Anthony Heyes and John Maxwell (2003) Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment.
Full text access: Open
Minimum standards set by a ‘World Environmental Organisation’ (WEO) and NGO labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO ‘alternative’ increases industry resistance to WEO proposals and this may reduce welfare. If, however, the schemes are run in parallel, existence of the NGO lessens producer opposition to WEO activities. This allows the WEO to be ‘bolder’ in its proposals, which is good for welfare.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2003 This item is peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/89d62817-33f8-d1e2-903c-6a7257b5b62a/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 24-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 24-Oct-2012
©2003 Anthony Heyes and John Maxwelll. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, no t to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.