

University of London

THESES

THE RIVER CLAY OF SWIFT AND MASONRY
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

THESES

For The Degree of M.A. in Ancient History.

May 1924

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T H E S I S

" THE RIVAL CLAIMS OF SPARTA AND MACEDON
TO THE LEADERSHIP OF GREECE IN THE
LATE THIRD CENTURY B. C. "

T H E S I S

INTRODUCTION

" THE RIVAL CLAIMS OF SPARTA AND MACEDON
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IN THE
LATE THIRD CENTURY B. C. "

The latter part of the story of the late third century B.C. is the period in which Greece was in danger of destruction at the hands of a stronger power, which she had lost the vigor to resist as she had repelled the Persians, nearly three centuries before. Her position, in fact, was becoming almost as critical as at the time of the Persian Wars - indeed, the same story was to be repeated, though with a different ending. Greece was again to suffer attack at the hands of a powerful foreign foe, but now the danger was to come from the West instead of the East, and Persia as a power was to be replaced by Rome.

This being so, it was of paramount importance that the Greeks should attempt to solve that intractable problem which lay at the root of all their political - the problem of national unity. It was a question of

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

The latter part of the Third Century B. C., is the prelude to a drama telling the story of the downfall of Greece. She was rapidly approaching a crisis in her fortunes, since her very existence, as an independent nation, was in danger of destruction at the hands of a stronger power, which she had lost the vigour to repel, as she had repelled the Persians, nearly three centuries before. Her position, in fact, was becoming almost as critical as at the time of the Persian Wars - indeed, the same story was to be repeated, though with a different ending. Greece was again to suffer attack at the hands of a powerful foreign foe, but now the danger was to come from the West instead of the East, and Persia as protagonist was to be replaced by Rome.

This being so, it was of paramount importance that the Greeks should attempt to solve that hitherto insuperable problem which lay at the root of all Greek politics - the problem of national union. It was a question with

which they had often been confronted, and especially in times of danger from foreign aggression, and it was to assume no less importance now than in the Fifth Century, on the eve of Marathon, or again, more than a century later, when it was essential that Philip of Macedon should lead the united forces of the Greek world against the East. It was just the very fact that the Greeks had solved this problem successfully during the Persian Wars, and had drawn together the separate States to form a national confederacy, which had saved them from ruin and subjection at the hands of Persia. Though in that struggle the difficulties in the way of united action had at times seemed very great, the interests of the Northern Greeks clashing with those of the Peloponnesians, yet they had been brought to realise their dependence on each other, and that the only way to resist the enemy successfully was by acting in concert. Accordingly, in spite of the overwhelming odds against them, so that it seemed impossible to escape destruction, they had emerged victorious from the unequal struggle, and had shown the world that the weakness of the West was a match for the strength of the East, when the stake for which they were playing was national freedom. In the Second Century, the Greeks were faced with a similar crisis, but failing to profit by the lessons of the past, they remained disunited and so fell an easy prey to Rome,

For in 200 B.C. Rome found herself confronted with a nation composed of elements not only discordant, but fighting against each other. On the one side, Philip V. of Macedon, to further his ambitious schemes of conquest, was making war on friend and foe alike; on the other, the various Greek States, already weakened and distracted by wars and divisions among themselves, were apparently so little able to manage their own affairs, and in particular,

to deal with the aggression of Philip, that they found it necessary to appeal to Rome as the great power in the Western Mediterranean, for aid and protection against him.

So it is not surprising that Rome, perceiving the chief powers not only of European Greece, but also of Asia Minor and Egypt, anxious to become her allies in the war against Philip, should find the task of subduing first Macedon, and later, the whole of Greece, a comparatively easy one.

If only the Greeks could have remembered the means by which they had managed to save themselves in the past, and, burying the hatchet, so to speak, among themselves, have formed, under the influence of a revived national spirit, a federation of States with the common object of resisting the foreign foe, they would have faced the danger with all the courage befitting their great traditions, and the Romans would at least have found a resolute enemy, determined to fight to the death in defence of the liberties of their fatherland. It is not too much to say that history might have repeated itself and the Romans have been driven back from the shores of Greece as were the Persians three centuries before. We may go still further, and say that in all probability, a resolute and united Greek nation would have had no foe to encounter. For it is quite beyond doubt that at this period the Romans had no thought or desire for the conquest of Greece. This was made sufficiently clear by their conduct at the end of the Second Macedonian War, when, after crushing Philip, they took no territory for themselves, but withdrew all their troops from Greece and contented themselves with proclaiming the freedom and independence of the Greek States. In fact, so far were they from any thoughts of conquest in 200 B.C., that they did not wish to interfere in Greek politics at all, and

when they did so, it was with the greatest reluctance.

Frank, in his "Roman Imperialism", (1) points out the extreme difficulty experienced by the Senate in persuading the Assembly to accept the invitation of the Greeks and to vote for war against Philip, and shews how natural was their repugnance against embarking on a new war, since they had only just emerged from the conflict with Hannibal, a long one, and that, too, waged in their own country. Again, they could not feel the same obligation to help the Greek States who appealed to them as if they had been their own "socii", since up to this time they had ^{had} no definite political relations with them.

This point is made clear by Holleaux who, in his recent book: "Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au troisième siècle", states definitely that the Romans had no Oriental politics before 200 B.C. He says: "A cette époque" (during the last quarter of the Third Century) "les Romains n'ont nullement la pensée de chercher en Orient un accroissement de puissance" (2). He shews that, even on occasions when the Romans had good reason to interfere, as, for instance, during the depredations of the Illyrian pirates who infested the seas between Greece and Italy, and were almost as great a trouble to Italian as to Greek commerce, they refrained from taking any action. In fact, it does not seem to have occurred to the Greeks to ask for the help of the Romans against the pirates, since they did not expect Rome to be sufficiently interested, the Romans having hitherto neglected to

(1) Frank: "Roman Imperialism", p. 145.

(2) Holleaux: p. 97, Chap. II, 5.

enter upon any public relations with Greek States. (3).

Again, in the case of the perilous situation of Macedon at the beginning of the reign of Antigonus Doson, the Romans neglected to interfere, even though such interference might have redounded to their advantage, and so Macedon had the opportunity of recovering its power and position (4).

The motive, according to Holleaux, which induced the Romans finally to intervene, was not the desire to conquer Greece, but the opportunity they thus gained of checking the rising power of the two kings who were the enemies of Rome, Philip and Antiochus (5).

There is no doubt that, as Frank makes clear (6), the main reason which induced the Senate to force a new war upon the already exhausted State in 200 B.C., was their fear that the aggression of Philip would soon have to be met by themselves, and in any case they saw the necessity of crushing him, and thus preserving the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In other words, the only motives which induced the Romans to interfere in Greek politics were directly due to the situation created in the Eastern Mediterranean by the disunion of Greece.

To sum up, it is not untrue to say that a Greece disunited brought about her own downfall, while a Greece united in a national confederacy might, and probably would, have proved strong enough to save her independence as a nation.

If this was the case, it is worth while considering whether, at the end of the 3rd Century, such a union was practicable and could have been consummated.

(3) pp. 23-25, Chap. I, 3.

(4) Holleaux: pp. 121 & 122, Chap. III, 4.

(5) Holleaux: p. 94, Chap. II, 5.

(6) Frank: "Roman Imperialism" pp. 148 & 149.

At this point it may be well to mention an objection brought forward by some historians which, if allowed, would make any further pursuit of the subject of Greek federalism useless. It has been definitely stated that any such union, however desirable it may have been, was clearly impossible (7).

At first sight this objection would seem to be supported by several strong arguments.

(1) Let us take first the practical difficulty of physical obstacles, which at once occurs to the mind. There is no doubt that geographical conditions in Greece made for disunion rather than union. Split up as the country is by mountains, almost cut in two by the Isthmus of Corinth, communication between one part and another must always have presented great difficulties, and especially in ancient times, when there existed none of the modern facilities for travel. Moreover, "the Greek world" means more than European Greece. The "union of all Greece" implies an enormous area, embracing as it does not only European Greece, but also the islands of the Aegean, and the Greek cities of Asia, besides all the Greek colonies scattered up and down the Mediterranean. There would first be the question of selecting a town for the meetings of the Federal Assembly in a position sufficiently central to suit everyone, and secondly, the difficulty for some States of reaching it. This might result in the withdrawal of some cities from the League, and in any case it would always be difficult to make the meetings of the Federal Assembly truly representative.

(7) Tarn: Antig. Gon., pp. 407 - 8

(2) Secondly, it may be contended that the political ideals of the Greeks were inevitably bound up with the idea of the sovereign City State, self-sufficient, and entirely independent of its neighbours, and that this had always been the great bar to union.

To the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, this was the ideal form of government. Anything larger, such as Empire or Federation, would become too unwieldy to handle. The State would at once lose its self-sufficient character, and in any union with other States would be obliged to give up some of its own vitality and independence (8). The life of the *πόλις*, says Aristotle, was the life which best realised the best instincts of man.

(3) If we consider the results of a federal system of government as actually practised by the Greeks, we arrive at a third objection, that when the several City States did join together to form a league for purposes of mutual defence and protection against outside foes, these leagues, though some lasted considerably longer than others, were in the end almost invariably dissolved by the Greeks themselves. This was certainly the case with the smaller leagues, and even if we consider the larger national confederacy embracing the whole of Greece which Philip II formed in 338 B.C., we find that its life was a short one, and that it ceased to be with the passing of the two great personalities responsible for its existence, Philip and Alexander, and the consequent breaking up of the Empire. Though this federation was revived by Demetrius Poliorcetes (9), when in 303 B.C. he found himself master, by his conquests,

(8) Aristotle: Politics. 1326 B. Ἰδὲ μὲν καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανερόν ὅτι χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον.

(9) Plutarch: Demetrius, Chap. 25.

of Boeotia, Central Greece, and a considerable part of the Peloponnesus, it had an even shorter existence than before, for we hear of only one general assembly of the League at the Isthmus, when the Greek States met together to elect Demetrius general by sea and land in the war against Kassander. Had Demetrius then been able to carry out his plan of crushing Kassander and seizing the kingdom of Macedon, the League might have continued to exist and to flourish, but as things turned out, the war never took place, Demetrius being summoned in haste to Asia to the help of his father Antigonus, and with the defeat of both these kings at the Battle of Ipsus, the League died a natural death. (10)

These objections undoubtedly go to prove that the federal union of Greece was an extremely difficult problem, but hardly that it was an impossible one; and I hope now to show that each objection may be met by stronger arguments on the other side.

(1) To begin with objection No. 1, it is certainly true that the Greek world in the Third Century was too large, and the difficulties of communication were too great, for a general union of all Greeks.

Such a union was most certainly desirable, but was as yet hardly practicable. It was the union of European Greece and the Aegean area which had by now become, not merely desirable, but even a practical necessity, and the possibility is therefore worth considering. Even if we admit the

(10) Though there is little literary evidence as to this League of Demetrius, we know that it possessed a definite constitution from an inscription from Epidaurus found about 1920, and published in August 1921 by M. Cavvadias, which Mr. Tarn has proved (J.H.S. 1922) belongs not to the period of Doso's League of 225 B.C., but to that of Antigonus and Demetrius. It is, therefore, an inscription recording the constitution of Demetrius' League of 303 B.C.

geographical difficulties, they were by no means impossible to surmount. In fact, they were far less great than those encountered and met by the United States of America in 1776, when a permanent federation was formed which was to prove eminently successful in spite of the fact that thousands of miles of territory lay between some States and the meetings of the Central Assembly. In the case of Greece, on the other hand, to take Corinth as a convenient centre, it was possible in ancient times to reach that city from any point in less than a week.

The union of European Greece was specially important, for in the first place, she still supplied the bulk of the fighting forces of the nation, the Asiatic Greeks having already shewn that they preferred to send money contributions rather than to provide either men or ships for a war (11).

Secondly, European Greece was free from the burden of a foreign subject population, the effect of which would have been to sunder her interests, and distract her energies; and last, and most important, she was nearest to Rome, and, if united, could present herself as a barrier to Rome's advance eastward.

(2) We have now to deal with the objection that the form of government most favoured by the Greeks was that of the fully independent City-State. To this it may be replied that even if the Greek did prefer to live in his own particular city, under its special form of government, and to be politically independent of his neighbours, yet in his heart was the strong consciousness of a common nationality and a common brotherhood with

(11) Thus we find that the Greek mercenaries who helped to swell the armies and to fight the battles of the 3rd Century, came chiefly from European Greece.

Greek
the citizens of every other/community. We have only to read the story of the Persian Wars to realise this. On the eve of Plataea, at a most critical moment in the war, if Mardonius had succeeded in his attempt to win over the Athenians to the Persian side, it is difficult to see how Greece could have been saved. The Athenians, in point of fact, seem never seriously to have considered such a proposal for a moment, though for their own purposes they kept the Spartans in doubt of their true intentions, and did not reveal them till they gave their final answer to the Lacedaemonian Envoys in the General Assembly. They announced that there was no bribe in the whole world great enough for them to accept as the price of the enslavement of Greece, adding that one of the many powerful considerations which would prevent them from ever making terms with the Persians was "that tie of blood and language which binds the Greek world together, our common share in our religious foundations and sacrifices, our community of manners - things which it would disgrace the Athenians to betray". (12)

This sentiment, strong as it evidently was in the time of Herodotus, must have been stronger still by the end of the Third Century, when we consider the various forces at work which would help to foster it. Thus the Olympic Games, which played such a large part in the life of the Greeks, and were a development of the earliest religious unions, when two or more tribes joined together in the common worship of a particular god, could not fail to bring home to them, in the most striking fashion possible, the realisation that they were a single nation.

Moreover, by the end of the Third Century, there was another strong

(12) Her: VIII, 144.

bond of union which did not exist in the Fifth - the fact that, as one of the results of Alexander's conquests, the Greek language, and in fact Greek culture generally, had been spread over the whole of the civilized world.

A striking illustration of the pride of the Greeks in their own language as contrasted with the tongues of all other nations can be seen in the expression they used for foreigners - "βάρβαροι", that is, men who said: "βάρ-βάρ", being incapable of anything better than an unintelligible jargon, since they were not Greeks.

Among the Greeks there was an increasing consciousness, at any rate in the Fourth and Third Centuries, of Hellenism as the outpost of civilization, confronting the menace of a barbarian world; this consciousness, as much as, if not more than, anything else, tended to draw the Greeks together in a common fellowship. A parallel to this may be found in the case of Germany and Italy in the Nineteenth Century. In both nations there existed the consciousness of a common culture, which made for union.

The Greeks of the Third and Second Centuries had at any rate a much stronger feeling of a common nationality than the peoples of Italy at that period, who consisted of a mixture of races, speaking a variety of tongues.

Although we find the political ideal of the *πόλις* associated with such great names as Plato and Aristotle, we have to confess that these were the views of men who were philosophers and idealists rather than practical statesmen. The average man of education and intelligence, the "man of the world", found his true representative in such a thinker as Isocrates, a strong advocate of union, whose practical wisdom in promoting the confederacy of all Greece under the *ἡγεμονία* of Philip II was proved by events.

(3) There remains the third objection: that all the more important federations of Greece were dissolved by the Greeks themselves, and we are faced with the question whether the Greek leagues were, after all, failures, coming ultimately to a bad end.

On the contrary, I hope to be able to prove that at any rate the largest and most important leagues were, on the whole, successes, and that the later ones were more successful than the earlier.

The period during which Athens was head of the Delian League was the time of her greatest glory and prosperity, a prosperity which was shared, at any rate at first, before the League became merged in the Athenian Empire, by the other Greek cities belonging to it. Similarly, the Peloponnesian cities were a singularly united body under Sparta, always content to follow her lead in war, a fact which contributed not a little to the repulse of Persia in the Fifth Century, and to the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. As leagues, these prospered. They broke up, not because they were leagues, or because of any inherent weakness in government, but because of the tyrannical behaviour of their leading cities. The Greeks, proving always false to their own ideal, which contained the fundamental axiom that the ~~freedom and independence~~ ^{autonomy} of each ~~polis~~ ^{polis} must be respected by the rest, were content to allow one State to exercise undue predominance until the troubles resulting from this tyrannical desire for supremacy usually led to the dissolution of the whole league.

If we turn to the earliest examples of leagues in Greece, we find striking instances of this, and the later ones were not exempt from the same evil.

Thus even considering only the more important federations, the first Delian League became merged in the Athenian Empire, because Athens abused her power, and became a mere tyrant.

The Peloponnesian League was always overshadowed by Sparta, and when through the instrumentality of her king, Agesilaus, she called in the help of an outside power solely for her own aggrandisement, this purely selfish policy had the effect of breaking up all leagues throughout Greece, and forcing on the Greeks a universal autonomy.

Again, the dissolution of the Boe^otian League in 387 B.C. was the inevitable result of the undue desire of Thebes for supremacy.

The union of Greek states under Philip II, and the league created in 303 B.C. by Demetrius Poliorcetes had broken up, not because they were leagues, but because both Alexander and Demetrius has used them merely as a base for their attacks upon Asia, and not for the defence of Greece. The policy both of Antigonus Gonatas and of Demetrius was the reverse of this. They aimed at securing peace for their country. It is not impossible, then, to assume that they would have made such a League a success.

(4) It is significant that the later leagues of Greece, the ~~Achaean~~^{Achaean} and Aetolian, and afterwards, the League of Antigonus Demetrius, which flourished when the political ideas of the Greeks may be said to have developed and improved, were undoubtedly successful, the first two being of long duration, and the third giving promise of a similar success, and succumbing only to the force majeure of Rome. The cramped and narrow doctrine of the independent City State, each State shut off from its neighbour, as it were, in water-tight

compartments, had given place to an altogether broader outlook, and to the realisation of the necessity for interdependence for the purpose of mutual help and security. We can trace such a change of outlook as far back as the Fourth Century, and we find City States which had had an important individual existence in the Fifth Century, consenting to become members of a league. Thus, Corinth and Argos agreed to be annexed to Achaea, and Phocis and Locris joined Aetolia. Why, then, should it seem an impossible feat for the whole country, when faced with a foreign war at the end of the Third Century, to act in a similar manner on a big scale, and to form a general Hellenic federation under Macedon?

The League of Antigonus Doson (13), while it lasted, seems to have worked with success. By 220 B.C. we find it in full working order, for when in that year the Messenians wished to become allies of the League, they were told by the Achaean magistrates that "it was impossible to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other allies" (14).

Again, when the League decided to make joint war upon the Aetolians in consequence of their usual aggressive behaviour, it was suggested that even at the eleventh hour, they should "meet and settle the controversy by conference" (15).

Doson's League did actually last till 211 B.C., and the Achaeans did not again fight Macedon till 198 B.C. It had started well, and it might have survived and incorporated the remaining Greek States, had it not been for

(13) Polyb: IV, 9, 3.

(14) Polyb: IV, 9, 4. (Shuckburgh's Translation.)

(15) Polyb: IV, 26, 2.

the conduct of Philip V. But it was his lust for conquest and desire for dominion, leading him to make ^{aggressive} war ~~even~~ on his own countrymen, which finally brought about its dissolution.

Perhaps the strongest argument for the formation of a national Hellenic federation towards the end of the Third Century B.C. is this: - that the Greeks saw the necessity for it themselves, to ward off the threatening power of Rome. By 217 B.C., we find "all sorts and conditions of men", no matter what their political creed or outlook might be, waking up to a sense of their peril, and to the importance of uniting. Agelaus of Naupactus, the statesman who voiced this feeling in the assembly held to discuss terms of peace between Philip V of Macedon and the Aetolians after the news of the Battle of Lake Trasimene, was an Aetolian, yet he urged upon the Greeks the necessity of united action. Philip was advised to stop fighting with Greeks, to concentrate on Illyria, and to gather together an expedition against Italy. It was dangerous to ignore any longer "the clouds gathering in the West", which were already beginning to overshadow their freedom.

"Let Greece be united; let no Greek State make war upon any other; let them thank the gods if they can all live in peace and agreement, if, as men in crossing rivers grasp one another's hands, so they can hold together, and save themselves and their cities from barbarian inroads".
Whether Rome conquers Carthage, or Carthage conquers Rome, the victor will not be content with the dominion of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily; he will extend his plans and his warfare much further than suits us or our welfare. Let all Greece be upon its guard, and Philip above all.
If once the clouds which are gathering in the West should advance and spread

over Greece and the neighbouring lands, there will be danger indeed that all our truces and wars, all the child's play with which we now amuse ourselves, will be suddenly cut short. We may then pray in vain to the gods for the power of making war and peace with one another, and indeed of dealing independently with any of the questions which may arise among us". (16)

To sum up, we may say that the fundamental condition to ensure the success of any such great Hellenic League as I have suggested must be the preservation of complete autonomy in each State. Only thus would the Greeks join willingly in a scheme for national union. But this merely implies that the League should fulfil the conditions of all true federations, that is, that the individual cities should have complete freedom of action in all domestic matters, and should take their share, by means of their representatives in the Federal parliament, in helping to frame the foreign policy of the League, while in return, they should be willing to abide by the decision of the Federal Council in all matters which concerned the general good.

Under such conditions, it may be ^{not} ~~but~~ unreasonable to suggest that a general union of Greece at the end of the Third Century was neither impracticable nor impossible.

To establish such a league, and to get it into proper working order, one thing was essential. It was necessary to incorporate the various States under the *ἡγεμονία* of a single power sufficiently remote

(16) Polybius: V, 103 & 104 (Freeman's Translation)

and sufficiently indifferent to their individual interests and concerns to be considered in no way a tyrant, but merely a *ἡγεμῶν*. He must be, not only the director of their foreign policy, and leader in their wars against foreign powers, but also a man of power and personality striking enough to keep the League together, and to coerce possible defaulters. A great deal would depend on the character of the *ἡγεμῶν* himself. Greece needed a man with such aims as those put before Philip II by Isocrates in 346 B.C. (17) The acceptance of the *ἡγεμονία* would have to imply, not merely personal power and glory for the *ἡγεμῶν*, but a pledge to the Greeks that he intended to justify their trust by procuring for the nation as a whole peace and security.

About 225 B.C. came the opportunity for forming a national Greek confederacy. There were then two powers in Greece of sufficient importance to possess claims to the *ἡγεμονία*, Sparta and Macedon - Sparta having attained this leading position through the vigour and ability of her king, Cleomenes, Macedon under the rule of the capable Antigonus Dason.

In 223 B.C. the Achaean League in its weakness was beginning to look towards some stronger power in Greece to aid in defending it against its enemies. Should it join Sparta or Macedon? The question was an important one, for to either State it would prove an invaluable asset. In the first place, the League possessed ~~a well trained, well equipped army;~~ *the man-power for a formidable army;* secondly, its leading statesman Aratus had shewn himself a man of no mean diplomatic ability; and lastly, it numbered among its possessions a city of great

(17) Cp. Isocrates-Philippus 16, 80, 116. Isocrates had pointed out Philip's great opportunity. He was master of Greece by force of arms. Would he rule as an ordinary conquering king, a *δεσπότης*, or as a "gentle and kindly" *ἡγεμῶν*, the "President of Greece", and the "acknowledged arbiter of her destinies"? *ἄγε προτρέπειν ἐπὶ τε τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρώτῃ τε καὶ φιλοφρονητικῶν.* (Ira: 116).

strategic value in Corinth, the key both to the Peloponnesus and to Northern Greece.

Aratus, as we know, chose Macedon. His choice gave Macedon control of nearly as much Greek territory as Philip II had ruled over in 338 B.C., viz: Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, Acarnania, Phocis, Boeotia, Achaea (18), Enboea and Locris (19), Sparta (after Sellasia) (20).

This included the whole of Greece with the exception of Athens; the Aetolian League and Elis. Hence Antigonus Doseon did actually establish a new Hellenic Confederacy (21) similar to that of Philip II, which, had it become permanent, might have saved Greece from conquest by Rome, and altered the subsequent course of her history.

The dilemma of Aratus in 225 B.C., and his final decision to join Macedon, has been much discussed and criticised both by ancient and modern writers, but chiefly from an Achaean point of view, that is to say, whether an Hellenic League could suitably invite the King of Macedon, ^{an alleged} a foreigner and a tyrant, to fill the position of ἡγεμῶν in an Hellenic war.

Among ancient authorities, we find Plutarch and Polybius taking opposite sides: Plutarch supporting Sparta, Polybius Macedon. Plutarch condemns the action of Aratus in offering the ἡγεμονία to the King of Macedon. He accuses him of acting the part of traitor to his country, through feelings of personal jealousy towards Cleomenes. He says: "For Aratus, either for that he trusted not Cleomenes, or for that he otherwise

(18) Polybius, IV, 9, 4.

(20) Polyb. IV, 24, 6.

(19) Polyb. XI, 5, 4.

(21) Polyb. IV, 9, 3.

envied his honour and prosperity, to see him risen to such incredible greatness in so short a time, and thinking it also too great shame and dishonour to him, to suffer this young man in a moment to deprive him of his great honour and power which he had possessed so long time, by the space of thirty years together, ruling all Greece; brought Antigonus into Greece, and in his age filled the country of Peloponnesus with Macedonians, whom he himself in his youth had driven thence, had taken from them the castle of Corinth, and had always been an enemy of the King's." (22)

Polybius, on the other hand, extols the policy of Aratus, and brings in another factor, the fear of Aetolia. He shows that the Aetolians were anxious to make use of this critical moment in order to inflict a final blow on the Achaeans, whose power had already diminished. They not only deserted them, and made an advantageous peace for themselves with Antigonus Doseon, but they had also previously increased the strength of Sparta, and raised the hopes of Cleomenes for Sparta's supremacy in the Peloponnesus, by handing over to him their Arcadian cities, Tegea, Orchomenus, Mantinea and Caph^ylae.

Polybius, indeed, accuses them of motives still more hostile. He says :-
"They were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean States, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of ~~Aeonia~~ ^{Acarmania} with Alexander, and had planned so to partition those of Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas", and he adds, "It was only Aratus who, by skilfully winning over Antigonus to the Achaean side, saved the League from being overwhelmed by three enemies at once." (23)

Among modern authorities, Freeman and Thirlwall are notoriously

(22) Plut: Cleomenes 16 (North's Translation)

(23) Polybius II. 45.

hostile to
~~prejudiced against~~ Aratus. Dubois, on the other hand, defends him. Freeman tells us that "the deliverer of Greece" was transformed into "her betrayer". (24)

Thirlwall is hardly less emphatic in his denunciation. He says that Aratus stooped "to undo the great work of his public life, to call the King of Macedonia into the Peloponnese as an ally and protector against Cleomenes". He adds that Aratus formed this resolution with "a full view of the danger with which it threatened the liberties of Greece". (25)

Both these writers dwell, too, on what they consider the personal motives of Aratus - on his personal jealousy of Cleomenes, and the humiliation which a yielding to him would have entailed.

Dubois disclaims any necessity for treating the King of Macedon as a foreigner and an enemy, and refers to the benefits conferred upon Greece by Philip and Alexander. Speaking of the hostility of Freeman to the policy of Aratus, he says :- (26) "Mais comment l'éminent écrivain, dont le livre contient tant d'excellentes remarques sur l'esprit publique des Grecs après la diffusion de l'hellénisme par Alexandre, peut-il voir dans la naissance de la ligue achéenne le signe d'un réveil des haines de la Grèce contre la Macedoine? Nous avons déjà montré avec quelle netteté Polybe, représentant fidèle, s'il en fût, des traditions politiques de la ligue, condamne la conduite de Démosthène, et rend hommage à Philippe, père d'Alexandre. Appeler Antigone contre Cléomène n'était pas, aux yeux de l'historien achéen, inaugurer

(24) Freeman: History of Federal Government, p. 359.

(25) Thirlwall VIII, p. 136.

(26) Dubois: Les Ligues Étoliennes et Achéennes, Part 2, Chap. 2
p. 67, note.

une politique nouvelle, mais renouer une vieille tradition d'amitié". (27)

Dubois goes on to show that in the Second Macedonian War the feeling among the States of the Peloponnese was that Philip V., being a Greek, ought not to be deserted for the foreign enemy, Rome. Similarly, in the final struggle between Perseus and Rome, he shows that the sympathies of the Greeks were all on the side of Perseus. It was felt that he was their champion against Rome, and that if once he were conquered, the liberty of Greece would pass away for ever.

The dilemma of Aratus really opened up a wider problem, which I propose to review from the pan-Hellenic standpoint.

Was Sparta or Macedon better fitted, by nature and by resources, to become ἡγεμὼν of a general Greek confederacy?

(27) Cf. Polyb: II. 52.

CHAPTER I

OTHER POSSIBLE CLAIMANTS

Before discussing the claims of Sparta and Macedon to the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece about 225 B.C., we must consider whether the choice was actually limited to these two states, or whether other powers in Greece might not have possessed like claims to such a position. There were, in fact, three other powers of sufficient importance to make a discussion of their claims necessary.

These were:-

- I Athens
- II The Aetolian League
- III The Achaean League

A T H E N S

At the end of the third century Athens was perhaps the least important of these three states, at any rate in material resources, yet she has a claim on our consideration from the fact that she had already, in the fifth century, filled such a position, first as head of the Delian Confederacy, and later as Mistress of the Athenian Empire.

In 225 B.C. Athens could once more stand proudly before the world as a free and sovereign state. After suffering 65 years of Mace-

donian rule in Attica, the Athenians had seized the opportunity given them by the death of Demetrius II in 229 B.C. to secede from Macedon (1), and to dismiss the Macedonian garrisons from their land. It was an opportune time for Athens to shew her fitness to become once more the leader of Greece.

I propose now to review the arguments in favour of the ἀνελευθρία of Athens.

The Athenian Empire in the fifth century had been built up on some very solid foundations.

1. The Athenians possessed a fairly large army which had fought with some distinction in the Persian Wars, and had gained for Athens a considerable reputation as a military power among the other states of Greece. It was because the Athenians were found to make better soldiers and to have better discipline than their allies that they attained to such a prominent position from the first in the Delian League.

2. The extraordinarily firm hold which the Athenians acquired over their allies can be explained by their possession of a valuable asset which belonged to no other Greek State in the same degree. They had a strong fleet. The Athenian fleet had predominated over all others in the fifth and fourth centuries. No other Greek state could compete with it. By means of it, the power of Athens over her allies was stronger even than that of Sparta in the Peloponnesus. If any of the members of the League refused to obey her, she could, by means of her ships, hinder their commerce and starve them out. From this it follows that the possession of a strong fleet was an indispensable factor in the equipment of any power aspiring to

(1) Plut. Ar. 34.

to become ἡγεμῶν of Greece. The geographical position of the country, moreover, demanded it. It was only by sea that Greece could be attacked, (with the one exception of the Macedonian power in the North) and therefore a strong navy was essential for the maintenance of her security in the Mediterranean. It was, too, by means of their fleet that the Athenians were enabled to enforce from the subject states the tribute which was used to maintain its efficiency, thus making it self-supporting. Athens had once built up a great Empire by means of her sea-power. If she could have developed that power again, the conjecture is not improbable that a united Greece, under her leadership, might once more have attained to Imperial power among the nations. (2)

3. This command of the sea led to the development of Athens as a great commercial power, and the wealth accruing through its industry and commerce could be used to keep both navy and army at their full strength, and always in superior force to their neighbours.

4. Lastly, Athens in the fifth century possessed the proud distinction not only of being the capital city of a large and powerful Empire, but also of being regarded as the centre of the intellectual and artistic life of Greece.

This gave her great prestige in the eyes of the Greeks, ^{who} ~~for the~~ ~~would feel that at Athens all the arts were to be found~~ ~~cultivation of all the arts, in which their souls delighted, was to be~~ ~~cultivated in their fullest perfection.~~ ~~found in its fullest perfection at Athens, which thus became the home of~~ ~~all the great men and all the great works.~~

(2) The ascendancy acquired by the leading city over the rest through the possession of a strong navy is well illustrated in the Xenophonic "Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία" chap. II §§11-13, where it is shown that it can control all the commerce, especially materials for ship-building, and prevent its being sent to rivals, or else the cities in question "shall not have the use of the sea."

In the third century, the Athenians could still lay claim to the possession of two of the important assets which had helped to build up the greatness of their city in the fifth century, namely, the last mentioned and the first - 4 and 1.

4. The reputation of Athens as the intellectual capital of Greece, "The School of Hellas" was still unimpaired in the third century. Though no longer possessing the power to lead the Greeks to battle as their champion against outside foes, Athens was still influential enough because of her great past, to be able to create public opinion, and to unite under her banner forces at variance with each other.

1. At the period with which we are dealing, the land forces of the Athenians were still fairly considerable. Throughout the first half of the third century and up to the time of the Chremonidean War, Athens had stood as one of the four chief military powers in Greece which from time to time fought against Macedon for their freedom. (3) After the defeat of Athens in the Chremonidean War, the defence of Attica for the future was given over to the Macedonian garrisons planted by Antigonus. Yet in 229 B.C. when the foreign mercenaries were dismissed from Attica, the native Athenian troops were found to be in sufficient strength to take their place. These were stationed as garrisons in all the forts, to defend the land against the incursions of the Achæans and others, and their raids on the crops in the Eleusinian and Athenian plains (4), and they were considered adequate, even though the defence of the whole country against the attacks of the outside world had now to be undertaken by the land forces alone.

(3) Tarn. Antig. Gon.
p. 296

(4) Ferg. Hell. Ath.
p. 211

Arguments against the *ηγεμονία* of Athens.

By 225 B.C. the Athenians had lost the other assets, 2 and 3.

2. They no longer possessed a fleet. The death-blow to their naval power had been dealt at the time of the Lamian War in the Battle of Amorgos. But before this, in 322 B.C., the Athenians had suffered a severe defeat and had lost a considerable number of ships in a naval battle near Abydos. This diminution of strength is evidenced by the fact that at Amorgos the Athenian Admiral Euetion had only 170 ships with which to meet 240 Macedonian vessels. Euetion was defeated and perhaps even cut off from a retreat to the Piraeus, and the control of the sea passed definitely in the hands of the enemy; and "with right", says Beloch, "might the Macedonian admiral, Gleitus, compare himself with the sea-god Poseidon; for he had won the greatest battle which was fought on the Aegean Sea since Salamis. - And more than that - it was a decision of importance in universal history, for on this day the Attic dominion of the sea was borne to the grave, and with it the political greatness of Athens." (5)

3. The loss of their commerce naturally followed the loss of their fleet, though this was also due to the birth of the new kingdoms in the East which sprang up under the rule of Alexander's successors. Hence came the removal of the economic centre of gravity from the Piraeus to Alexandria, Rhodes and the cities of the East (6), and with it went the wealth which the commerce and industry of Athens had created.

Even in the fourth century the reverses of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War, and the loss of so many of their over-seas possessions

(5) Beloch. III. 1, 75 ff

(6) Ferg. Hell. Ath. p. 65

had exhausted them and made them unfit to bear the burdens of Empire. The result was that by the middle of the third century Athens was so thoroughly crippled that she became dependent for her very food supplies on other powers. As Mr Tarn says, "Athens was like an island that could not feed itself, and had lost its fleet." (7)

Thus by 225 B.C. Athens had not merely failed to be a leader - she had even become a dependent.

The Athenians had lost even more than their sea-power and commercial supremacy - they had lost the desire for leadership. Up to 260 B.C. the policy which had always won in the long run at Athens had been that which advocated Greek freedom and independence against any outside power. They had only joined the League of Philip II in 338 B.C. because there had been no alternative, but while Philip was engaged in the task of subduing Greece, the opposition of Athens had been fiercer than that of any other Greek state. When Antigonus of Phrygia had revealed the ambitious desire of uniting the whole Empire of Alexander under his own dominion, and had declared that he would uphold the independence and autonomy of the Greeks (8), the Athenians had been only too ready to receive his son Demetrius as their liberator from the tyranny of Cassander. When they realized, however, that Demetrius intended merely to repeat the policy of Cassander by himself placing a Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus, they declared their refusal to submit by shutting their gates against him. (9)

It is after 260 B.C., and their final defeat in the Chremonidean War, (10)

(7) Tarn. Antig. Gon.
p. 221

(8) Diod. XIX 58.1; 61,3

(9) Ferg. Hell. Ath.
p. 176

(10) Ferg. Hell. Ath. p. 145

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that we can trace the gradual failure of the Athenians to assert themselves with any real force among the other Greek states. It is now that the opposition party begins to emerge triumphant. This party had always existed, though its more distinguished supporters had sometimes to pay rather heavily for their resistance to the popular view. From the days of Athens' greatest glory as an Imperial city, there had always been critics of the Imperialistic policy. Thucydides the Elder, the leader of the aristocratic party, which he had organised in opposition to Pericles, had been ostracised in 443 B.C. because he had objected to the profuse expenditure of Pericles in public works, the real objection being, of course, that Pericles was misappropriating the funds of the allies.

The comedies of Aristophanes contain much criticism of Imperialism, as we should expect, since it is the favourite rôle of comedy to take the side of the opposition. This criticism, however, was probably quite genuine, for Aristophanes was a true conservative, his ideal being the Athens of the Persian Wars, and he disapproved of the policy which had made the Athenian Empire a burden to the Allies and a menace to Greece. (11) This opposition was not taken seriously by the Athenians till the next century, when "bitter constraint and sad occasion dear" forced them to acknowledge that the critics were right. Isocrates had realised that independence must yield to expediency, and the king of Macedon be accepted as the champion of the Greek cause, to assume the initiative in the war on Persia.

Phocion also saw that Macedonian ascendancy in Greece had become inevitable, but his opposition to Demosthenes and the anti-Macedonian party

(11) In "The Babylonians" he attacked the demagogues and their oppression of the allies by representing the latter as barbarian slaves, employed to grind in the mill.

after the death of Philip in the end cost him his life, and earned for him the reputation of helping to destroy the independence of Athens.

But it was after his time, when the Athenians were becoming accustomed to the idea of the dominion of foreign kings and the presence of foreign garrisons in Greece, that the critics of Imperialism began to gain ground, and to find many supporters. When the last blow for freedom had been struck in the Chremonidean War, and struck in vain, the party of the opposition found themselves supreme. The 'neutral' policy they inaugurated marks a fresh period in the life of Athens. It was useless to struggle any longer - submission must be made to what the destinies decreed - all dreams of Empire must be banished. Athens must be merely a neutral among the powers. Hence it followed that the Athenian citizen came to take very little interest in politics, since his city no longer took any part in foreign affairs, and even in local matters he had very little share, since the decision then rested generally with the commander of the Macedonian garrison. Thus the interests of the citizens came to be diverted from public to private matters, and there followed the growth of clubs, of private associations of all kinds, and of various philosophic schools, until at last Athens became, of her own choice, a 'neutral' university town. That ^{this} ~~the~~ attitude was deliberate is clear from the policy of the Athenians at this period. In the first place, they refused to join the Achaean League when invited by Aratus in 228 B.C. (12) The reason was a practical one. Since their wealth now rested almost entirely on their land, they could not afford to risk the devastation of their fields, ^{which} would be the inevitable result if Athens became a member of the Achaean League, and if the League went to

(12) Plut. Ar. 36

war either with Aetolia or Macedon. (13) Secondly, they took care to secure a recognition of their 'neutrality' from other powers who might otherwise prove dangerous, especially from Macedon, Aetolia and Boeotia.

This explains the position of the Athenians in 224 B.C. They were able to form an alliance with Egypt, while at the same time maintaining friendly relations with Macedon. (14) It was their alliance with Egypt which saved them from being drawn into the war between Achaean and Sparta in 225 B.C. and left Athens a strict neutral among the powers during the Social and first Macedonian Wars, until in 201 B.C. she took the field once more against Philip V of Macedon. (15)

(13) Ferg.Hell.Ath.
pp.208-9

(14) Ferg.Hell.Ath.
p.243

(15) Hoileaux, in his article in the "Revue des Etudes Anciennes" 1920, shews that in 201 B.C. the Athenians were still in the background of the political stage, and were by no means the prime movers in the negotiations between Rome and the Greek states that preceded the second Macedonian War. Far from being the "casus belli" by inviting the Romans to champion their cause, and fight Philip - the hitherto accepted view - they were only a "casus belli" in that they were taken under the protection of Rome together with the rest of the Greek states. (p.81)

He questions whether any Athenian embassy ever was sent to Rome to ask for help against Philip, and compares the reception given by the Athenians to Attalus and to the Roman envoys (as described by Polyb.), the latter being almost entirely ignored. At the meeting of the Athenian assembly, Attalus begs the Athenians to join him and the Romans and the Rhodians against Philip (Polyb XVI.26,6), which he would scarcely have done if they had already approached the Romans with the same request. In fact, the language of the king leads to the belief that hitherto the Athenians had been little inclined to place themselves under the protection of Rome. (p.90)

In conclusion, we may say that the greatness of Athens belonged to the fifth and fourth centuries, and that by the end of the third, her position among the other powers, first of dependence and then of neutrality, must be considered sufficient to exclude her from any claim to the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece.

Though rude and uncivilized the Athenians were undoubtedly brave warriors, and their love of fighting, which made them such lofty and constant assailants of territory, far from exhausting them in war-pose, had but served to increase their military efficiency. (16) In this they could certainly claim superiority over the Spartans. Not only were they bold warriors, but they were always ready and eager for military service. For the Athenians were a collection of hardy mountain tribes, each fighting for its own chief, a rough freewarrior under whose banner they knew they would march to victory and enrich themselves with plunder. These chiefs could exercise a firm hold over their followers, and could use their resources as they pleased.

II Through the reputation they had gained as good soldiers, they were constantly in demand as mercenaries, (17) and practice in fighting gained them much military experience.

III The Constitution of the Achaean League was similar to that of the Achaean, but superior in the greater energy and unity of its members, and in its rapidity in making decisions. In theory, it was like the Achaean

(16) *Antike, Les Liguees attiques* (17) *Ann. Antig. Gen.*
 et suivantes, p. 40 p. 66

THE AETOLIAN LEAGUE

Arguments in Their Favour.

- I The Aetolian League was in 225 B.C. at the height of its power. Though rude and rapacious the Aetolians were undoubtedly brave warriors, and their love of fighting, which brought them much booty and constant extensions of territory, far from exhausting them in man-power, had but served to increase their military efficiency. (16) In this they could certainly claim superiority over the Achaean. Not only were they bold warriors, but they were always ready and eager for military service. For the Aetolians were a collection of hardy mountain tribes, each fighting for its own chief, a rough freebooter under whose banner they knew they would march to victory and enrich themselves with plunder. These chiefs could exercise a firm hold over their followers, and could use their resources as they pleased.
- II Through the reputation they had gained as good soldiers, they were constantly in demand as mercenaries, (17) and practice in fighting gained them much military experience.
- III The Constitution of the Aetolian League was similar to that of the Achaean^a, but superior in the greater energy and unity of ~~its members~~, ^{the Aetolian people,} and in its rapidity in making decisions. In theory, it was like the Achaean

(16) Dubois. Les Ligues étoliennes
et achéenne. p. 46

(17) Tarn. Antig. Gon.
p. 64

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in that it favoured slow action, but in practice its policy was controlled by the chiefs of the tribes, who did much as they pleased and decided for themselves on any course of action without always consulting either Assembly or Council. This was an advantage because it prevented dangerous delays, and there were two causes which made it possible - Firstly, these chiefs could always rely on the habits of military obedience in their followers. They were like the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, and so could command the absolute allegiance and loyalty of their dependents, who would be ready to use their wealth and risk their lives in their cause. Secondly, there was no jealousy between city and city, for since the Aetolians had only taken to city life at the beginning of the third century, their cities had as yet no independent traditions as had those of the Achaean League. They were, in fact, little more than hill fortresses, and the League was much more a union of tribes than of cities, all animated by the same aims, and much more closely united in purpose and action than the various city states of the Achaean League, each of which was wrapped up in its own concerns and interests. It is this unity which accounts for the extraordinary success of the Aetolians in warfare, and for their large acquisitions in territory, so that by the latter half of the third century they had a considerable number of possessions scattered up and down Greece. (18)

(18) This centralisation is well illustrated by Aetolian coins. The Aetolians had only a Federal system of coinage, and no individual city issued its own coins. Before the age of Alexander there is no trace of Aetolian money, and it was not till after the invasions of Aetolia by the Macedonians (in 314-311 B.C.) and the Gauls (in 279 B.C.) that the Federal coinage began. (Head, *Historia Numorum "Aetolia"* pp. 334 and 335)

IV The Aetolians had gained a certain reputation for the bravery and patriotism they had displayed in defending Greece against the Gauls in 279 B.C. In this they took the foremost place (19) and sent the largest number of troops, 12000 men or more, of whom 7000 were hoplites-(20) Most of the fighting fell on them, and they avenged the attack on their own town of Kallion with deadly effect upon the Gauls-(21) Their praiseworthy action in sending their main body in pursuit of Acichorius, (who led the main mass of the Gauls) after the pass of Thermopylae was turned, while detaching only a handful of men to the defence of their own god at Delphi, (22) decided the issue of the whole campaign, and it is in consequence of this that the Aetolians have rightly been given the chief credit for the victory over the Gauls. Even Polybius, their enemy, praises them for this, and there is no doubt that the prestige they gained from it helped enormously to increase their influence. It is from this time, indeed, that we can date the control of the Delphic sanctuary by the Aetolians, which led, in its turn, to their complete control of the Amphiktyonic League, -

Mr Tarn points out that it was the policy of Aetolia to use the League to advance ^{her} ~~the~~ power politically, as Philip II had done. He says, "The Amphiktyonic States were to be her sphere; she looked forward to the day when she should include them all in her own polity, and make the Aetolian League coterminous with the Amphiktyonic." (23)

(19) Paus.X, 21,1

(20) Paus.X, 20, 3-5

(21) Paus. X. 22, 2-7

(22) Paus.X. 23,1

(23) Tarn.Antig.Gon.p. 211

We find by inscriptions (24) that after a time, cities which had been fined by the Amphiktyons found it better to apply for remission, not to the Amphiktyons, but to the Aetolians direct. But the Aetolians used their power over Delphi and the League well. They showed a wise and liberal policy in their treatment of the various cities generally, and they were responsible for the creation of the numerous " *Isula* " or centres of peace, which were declared inviolable, and safe from the horrors of war, by the consent of as many civilized states as possible. The following are examples of inscriptions which record this:-

- a.) B.C.H. 1909, p. 482, No. 8, note 4.
(About 252 B.C.) Decree of the Aetolians, that Delos is to be safe from them and the cities of their League.

Δαλίσις εἶμεν ἀσφάλεια τὰ [ἄπ' Αἰτω]ῶν καὶ τῶν πό[λεων] - -

- b.) O.G.I. 228
(About 242-238 B.C.) Temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis at Smyrna, built in response to a Delphic oracle, was declared *Isulon* and Smyrna itself " *ἱερά καὶ ἄστυλος* -"

Ἔδοξε ταῖ πόλει τῶν Αἰτωῶν. ἔπει βασιλεὺς Σελευκὸς βασιλεὺς [Ἀντιόχου ἀπέστειλες γράμματα ποτὶ τὰν πόλιν ἄξιόν τὸ τε ἱερόν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς στρατονικίδος καὶ τὰν πόλιν τῶν Σμυρναίων ἱεράν καὶ ἄστυλον εἶμεν - - - δεδόχθαι ταῖ πόλει τῶν Αἰτωῶν, τὸ τε ἱερόν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς στρατονικίδος καὶ τὰν πόλιν τῶν Σμυρναίων ἱεράν καὶ ἄστυλον εἶμεν, καθάπερ ὁ τε βασιλεὺς ἀπέστειλε καὶ ἄ τῶν Σμυρναίων πόλις ἄξιόν.

(24) Syll³ 412

----- παραγενομένων εἰς θερμοπύλας τῶν πρεσβευτῶν Πυθαγόρου, Ἐπικούρου, Λάμπωνος, καὶ ἐμφανισάντων αὐτῶν] περὶ ὧν ἦσαν ἀφεσταλέμοι, συνεβούλευέν τε καὶ συνέπραττεν φιλοτίμως ἃ ἦν χρήσιμα τῇ πόλει, καὶ ὡίετο δεῖν ἡμῶς ἀποστεῖλαι πρεσβείαν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωῶν περὶ τῆς πόλιος καὶ τῆς καταδίκης -----

Asylums Against Apollo

c.) Syll³ 557-562
 (About 221 or 220 B.C.) City and territory of Magnesia on the Meander declared "ἄσυλον."
 The recognition as "ἱερά καὶ ἄσυλος" was in pursuance of a Delphic oracle to that effect; the Aetolian decree confirming it is Syll³ 554.

No. 557 Apollo Pythius receives special mention as protector of asylums.

Χρηστηριάζει τάδε πρὸς τὰν ἐρωτηθεῖσαν αὐτῶν
 λῶγιον εἶπεν καὶ ἄχεινον τοῖς σεβασμένοις Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθίου] καὶ
 Ἄρτεμιος Λευκοβρυχηῆν καὶ τῆν] πόλιν καὶ τὰν χώραν τῆν Μαγνητῶν
 τῶν ἐπὶ Μαιάνδρου [ἱερά καὶ ἄσυλον νομιζόντοισι.]

d.) O.G.I. No. 234, l. 24.
 The Amphiktyons declare the city of the Antiochians "ἄσυλον καὶ ἱεράν."
 δεδόχθαι ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτῶι, ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων
 τὰν μὲν πόλιν τῶν Ἀντιοχέων καὶ τὰν χώραν ἀναστικνύει
 ἄσυλον καὶ ἱεράν τοῦ Διὸς χρυσαορέως καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος
 Ἰσοτίμου

e.) Syll³ 563
 Here the Aetolians themselves assure the right of asylum to the city of the Teians.

(23) Polyb. II 45

(26) Freeman: Hist. of Fed. Gov. p. 267.

Arguments Against Aetolia.

(1) Although there was a close unity among the members of the League, they had no continuity of territory. The Aetolian possessions were scattered up and down Greece, and over the islands too. For instance, we find Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenus (25) (in the Peloponnasus), the island of Ceos (in the middle of the Aegean), Cius (on the shores of the Propontis), also Lysimachia and Chalcidon - all incorporated into the Aetolian League.

This was a serious barrier to effective administration, for it was impossible to bring about any real incorporation of many of these scattered states, or to admit them to any share in the government of the League. Those further afield, such as ^{Phigaleia} ~~Philagoia~~ and Kephallenia, were merely used as Aetolian outposts, sometimes paying tribute in return for their defence by Aetolian garrisons, sometimes perhaps joining the League in order to be secured against piratical attacks from the Aetolians themselves. (26)

It follows from this that the relations of the different cities to the League varied somewhat - Some had been acquired by absolute conquest, such as Naupactus and Oniadae; others, like Heraclea, had been forced into union, although they were allowed some share in the political activities of the League; others, such as Teos, had joined because they preferred the Aetolians as friends rather than as foes; and some again, like Mantinea,

(25) Polyb: II 46

(26) Freeman: Hist. of Fed. Gov. p. 267.

had voluntarily joined Aetolia rather than Achaea. There were, however, several central Greek states who were given full membership in the League, e.g. Naupactus, and the dependent states were not ill-treated.

Thus the relation of the different states to the rest of the League varied from that of absolute equality to absolute subjection. In this respect the Aetolian League compares unfavourably with the Achaea^a, where the various cities entered the League on terms of perfect equality. While, in matters of general government, there is no doubt that the Aetolians were inferior to the Achaeans, it must be remembered that the Aetolians had only taken to city life at the end of the third century, and that therefore their ideas of government were a good way behind those of the Achaeans.

2) The Aetolians never possessed a regular battle fleet, and as they were not a commercial nation, they would have found it difficult to get the materials with which to build and equip it. This, however, did not by any means deter them from becoming notorious pirates. Volunteer bands were formed for this purpose, with, of course, the knowledge and connivance of the heads of the League, and it must have been particularly annoying to the victims of these raids to find that when they made complaints to the Government, the latter disclaimed all knowledge or responsibility in the matter.

3) This brings us to the third objection to the ἡγεμονία of the Aetolians, - their notorious reputation in antiquity as robbers and pirates. (27) As Freeman says, "Their character is known to us only from the descriptions of enemies", (28) but there can be no doubt that their reputation was well deserved. They were known to be frankly unscrupulous, and to make a practice of doing as they liked without considering others. For instance, they showed an utter lack of

(27) The part played by the Aetolians on the stage of Greek history may be compared with that of the braggart Captain in the "Miles Gloriosus" of Plautus, who was imitating a Greek play of the 3rd century, or with Bobadil in Ben Jonson's

(28) Freeman, Hist. of Fed. Gov p. 265

"Every Man in his Humour".

restraint and a disregard for the rights of others in the methods by which they made annexations of territory, and it was this, as much as anything, which so incensed public opinion against them, and gave rise to the threat made by ^{one} of the Macedonian kings, that he would deport the whole nation to a remote spot in Asia. (29) The League's leading men were, of course, responsible for this. Being lawless marauders themselves, they failed to keep under proper control the forces at their disposal, and encouraged rather than suppressed their piratical tendencies.

The leaders, too, displayed but poor powers of statesmanship in their diplomatic relations with other states. Polybius and Freeman, who are, however, notoriously prejudiced against the Aetolians, mention as an instance of their selfishness and lack of good faith, their alliance with Rome in 211 B.C. against Philip V of Macedon, by which they arranged to make conquests in Acarnania and elsewhere, and to hand over the moveable spoil to the Romans, while annexing the conquered territory and making it Aetolian. Freeman calls this alliance the "Aetolian treason against Greece", and charges them with having "deliberately introduced the strong arm of Rome into Grecian warfare." (30) Be this as it may, and whether we find the Aetolians guilty or not, such conduct was scarcely desirable in the record of any power which possessed a claim to the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece (31).

Finally, the Aetolians may be regarded as entirely unsuitable on the following grounds - That their political unity and physical vitality, although excellent qualities to possess, could scarcely be said to counterbalance their numerous acts of wilful aggression.

(29) Diod. XVIII 25.

(30) Freeman, Hist. of Fed. Gov. p. 266.

(31) Holleaux acquits the Aetolians of the charge of making an advantageous alliance with the Romans for themselves without the participation of the other Greek states, and points out that the alliance was not to be confined to the Aetolians and Romans alone - it was to be enlarged, if necessary, so as to include the Eleans, Lacedaemonians, Messenians and King Attalus, on the Aetolian side, and on the Roman side, the Illyrians. (Rome et la Grèce... p. 211)

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE

The Achaean League, shortly before 225 B.C., stood at the height of its power and reputation, and had become the leading state in Greece. It presents a good example of the Federal system as a successful form of government, and its constitution was modelled on generous principles, whose object may perhaps have been, as Freeman thinks it was, the union of Achaea, Peloponnesus and, if possible, of the whole of Greece in a free and equal federation. Thus, at first sight, it would seem to have been an extremely suitable power to receive the hegemony.

Arguments in Favour of Achaea.

- (1) In actual extent of territory, it had all the advantages which Aetolia lacked. In 223 B.C. the League embraced a large continuous stretch of land, every bit of which was Achaean. To it belonged the whole of old Achaea, the Argolic peninsula and the greater part of Arcadia, with Phlius, Sicyon, Corinth, Megara and the island of Aegina. This included practically the whole Peloponnese, and, if conditions had been happier, it might have extended itself over the whole of Greece. The possession of one large continuous stretch of territory had this advantage, that it was easier to weld the whole league into one political body. The meetings of the Central Assembly, could be attended regularly and without risk or difficulty. The Achaean League held a strong central position in Greece, while the possession of Corinth meant control of the Isthmus, and control of the passes to the North and South of Greece. The Macedonian kings had demonstrated in the past the importance they attached

~~20~~

to the possession of Corinth. To secure Corinth had been the most cherished dream of Antigonus Gonatas. "Gonatas, when he held Corinth in fact, held in idea the heritage of Alexander in Europe, the potential headship of the Greek world." (32)

- (2) The military resources of the League were of course considerable, and Corinth possessed a fleet. It was to Achaea now, and not Sparta, that those forces belonged which Sparta had led to victory in the fourth century. Had the League only possessed good generals to collect and organise its forces, at the critical period when it was threatened by Cleomenes, there would have been no difficulty in establishing its military ascendancy, for there was an ample amount of good fighting material to be found in the Peloponnesus. This was to be proved later by Philopoemen, who by his skilful generalship marshalled the forces of the League and led it to victory, so that it eventually gained control over the whole peninsula.
- (3) The League was not without wealth in that it could boast the possession of certain large and important cities whose resources would help to swell its revenues. Such were Corinth, prosperous by reason of its commerce, Megalopolis, which was large enough to possess subject districts, Argos and Sicyon. Thus the League had always the combined resources of all its constituent cities to fall back upon in case of war or any other emergency, and we know that Aratus was never without the means of using bribery to further his schemes for the inclusion of new members in the League.
- (4) But perhaps the League's greatest asset was its possession of good statesmen who knew how to work the Federal system with success. Polybius waxes enthusiastic on the subject of the League and its constitution. He describes

(32) Tarn: Antig.Gon.
p.371

it as the body which, "without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages, first freely offered Liberty, Equality and Fraternity to every inhabitant of the Peloponnese....." None of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them, but equal rights were given to all comers.. the rights of equality and fraternity..... This then must be looked upon as the source and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity". (33) This system of equality between city and city shews a very great advance in federal government, for it was just what previous leagues had failed to give. And just as each city was admitted to the League on terms of perfect equality, so each was left free and independent to manage its own internal affairs as it chose. Thus the *αὐτονομία* of each state, a factor considered indispensable in the Greek city-state system ^{was preserved} to an extent which had not been the case in earlier leagues e.g. in Boeotia and Arcadia, ~~was preserved~~. On the other hand, each city was subject in matters of foreign policy to the decisions of the central government. This gave just the curb that was needed, for it saved them from the possibility of making war on their neighbours whenever they chose, one of the causes which, more than anything else, had hitherto contributed to prevent the unification of Greece.

- (5) The Achaeans were particularly fortunate, not only in their form of constitution, but in possessing a statesman like Aratus whose foreign policy, though open to criticism (See pp. 22, 23, 24) succeeded on many occasions in effecting an economy in blood and treasure.

It is entirely due to the peculiar powers of Aratus that the League was, on several occasions, enlarged by the inclusion of additional cities. His greatest successes were with Sicyon/and Corinth (35) which thus became incorpo-

(33) Polyb. II 39, 42

(34) Paus. II, 3. 4

(35) Plut: Ar. 18-23

rated in the League. But what may perhaps be considered his greatest diplomatic achievements were his transactions, first with Antigonus and then Cleomenes during the Cleomonic war. In the first, he contrived to enter into negotiations with Antigonus while apparently taking no part in the business, though really acting under the cloak of Megalopolis. (36) In the second, having practically come to terms with Macedon, he skilfully averted the danger of adherence to Sparta (a step which the League was then on the point of taking), by contriving matters in such a way that Cleomenes himself broke off all negotiations and declared war. (37)

Another brilliant "coup" of Aratus, which illustrates his peculiar methods of action, was the feat of surprising and taking Mantinea (38) immediately after he had been defeated by Cleomenes at Lycasum, when all the world thought him dead. Certainly no one could ever have accused Aratus of throwing away opportunities.

Arguments Against Achaea.

Yet, in spite of all these advantages, Achaea failed to step into the leading place, and to save the fortunes of Greece, because of one inherent weakness, which brought disaster upon it. It was lacking in military efficiency. The responsibility for this rested with the federal government, which was guilty of extremely weak and vacillating conduct with regard to its external policy. Being plutocratic in character, and afraid of any changes that might affect the constitution of the League through the spread of the revolutionary ideas of Agis and Cleomenes, which advocated an abolition of debts and a redistribution of lands, it was selfishly opposed to making any sacrifices, but wished to protect home interests at the cost of everything else, and to keep wealth in the hands of the few. A certain amount of blame must also be laid to the charge of

(36) Plut. Ar. 38
Polyb. II 48

(37) Plut. Ar. 39
Cl. 17

(38) Polyb. II 57-58
Plut. Cl. 5
Ar. 36

the various cities of the League, which ^{were} ~~was~~ probably unwilling to be taxed and conscripted for federal purposes.

The result was that the central government had not sufficient control over the rest of the League to be able to muster its forces in time to meet the powerful and well-equipped army of Cleomenes, created by his own revolutionary and energetic measures in Sparta. (39) Hence followed disaster and defeat at the hands of the Spartan king. He attacked the Achaeans with vigour, and made the campaign a series of victories for Sparta. Whenever Aratus could avoid fighting he did so, as at Pallanteum (40), whenever he was compelled to fight, as at Lysaeum (41) and Ladoecia, (42) he was utterly defeated. Town after town which had belonged to the Achaean League fell before the forces of Cleomenes, until his overwhelming victory at Hecatombaeum (43) proved so decisive that by 225 B.C. the Achaeans were utterly exhausted, and finding it impossible to maintain their independence they were obliged to seek external assistance. (44)

To conclude, it has been shown that since the disadvantages outweigh the advantages in the case of each of the three states, Athens, the Aetolian League and the Achaean League, they must, one and all, be excluded from any claim to the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece.

There remain to be considered the claims of the two great powers, Sparta and Macedon.

(39) This would explain the extraordinary disparity in numbers between the opposing forces before the Battle of Sellasia. The entire Achaean forces, including the Megalopolitans, numbered only 4,300 men, as against 18,600 Macedonians and 20,000 Spartans. (Polyb:II 65)

(40) Plut: Cl: 4

(41) Plut:Cl:5
Polyb:II 51

(42) Plut:Ar:37
Polyb.II 51

(43) Polyb.II 51

(44) Plut:ar: 41

CHAPTER II

SPARTA AND MACEDON

MATERIAL RESOURCES

We have already seen that the political situation in Greece in 225 B.C. was to be determined by the action of the two dominant powers, Sparta and Macedon. When at last they came to grips at Sellasia, all the world knew that the prize of victory would be the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece.

It is now necessary to compare the resources of the two powers, and to consider which had the better claim. Did Aratus choose wisely in invoking the aid of Macedon, or, if he had thrown in his lot with Sparta, would Sparta have been suited to become the head of a national Greek confederacy, and would she have been likely to make Greece into a strong national State?

A. SPARTA

Sparta's Assets in 225 B.C.

- (a) What Sparta Had in 225 B.C. Sparta possessed one very important asset gained by the energetic measures of Cleomenes, - a large and thoroughly efficient army.

The Spartans had always been a nation of soldiers; their military training ensured this, and the reputation they had gained in early times as the best fighting force of any state in Greece was well deserved. Yet at the time of Cleomenes' accession to the throne, the Spartan army, as far as numbers were concerned, was not in any way outstanding. At the beginning of

his reign he led his troops to attack the Achaean^a League because he wished to restore Sparta's old renown in war and therefore secure a strong position for himself, before attempting his revolution at home. The number of men he then had with him to oppose the large army of Aristomachus near Pallanteum was a meagre 5000.(1) Yet at Sellasia we hear that he was able to put into the field against Antigonus over 20,000 men.(2) He was able^{to} effect this wonderful change by carrying out with success the scheme of reform which Agis had attempted, and which had cost him his life. Cleomenes found the State in the throes of an economic crisis which had to be met before he could carry out his schemes for re-arming the Spartan nation, and restoring their ancient ascendancy in Greece.

The fact that all Spartiates were prohibited from engaging in commerce had led to serious and evil consequences. One result was that land began to be concentrated more and more in the hands of a comparatively few men. The trouble was increased when in 369 B.C. Epaminondas restored the Messenians to their country, for it meant that the Spartan state was the poorer by the 4000 κληροί which its citizens had hitherto held in the Messenian territory. Bereft of his allotment, the Spartan citizen had perforce to try his fortunes in mercenary service, and on his return home the natural investment for his hard-earned gains would be the purchase of land. This explains the necessity for the rhetra of Epitadeus,(3) which removed the prohibition concerning the alienation of land. Results unfortunately proved, however, that the institution of this law, which was meant to redress the evil, served rather to

(1) Plut:Cl:4

(2) Polyb:II 65

(3)The date of this rhetra is not certain, but Prof.Toynbee in

J.H.S.1913, places it at about 357 B.C.explaining that it must have been passed soon after the independence of Messenia was recognised in the general treaty of peace which followed the Battle of Mantinea.

increase it, for instead of giving the poor man the opportunity of buying a κτήρος, it merely helped the rich land-owner to extend his gains. Finally, all property seems to have accumulated among a very few families, so that by the time of Agis and Cleomenes, we hear that out of 700 Spartans, only about 100 possessed land. (4)

So Cleomenes found, as Agis had done, that the problem before him was a social and economic one, and that the only possible remedy was a general redistribution of land, and the only means of effecting this, a social revolution. Having abolished the ephorate, and transformed a constitution which was oligarchic in character into an absolute monarchy, he had a perfectly free hand to carry out his reforms. He presented his own property to the State, and made the rest follow his example, and he thus had all its resources at his disposal. Hence followed the redistribution of land, the cancelling of debts, the recall of the exiles, and the enfranchisement of Perioeci and foreigners. (5)

The extension of the franchise to Perioeci and foreigners was important from a military point of view, because it admitted a large body of men into the ranks of the heavy-armed troops and thus helped to form an army of 4000 citizen infantry, (6) furnished with up-to-date military equipment, and using the "sarissa" in Macedonian fashion. (7) Finally, with his Spartans, Perioeci and Helots, Cleomenes was able to put over 20,000 men into the field. (8)

(4) Plut: Agis. 5 (5) Plut: Cleom. 10, 11
(6) The number 4000 represents the 4000 κτήροισι into which Cleomenes divided up the Spartan territory, and is identical with the number of land allotments in the Stenyklaros plain lost to Sparta in the days of Epaminondas. (Toynbee, J.H.S. 1913)
(7) Plut: Cleom. 11
(8) This total of 20,000, the number given by Polybius II, 65, compares closely with the 19,500 κτήροισι mentioned by Plutarch, Agis 8, as the number of lots into which Agis proposed to divide the whole Spartan territory, i.e. 4,500 land lots between the valley of Pellene and Mount Taygetus, and 15000 to be made out of the remaining territory, and to be shared among the Perioeci and foreigners, after every Spartan had received his portion. Cleomenes probably carried out this very scheme.

It remains to shew that Sparta's home resources, all of which were now for the first time utilised to their fullest extent by Cleomenes, were:-

- (1) Greater than they had been in the fifth century,
- (2) Considerably greater than in the fourth and early third centuries.

(1) It is true that the beginning of the fifth century had seen Sparta at the height of her power. The number of full citizens had been 8000, and the subjugation of Laconia and conquest of Messenia in the sixth century had added to this number a large army of Helots and Perioecae, who were completely under her control. But this state of things had not lasted. In 464 B.C. the earthquake which devastated Sparta had been followed immediately by a rising of the Messenian helots, which was destined to be the first of many. From this time, Sparta could never feel perfectly secure against them, and the loyalty of the Laconian helots too, with whom Pausanias was thought to have plotted, had been mere than doubtful. This explains the reluctance of the Spartans to send large numbers of troops far from home on war expeditions. It was not safe to leave the Helots.

(2) But if this was true of the fifth century, it was true in a considerably greater degree of the fourth and early third centuries, by which time the home resources of Sparta had dwindled still further. From early times the marked differences in wealth among the citizens had led to a gradual decay of the population, until in the time of Aristotle, the number of full citizens had sunk to less than 1000. With this reduction in the numbers of the army had come the decrease in the proportion of Spartans to Perioecae, and the weakness resulting from this revealed itself in the defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra. The State had been further weakened by the loss of Messenia in the time of Epaminondas, which meant not only the freeing of numbers of

Helots from its dominions, but also the loss of a large tract of land in the Stenyklaros plain which had belonged to Spartan citizens.

The end of the fourth century and the beginning of the third saw the devastation of Laconia by Philip of Macedon, and the crushing of various Spartan rebellions against Macedon in the days of Alexander and his successors.

Finally, in 244 B.C. an Aetolian army overran Laconia, carrying off large numbers of captives. (10)

These causes, together with those mentioned on page 2, serve to explain the paucity of population and of Sparta's home resources generally, when Cleomenes came to the throne.

Sparta's Deficiencies in 225 B.C.

What Sparta Lacked in 225 B.C.

A very important contribution to the

material equipment of Sparta was now lacking.-

1. The resources of the Peloponnesian League. In fact, it was the military strength of the Peloponnesians together with her own, which had been the sole means of raising her to the position of ἡγεμῶν of the Greek states, and had formed her sole claim to supremacy. It was as head of the Peloponnesian forces that she had fought in the Persian Wars, and it was her power to draw on the resources of the Peloponnesian League which had been largely instrumental in giving her the victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War. As soon as Sparta began to lose her Peloponnesian possessions, she lost her power and prestige in Greece. It was the fact that Epaminondas was able to detach so many of the Peloponnesian states from Sparta to the side of Thebes during his campaigns in the Peloponnese, that contributed so materially to her defeat, first at Leuctra and then at Mantinea, and left her isolated in

(9) See Page 2

(10) Plut: Cl: 18
Polyb: IV, 34

the south of the peninsula, robbed of the best of her territory and surrounded by two dangerous neighbours, now independent - Messenia and Arcadia. Her position of leadership, lost then, was never afterwards recovered.

It is true that Cleomenes, by his victories over the Achaean League, gradually gained over to his side a large part of the Peloponnese, namely, the chief cities in Arcadia - Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenus - the chief cities in Achaea - Dyme, Langon, Pellene, Cleonae and Phlius - and, finally, the important cities of Argos and Corinth. But these accessions were of little service to him, for, as we have seen, the cities of the Achaean League had very little to boast of at this time in the way of military efficiency-(11) Cleomenes may have received small detachments of troops from one or two to add to his fighting force, but the majority were unwilling victims of his conquests, and some cities he was only able to hold for a short time, e.g. Corinth and Megalopolis which had to be taken by force, and remained throughout loyal to Achaea, and we know that her men of fighting age had mostly fallen in his earlier campaign.

As for the acquisition to the Spartan treasury made by the conquest of these towns, they could not have amounted to much, for there was not much wealth in the peninsula. Polybius, in discussing the question of the spoil taken by Cleomenes in the destruction of Megalopolis, points out the comparative poverty of the Peloponnese at this time, and shews how much it had been drained of its resources by the Macedonian kings, and by intestine wars. He adds that the value of the whole spoil of Mantinea, when it was taken by Antigonus Doseon, amounted to only 300 talents. (12)

II The Spartans possessed no fleet. This disadvantage followed as a result

(11) See Chap I page 22

(12) Polyb: II, 62

of the first. It was because the Spartans could no longer use the resources of the Peloponnesian League as they had done in the fifth and fourth centuries that they had not the man-power necessary to maintain a navy.

But their disability went further than this - Sparta never had possessed a fleet, and never could have become a great sea-power. The fleets sent out from the Peloponnese during the later years of the Peloponnesian War, and generally commanded by a Spartan admiral, had been called "Spartan", but they had really been requisitioned from the other Peloponnesian states, and had not belonged to Sparta at all.

Even this "borrowed" sea-power, so to speak, had not been maintained for long. Its existence had depended largely on the support given by Persia. When this support was withdrawn the Spartans had paid less attention to the maintenance of their navy, until, with its defeat off Cnidus in 394 B.C. by the Persian fleet under Conon and Pharnabazus, they had lost their sea-power for all time. *B. of Navos in 376?*

~~The truth of the matter was that Sparta had not the necessary conditions for becoming a sea-power. Only great commercial states, in fact, were eligible, for they possessed the wealth which commerce, forbidden to Spartan citizens, alone could bring.~~

III Sparta had little wealth in comparison with other city states of the ancient world. Such revenues as she possessed were not in the form of gold and silver, as in other states, but in the wealth derived from landed property, which consisted entirely in the annual return, in kind, made by the Helots. The sole use to which this wealth could be put was to provide each Spartan with the necessities of life without his having to work for them. But it could only be used in Sparta. For war purposes, therefore, it was quite valueless.

There was another source of revenue in the form of money, but it was fitful and uncertain, viz Payments for mercenary service. At times these seem to have been fairly considerable, (13) but they would depend on -
Firstly, the outbreak of war in other places,
Secondly, the number of Spartans employed as mercenaries from time to time, (14)

Apart from these two sources of income, the Spartans had practically no other financial resources. At the latter end of the third century, they occupied an isolated position in the south of the Peloponnese, and possessed no tribute-paying subject cities, as they had done in the fourth century when they had set up their Empire over the cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean.

It is true that Sparta exacted tribute from the Perioeci, who probably paid a small rent for the domain lands which they occupied, but this source of revenue was quite inconsiderable. This payment, too, would vary considerably from time to time with the variation in the numbers of Perioeci, chiefly through losses in battle. Many, too, must have been lost to the Spartan state when Messenia and Arcadia were made independent.

Lastly, Sparta lacked something which formed for other states their most important source of revenue - the money brought by trade and industry.

But the Spartans were debarred by law from trade or manufacture, and were forbidden to possess either gold or silver. This prohibition, as we know, was evaded, (15)

(13) A considerable part of the 600 talents (about £150,000) which Agis had been ready to give to the State at the time of his revolution must have been payment for mercenary service made to Agis' predecessors. Holm suggests that the Spartans made a certain amount of money out of the market for mercenaries at Cape Taenarum. (Holm: Hist. of Greece IV, p. 223)

(14) There seems to have been a considerable increase in this number after the passing of the rhetra of Epitadeus, when many Spartans were deprived of their ancestral estates. (See page 2)

(15) After the rhetra of Epitadeus was passed, some Spartans must have made considerable sums of money by selling their estates, and we know that large sums were paid to the state by rich citizens at the time when Cleomenes was carrying out his economic reforms.

and individual Spartans did come into possession of money, but they could not use it for commercial purposes. All the industry and trade of Laconia was in the hands of the Perioeci. It was they who possessed whatever gold and silver might be in the country, and who traded in the iron and steel wares from the mines on Mount Taygetus, and the shoes and woollen stuffs from Amyclae. In fact, all the import and export trade of Laconia and Messenia was in their hands.

After Alexander's death, Macedonia had been considerably weakened through the various wars waged by his numerous princes who strove to gain possession of it. It was Antigonus Gonatas who carried the dynasty, and whose Macedonia was a strong kingdom. By his policy of tyrants and garrisons, he had also extended his sway over Greece and the Peloponnese. After his death, however, Southern Greece began to try to shake off the rule of Macedonia. The old Achaean League, which had been dissolved by the Macedonian kings, came to life again, and the cities began to expel their tyrants and foreign garrisons.

In Central Greece, too, Macedonia had scarcely any influence. The Achaean and Aetolian were predominant. Thessaly (16) had broken away from Macedonia, and was in alliance with them. In the time of Antigonus Gonatas, although Macedon was independent in its internal affairs, yet Macedonian influence had predominated, but the anti-Macedonian party had now gained the upper hand.

Corcyra was in the hands of the Romans, established by Demetrius of Pharos after its capture by the Illyrians (17) and Macedonia held nothing south of Thessaly except Euboea and the Cyclades.

(16) Justinus XVIII, 1.

(17) Justinus II, 12.

B. M A C E D O N
Macedon's Assets
What Macedon Had in 225 B.C.

I In 225 B.C. the military strength of Macedon was greater than that of any single Greek state.

This was partly due to the energy and ability of Antigonus Doson, who, when he came to the throne, found it necessary, like Cleomenes, to re-establish his country's position in Greece.

After Alexander's death, Macedon had been considerably weakened through the various wars waged by the numerous princes who strove to gain possession of it. It was Antigonus Gonatas who settled the disorders, and made Macedon once more a strong kingdom. By his system of tyrants and garrisons, he had also extended his sway over Greece and the Peloponnese. After his death, however, Southern Greece began to try to shake off the rule of Macedon. The old Achaean League, which had been dissolved by the Macedonian kings, came to life again, and the cities began to expel their tyrants and foreign garrisons.

In Central Greece, too, Macedon had scarcely any influence, for there the Aetolians were predominant. Thessaly (16) had broken away from Macedon, and was in alliance with them. In the time of Antigonus Gonatas, although Thessaly was independent in its internal affairs, yet Macedonian influence had predominated. But the anti-Macedonian party had now gained the upper hand.

Cercyra was in the hands of the Romans, surrendered by Demetrius of Pharos after its capture by the Illyrians, (17) and Macedon held nothing south of Thessaly except Euboea and the Cyclades.

(16) Justin: XXVIII.3.

(17) Polyb:II, 11

The Other native troops included the Royal foot guards and the Macedonian cavalry.

In addition to these there were the Thessalian troops, who would follow the Macedonian king as their overlord, and who numbered 1000 good fighting men. (24 a)

There were also various contingents from allied Greek states who were not formally subjects of the Macedonian king. Thus in Dason's army in 222 B.C. were allied troops from Boeotia, Epirus, Acarnania and Illyria, besides the Achaeans. Lastly, there were the mercenaries, who had always, since the time of Alexander, formed an important part in the armies of the Macedonian kings. These were either Greeks or Gauls. It was quite customary to engage Greek officers of high military reputation to command the native troops. Gauls had been employed as mercenaries from the time of the Gallic invasion of Greece and Asia Minor in 279 B.C. Besides their use for service abroad, these mercenaries were also largely employed for garrison duty in the various cities subject to Macedon. Demetrius had had a force of about 20,000 men in garrisons both in Greece and on his western and northern frontiers.

The Battle of Sellasia affords a good opportunity for comparing the numerical strength of the armies of the two powers.

The numbers on the side of Macedon far exceeded those of Sparta. The Macedonian troops alone, with the Greek and Gallic mercenaries, were nearly as many as the whole Spartan army. They numbered 18,600, while the total strength of Sparta was 20,000. If to these are added the allied troops which came from Boeotia, Epirus, Acarnania and Illyria, together with the 4,300 of the armies of the Achaeans, we get a grand total of 28,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry. (25)

(24a) Beloch - "Griechische Geschichte" - Vol: III. Chap: VIII. p. 293, quoting Xen: Hell: VI.1.8, mentions 10,000 Thessalian infantry, and 6000 cavalry - As, however, the infantry were drawn from the small peasantry, they were not so readily available for foreign service as the cavalry, who consisted of nobles and their retainers.

(25) Polyb: II 65

But in estimating the full military strength of Macedon, it is necessary to add the mercenary troops used for the garrisons which Doseon still held in Greece. The grand total gives Macedon the superiority, so much so, indeed, that we may estimate the relative strength of the two powers as being in the proportion of 3 / 2.
(25a)

knowledge?

II In 225 B.C. Macedon was the greatest sea-power in the Eastern Mediterranean and possessed the strongest war fleet. At the beginning of the third century the supremacy of the sea had been held by Egypt, and it is to Gonatas that the glory belongs of having broken that power. By the victories of the Macedonian fleet in the two sea fights off Cos (in 256 B.C.) and Andros (227 B.C.) the command of the sea passed definitely into the hands of Macedon, and with it went the sovereignty over the Cyclades.

The conquest of the navies of Egypt was a great achievement, for it removed the chief menace to the power of Macedon in Greece, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. There had always been the danger ~~that~~ ^{that} the fleet of Egypt might sweep down at any time upon any of the strongholds of Macedon in Greece, such as Corinth or Chalcis, and take possession. Now, however, all such danger was at an end, and the king of Macedon could hold securely by means of his fleet the various ports in Greece which belonged to him, and likewise the islands in the Aegean.

III The financial resources of Macedon, though not to be compared with those of Egypt, were considerably greater than those of Sparta.

Macedon's Deficiencies.
What Macedon Lacked

The gold mines of Philippi, which in the days of Philip II had yielded a yearly revenue of 1000 talents, (26) had been worked out, (27) and no others had been discovered.

(25a) Gr 4:2, using Xenophon's estimate of 10,000 Thesalians.

(26) Diod. XVI 8

(27) Perdrizet, Klie 1910, Article Scaptésyle pp.26-27.

What Macedon Had.

But there remained:

a. The silver mines on Mount Pangaeus, and the country also possessed iron, lead and copper mines. (28) We hear that, up to about 156 B.C., the Romans, though they shut up the gold and silver mines, at any rate caused the iron and copper mines to be worked. (29)

There were, too, royal monopolies, such as salt mines.

b. Export duties on timber and other commodities, and harbour and customs duties. (30) Macedon must have exported a good deal of timber as well as pitch, for ship-building. Corinth, too, brought a certain amount of revenue from its trade and harbour dues.

c. Land Tax.
We hear that in the reign of Perseus Macedon provided a yearly revenue of over 200 talents from land taxes alone, exclusive of mining royalties. (31)

d. The tribute exacted from the Greek cities by the Antigonid kings, which was often demanded under a pleasanter name, as the "contribution" - "ὀρταξίς" - of an ally. This also helped to swell the treasury, though it was a fluctuating quantity.

The total revenue was far less than the 1000 talents of which Macedon could boast in the days of Philip II, but as the land tax alone brought in 200 talents, the total probably exceeded 500 talents.

This was, at any rate, sufficient to finance a large army and strong

(28) Polyb V 39, 6 & 7
Livy 45, 18

(29) Daranberg - Saglio
"Dictionnaire des Antiquites" - "Metallum"

(30) Polyb. V 39, 6 & 7

(31) Plut. Aem. 26, 4

fleet, and the expenses of the latter would be reduced by the fact that the country would provide its own timber for shipbuilding, and that, too, in large quantities.

That the country was comparatively wealthy in the reign of Doseon may be inferred from the fact that he was able to make generous gifts to other states, as, for example, to Rhodes after the earthquake in 224 B.C. Polybius mentions the royal liberality displayed not only by the kings of Egypt and Syria, but also of Macedon. Among the rich presents offered to the city, those given by Antigonus Doseon were, besides other things, "ten thousand timbers.....three thousand talents of iron, a thousand talents of pitch.....and a hundred talents of silver".(32)

To sum up, if we exclude such opulent kingdoms as those of Syria and Egypt, we come to the conclusion that Macedon was wealthy in comparison with the other European states in her neighbourhood. She had, at any rate, much more wealth than Sparta. Macedon never had to face economic difficulties like those of Sparta. She possessed a vigorous, hard-working people, and a land which responded well to their agricultural labours. After the wars of Gonatas' reign were over, and peace was once more restored, the country became prosperous, and this prosperity was maintained in the reign of Antigonus Doseon.

In comparing the resources of Sparta and Macedon, we find some similarities between them, but it is Macedon which weighs down the scale.

Both had able military leaders, each of whom found his country weak,

(32) Polyb. V 89, 6 & 7

CHAPTER III

SPARTA AND MACEDON - MENTAL APTITUDES FOR LEADERSHIP.

There remains to be discussed the question - which of the two, *states*, Sparta or Macedon, was the better suited for leadership. A successful

ἡγεμῶν must possess the following qualities:-

1. The power to maintain a sufficiently firm hold over the other members so as -
 - a. To secure internal peace -
 - b. To summon without difficulty the combined forces of the League for its protection and defence against outside powers.

2. The wisdom and moderation -
 - a. To respect the *ἰσὺτονομία* of each State to the extent of allowing not only local self-government, but also exemption from tribute.
 - b. To give the dependent States a voice in framing the general policy of the League by admitting their representatives to a share in the deliberations of a Federal Assembly.

A. SPARTA

Arguments in her Favour.

I The peculiar training - *ἄγωγή* - of the Spartans had converted them into a nation of disciplined warriors. They were professional soldiers, and they fought in groups rather than as individuals. Such was their discipline that they could be trusted to stand firm in battle, whether in victory or defeat, and never to break their ranks or scatter in confusion like the other Greeks. In fact, no other troops, until the days of Theban Supremacy, were considered fit to match with theirs. The Spartan army was always regarded, both by friends and foes, as a power to reckon with, and

the reputation it had gained of never turning its back upon the enemy was well deserved. It was because her troops were of this high quality that Sparta had gained her prestige as a great military power, with the result that the ἡγεμονία of the Peloponnese, and indeed, of the whole of Greece, had been her natural position.

The training of the Perioeci was inferior to that of the Spartans, and on this account they were never placed, in battle, either in the front ranks or in the rear, but always in the middle. In spite of this, however, the Lacedaemonian army was still superior in quality to the armies of the rest of Greece, for the inferior training of the Perioeci added to the superior training of the Spartans formed, in the aggregate, a superior army.

In short, it may be said that, as the fighting force possessed by the leading state, the Lacedaemonian army would have been sufficiently strong and reliable to ensure tranquillity at home, and to form the nucleus of a united Hellenic force against foes abroad.

This efficiency and confidence which had belonged to the Spartan troops in the past, but which had been lacking since the days when Thebes had wrested from Sparta the supremacy, was restored by Cleomenes. He not only succeeded in converting the whole Spartan nation into a military force, duly trained and equipped, but by his personal example and bravery he gained their respect and loyalty, and as their general, he was able to inspire them with such enthusiasm that they were ready to follow him anywhere, confident of victory.

II Sparta had been in the position of ἡγεμόν in the past, as head of the Peloponnesian League, which, at any rate in the sixth and fifth centuries, or during the greater part of its existence, had been a success. The

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The basis of its formation was the equality and freedom of its members, and it provided the following advantages:-

- a. The states were given security against outside aggression. All had to unite to defend the Peloponnese (1). If one state was attacked, the allies were bound to respond to its summons for aid. (2) In this way it became the habit of the members of the League to act in union under Sparta, and this it was which, in the Persian Wars, helped to bring the Greeks victory, and in the Peloponnesian War, brought about the downfall of Athens.
- b. The League formed a real obstacle to the making of war between the Peloponnesian States. If a dispute arose between two members of the League, an attempt at an amicable settlement was made; if, however, this failed, a third state was called in as arbiter. (3)
- c. The League imposed no burden upon the allies except occasional conscription and taxation.

While the *ἀυτονομία* of each of the dependent states was preserved, they were at the same time given a real share in helping to frame the general policy of the League, especially in times of crisis, as we see, for example, during the Persian Wars.

The result was that Sparta had the good-will of her allies, and in the Peloponnesian War the advantage of this was demonstrated, as compared with the position of Athens.

III Sparta had never had a better opportunity of securing the hegemony of Greece than in 225 B.C., for she had never had a better king than Cleomenes. From the very beginning of his reign he had shewn how eminently fitted he was

(1) Thuc: V, 77

(2) Thuc: V, 79

(3) Thuc: V, 79

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to guide the destinies of his country. His nobility of character and generosity, and his practical commonsense had revealed themselves in the reforms he had carried for the welfare of Sparta.

These reforms, too, had proved him to possess wide and liberal views. He had acted in opposition to Spartan principles by being generous to the Helots and Perioecæ, whom he had enfranchised freely. There is therefore no reason to doubt that he would also have been generous to the Peloponnesian States. It is likely that he would have revived the principles of the first Peloponnesian League, and having secured for Sparta the *ἡγεμονία*, would no doubt have admitted the other States in a free and equal confederation.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST SPARTA.

1. Sparta had not been entirely successful as head of the Peloponnesian League, for the following reasons:-
 - a. She was handicapped by the lack of a fleet, and her army, without this support, was not always quick enough to crush rebellions and prevent them from spreading-(4)
 - b. Her policy in the Peloponnese, to play off various states against each other for her own advantage, and to trade upon their mutual fears and jealousies, though it ^{secured Spartan ascendancy for a long period,} ~~gained for her a considerable amount of domination~~, was not always a success. Sometimes the States refused to allow her to govern their actions, and threw off her control. Thus the Corinthians broke up the expedition of Cleomenes against Attica about the year 506 B.C. Again, there were times when she found it impossible to unify the Peloponnese for concerted action. On several occasions the States absolutely refused to follow

(4) Cf. Xen: Ath. Pol.

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§ § 11-13

her to war, and she was powerless to compel them.

Thus ^{her} the military hold on the Peloponnese was always precarious.

II

As a consequence of the $\lambda\gamma\omega\gamma\eta'$ certain qualities were developed in the Spartan character which to the Greeks at any rate were far from admirable.

a. It has been said that the $\lambda\gamma\omega\gamma\eta'$ produced fine specimens of manhood, but that they were little better than healthy young animals, and that their physical excellence went hand in hand with a complete vacuity of intellect.

cf. Arist. Pol. viii, 4

It is true that the subordination of all the energies of the State to one end only, the training for war, led speedily to the repression of all culture and of all desire for it, (5) and that so far as the liberal arts were concerned, the Spartans may be regarded as barbarians.

This defect may, however, be regarded as unimportant from the point of view of ^{this} the argument. The absence of any outstanding intellectual or artistic gifts in a State with imperial aspirations need not necessarily condemn it. In the history of mankind it has often been found that the very states in which such qualities are conspicuous by their absence are those pre-eminently fitted to conquer and rule a large section of the rest of the world. The Romans, for instance, could make it their boast that the arts they cultivated were the arts of government, and so they could afford to leave other accomplishments to their neighbours. Virgil has expressed this idea in the well-known lines of the sixth book of the Aeneid (6)

"Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera".....
"Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento"

(5) Professor Toynbee says, "Within a century of the $\gamma\eta\varsigma$ $\lambda\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\mu\alpha\varsigma$, Spartan art was dead." J.H.S. 1910, Toynbee, "The Growth of Sparta."

(6) Virg. Aen. VI, ll 847-853

=6= ?

The same thing may be said of Persia, of Turkey and of other powers that have built up great Empires; of smaller states, the Aetolian League is a case in point.

b. But the *ἄνωγῆ* produced much worse faults in the Spartan character than lack of culture, and these, when practised on the world at large, caused much discontent.

The Spartans became proud and arrogant, for were they not brought up to consider themselves a race apart? They were the 'chosen people', the lords and masters of the Helots. Moreover, not only Helots, but Perioeci and foreigners, and in fact, the rest of the world, must acknowledge their superiority. This explains the charges of pride and insolence brought against individual Spartans when placed in positions of authority abroad. Pausanias, *Clearchus* ~~Gylippus~~ and Lysander are typical examples.

To the Greeks, with their love of moderation - *μηδὲν ἄγαν* - "nothing could be more offensive than the display of these qualities.

c. Another objectionable characteristic of the Spartans was their cupidity. By the laws of Lycurgus they were forbidden to trade, or, as individuals, to possess money. The effect of this was to make them powerless to resist financial temptations when they came their way. There are many individual instances of cupidity, and in some cases, of actual theft. A striking example is the story of Gylippus and the treasure ^{at} of Syracuse. Nor was this vice confined to individuals. A glaring example of it was afforded by the Spartan government when they continued to exact the tribute from the former allies of Athens after the Peloponnesian War. It was not so much the actual taxation of the Greek cities - in this they were justified - as the manner in which they procured the money.

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~~secured the money.~~ In the first place they were not consistent in their conduct; for they had promised to 'liberate' the Greeks from the tyranny of Athens, and having duly 'liberated' them, they proceeded to break their promises by continuing to exact the tribute. Secondly, they exacted more than twice as much as they need have done, for they continued to demand the war rate of 1000 talents, (7) whereas before the war Athens had found 500 talents an ample sum, and even that had yielded a surplus.

It is true that there was a strong party in Sparta which opposed this action of Lysander on the grounds that so much wealth would foster corruption and cupidity, but their proposal to dedicate the whole of the spoil from the captured cities to the Delphic god was defeated by Lysander's party.

It may be argued that Cleomenes had already shown such wisdom and moderation that, if he had been able to make Sparta an Imperial city, he would have been fully capable of checking these far from admirable tendencies on the part of his countrymen. But there is little doubt that his influence would only have extended during his lifetime, and that the Spartans, under less high-minded and honourable leaders, would probably have fallen back into their old ways.

These qualities - arrogance and cupidity - became conspicuous as soon as Sparta was brought into continuous relations with the outside world; that is to say, when she became Head of the Second Hellenic League in the time of Ly-handed sander. His high-minded policy in setting up oligarchical governments everywhere, whether the cities really wanted them or not, shewed that Sparta, when placed in a position of power and authority, could only act with oppression and tyranny. For these oligarchies, with their systems of decarchies, har-

(7) Diod: XIV, 10

mosts, and foreign garrisons, were most uncongenial to the Greek cities. They had been created by Lysander merely to further his own ambition, and they ran counter to all the ideas of liberty cherished by the Greeks. Atrocious deeds were committed in setting up these governments. They arose among scenes of bloodshed and treachery; and under them the cities were exposed to a double tyranny, that of the decarchies on the one hand, and the Spartan har-
 mosts on the other, and these together had them at their mercy. (8)

Agesilaus, too, restored oligarchies in the cities of the Aegean, under the conviction that democrats were not 'safe' subjects. Yet in spite of the fact that Sparta lost her over-seas Empire through the discontent caused by this, Agesilaus kept up the same 'safe' system in the Peloponnese.

The downfall of the Spartan Empire is merely an instance of the failure of the system by which one Greek state assumed the *ἡγεμονία* and ruled tyrannically over the others. Athens and Thebes are notorious examples of the same thing. But the Spartan Empire was even more unpopular than the Athenian. Athens had made the great mistake of refusing to give her subjects any share in the rights and privileges of her own citizens. The Spartans went to the extreme length of forcing on their subjects a system of government which they hated. The policy of both Athens and Sparta offers a striking contrast to that of Rome, whose system of extending rights showed its wisdom by its

(8) Isocrates, Panegyricus § 110 sqq compares the rule of these decarchies with that of Athens over the cities of her Empire.

..... φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ
 πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, ----- καὶ χρημάτων ἄρπαγὰς, τίς ἂν
 δύναίτο διεξελθεῖν; πλὴν τούτου εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ' ἑπείρω, ὅτι
 τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῶν δεῖναι ῥηδίως ἂν τις ἐνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε,
 τὰς δὲ σφραγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ τούτων γενομένας
 οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰσχύσθαι δύναίτο.

success. Alexander the Great, too, had realised the true secret of Empire in that his aim was the fusion of races.

If we sum up the foregoing arguments, we arrive at the conclusion that the Peloponnesian League, which, under Sparta's earlier rule, had been a success, was dissolved because eventually that rule became too oppressive. This, as we have seen, was the result of qualities inherent in the Spartan character.

Even if we take for granted that it would have been possible for Cleomenes to effect the unification of the Peloponnese, the assumption is by no means so clear that a general union of Greece under Sparta would have followed.

It would be interesting to know how far the ambitions of Cleomenes really reached, and whether they extended beyond the Peloponnese to the idea of a united Greek state under Sparta. Modern authorities hold different views. Freeman (9) negatives the idea that Cleomenes wished to establish a kingdom of Greece. Schorn (10) seems to accept it, and says that if the Achaean League had joined Cleomenes, the result would have been the "union of the entire peninsula, or perhaps of the whole of Greece" a union which might have grown powerful enough to oppose the Macedonians. Holm says that the intention of Cleomenes was "to raise Sparta to the position of leader of the Peloponnese, if possible of all Greece." (11)

Whatever the ultimate ambitions of Cleomenes may have been, the Spartan nation as a whole had no Imperialistic ambitions, and had constantly shown their inability to take any permanent interest in affairs outside the Pele-

(9) Freeman: Hist. of Fed. Govt. p. 357

(10) Schorn: Geschichte Griechenlands, p. 115

(11) Holm: Hist. of Greece IV, p. 230

ponnesus. Their character has come down through history as 'dilatatory', 'conservative', unenterprising', and the narrowness of outlook which was the result of these qualities made them incapable of taking a pan-hellenic point of view. (12) Their actions from the very beginning were a proof that they did not wish for Empire. They revealed this by their strategy in 480 B.C. during the Persian Wars. In 477 B.C. they showed no great regret, but rather relief, when the Greek cities in the Aegean went over to Athens and thus caused the dissolution of the first Hellenic League. For a similar reason they had been perfectly willing to stand aside and to allow the Athenian Empire to grow up. In 386 B.C. they had parted without any reluctance with their over-seas possessions, presenting by this attitude a striking contrast to Athens, from whom, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, they had had the utmost difficulty in wresting her Empire. This they would probably never have done at all but for the driving force of Lysander.

To Agesilaus, also, the Spartans owed much. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the position of Sparta at the beginning of the fourth century as head of the greatest Empire any Greek state had yet possessed, was due

(12) Modern historians, notably Grundy - "Thucydides & the History of His Age" Part IV, Chap. VIII, have found the following reasons for this backwardness in the relations of Sparta with the outside world; (1) Her geographical position, in the extreme south of the Peloponnese, tended to isolate her from the rest of the Greek world. (2) The Helots were a constant danger. They enormously outnumbered the free population in the proportion of 15 : 1 - Hence a successful rebellion would probably mean Spartan annihilation. This fear of the Helots explains Sparta's reluctance to send her citizens on Imperial enterprises. She needed them at home to preserve her own existence.

solely to the energy and enterprise of these two men.

The unadventurous attitude of the Spartan nation as a whole was a clear proof that they were unfitted for Empire, and when they were thrust into such a position they were only able to sustain it during the brilliant careers of individuals whom chance or fortune raised up for them.

B. M A C E D O N

In comparison with the other states of Greece, Macedon was still a new country, with few traditions. Its people were peasants and soldiers, obediently fighting in their country's wars, and as yet they had had little opportunity of cultivating the arts of civilisation and devoting their time to politics, as had the citizens of the Greek city states.

Thus the history of Macedon was the history of its kings. The kings mattered much - the people mattered little. In this way, Macedon presents a strong contrast to Sparta, where each Spartan citizen was a real entity who took his share in the political life of the state.

Arguments Against Macedon -

I Some of the Macedonian kings used the resources of the Greek states for purposes which could hardly be said to benefit the Greeks. It was not really to their interest that they should be conscribed for wars of conquest in Asia and the Far East. Apart from the honour and glory of fighting under the banner of the conqueror, the Greeks got nothing in return for providing men, money, and ships for these far-away wars.

a. Alexander the Great conscribed the Greek states for his Asiatic

conquests. (13) His nearer conquests were, it is true, not without benefit for Greece, since they brought it material prosperity and Empire, but his more distant conquests brought no advantage in return for the loss of men. Alexander, in fact, made the mistake of extending his conquests too far. It was impossible that such vast tracks^E of country could ever have been secured for civilisation. He would have done better to stop, either at the Taurus mountain range, or at the Euphrates basin, and so make his Empire a Mediterranean one. (14)

b. Demetrius^I followed the example of Alexander in using the resources of the Greek states for his own purposes, though he cloaked his true designs under the guise of friendship and sentiment. For he revived the League of

(13) Cf. Hicks and Hill - Greek Historical Inscriptions No. 158

Letter of Alexander to the Chians B.C. 333-332

----- παρέχειν δὲ χίους τριήρεις ἑξήκονσι
 πεπληρωμένας τοῖς δότων τέλεσιν, τούτων δὲ πλεῖον
 μέχρι ἂν καὶ τὸ Ἴλλο ρωτικὸν τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
 μεθ' ἡμῶν συμπληρ-----

(14) It has been suggested that, instead of wasting his energies in the Far East, Alexander should have gone west and helped the Greeks of Italy, who were fighting hard against being Italianised. It would have been a useful work, too, to anticipate the Romans, and to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily, thus making the whole island a Greek colony.

Corinth, and made a great display of generosity towards the Greek states, promising to respect their independence and to give them *αὐτονομία*.

His real motives came to light later. He merely wanted Greek troops for his Asiatic schemes, which included the conquest of Seleucus. Diodorus (15) says that his Greek troops numbered 25,000.

II The Macedonian kings imposed their rule on the Greek states by methods which were both oppressive and unpopular.

1. In their endeavour to keep the various cities under their own dominion they instituted the system of garrisons, which was a mistake. The Greeks never ceased to show their dislike of this system, though it was practised by all the Macedonian kings, notably by :-

- a. Alexander
- b. Cassander.

a. We learn from an inscription (16) that the Chians, among other peoples, were compelled by Alexander to receive and maintain a garrison.

An Attic orator (17) delivered an oration about 325 B.C. protesting against Alexander's breaking his contract with the Greeks, and instead of leaving them free and autonomous, "leading them into slavery".

(15) Diodorus 20. 110, 4

(16) Hicks & Hill No. 158..... μέχρι δὲ διαλλαγῆσι χίῳι, φυλακὴν εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅση δὲ ἰσχυρὴ ἦι τρέφειν δὲ τὴν χίον.

(17) [Demosthenes] Oratio 17 Par. 8 - - - ἔπειτα καὶ ἐπιτίπτει

ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας. διὸ καὶ πῶς οὐχ ὑπεράτοπον, ἡγεῖσθαι μὲν τῶν συνθηκῶν τὸ αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ ἐλευθέρους, τὸν δὲ εἰς δουλείαν ἀγαγόντα μὴ οἶεσθαι τὰναντία ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμολογίαις διαπεπραχῆσαι; οὐκοῦν ἀναγκασίον ἔστιν ἡμῶν, ὡς ἄνθρωποι Ἀθηναῖοι, εἶπερ ταῖς συνθηκαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμκερούμεν καὶ τὰ δίκαια ποιήσομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ ὑμᾶς παρακαλοῦσι, καθάπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, λαβούσι τὰ ὄπλα στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς παραβεβηκότας μετὰ τῶν βουλομένων.

b. Cassander, unlike Alexander, did not aspire to the conquest of Asia. He wished, however, to be overlord of Greece, and the methods he employed for ruling the Greeks were both oppressive and unpopular.

The Peiraeus (18) had to receive a garrison under Cassander, and similar garrisons were planted by him in many other places. An inscription (19) set up by the people of Eretria records the rejoicings of the city of losing the garrison which Cassander had imposed upon it.

2 Some of the Macedonian kings interfered with that sacred prerogative of the Greek city states - their *αὐτονομία* - in the following ways:-

a. Some of the cities were forced to receive back their political exiles. This was a most unpopular measure, for it was bound to cause a certain amount of confusion, and it raised all sorts of difficulties with regard to property, and its possession by past and present owners. There are numerous references shewing what a large number of cities received the commands of Alexander to

(18) Paus: I. 25, 5

Syll. (19) D.S.³ 323

Eretriensium urbs liberata - (308 B.C.)

ἔπειδὴ ~~ἦν~~ πομπῆι τῆι Διονύσου ἢ τε φρουρὰ ἀπῆλθεν
ὁ τε (ο) δῆμος ἠλευθερώθη καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους
καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἐκομίσσαστο -

Of also Diodorus XVIII 10, 2

----- καὶ τὰς μὲν φρουρουμένας πόλεις
ἠλευθερώσασσι. -----

restere their exiles. (20)

b. Some of the kings imposed their will on the Greek states to the extent of forcing them to revise their code of laws. Alexander in particular was guilty of this. There is an inscription (21) recording a letter sent by him to the people of Tegea in Arcadia, which contains such a mandate.

(20) 1. Of Hicks & Hill No. 158 (Letter of Alexander the Great to the Chians B.C. 333-2

----- τούς φύλαδας τούς ἐκ Χίου κατιέναι πάντας -----

2. Hicks & Hill No. 164

Return of the Exiles at Mytilene by Alexander's edict B.C. 324

----- ἔλθεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄμφορ ἄνδρας εἰκοσι,
δέκα μὲν ἐκ τῶν κατελθόντων, δέκα δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐν
τῇ πόλει πρόσθε ὄντων -----

The confusion at Mytilene discernable in this inscription was the direct result of Alexander's interference in ordering the return of the exiles.

καὶ ἐν τῷ διαλλάγῳ ἐμμετέροισι πάντες καὶ οἰκήσοισι τὰ μὲν πόλιν ἐπέκρινε, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ταῖς διαλυσίεσσι, ταῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέκρινε, ἀτρέστως καὶ ὁμονόερες πρὸς ἁλλήλους.

3. Hicks & Hill No. 157

4. Hicks - Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions No. 130

which record revolutions at Eresos and Kalymna respectively for the same reason.

(21) D.S.³ 306 Tegeatarum lex de exilibus restituendis (324 B.C.)

βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος τὸ διάγραμμα, γραφῆναι κατὰ τὰ ἐπανωρθώσαντο ἃ πόλεις τὰ ἐν τῷ διαγράμματι ἀντιλεγόμενα -

c. In some cases, oligarchies were imposed on the Greek cities by the Macedonian kings. These which Antipater had established transferred their allegiance at his death in 319 B.C. to his son Cassander (22). The latter also imposed an oligarchy at Athens in 318 B.C., setting up Demetrius of Phalerum as their chief man in a position which was regarded by the Greeks as practically that of tyrant. (23)

d. One of the terms of agreement between the Macedonian kings and the Greek states had always been that the Greeks were to pay no tribute as a mere acknowledgment of Macedonian supremacy; it was only to be exacted in case of war or special necessity. (24) In spite of this, however, we have evidence, at least from one inscription, that Antipater levied tribute. (25)

e. The system of tyrants, by which some of the Macedonian kings maintained their control over the Greek states, is another example of coercion.

Even Antigonus Gonatas, a man of moderation and self-restraint, of whom it may really be said that he ruled for the benefit of his country, and not of himself, supported tyrants in the Greek cities, and it is difficult to defend his policy.

(22) Ferg: Hell: Ath: p.29

(23) Diod: XVIII 74. Cf also [Demosth.]
Oratio 17 par.8

(24) Cf. also the scholia to Demosthenes, De Corona § 89

ἔσπεισάτο γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς (Ἀλεξάνδρος) πρὸς αὐτοὺς
ὥσπερ ὁ πατὴρ ὥστε αὐτοὺς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ
ἀφορολογητοὺς.

(25) Collitz-Bechtel, "Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften"
No. 304 A.I. 10

----- Ἄντιπάτρῳ γὰρ ἐπιτάξας χρήματα
εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσφέρειν -----

To quote Mr Tarn, there are three possible points of view from which to regard this question, the Macedonian, the Greek and our own, and it is the Greek view which we are bound to consider.

As far as Antigonus was concerned, he felt that such a policy would be for the benefit of Macedon, and it provided the following advantages:-

a. An unconstitutional ruler who maintained his power by means of mercenaries, and was assured of the support of Antigonus, would most certainly keep faithful to his interests.

b. Antigonus would be enabled to garrison the cities in this way without having to bear the cost.

From the modern standpoint, it was illogical for the Greeks to object to 'tyranny' when they practised it at home over their own slaves.

From the Greek point of view, it was wrong because it infringed upon the rights and liberties of free city states, and thus it failed to come into line with the standards of the time. The hatred and fear felt by the Greeks for 'tyrants' was still very strong. This would explain the attitude of hostility towards them displayed by Polybius (26) and others.

The policy of Gonatas has, however, been defended by some historians, notably by Mr Tarn, (27) who has shown that the king was obliged to adopt this course from motives of expediency. In the first place, he had not enough troops to hold the cities by means of garrisons. Secondly, for the sake of Macedon he could not leave them free altogether from interference, because of the danger from Egypt.

Such evidence as we have, Mr Tarn adds, goes to show that Gonatas, find-

(26) Polyb: II, 41

(27) Cf. Tarn: Antig. Gon. pp 278-286

ing the institution of tyrants a necessary evil, attempted to make his system as little objectionable as possible to the Greeks by choosing good men who would not abuse their position. It is true that, with the exception of Polybius, (28) who declaimed against tyrants as tyrants, the evidence against those of the period of Gonatas is small. Aristotemos of Elis is the only one whose record is bad, while on the other hand the tyrants of Argos and of Megalopolis were good rulers.

Yet though it may be true that Antigonus used the least objectionable instruments for carrying out his policy, it may be claimed that the policy itself was a bad one.

Arguments for Macedon

The majority of the Macedonian kings were men of moderation, with wise and liberal views of government. Such were Philip II, Antigonus Gonatas, and Antigonus Doseon. (29)

1. Philip II had begun by making his own country the greatest power in Greece. (30) Then, turning his arms against the latter, he had made himself master of it, and was thus in a position to carry out his next and greatest idea, the creation of a national Greek state.

The Hellenic Confederation which Philip succeeded in forming at the

(28) Polyb. IX 26 sqq.

(30) Arrian (Anabasis VII 9.2 ff) puts into the mouth of Alexander a good description of the work his father achieved for Macedon and Greece.

(29) Philip V also, though he has come down through history with such a consistently bad record, showed himself occasionally capable of acting in a statesmanlike manner. We have an inscription (Michel 41) recording the contents of a letter he sent to the people of Larissa, in which he urged them to enfranchise freely the slaves and foreigners within their borders in order to increase the number of their men of fighting age. He advised them to adopt the customs and constitution of the Romans, who enfranchised their emancipated slaves.

great congress of all the Greeks at Corinth was exactly what was needed. It contained all the essential principles of true Federal government. For it fulfilled the two main conditions inherent in a perfect Federal constitution, the independence of each member of the Federation in all internal affairs, and the sovereignty of the Central authority in all external matters common to the interests of the whole League.

The central authority was to be a central council made up by proportional representation, in which the number of delegates sent from the various states was to vary with the number of citizens. (31)

Similarly, every state was to send a certain number of soldiers proportionate to the population for all wars which had been entered upon for the common interest by the common federal council.

In order to safeguard the preservation of peace among the Greek states themselves, disputes between states were henceforth to be settled by arbitration. (32) This had not been practised hitherto to any great extent, and it was a real advance in that it put federal theory into practice.

The League of Philip II did, certainly, put a curb on the liberties of the Greeks, but only where it was useful and necessary. For it prevented them from killing each other, and at the same time made it essential that each state should take its proper share in the protection of the whole Confederation. In local affairs, however, they were left just as free as in the ancient days of independence and *ἀυτονομία*, and by the admission of their

(31) Of. D.S. 260 Foedus Civitatum Graecarum cum Philippo rege (338-7 B.C.) Section (a) refers to the oath of loyalty sworn by the separate Greek states to Philip II.

--- οὐδὲ τῆν βασιλείαν τῆν φιλίππου καὶ τῶν ἐκγόρων καταλύσω ---
Section (b) refers to the numbers of votes possessed by the delegates in the pan-Hellenic parliament. Thus the Thessalians had ten, while the Phocians and Locrians had only three -

(32) Of. Hicks & Hill, Greek Hist. Inscriptions No. 150

representatives to the Federal Parliament, they were given a real voice in helping to frame foreign policy. Thus Philip could not summon their troops to war without first getting their consent to fight.

Finally, Philip II's League was based on the principles of equality and freedom, inasmuch as its various members stood towards Philip in the relation not of subjects but of fellow-members of a confederacy. Such a league is a justification of Imperialism, and if Philip II was capable of forming a League of such excellence, there is no reason why the other Macedonian kings should not have followed his example. As a matter of fact, the leagues of all the Macedonian kings who came after him were based on his. The inscription which records the constitution of Demetrius' League of 305 B.C. (33) proves this, and the Confederation of Antigonus Doseon was formed according to the same plan.

2 Doseon, in fact, followed in the footsteps of Philip II. Unlike Antigonus Gonatas, he did not set up tyrants, nor is there any evidence that he intended to renew the system had he lived longer, though he insisted on garrisoning such a strategic position as Corinth, and he kept garrisons also at Demetrias and Chalcis for the same reason. We do not hear, however, of his putting in more than the minimum number of men. His policy therefore compares very favourably with that of Sparta under Lysander, who filled the cities of the Aegean with garrisons.

The League of Greek states which Doseon was actually able to form (34) differed from that of Philip II only in the following respect - that it gave the confederate states a greater amount of freedom. Whereas in Philip's

(33) See Introduction p.8

(34) For extent of League see Introduction p.18

CHAPTER IV

SPARTA AND MACEDON - THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO THE GREEKS

A. S P A R T A

Arguments In Her Favour.

- 1 Whatever the origin of the Macedonians, there was no doubt whatever about the Spartans. They were certainly Greek both in race and language. If they had held the *ἡγεμονία*, there could have been none of that bitterness of feeling always roused by thoughts of foreign domination.

- 2 The Spartans excelled in just those activities which to the Greeks were most worthy of admiration - they were pre-eminent in the realms of sport and of war. They gained their reward for the hard physical training which formed so large a part of their education in their constant successes in the eagerly coveted honours of the Olympic games. Similarly the efficiency they had acquired through their military training had gained them a universal reputation for undaunted courage and firmness in face of the gravest danger. Xenophon (1) in the "de Republica Lacedaemoniensium" warmly praises the habits and customs of the Spartans, as enjoined by the laws of Lycurgus. In fact, the general

(1) Xen. De Rep. Lacedaemoniensium, Chap. VII. "ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἰματίων γέ ἐνεκά χρηματιστέον, οὐ γὰρ ἐσθῆτος πολυτελεία, ἀλλὰ σώματος εὐεξία κοσμοῦνται."

(2) (Also Chap. IX-) "ἐκείνος τοίνυν αἰφῶς παρεσκεύασε τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακοδαιμονίαν."

(4) Plutarch - Life of Lycurgus (chap. XXII par. 1)

admiration rose to such a pitch that to imitate the Lacedaemonian dress and manners, and especially the custom of wearing the hair long, became a common practice, so that a special word had to be coined to express it. (Ἀκκωρίσιον.)

Thus the Athenian statesman Cimon was a 'Laconiser'. Plutarch (2) tells us that, from his youth up, he was a great admirer of the Spartan constitution, and that he often quoted the Spartans in his speeches to the Athenians as models of excellence which they would do well to follow. The fact that this brought him much unpopularity seems to have been no deterrent.

Throughout Plutarch's "Life of Lysander", the references made by Plutarch himself to the Lacedaemonian people and their institutions seem to reach a high level of admiration. Thus he says that Callicratidas (3) behaved in a fashion worthy of Sparta, whereas Lysander (4) in his administration of the cities in the second Hellenic League, "gave the Greeks no worthy specimen of Lacedaemonian rule".

3. Sparta had, in the sixth century, and most of the fifth, held the position of first state in Greece. This political prestige can be traced to three causes:-

a. The fact that her constitution remained throughout fixed and unaltered.

- (2) Cf. Plutarch - Life of Cimon (chap. XVI par. 1) "Ἦν μὲν οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φιλολάκων." (Also chap. XVI. par. 3) "καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ παντὶ μεγάλων τῆν Λακεδαιμόνων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε τύχοι κερδορένοιο αὐτοῖς ἢ παροξύνων, ὡς φησὶ Σησίμβροτος, εἰώθει λέγειν, Ἄλλ' οὐ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γε τοιοῦτοι - ὅθεν φάνοι ἐαυτῶ σὺν ἡγε καὶ δυσμένειαν τινα παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν."
- (3) Plutarch - Life of Lysander (chap. VII par. 1)
"Ἄλλὰ Καλλικράτιδος μὲν εἶξεν τῆς Λακεδαιμόνων διασηθεῖς, καὶ γενόμενος τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἐράμιλλος τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν."
- (4) Plutarch - Life of Lysander (chap. XIII par. 4) ----- "οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς ἐδίδοι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι δαίμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς" -----

b. Her position as leading state in the Peloponnesian League.

c. Her leadership of Greece in the Persian Wars.

Sparta had been accepted as ἡγεμονία by the Greeks without question.

It was to her that the Ionians, when they required the help of European Greece, naturally turned. Thus Aristagoras^a of Miletus went to Sparta to beg the assistance of king Cleomenes, in the Ionic revolt against Persia (5)

During the second Persian invasion of 480 B.C. the Lacedaemonians, "δουρῆσι τῆσδε χερσίν," (6) headed the combined Greek forces. This prestige still remained even in the days of Agis IV, and if he had been successful in carrying out his schemes for the re-establishment of Sparta as the first state in the Peloponnese, the existence of the newly-formed Achaean League would have been endangered, since each city would, without hesitation, have joined Sparta rather than Achaea. (7)

4 Sparta never had a better opportunity of securing the ἡγεμονία than in the reign of Cleomenes. Both ancient and modern historians (8) are enthusiastic in their praise of his character and achievements, and his personality

(5) Her. V 49-51

(6) Thuc. I 18

(7) Cf. Mahaffy - Alexander's Empire p. 174

(8) Freeman, Hist. of Fed. Govt., p. 359 echoes Plutarch, and expresses what have been the views of other historians, both ancient and modern, in favour of Sparta, when he says "If you must have a President, or even a King, take the Greek, the Spartan, the Heraclid, the gallant soldier, the generous conqueror." Even Polybius V, 39, in describing his gallantry at death, cannot resist a word of praise. He calls him "a man of brilliant social qualities, with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endowed with all the qualifications of a general and a king."

(9) See Chap. III
pp. 12 & 13

(10) Even Xenophon, who showed clearly in his writings that he was a warm partisan of Sparta, had to admit in Hellenica V, 4, 1, that her behaviour to them in 352 B.C. was worthy of the greatest censure.

was such that there is little doubt he would have been popular and acceptable as ἡγεμῶν.

Arguments Against Sparta

As an Imperial Power, Sparta had been both unsuccessful and unpopular. She had maintained her hegemony of the second Hellenic League for a comparatively short time only, and at the end of ten years her overseas Empire had ceased to exist. The tyrannical policy and general mis-government which had brought about this result had gained for the Spartans an unenviable reputation for pride and avarice. (9)

It was the unpopularity of the Spartan Empire which made the Asiatic Greeks desert Pisander at the critical moment at Cnidus. This brought about the dissolution of Sparta's maritime Empire. Similarly, it was her tyrannical treatment of the other land powers in Greece which caused the loss of her land Empire. She had used the Asiatic Greeks as a bait for Persian help, and in fact they had discovered at the end of the Peloponnesian War that far from being liberated from the tyranny of Athens, they had merely changed masters. Sparta's treatment of Thebes in 382 B.C. is a notable example of her 'tyranny' (10) Mantinea, which in 386 B.C. incurred her wrath, fared worst of all, for that city she utterly destroyed.

The feeling, therefore, both in Greece and in the Peloponnese, was very bitter against her, and she was attacked on all sides in 370 B.C. This active hostility, together with the rise in power of Thebes, were the two causes that combined to bring about her downfall, and from about 360 B.C. the Spartans ceased to take a prominent part in Hellenic affairs, but were

(9) See Chap. III
pp. 12 & 13

(10) Even Xenophon, who showed clearly in his writings that he was a warm partisan of Sparta, had to admit (in Hellenica V.4,1) that her behaviour to Thebes in 382 B.C. was worthy of the gravest censure.

engaged merely in unimportant border wars with their neighbours.

The way in which the Spartans were regarded by the Greeks - as conspicuous for their arrogance and ambition - is reflected in the pages of Plato and Aristotle.

Plato, in speaking of timocracy, is undoubtedly referring to the Spartan constitution, and he makes the citizens of a timocracy chiefly distinguished for their avarice. (11)

Aristotle describes the government of the Spartans, and lays to their charge the sins of pride and insolence. (12)

2 In the third century B.C. not Sparta, but Achaea was the leading state in the Peloponnese, and the Achaean League had begun to renew the federation of Peloponnesian states. When therefore, about 225 B.C. the Spartans under Cleomenes began to oust the Achaean League from the position it had secured, and to rob it of many of its possessions, it was natural that the most bitter feelings of rivalry and hostility should be aroused on the part of the Achaeans. For this reason they would never have joined willingly in a League under the *ἡγεμονία* of Sparta.

(11) Plato. Republic (Bk.VIII par. 545)

" Ἄρ' οὐν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χεῖρους, τὸν φιλόρικόν τε καὶ φιλοτιμόν, κατὰ τῆν Λακωνικὴν ἐστῶτα πολιτείαν - - - - - ἐπιθυμητὰ, δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, χρημῶτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι (= the citizens in a timocracy) ἔσονται, ὡς περ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἄγριως ὑπὸ σκοτοῦ χρυσόν τε καὶ ἀργυρόν. - - - - -"

(12) Aristotle. Pol. II 9, 4

" Ἰσχυερόι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι, καὶ τῶν ἰσῶν ἀξιούσιν ἐν τοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθεῖν ζῆντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μισοῦσιν. - - -"

B.

M A C E D O NArguments Against Macedon

1. In the fourth century, the Macedonians, far from being regarded as Greeks, had been looked upon as foreigners and barbarians. This attitude had been created largely by the hostility of Demosthenes. In the "philippics" he had represented Philip as a barbarian conqueror bitterly opposed to Athens, and aiming at nothing less than her destruction, and had implored them to use every means to avoid the degradation of conquest by mere barbarians.
2. It is clear that the bitter hostility of Demosthenes to Philip was solely responsible for his distorted description of the Macedonians, and therefore his evidence is of no value. It must be admitted, however, that many of the other Greeks agreed with him. Thus neither Philip nor his son Alexander had found the conquest of Greece an easy one. There had been the most active opposition, and many valiant attempts to keep the Macedonians out. When it was seen that further resistance was useless, the Greeks had given in, but their acquiescence had been most unwilling, since in their eyes, the Macedonian rule seemed a foreign domination. This would account for the constant revolts made against Macedon during the period succeeding the reigns of Philip and Alexander.

Arguments for Macedon.

1. Though the Macedonian people might be regarded as foreigners their kings, at any rate, had ranked as Greeks since the fifth century. Herodotus (15) makes Alexander, son of the Macedonian king Amyntas, describe himself to the

Persians as " Ἰνδοὶ Ἑλλήνων Μακεδόνων ὑπαρχοῦς ", and mentions that he was even allowed to compete in the Olympic Games. Philip II and his son Alexander could actually claim to be Greek by blood, while their successors were certainly Greek in language and culture. (14)

- 2 As for the Macedonian people, Mr Tarn (15) comes to the conclusion that the original Macedonians were an invading Illyrian tribe who found the country already occupied by various peoples - Anatolian, Illyrian and Thracian. The Macedonian nation, therefore, was made up of mixed elements. Herodotus (16) says they were closely related to the Dorians. If the Dorians were Illyrians, then probably the Spartans were closely related to the Macedonians.

(14) Alexander, in his letter to Darius, talks of " Μακεδόνων καὶ τῆν Ἰνδῶν Ἑλλήνων " (Arr. II 14,4) and continues " ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμῶν καταστάθεις " - - - - - Similarly, the confederacy of which Alexander was head, seems to have been described in the terms, " Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες " - (Arr. II 2-2,3 I.16,7) Isocrates fully recognises Philip as a Greek - (Phil:10)

(15) Tarn: Antig. Gon. p.176

(16) Her: I 56:VIII 43

In any case, there was a strain of common blood between Macedonian and Greek, (17) and it has been suggested that perhaps some of the Achaeans and Dorians were left behind in Macedonia when the rest penetrated further into Greece.

Racial differences, however, are quite unimportant - what really matters is this - that by the third century the Macedonians had reached the same standard of civilisation as the Greeks. They shewed this by their actions. During most of the third century, from the Gaulish invasion of 279 B.C. onwards, the Macedonians had formed, as it were, a bulwark for Greece in keeping off the raids of the Illyrians and other border tribes from their frontiers. In language and manners the courts of Alexander's successors were Greek. The Macedonian dialect was generally forgotten, though there were occasions on which it was used by the king. The Oriental features introduced by Alexander were not copied, and the kings did not wear Oriental dress. By the third century B.C. the Macedonians had come to be accepted as Greeks by the Greeks themselves, who no longer regarded their rule as a foreign conquest. Even Polybius, whose sympathies were against them, does not in speaking of them, use the old formula "Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους".^A

In the third Macedonian War, the Greeks made it clear to the world that they championed the cause of Perseus and the Macedonian nation, and not that of Rome.

In short, we may say that the Macedonians had a capacity for assimilating

(17) Disputes as to the exact relations between Macedonians and Greeks have till lately turned chiefly on philological questions. It was argued that the Macedonians must be Greeks because many of their words, especially common household words, were the same. This argument, however, has fallen to the ground since the discovery that the Roumanian language has borrowed many common words from its Slav neighbours. (Cf. Tarn: Antig. Gon. pp. 180-1)
neighbours.

Greek culture such as no mere "βάρβαροι" (18) had ever succeeded in doing, and that by the end of the third century they had become sufficiently hellenized to take the lead in a general Confederation of all Greece.

3. There had always been States in Greece ready to champion the Macedonian cause since the days of Philip II. Philip himself had been invited by the Thessalians to come to the aid of the Greek states in the Sacred War, and this had led to his first direct intervention in their affairs. Beotia (19) remained loyal to the Macedonians in the Lamian War in spite of the revolt against them of all her neighbours. Similarly, many cities in the Peloponnese joined Cassander when he was fighting against Antigonos, and he gained much power in Greece. The Athenians declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorcetes on his promise to restore the democracy, and gave him an enthusiastic welcome to their city. Alexander (20) the Molossian king of Epirus, was a staunch ally of the Macedonians, whose aid was largely responsible for the increased power and extent of his kingdom.

While Sparta in 225 B.C. stood in a position of isolation in the extreme south of the Peloponnese with no allies in the rest of Greece, the Macedonians could boast the loyalty of Thessaly, and the friendship of the Achaean League, besides having the goodwill of other states in central Greece.

The importance of the allegiance of Thessaly to Macedon, and the close relations between them since the days of Philip II, is significant. The only occasions on which the Thessalians had revolted had been at the accession of Alexander and in the Lamian War. Alexander had felt that the overlordship of Thessaly was more important to the king of Macedon than the allegiance of any

(18) Isocrates (Phil:178) distinguishes Macedonians from true Greeks but also from mere barbarians. "φησὶ γὰρ χρῆναι σε τοὺς μὲν Ἑλλήνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βελτιδεύειν, τῶν δὲ βάρβαρων ὡς πλείστον ἀρχειν."

(19) Pausanias I 25,4

(20) Cf. Grote; Hist. of Greece Vol. XII pp. 304 & 305

of the other Greek states, and therefore he had taken care to win over Thessaly first. About 350 B.C. the old Thessalian constitution had been revived, and in place of the Federal chief (or ^{τῆς} ~~τῆς~~ ^{ΥΡΣ,}) who had been chosen hitherto to levy troops, the Macedonian king was appointed. Hence he could feel that the Thessalian troops were as much at his command if needed for war as his own Macedonians.

It is at any rate noteworthy that in the third century, after a long period of Macedonian rule, the Thessalians were a prosperous and contented people. In Boeotia and at Athens there had been constant trouble; it was not so with Thessaly. But by 225 B.C. Boeotia had submitted, and if only Athens too could have accepted the overlordship of Macedon instead of adopting a position of friendly neutrality, it might have been greatly to her advantage. It has been made clear by Holleaux (21) that in 200 B.C. the Athenians shewed no real signs of hostility to Philip V, and were by no means anxious to go to war with him.

Conclusion

In comparing the claims of Sparta and Macedon, it has been shewn that on the whole Macedon was the more suitable power to assume the leadership of a united Greece.

- 1 Macedon was superior in material equipment. She possessed a fleet, larger military resources and greater wealth.
- 2 Macedon possessed greater ability to govern. Whereas the Spartan people, throughout their history, had never shewn any real eagerness to take the lead in Hellenic politics, but had generally been in the position of those who "have greatness thrust upon them", on the other hand, the desire for

(21) See Chap. I p. 9

^cἡγεμονία was the normal principle of the Macedonian policy from the time of Philip II onwards. The Macedonian kings had actually formed a confederation of Greek states on free and liberal principles.

3 The attitude of the Greeks towards Macedon in 225 B.C. was very different from what it had been in the fourth century. They would have been more ready to accept her leadership than that of Sparta. For Macedon, being a large national state, had greater coercive powers over the smaller city states which were her neighbours, and therefore would have ruled with the consent of a larger number of states than would have been the case with Sparta.

The revival of the Federation of Philip II was undoubtedly the best scheme for Greek interests in 225 B.C.

The Achaean League could have joined it without dishonour. In fact, it was the best safeguard of Greek liberties, and the only means of stemming the tide which was soon to engulf the Greek world - the tide of Roman conquest.

The policy of Aratus, therefore, in incorporating the Achaean League under the ^cἡγεμονία of Macedon rather than that of Sparta may be said to have been justified.