Desires as reasons

Abstract

The main purpose of the thesis is to show that a man's beliefs must be imposed on him by the world as it is whereas his actions must in some sense stem from himself and that these features of belief and action are respectively essential to our concepts of belief and voluntary action. The asymmetry between belief and action is located primarily in the reasons for belief and action. The constraint which is imposed on the reasons a man gives for his beliefs, if he is to count either as believing or as giving reasons for his belief, is imposed by the objective notion of good evidence whereas the constraint which is imposed are the reasons a man gives for his voluntary actions is imposed primarily and essentially by factors which stem from himself; his desires. Since the reason which motivates a man's action is composed of a belief and a desire of his, the question of whether a man can be responsible for his beliefs or his desires has important implications for whether he can be held responsible for his actions. A man cannot be held responsible for his beliefs, or only in a very limited sense, because they must be imposed on him by the world, so if he is to be a voluntary agent and, therefore, responsible for his actions, this must be in virtue of the fact that his desires form part of the reasons for his action. The sense in which a man can be held responsible for his desires is examined and it is found that he can and must have some control over which of his desires motivate his actions, but this is based on the essential feature or a man's most basic desires that they stem from himself.