Egerton to Salisbury	740	17 November 1879
			Confidential.
(4) F.O.7/988	Primrose to Elliot		15 January 1880

There appeared to be parties in both countries eager to effect a formal understanding. Balatchano, Rumanian Minister in Vienna, told Elliot that Bratiano had failed in his mission. He had not achieved its real object; the establishment of engagements which should bind his country to common action with Austria-Hungary and Germany if an emergency arose. Bratiano and his supporters considered a definite engagement essential, in order to defeat the champions of Rumanian
(1)
neutrality.

Information received by the Foreign Office from 1879-80 justified the expectation that relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania might eventually be thought of in the terms of a mutual pledge of military assistance in the event of an attack upon either by Russia and a pledge of a less far reaching character between Rumania and Germany.

In October 1883, this expectation was fulfilled. On August 19, Bismarck telegraphed to Reuss from Kissingen
(2)
concerning the meeting with Kalnoky that was then impending. He proposed as the principal subject of discussion the possibility of widening the understanding with Italy to include the
(3)
near Eastern States, and particularly Rumania. Kalnoky was ready to use the visit of King Charles to the court of
(4)
~~Berlin~~ and Vienna which took place at the end of the month

(1) F.O.7/989 Elliot to Salisbury 158 1 April 1880
Very Confidential.

(2) See page 286

(3) G.P.Vol.III. No.583.

(4) F.O. 104/33 Sanderson to Granville 65 17 August 1883.

to raise the question of Rumania's inclusion in the Alliance immediately and suggested that further negotiations should then be carried on with Bratiano who alone could offer some security that an agreement if it was reached would be observed. ⁽¹⁾ In two conversations between Bismarck and Bratiano who visited the Chancellor at Gastein on September 8, Rumania's determination to act unreservedly with Germany, and with Austria-Hungary, so far as Germany did, was established. The anti-Russian, but purely defensive character of any agreement that might be reached between Rumania, Germany and Austria-Hungary, was then determined and it was decided that such an agreement should take the form of a preliminary understanding between Rumania and Austria-Hungary, to which Germany would accede. For there were certain differences to be settled between Rumania and Austria-Hungary before an agreement could be effective. ⁽²⁾ Bratiano arrived in Vienna at the beginning of September, and an agreement with Kalnoky was rapidly effected, the Rumanian Prime Minister accepting a draft Treaty drawn up by the latter. As a result of negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Germany, some slight modifications were introduced: in order to satisfy the Emperor's scruples. Russia was not to be specifically named as the potential aggressor against

(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.584.

(2) G.P. Vol.III. No.585

whom the Treaty was directed, and the purely defensive character of the Treaty was strengthened by alterations in the preamble. ⁽¹⁾ A German attempt to avoid the signature of, or accession to, the Treaty by an undertaking that a casus foederis under the Austro-German Alliance would exist for Germany as the result of a Russian attack upon Rumania as well as of a Russian attack upon Austria-Hungary, failed owing to Rumanian and Austro-Hungarian insistence on Germany's direct participation in the Alliance. ⁽²⁾ On October 30, the Treaty was signed and Germany acceded on the same day. ⁽³⁾

It was again a secret document and was to remain in force for five years. The preamble established as the objects of the Treaty, the maintenance of friendly relations between the three Powers, the preservation in a conservative sense of the present political order, and the maintenance of peace. The aspect of the Alliance which concerned policy was not developed. Article I provided merely that the Contracting Parties should follow a policy of friendship towards each other and support one another within the limit of their interests. It bound them also not to enter any alliance or

(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.588, 590, 593, 594.

(2) G.P. Vol.III. Nos.588, 589, 590, 596.

(3) Pribram, op cit. Volume I. pp.32 et seq.

engagement directed against the present Treaty. The rest of the Treaty was concerned with engagements ^{to} in the event of an aggression upon either party. The Signatories by Article II bound themselves to give immediate assistance to the attacked Power. Articles III and IV strengthen the value of this obligation by providing for the regulation of details respecting such assistance by a military convention when the occasion arose, and by stipulating for the conclusion of a common peace if the obligation came into effect. The source from which aggression was expected was not named. The Treaty however, was based upon the conviction that Rumania in reality was likely to be attacked only by Russia, ⁽¹⁾ while the clause "si l'Autriche etait attaquée dans une partie de ses Etats limitrophes a la Roumanie," in fact limited the undertaking from the Rumanian side, for the event of an attack upon Austria-Hungary by Russia.

During 1880 the relations between Rumania and Austria-Hungary and Germany did not appear from the information in possession of the Foreign Office, to have developed. They seemed still to hinge upon the two questions: the admission of Rumania to the Austro-German Alliance, and the recognition of Prince Charles as King. On August 28, the Prince and Princess arrived in Berlin. Russell reported that the Prince had been very satisfied by a long conversation with Bismarck. He had

(1) G.P. Vol.III. No.585, 590, p.275 and 593.

been represented only by a chargé d'affaires, seemed to confirm this information. ⁽¹⁾ As yet however, no serious change was apparent. When the Prince was eventually proclaimed King in the following March, no difficulties were made by Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, neither Power showed any eagerness in recognising him. Germany, Russell reported, ⁽²⁾ wished to leave the initiative in doing so to the other Powers.

In December, relations did in fact become strained. Austria-Hungary took offence at the tone of the King's speech on opening the Rumanian Chambers, and at his references to obstacles placed by her in the way of Rumanian trade, and to the Danube question which was about to come before the Powers as a result of the expiration in 1882 of the authority of the ⁽³⁾ International Commission. The Austrian representative at Bucharest was first instructed to abstain from personal ⁽⁴⁾ relations with the Rumanian Government, and then summoned to Vienna. A chargé d'affaires was however left in his place. Kalnoky refused to be satisfied with the explanations offered ⁽⁵⁾ by Rumania and insisted on a complete retraction. The matter

(1) F.O.65/1083	Dufferin to Granville	528	27 December 1880
(2) F.O.7/1013	Elliot to Granville	79	17 February 1881
F.O.64/980	Russell to Granville	164	28 March 1881
F.O.7/1014	Elliot to Granville	164	29 March 1881
(3) F.O.7/1018	Fraser to Granville	489	1 December 1881
(4) F.O.7/1018	Elliot to Granville	493	19 December 1881
(5) F.O.7/1018	Elliot to Granville	505	22 December 1881

(1)
was cleared up by the end of the month, but it proved to be only the first of a series of similar incidents.

With the re-opening of the Danube question in 1882, serious differences of opinion occurred between Austria-Hungary and Rumania as to the navigation and control of the Upper River, while Russia's contention that where the river flowed between Russian and Rumanian territory the regulations made by the International Commission should be applied under the superintendence of the Rumanian and Russian members of Commission only, afforded the opportunity for a Russo-Rumanian rapprochement. At the same time, Russia's insistence that the Kilia mouths of the river had been surrendered to her by the Treaty of Berlin, and that the practical superintendence of the waterway there should belong to her as the sovereign Power in control of both banks, caused considerable alarm in Rumania. (2) By the end of the year, a dangerous situation appeared to have developed from this state of affairs. Stourdza, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, told Colonel Primrose in November that his Government was preparing for war. Rumania could not acquiesce in Russia's pretensions respecting the Kilia mouths. On the other hand, the Austrians were

(1) F.O.7/1018 Elliot to Granville 513 28 December 1881
 F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 17 13 January 1882
 F.O. 64/1984 Ansthill to Granville 678
 D.D.F. Ser. I. Vol. II No 215 222 Vol II
 (2) Fitzmaurice, op.cit. App.238-243. *Capitulum* 15 December 1881

hated at Bucharest, and with the best of intentions could never make themselves tolerated. Rumania could not agree to the Austrian demands in regard to the navigation of the Upper River. Stourdza concluded by expressing the hope that Rumania would secure British and French support. The mutual ⁽¹⁾ ~~imitation~~ ^{irritation} between Austria and Rumania found expression in untoward incidents, which still further increased it. In Vienna, it was complained that Austrian commerce was subjected to petty obstructions. Rumania complained that her customs officers at a little place on the Galician frontier had been unlawfully arrested by Austrian gendarmerie. The speeches at a public banquet at Jassy where, in the King's presence and apparently with his approval, the toast "to the former provinces of Rumania" was drunk, finally brought about a crisis. ⁽²⁾ Austria-Hungary demanded explanations, and Germany warned King Charles against the dangerous attitude he was adopting. The explanations offered were deemed unsatisfactory. ⁽³⁾ Kalnoky made further representations and raised the matter of the Address of the Rumanian Chambers which styled the King, "King of the Rumanians," an incident of which official notice had not

(1)	F.O.7/1036	Elliot to Granville	526	1 November 1882.
(2)	F.O.7/1049	Elliot to Granville	181	27 June 1883
		Confidential.		
	F.O.104/33	White to Granville	52	26 June 1883
(3)	F.O.104/33	Sanderson to Granville	56	2 July 1883
	F.O.7/1050	Elliot to Granville	Telegram	4 July 1883
			21	

at the time been taken. He demanded something explicit, he told Elliot, in regard to the whole attitude of Rumania towards Austria-Hungary. (1) Meanwhile General Brialmont, a Belgian had been at Bucharest to give advice to the Rumanian Government respecting the military organisation of the country and the state of its defences it was said towards the Austrian frontier. When a note from the Rumania finally closed the Jassy incident, (2) there were still several questions to be settled between the two Governments. A joint Commission was appointed for the purpose. (3) At the same time, Austria-Hungary took up the question of Brialmont's activities and addressed a representation to the Belgian Government. She was informed that the General had been struck off the active list of the Belgian army. (4) Assurances were then received from Rumania that no fortifications were to be erected on the Austrian frontier. (5)

It was at this point, when a *détente* was taking place between Austria-Hungary and Rumania that the Foreign Office

(1) F.O.7/1050	Elliot to Granville	186	5 July 1883
		Confidential.	
(2) F.O.7/1050	Elliot to Granville	Telegram	7 July 1883
		23	
		192	16 July 1883
(3) F.O.7/1050	Elliot to Granville	201	23 July 1883.
(4) F.O.7/1050	Elliot to Granville	207	30 July 1883.
(5) F.O.7/1051	Elliot to Granville	219	13 August 1883
		Confidential	

was informed of the visits to Berlin and Vienna of King Charles and later of Bratiano. Information derived from statements by Bratiano and Kalnoky did not show that the visits were significant except in so far as they furthered this detente. Bratiano arrived in Vienna on September 7. On the 8th he went on to Gastein. Elliot reported that this object was to see Kalnoky and Bismarck, and that he hoped thereby to remove the differences between Austria-Hungary and Rumania which resulted from Rumania's attitude on the Danube question and her refusal to sign the treaty drafted by the London Conference. Kalnoky confirmed Elliot's information. He stated further that the general relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania had also been discussed and that they had as a result been placed upon a more satisfactory footing. There appeared still to be an obstacle in the way of Austro-Rumania friendship. The Rumanian Envoy in Vienna had intimated that closer relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania could only be a prelude to war with Russia and Kalnoky appeared to be considerably irritated by his language. Kalnoky however, informed the Delegations that he had indicated to the Rumanian Government the necessity for good relations

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- (1) F.O.104/33 Sanderson to Granville 64 13 August 1883
 Confidential
 x66 17 August 1883
 F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 253 7 Sept^r 1883
- (2) D.D.F. Series I. Vol.V. No.34.
- (3) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 256 10 Sept^r 1883
 c.f.G.P.Vol.III.No.587.p.270. Confidential

being maintained, and that King Charles in passing through Vienna on his way to Berlin had expressed a lively desire for reconciliation. ⁽¹⁾ Bratiano, after he had again seen Kalnoky when he returned to Vienna on the 21st told Elliot that the exchange of ideas which had taken place between himself and the Austro-Hungarian Minister had led to the view that there was no conflict of interests between the two countries to justify the strained relations that had existed. ⁽²⁾ The Foreign Office, as has already been mentioned, had no information on the interview between Kalnoky and Bismarck at Salzburg on August 30, when the subject of the Rumanian Alliance was apparently discussed between Bismarck and Kalnoky. ⁽³⁾

It was from Bucharest that the only information was received which indicated that something more than a détente had taken place. Sanderson who was temporarily in charge there, reported on September 8, that it was generally believed in Rumania that the Government contemplated entering into an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. He stated his conviction that any negotiations which were taking place had not as yet assumed a definite form. His conjectures as to what was in fact happening were equally accurate. He

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- (1) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883.
 (2) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883.
 (3) See p. 286

suggested that during the King's visit at Berlin it had been hinted that the isolated position which Rumania was taking up was fraught with danger, and that, this warning having been taken as a hint, Bratiano had gone to Vienna and ^{Gastein} ~~Berlin~~ in order to ascertain on what terms a favourable agreement might be concluded. In the event of a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Sanderson continued, neither belligerent would be likely to accept a declaration of neutrality unless it were accompanied by reasonable proofs of the power of Rumania to defend her whole frontier. This he regarded as far beyond her capacity. He left it to the Foreign Office to draw the conclusion that an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Rumania would involve a pledge of support for Rumania to Austria-Hungary in the event of an Austro-Russian war.

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When White returned to Bucharest, at the end of September, he reported that it was generally believed that a permanent and important change had come over the relations of Rumania to Austria-Hungary and informed the Foreign Office that it might be said to date from Bratiano's conversation with Bismarck at ⁽³⁾ Gastein. Sanderson's only grounds for believing

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- (1) F.O.104/33 Sanderson to Granville 72 8 September 1883
Confidential
- (2) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 75 19 September 1883
- (3) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 77 22 September 1883
Confidential

that an Alliance was under negotiation between Russia and Austria-Hungary was the fact that after leaving Vienna, King Charles had requested Bratiano to see Bismarck and Kalnoky. The only authority for his other statements was the opinion generally held in Bucharest and among his colleagues. His report was unconfirmed. In October therefore, when the speculations of Bucharest could be separated from the facts that were actually known respecting Bratiano's communications with Kalnoky and Bismarck, White reported that nothing had occurred beyond the removal, under Bismarck's guidance of the dangerous ^{irritation} ~~imitation~~ that had characterized Rumanian relations with Austria-Hungary. ⁽¹⁾ Baron Mayr, the Austrian Minister at Bucharest stated moreover, that "no alteration had taken place in the relations between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, except that Austria-Hungary had expressed herself as satisfied with the wish manifested by Rumania to resume more friendly relations." ⁽²⁾ White then reported that he did not share the curiosity of his colleagues as to "the mysterious points of the suspected Alliance" - a curiosity which he stated remained unsatisfied in spite of repeated efforts to

(1) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 83 8 October 1883
Confidential

(2) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 85 15 October 1883
Confidential

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 secure information. "I am more and more convinced," he wrote,
 "that the understanding rests entirely upon the conversation at
 Gastein between Bismarck and Bratiano and that there is no
 record of it. Its object is to keep up a thorough intimacy
 between this kingdom and Austria-Hungary; to protect the former
 and its dynasty from all Russia's encroachments and eventually
 to make it side with the Germanic Empires should a war arise."⁽²⁾

Tendencies towards a Turko-German rapprochement began to
 develop soon after the ^{con}inclusion of the Austro-German Alliance.
 Abdul Hamid attacked the problem of restoring his Empire after
 the disintegrating effects of the Berlin Congress from the
 financial and military standpoint.⁽³⁾ Great Britain failed to
 assist the Sultan to re-organise his finances, she was not
 likely to assist him to reform his army. He began then to
 turn towards Austria-Hungary who had offered her protection in
 1878.⁽⁴⁾ He saw in the Austro-German Alliance which associated
 Austria-Hungary with the strongest military Power of Europe
 an opportunity to secure the assistance he desired in reorganis-
 ing his army. Early in 1880, therefore, he sent his military

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- (1) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 80 5 October 1883.
 concerns Turkish efforts to discover the details
 of the Alliance.
 D.D.F.Series I. Vol.V. Nos.91, 99.
- (2) F.O.104/33 White to Granville 93 2 November 1883.
- (3) H.Holborn: Deutschland und die Turkie 1878-90.
 p. 8-10
- (4) F.O.7/932 Elliot to Salisbury 499 18 July 1878
 Secret
 505 23 July 1878
 Confidential
 517 12 August 1878
 Confidential

adviser, Captain Dreyse, to Count Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador to sound him as to whether Germany would be ready to respond to Turkish overtures for friendship and to a request for assistance in reorganising his army and finances. Hatzfeldt did not report the matter until the Sultan had spoken to him in person. ⁽¹⁾ Bismarck then seemed quite prepared to comply with the Sultan's wishes. He instructed Reuss however, to find out whether Austria-Hungary would have any objections. Reuss replied that Haymerle saw no danger in a strong Turkish army, but regarded it as a useful element of order in a situation that was otherwise chaotic. ⁽²⁾ The Kaiser sanctioned the sending of German civil servants and accepted, in principal, the sending of military officers. Wettendorf was thereupon sent to Constantinople and received an appointment as Under-Secretary in the Turkish Ministry of Finance. ⁽³⁾

At this point the British Foreign Office received its first important information on the Turko-German rapprochement. For evidence had now been publicly given respecting it, and Bismarck had consulted Granville before Wettendorf was appointed. ⁽⁴⁾ Russell informed the Foreign Office that Bismarck ⁽⁵⁾

(1) Holbein op.cit.p 11 (Hatzfeldt to Bismarck 14 May 1880)

(2) Holbein op.cit.pp 11-12 (Bismarck to Reuss 22 May 1880)
(Reuss to Bismarck 26 May 1880)

(3) Holbein op.cit p. 11

(4) F.O.64/960 Russell to Granville 302 14 July 1880

(5) F.O.64/960 Russell to Granville.Telegram.17 July 1880

principal motive was to secure inside information as to the activities of the Powers at Constantinople, in order to be in a favourable position to frame a sound policy when the final contest for the possession of Constantinople took place. "The next race," the Chancellor was reported to have said, "would bring all three rivals, England, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, still nearer to the winning post when a comfortable seat secured beforehand in the Grand Stand might enable Germany to judge of their respective chances and to make her book accordingly." ⁽¹⁾ Bismarck's motives however, went further than Russell reported. He had, it is true, told Hatzfeldt that one advantage of complying with the Sultan's request would be the reliable information which Germany would then be able to secure. ⁽²⁾ He saw also however, an opportunity of influencing events at Constantinople. ⁽³⁾ He believed moreover that control of events at Constantinople would give Germany the whip hand as far as Russia was concerned, and would both compel her to re-enter the DreiKaiserbund, for which as has been seen negotiations were then going on, and to remain true to that combination when it had been formed. ⁽⁴⁾ Furthermore, the consol-

(1) F.O.64/961 Russell to Granville 314 17 July 1880
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(2) Holbein ^{orn} op.cit.p. 12 (Comment of Bismarck on a report of Hatzfeldt. 6 July 1880)

(3) Holbein ^{orn} op.cit.p. 12 (Bismarck to the Kaiser 1 June 1880)

(4) Hohenlohe: Deukwardigkeitin Vol.II. p.301.
(Hohenlohe to the Crown Prince).

Holbein ^{orn} op.cit.p p 19-4 seq

idation of Turkey which the reorganisation of her finances and army would bring about, would prevent the re-opening of issues which would disturb the European peace, and yet would not permanently close the Eastern Question and make possible thereby Anglo-Austro-Russian coalition directed against Germany. "Unserer Ueberzeugung nach entspricht es der Europaischen Politik," he wrote to Hohenlohe, "der Reporte zur Konsolidierung des Besitzes, der ihr schliesslich verbleiben wird, behelflich zu sein."⁽¹⁾

Meanwhile, there was an outcry in the French and English Press against the sending of German officials to Turkey, and France raised objections with the German Foreign office. Granville then withdrew the unreserved approval which he had at first expressed to Münster and suggested that financial advisers only should be sent. Bismarck therefore informed the Ambassadors at the different courts that only financial advisers would be sent, and that while permission had been granted to certain officers to transfer to the Turkish Army, they would not leave Germany until the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions were settled.⁽²⁾

Crowe was able to keep Russell informed of Wettendorf's activities at Constantinople. For it seems that he kept up

(1) Holbein^{orn} op.cit.p. 18

(Bismarck to Hohenlohe
19 July 1880).

(2) Holbein^{orn} op.cit.pp 17-19

a correspondence with the latter. The Foreign Office was thus informed of Turkey's desire not only to secure German officers to train her army, but also a pledge of German support in the event of war with Russia. ⁽¹⁾ A report, indeed, reached Granville from another source which he did not specify, that a project had been drawn up for an offensive and defensive alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. ⁽²⁾ Russell, however, informed Granville that Crowe for once had not convinced him, and that he was certain that Bismarck would never consent to an alliance with Turkey "which would alienate Russia, France and Italy from, and unite them against Germany." ⁽³⁾ Elliot reported in reply to Granville's enquiry that he had been unable to detect in any quarter a suspicion of the existence of the Treaty, and that he was himself not inclined to credit the rumour. ⁽⁴⁾

After the definitive settlement of the Greek question by the Treaty of 2 July 1881, both Greece and Turkey asked for German instructors for their armies. The conclusion of

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| (1) G.D.29/177 | Russell to Granville | 5 November 1880. |
| | enclosing Crowe to | Russell 29 Oct ^r 1880. |
| (2) F.O.64/978 | Granville to Russell | 35 20 January 1881 |
| | | Confidential |
| (3) F.O.64/979 | Russell to Granville | 51 28 January 1881 |
| | | Confidential |
| (4) F.O.7/1013 | Elliot to Granville | 74 10 February 1881 |

the DreiKaiserbund had improved Germany's diplomatic position since the previous year. The coincidence of the Greek and Turkish requests created a difficult situation as their armies were likely to be used against each other. Bismarck therefore complied with neither request. He instructed Hatzfeldt, however, to handle the Turkish request in a dilatory manner and only to give a definite refusal if a plausible ground offered itself. (1)

At this time indisputable evidence respecting German relations with Turkey was afforded by the frequent interviews which were seen to be taking place between Hatzfeldt and the Sultan and the German dragomans and the Porte, (2) and in Berlin between the Turkish Ambassador and Limburg-Stirum who was in charge of the German Foreign Office. (3) They led Amthill to make enquiries. Limburg-Stirum was reserved, but he acknowledged that the Sultan constantly appealed to Germany for advice on the Egyptian question. Amthill was convinced that Bismarck had definitely embarked on a policy of cultivating intimate relations with Turkey and would not endanger his opportunity of securing ~~it~~^{them} by supporting England in the Egyptian question. (4)

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- (1) Holbein⁸⁵⁷ op.cit. p.20 (Herbert Bismarck to Bush) 6 October 1880.
 (2) G.D.29/206. Granville to Amthill(enclosing 27 Sept^r 1881. Dufferin to Granville). 20 September 1881
 (3) G.D.29/177 Amthill to Granville. 1 October 1881.
 (4) F.O.64/983 Amthill to Granville. 412 3 October 1881.
 Confidential.

Bismarck still maintained his policy of keeping Great Britain informed of his relations with Turkey and Hatzfeldt who took charge of the Foreign Office on October 22, asked Ampthill to inform Granville privately of Bismarck's desire to send four military officers to Turkey, and to enquire whether he had any objections. ⁽¹⁾ Granville telegraphed his approval. Before however, any action was taken by Germany there was a fresh incident in Turko-German relations. ⁽²⁾

At the beginning of December 1881, Ali Nizami Pasha, and Reshid Bey the Sultan's private secretary, together with a large suite, ⁽³⁾ arrived in Berlin. The purpose of their mission was ostensibly to present to the Kaiser the insignia of an Order which the Sultan had conferred upon him. The length of their stay in Berlin, and the warmth of the reception which they were given, led the Press to assert that a secret Treaty of Alliance with Germany was being negotiated. Ampthill ⁽⁴⁾ was inclined to believe the official denials of these assertions, and information which was received to the effect that the Sultan's emissaries were in Berlin to secure the investment of

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| (1) G.D.29/177 | Ampthill to Granville | 29 October 1881 |
| | Telegram | 4 November 1881. |
| (2) G.D.29/206 | Granville to Ampthill | 5 November 1881. |
| (3) F.O.64/984 | Ampthill to Granville | 459 4 December 1881. |
| (4) F.O.64/984 | Ampthill to Granville | 468 14 December 1881. |
| | Confidential | |

For this reason he must refuse to support Britain in urging administrative reforms upon the Sultan. ⁽¹⁾ The Ambassador was in fact convinced that Nizami Pasha and Reshid Bey "are getting round Bismarck" and that "German influence will now become very great at Constantinople." ⁽²⁾ Shortly afterwards Nizami Pasha arrived in Vienna. The length of his stay there again aroused suspicions. ⁽³⁾ Dufferin telegraphed from Constantinople that the Sultan had offered Crete and Rhodes to Austria-Hungary in return for Bosnia. ⁽⁴⁾ Kalnoky assured Elliot that only the junction of the Turkish and Servian railways had been discussed between himself and the Turkish envoy. ⁽⁵⁾ Ampthill however, remained of opinion that the Sultan was in fact working for an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany directed against France. ⁽⁶⁾ His conjecture on this matter was correct. In February the Sultan made a formal overture of alliance to Calice at Constantinople. The arrangement which

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- (1) F.O.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 481 20 December 1881
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c.f. G.P.Vol.III.No.671. Bismarck's record of his conversation with the Turkish envoys. It follows closely the account he gave to Ampthill.
- (2) G.D.29/177 ^{F.O.64/1003 communicated from H. Bismarck to Granville & Ampthill on the subject} Ampthill to Granville ^{13 Confidential} 16 January 1882
24 December 1881
- (3) F.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 2 5 January 1882
Confidential
- (4) F.O.64/984 Ampthill to Granville 497 31 December 1881
Secret.
- (5) F.O.7/1032 Elliot to Granville 2 5 January 1882
Confidential
- (6) F.O.64/1005 Ampthill to Granville 1 1 January 1882

Fuad Pasha arrived in Vienna to present the insignia of an Order conferred on the Emperor Francis Joseph by the Sultan. ⁽¹⁾

In October 1883 General Mouktar Pasha arrived in Vienna and was received by the Emperor. He went to German military manoeuvres and was received by the Kaiser in Berlin. ⁽²⁾

In April 1882 four German officers at last entered the Turkish army to serve as military instructors. ⁽³⁾ In March 1884 a contingent of Turkish officers arrived in Berlin for service in the German army. ⁽⁴⁾ Meanwhile the Sultan's efforts to secure the investment of German capital in Turkey continued and an attempt was made in June 1882 to form a German Company for the execution of Turkish public works. ⁽⁵⁾ There could be no doubt of Austria-Hungary's anxiety to appear to the Porte as the supporter and protector of Turkey, and of the existing rights of the Sultan. ⁽⁶⁾ "We must," wrote Elliot, "be prepared to see

(1)	F.O.7/1035	Elliot to Granville	331	4 July 1882
			445	5 September 1882.
(2)	F.O.7/1051	Elliot to Granville	297	27 October 1883.
(3)	F.O.64/1006	Ampthill to Granville	143	27 April 1882
			151,	6 May 1882.
		^{on} Holbein, op.cit.p.26		
(4)	F.O.64/1049	Ampthill to Granville	68	17 March 1884
(5)	F.O.64/1000	Ampthill to Granville	198	2 June 1882
				Confidential
(6)	F.O.7/1032	Elliot to Granville	12	10 January 1882
				Confidential

Austria exercise at Constantinople a greater influence than she has previously enjoyed. ⁽¹⁾ In 1883 Kalnoky refused to support Dufferin's representations to the Sultan respecting Armenian reforms. Austria-Hungary kept steadily in view the determination to increase her influence at Constantinople, and would do nothing to endanger it. ⁽²⁾ During the Egyptian crisis Austria-Hungary saw an opportunity to prove to Turkey the reality of her offers of protection. Kalnoky repeatedly spoke to Elliot of the danger of Mussulman unrest resulting from the British operations in Egypt. He told him that an impression was growing throughout Turkey as a result of the pressure to secure the execution of the Berlin Treaty, the Tunis episode and the present events in Egypt, that a policy of systematic hostility was being pursued by the Christian Powers. Austria-Hungary therefore warned the Sultan not to withdraw his troops from Syria and herself sent a gunboat to Jaffa to guard against a serious outbreak of disaffection. Austria-Hungary's action was the more noticeable in that she had only the support of Germany. Britain, Turkey's former ally, refused to believe that there was any disturbance of ⁽³⁾ Mussulman feeling. There is no need to refer again in detail to

(1) F.O.7/1033	Elliot to Granville	171	10 April 1882.
			Confidential.
(2) F.O.7/1049	Elliot to Granville	156	22 May 1883
			Confidential.
(3) F.O.7/1035	Elliot to Granville	415	12 August 1882
			Confidential.
		420	17 August 1882
		430	29 August 1882
		435	30 August 1882
F.O.7/1031	Granville to Elliot	233	4 August 1882

the negotiations on the Egyptian question when Austria-Hungary and Germany advocated the settlement of the difficulties by means of a Turkish intervention, and supported the rights of the Sultan as Suzerain, and the light which they therefore threw upon the relations of the two Empires with Turkey. Suffice it to say that Bismarck went so far as to advocate a Turkish intervention even without European control and that Ampthill at one point feared he might even be prepared to support the Sultan in an effort to re-establish the national movement of Arabi against all foreign interference.

Already in 1882 Ampthill described to Granville the consequences of the state of affairs. There existed a state of real intimacy between Germany and Turkey, and Prince Bismarck had a useful ally in case of war with either France or Russia or with both France and Russia.

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| (1) | F.O.64/1004 | Granville to Ampthill | 390 | 11 September 1882 |
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| | F.O.64/1006 | Ampthill to Granville | 214 | 16 June 1882 |
| | | | | Secret. |
| (2) | F.O.64/1006 | Ampthill to Granville | 245 | 21 June 1882 |
| | | | | Secret. |
| (3) | F.O.64/1005 | Ampthill to Granville | 102 | 22 March 1882 |
| | | | | Confidential. |

It seemed clear however that no pledge had been given by Germany in return, and that every attempt on Turkey's part to secure an alliance had failed. ⁽¹⁾ A report spread that Radziwill's mission had been used as the opportunity to negotiate a military convention between Germany and Turkey. Amphill was certain that the report was unfounded.

(1) Kalnoky did not reject the Sultan's overture of February 1882 outright, but stated that the neutrality of Turkey in the Bosnian troubles would be sufficient and that he would welcome the co-operation of Turkey in general questions in the Balkans. He appealed to Germany to assist him to retain Turkey's friendship and to avoid the necessity of giving a pledge of support (Holborn op cit.p.27 et seq).

At the end of 1883 a conversation between one of the German officials in the Turkish employment and the Sultan, gave the latter an opening to offer a Turkish assurance that she would stand by Austria-Hungary and Germany in the event of war, provided he was given an assurance in return that Turkey would not then be attacked by England. Bismarck was prepared to respond to the Sultan's overtures, if German relations with Russia deteriorated. (Graf Waldersee: Denkwürdigkeiten Vol.I, pp.219-222).

In 1883 the rumour was circulated that Turkey was seeking to establish commitments between herself and Austria-Hungary and Germany. Kalnoky assured Elliot that nothing of the sort was taking place. ⁽¹⁾ Again Mouktar Pasha was suspected of seeking to negotiate an alliance. Kalnoky informed the Delegations that "no agreement on concrete political questions had been come to." ⁽²⁾

British information indicated that Russia's relations with Turkey developed on very similar lines to those between Turkey and the two Empires. As long as the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions remained unsettled and there seemed some prospect that forcible action of the European Concert against Turkey might bring about further disintegration, there was no evidence that Russian influence at Constantinople had increased since 1879. Gier accurately described the situation to Dufferin. "Shortly before Prince Labaroff," he said, "had quitted Constantinople, he had brought the Sultan very much under Russian influence. Now ⁽³⁾ however, we are again unfriendly with the Porte." By 1882

(1) F.O.7/1049 Elliot to Granville 164 31 May 1883
Confidential.

(2) F.O.7/1051 Elliot to Granville 297 27 October 1883

(3) F.O.65/1081 Dufferin to Granville 337 12 August 1880
Confidential.

however, British information indicated a change. Thornton reported that the Turkish Ambassador in St. Petersburg had told him Russia desired to be on friendly terms with the (1) Porte. At about the same time an article appeared in the Official Messenger drawn up according to Thornton by Jomini. It expressed pleasure at the closer friendship between Germany and the Porte and stated that Russia hoped to participate in it. (2) The Egypt question was seen to offer to Russia the same opportunity as to Austria-Hungary and Germany for a demonstration of friendship to Turkey. Russia in contrast to the attitude she had previously adopted, (3) by June 1882 was also advocating a Turkish intervention. (4) The Sultan appealed to the Czar "for moral support against British and French aggression." (5) In the summer Novikoff

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- (1) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 6 7 January 1882
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- (2) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 17 13 January 1882
- (3) F.O.65/1134 Thornton to Granville 51 7 February 1882
- (4) F.O.65/1136 Thornton to Granville 222 5 July 1882
- (5) F.O.65/1135 Thornton to Granville 57 15 May 1882
Telegram.
- F.O.65/1136 Thornton to Granville 186 1 June 1882

Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was replaced by Nelidoff, and the Foreign Office was informed that it might expect considerable Russian activity there. These expectations (1) seemed to be justified when it appeared shortly afterwards that Nelidoff was supporting the Sultan in his resistance to British efforts to secure his signature of the Military Convention respecting the conditions on which Turkish troops were to be sent to Egypt. (2) Suspicions that Russia was inciting Turkey against England continued throughout 1883. (3) At the same time information of a serious rapprochement and an attempt to secure a formal alliance reached the Foreign Office. In October, The Novoe Vremya announced that a rapprochement had taken place and urged that a formal alliance should be concluded. (4) In November, Granville received definite information that Ignatieff was intriguing with the Turkish Ambassador in St. Petersburg to bring about an offensive and defensive alliance. (5) Ampthill

(1) F.O.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 414 12 August 1882.

(2) F.O.64/1007 Ampthill to Granville 330 19 August 1882
Confidential.

refers to a series of reports on the subject received from Constantinople.

F.O.7/1035 Elliot to Granville 426 23 August 1882
Confidential

466 22 September 1882
Confidential

(3) F.O.7/1050 Elliot to Granville 208 30 July 1883
Confidential

F.O.65/1180 Granville to Thornton 81a 8 April 1884

(4) F.O.45/1057 Thornton to Granville 236 4 October 1883

(5) F.O.64/1023 Granville to Ampthill 34 23 November 1883
and 35
Telegrams

secured very clear confirmation from Schweinitz who was
(1)
then in Berlin. British information however indicated that
as in the case of Turkish relations with Austria-Hungary and
Germany while relations were obviously close, no formal
commitments existed.

(1) F.O.64/1027 Ampthill to Granville 328 28 November 1883
Secret.

CONCLUSION

We are then able to assign certain general characteristics to British information on European alliances and ententes during the period 1879-85. In the first place while the British Foreign Office on no occasion received exact information as to the type of agreement that had been concluded or as to its text, with some minor exceptions it received accurate information as to the effects which each of the agreements under certain circumstances might have on the development of European politics. Thus while the Foreign Office was informed that the Austro-German Alliance was recorded in a formal treaty, no information was received respecting the Protocol and Memorandum which supplemented it. Information was received at one point that a Protocol had been signed by Kalnoky and Giers, but no information was received on any occasion that a formal Treaty had been signed by Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. The conclusion finally reached by the British representatives was that only an informal agreement existed between them. Information was received that a written agreement existed between Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, but not that a Treaty existed. The Foreign Office was informed that the exchange of despatches addressed by the respective Ambassadors to their Governments established the Alliance. In regard to Austrian relations

with Servia and Austrian and German relations with Rumania, information was received at different times that a military alliance or military convention had been signed. The final conclusion reached by the British representatives, however, in the first case was that no agreement existed at all and in the second that only an informal agreement existed based upon conversations between the Rumanian Prime Minister and Bismarck and Kalnoky.

No part of the text of the Austro-German Alliance was known to the British Foreign Office. It was informed, however, that in the event of a Russian attack upon one of the two Powers it would have the assistance of the other. This information led it to expect as probable the other situation which would result from the Treaty: Austria-Hungarian assistance to Germany in the event of a war against France and Russia combined. Information received in regard to the close diplomatic co-operation of the two Powers and the evidence of their friendship given by the periodic exchange of views between the Emperors and the Ministers of the two countries, led the Foreign Office by 1884 to expect that neutrality would at least be maintained by the one Power if the other were engaged in war. The information received in 1884 that an agreement, if an informal one, existed between the three Empires closed the question that had been left open in 1879 respecting the relations of the allied Empires with Russia.

Evidence again in regard to the close diplomatic co-operation between Austria-Hungary and Germany from 1879-84, together with the information received in 1883 that agreements entirely separate from the Austro-German Alliance existed between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, and Austria-Hungary, Germany and Rumania finally enlightened the Foreign Office as to the character of the Alliance as an exclusive agreement between Austria-Hungary and Germany based on their existence as German Powers as well as a purely diplomatic agreement based on common political interests. Paget in November 1884 in reviewing Austria-Hungary's European relations described the Austro-German Alliance as the basis of a system, which agreements with Italy and Russia and close friendships with Servia and Rumania completed. (1)

Again the Foreign Office was informed as to the general results of the Dreikaiserbund. Its information as to the existence of an agreement, although an informal one, between the three Empires, and information as to their diplomatic co-operation since 1881, made the assumption that the other two would observe at least benevolent neutrality in the event of one of them being engaged in war natural. This, as has been seen was the only effect on European politics that

(1) F.O.7/1065 Paget to Granville 304 27 November 1884

would arise from the stipulations of the Treaty in the event of war. As to the effects of the Treaty in other circumstances, the Foreign Office was informed that the three Powers would co-operate in the Eastern Question and endeavour to keep the settlement of any fresh crisis that arose in connection with it in their own hands. It was led to expect that Russia would not disapprove of an Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Austria-Hungary of the eventual union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. It received information which led it to believe that Russia might raise the Straits question, not however that an agreement respecting it had actually been reached by the three Powers.

In regard to the Triple Alliance, information received by the British Foreign Office led it to expect first that in the event of an attack upon Germany, Austria-Hungary or Italy by either France or Russia the three Powers would unite in their common defence, and secondly that they would co-operate in all questions which came under general diplomatic discussion. In the first respect it anticipated a situation that would not entirely arise from the stipulations of the Treaty. In the event of an attack upon Germany by France only Italy was bound to act with her. Only if Russia were assisted by a second Power would the three Signatories co-operate against her. In the event of the third contingency

provided for by the Treaty - a declaration of war by one of the Signatories as a result of the menacing attitude of a fourth Power actually occurring, the information received by the Foreign Office as to the close friendship between the three Powers was sufficient to lead it to consider the maintenance of neutrality by the other Signatories as probable. Lastly, the Foreign Office was informed that the alliance would be in force until 1887.

In regard to Servia the information possessed by the Foreign Office was sufficient to lead it to expect that she would maintain neutrality, not support Austria-Hungary in the event of the latter Power being engaged in war, that Austria-Hungary would support King Milan in the event of any internal troubles, and that Austria-Hungary would probably exercise some influence on the relations of Servia with other Powers. No information was received such as to lead it to expect that Austria-Hungary would assist Servia in the event of her being engaged in war or that she would encourage Servian aggression at the expense of Turkey or other Balkan States.

In regard to Rumania, information was such as to lead to the expectation that in the event of war Rumania would side with Austria-Hungary and Germany, that the latter Powers would support King Charles in the event of internal difficulties, and that they would probably exercise some influence over Rumanian relations with other Powers.

This information was not, however, always so decisive nor always received from such a source that the Foreign Office could have full confidence in its accuracy or completeness. Thus in regard to the Dreikaiserbund, the information in 1881 respecting the signature of a Protocol was not received from a source which enabled the Foreign Office to consider it accurate. The Foreign Office had no decisive information that any one of the three Empires would maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality if the other two were engaged in war, nor that a promise of assistance had not been given for certain eventualities. It had only Malet's information from an unspecified source, though one for whose reliability he was prepared to vouch, that as a result of the agreement established at Skiernerwirce the question of the Straits was to be raised by Russia. Moreover, the fact that the report was never confirmed or substantiated, probably led to its being considered unfounded.

In regard to the Triple Alliance: information which led to the expectation that neutrality would be maintained by the others in the event of one of the Signatories engaging in a "preventive" war against a fourth Power was such as to lead only to an impression that that was probable, and was not decisive. The information that the alliance was to terminate in 1887 was also not decisive. For it was not known when it had been concluded and it was only considered

likely that it had been concluded some time during 1882.

Finally in regard to the Austro-Servian Alliance, and the Austro-German-Rumanian Alliance, British information again was such as to lead them to consider in given circumstances, certain developments probable rather than to feel convinced that they would actually come about.

In the case of the agreements where British information was generally decisive and such as to lead the Foreign Office to feel confidence in its accuracy and completeness, an interval elapsed either before it received information of that nature or before it received any information at all. Thus in regard to the Austro-German Alliance while only a short interval elapsed before the Foreign Office was informed of the main implications of the Treaty, it was only by 1884 that it had received decisive information respecting the effect of the Treaty on the relations of the two Powers to Russia and upon its exclusive character. It was not until three years after its conclusion that the Foreign Office had received information respecting the Dreikaiserbund which led it to appreciate the main effects of that agreement. It was almost a year after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance before the Foreign Office knew of its existence.

Only in regard to the Austro-German Alliance was the Foreign Office informed of the date of conclusion. Only in regard to the Triple Alliance was it informed of the date

of its expiration. Lastly the Foreign Office on no occasion received information respecting the negotiations of the agreements.

The diplomatic machine is not designed primarily for the purpose of securing information. An Ambassador or Minister is appointed to represent the interests of his country and to act as its agent in any transactions it may have with the country to which he is accredited. It therefore suffers under certain practical disadvantages in this respect. The public standing of an Ambassador necessarily restricts his freedom of movement. No British Ambassador therefore witnessed any of the imperial meetings, even when as in the case of the Danzig meetings or the meetings between the Emperors of Austria-Hungary and Germany, they took place partly in public. The same applies to the meetings between Bismarck and Andrassy at Gaskein, or between Bismarck and Kalnoky at Salzburg.

Again, only in exceptional circumstances can an Ambassador ask a direct question without running the risk of a rebuff or at best of an evasive reply. On no occasion, as far as has been shown by the documents that have been studied in connection with the present subject, did he do so without some opening being given, either, for instance, by the circulation of exaggerated rumours which the Ambassador could suggest the Foreign Minister might wish to deny, or by some

remark of the Foreign Minister himself. When Salisbury enquired of Karolyi whether the Austro-German Alliance involved a written agreement Bismarck considered he had been highly indiscreet. Later he complained to Ampthill that Waddington who was then in Berlin, had passed the limits imposed by ordinary diplomatic courtesy in questioning him in regard to the Triple Alliance. Paget questioned Mancini directly on the subject. It is doubtful, however, whether he would have secured any information as the result of his enquiries if Mancini had not considered it in his interest to give it. Paget questioned Kalnoky as to whether any agreement existed between the three Powers respecting the Straits and Kalnoky replied that none existed.

Again, the diplomatic machine being designed primarily for the purpose of negotiation, the moment when there was a lull in diplomatic negotiations was chosen for the regular leave of the head of the Embassy or Mission. The fact that an important development in European relations was taking place or might be about to take place was never considered sufficient to prevent an Ambassador from taking his leave. Thus it happened that in the autumn of 1879, at the time of the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance, Britain was represented by *chargés d'affaires* in all the principal European capitals. Walsham did not see Bismarck when he returned to Berlin immediately after the Vienna meeting.

Russell would probably have procured an interview. Bismarck when in Vienna called upon the Ambassadors who were there and spoke to them of the object of his journey. Egerton as chargé d'affaires did not receive a visit. Again at the time of the signature of the Dreikaiserbund agreement in Berlin, the British Ambassador was on leave. In the same way a change of Ambassadors was not determined by the demands of the Foreign Office as far as the obtaining of information was concerned. During the year in which important developments in Russian relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany took place, Dufferin was recalled from St. Petersburg and for six months the Embassy was without a permanent head.

Moreover, while instructions from the Foreign Office could influence to some extent the energy and success of the Ambassador as far as negotiations were concerned, the Foreign Office was entirely dependent upon the representatives' skill and activity when it came to securing information in regard to some new development. Paget's activity drew from Vienna more information than Elliot or Egerton as the chargé d'affaires had been able to procure.

As a result it has been seen that the Foreign Office secured the greater part of its information as to the relations between the Powers from the course of diplomatic negotiations. They showed the development from the fluid state of relationships in the period immediately following

the Congress of a close Austro-German friendship. After 1880 they were a less fruitful source but they served to indicate to some extent the basis upon which the relations between the three Empires were being drawn closer. They showed the relations existing between Germany and France, and served to confirm the information received from other sources respecting the relations between Italy and the German Empires. After 1881 on the one hand, they encouraged the view that some formal agreement existed between the three Empires and revealed to some extent the results of the agreement that had in fact been concluded. On the other hand, they furnished the only information which the Foreign Office possessed until 1883 respecting Italy's relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Only when an Ambassador had been led as a result of the evidence afforded by diplomatic negotiations to expect that some agreement was in existence or was about to come into existence, did he devote any serious attention to discovering what was the precise nature of the relations between any group of Powers.

There were other sources from which the necessary impulse to the obtaining of information came. There was generally some public evidence given sooner or later when any effort was made to put the relations between any Powers

upon some particular footing. An Ambassador's personal observation enabled him to detect any marked exchange of civilities between the representative of another Power and the Court to which he was accredited. Thus in 1879 the attention paid in Rome to the Russian Ambassador, and the exchange of civilities between the Russians and French in Paris, in 1880 the coolness of the Czar towards the French Ambassador, in 1881 the courtesy shown to the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, played some part in causing the British representative to seek information upon the relations of the Powers in question. In the same way the Ambassador soon observed any particular friendship between the representatives of different Powers accredited to the same Court as himself. In St. Petersburg the close association between Schweinitz and Kalnoky attracted Dufferin's attention. The Imperial meetings and the visit of King Humbert to Vienna, the visits of different Ambassadors to Varzin and Friedrichsruhe and meetings between Bismarck and the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister again gave public evidence of the relations existing between the Powers in question. To the same category belong the various military missions that took place: the mission that was sent from Germany in 1878 to attend the French army manoeuvres, the mission of Austrian and German generals to St. Petersburg in 1880, the mission of Russian Generals to congratulate the Emperor William on the seventieth anniversary of his receipt of the Russian order of St. George and the

various Turkish missions. Lastly, in Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, where the Governments exercised considerable control over the Press of their country, it often afforded public evidence of the relations that existed. The various "scares" that occurred during the period are examples in this connection. The necessary impulse might come from other articles in the Press or from the rumours that were circulating in the capital where the Ambassador was stationed. Thus it was the Press and the talk of the Vienna public that was largely responsible for significance being attached to the Vienna meeting in 1879 as it had not been attached to the Gastein meeting which preceded it. Again, it was the Press that was responsible by the publication of the Protocol that it was alleged had been signed by Giers and Kalnoky, for the attempt half-hearted though it was, that was made along lines that would have led to an eventual revelation of the Protocol that had actually been signed to obtain information respecting the Dreikaiserbund agreement. It was the Press in 1882 which eventually gave Paget the necessary material to enable him to frame important questions for Mancini and which was in part responsible for his successful attempt in 1883 to secure information respecting the Triple Alliance. It was public opinion in Bucharest that led the British representative there to attach some significance to the visits of Prince Charles and Bratiano

to Vienna and Gastein in 1883 and to attempt to discover what had taken place.

There was a certain circulation of information among the representatives of different Powers accredited to the same court, among the different British representatives, and occasionally among the Foreign Ministers in person. This also provided the stimulus necessary before an attempt to secure information was made. Two notable occasions when the information received from one of his colleagues set a representative at work to secure information, were when Kendell informed Macdonnell of Russian overtures to France and Italy, and when one of his colleagues informed Thornton of the Protocol signed by Giers and Kalnoky in December 1881. There was always some exchange of opinions between Dufferin and Kalnoky while the latter was Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and between Dufferin and General Chauzy, the French Ambassador there. Waddington's communications to Salisbury in 1879 respecting Andrassy's resignation furnished an example of an exchange of information between Foreign Ministers. The circulation of information among the British representatives was conducted by means of the Confidential Print, the sending of despatches under Flying Seal through certain capitals, the sending by the Foreign Office of copies of important despatches to other representatives for their comments, and the personal correspondence of the representatives themselves. A representative, especially at one of the

smaller capitals often secured important information that did not primarily concern him, although it might concern the Government to which he was accredited, as when the British Minister at Belgrade was informed that the Austrian Government had remonstrated with Robilaut on account of the close relations between England and Italy. In the same way Stephens at Philippopolis learnt in 1881 of the alleged overtures of Russia to Austria-Hungary for an agreement respecting the Balkans. Again a military attaché frequently secured information which did not concern him as when Stourdza spoke to Colonel Primrose respecting Rumania's relation with Austria-Hungary. Gould's despatches from Belgrade passing through Vienna under Flying Seal, drew further information from Elliot. The St. Petersburg despatches which went under Flying Seal through Berlin, such as the despatch concerning Jomini's overture for an alliance with England, drew information from the representative there. Of important despatches of which copies were forwarded to other capitals by the Foreign Office, the most important were those concerning the Austro-German Alliance and Paget's despatch concerning the Triple Alliance.

Less frequently statements of the Foreign Ministers in Parliament give the necessary impulse to the securing of information. Mancini's statements to the Italian Chambers and Senate respecting the Triple Alliance was the principal occasion on which this occurred.

All these sources from which the impulse to secure information came showed the results of developments which had already taken place and caused the Ambassador to seek information after the event in question had occurred. The Foreign Office was dependent for information contemporary with the event it concerned upon communications from the Powers in question, the Press, or upon some independent and private source. Communications from the Powers concerned were always open to the suspicion that they were incomplete and that they were determined solely by what the particular Power desired the British Foreign Office to believe respecting its relations with other Powers, and were generally distrusted. Thus Maffei's denials in 1879 that Italy was coquetting with Russia were disregarded. In spite of the friendship of Austria-Hungary to England in 1878, Andrassy never communicated the exact character of Austria-Hungary's relations with Russia. From 1878 until it was impossible in the face of evidence given publicly to the contrary, Austria-Hungary whenever she communicated anything respecting her relations with other Powers, was always careful to deny the existence of any chance of an Austro-Russian rapprochement. The communication respecting the Austro-German Alliance, it was obvious to the Foreign Office which knew of the existence of a written agreement, was at best but a paraphrase of the actual Treaty. Kalnoky's statements respecting the Triple Alliance were at once distrusted after Mancini's conversation with Paget. Where

the Press was in receipt of communications from the Government of the country, it furnished a useful source of information. As for instance when Mancini drew Paget's attention to an article in the Popolo Romano instead of himself communicating what had occurred at the Belgirate Conference. Again it was always an index to public opinion and the state of public opinion was an indirect source of information either as in the case of the Triple Alliance because it heralded the course ultimately taken by the Government, or as in the case of the Dreikaiserbund by giving an opportunity for the Foreign Office to appreciate the existence of considerable confidence between the three Governments. Independent and private sources, while they furnished information concerning the actual commitments undertaken and not only such information as would lead to an impression as to the probability of certain situations arising, were normally called into play only after the event. Thus in 1878 Russell, sometime after it had been written, secured information respecting the Confidential Memorandum concerning Germany's relations with Russia that was drawn up for the Crown Prince, Malet obtained information respecting the Dreikaiserbund in 1884 from some private source, Paget obtained information respecting the Triple Alliance from an independent and private source but not until 1883. Only on the two occasions of the signature of the Austro-German Alliance and the negotiations in the summer of 1880 between

Italy and Germany did such an independent source furnish information contemporary with the event.

The large body of information respecting actual commitments furnished to the Foreign Office was then the result of the interpretation in the light of the Ambassador's personal knowledge and experience - his preconceived notions on the subject - of the information derived from the sources which had originally caused him to make enquiries.

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