

BB5.5038

University of London.

---

Thesis for B.A. Degree in Philosophy.

December 1917.

---

D. M. Grierson.

---

ProQuest Number: 10097126

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10097126

Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

CHAPTER I  
A STUDY OF JOY

THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SHAND'S TREATMENT OF JOY.  
Based on the Theory Found in Shand's Foundations of

Character. It differs in the choice of principles on which

to base their account of mental life, and in studying the

I. The Difficulties involved in Shand's Treatment of Joy.

account any psychologist gives of a particular psycholo-

II. The Distinction between Joy, Happiness and Pleasure.

gical phenomenon, it is necessary first to understand on

III. The Emotion of Joy; its impulse, behaviour and end.

what principle his general account of mental life is based.

IV. Joy and the Formation of Sentiments in Relation to

Character. The two psychologists to whom reference in these

pages will most constantly be made are Stout and Shand,

and there is considerable difference in their views on

the fundamental truths of psychology.

Stout in the preface to the Analytic Psychology<sup>1</sup>

and the Manual<sup>2</sup> describes his method of study as genetic.

In the former preface he says his aim is "to bring systematic

order into the crowd of facts concerning our mental life

revealed by analysis of ordinary experience." In the

Manual he therefore traces mental life through three stages

of sensation, perception and ideation. In all three stages

he makes constant reference to the threefold nature of

experience -/

1. Analytic Psychology p. x.

2. Manual of Psychology p. vii.

experience - cognition, affective tone and conation. The

peculiar importance of attention becomes evident in the later developments.

#### CHAPTER I. THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SHAND'S TREATMENT OF JOY.

Shand's aim given in the Preface to the Foundations of Psychology differs in the choice of principles on which to base their account of mental life, and in studying the account any psychologist gives of a particular psychological phenomenon, it is necessary first to understand on what principle his general account of mental life is based.

The two psychologists to whom reference in these pages will most constantly be made are Stout and Shand, and there is considerable difference in their views on the fundamental truths of psychology.

Stout in the preface to the Analytic Psychology<sup>1</sup> and the Manual<sup>2</sup> describes his method of study as genetic. In the former preface he says his aim is "to bring systematic order into the crowd of facts concerning our mental life revealed by analysis of ordinary experience." In the Manual he therefore traces mental life through three stages of sensation, perception and ideation. In all three stages he makes constant reference to the threefold nature of

experience - / tendency

1. Analytic Psychology p. x.

2. Manual of Psychology p. vii. vii



tendency in some way to alter or transform it, either by experience - cognition, affective tone and conation. The peculiar importance of conation becomes evident in the later developments. Stout notices this. "Of late there has arisen a tendency Shand's aim given in the Preface to the Foundations of Character is "a scientific treatment of character."<sup>1</sup> Stout's aim quoted above is a means to this end. It is not accurate to describe Stout's method as abstract, yet it may be called abstract in companion with Shand's which he himself describes as concrete. The relatively abstract method is that which divides mental life into parts no one of which can exist in fact alone. The most usually accepted form which this method takes is the tripartite division of conscious experience into cognition, feeling-attitude and conation. No one of these can be encountered separately in real life; each is an abstraction which is present in every moment of real life. Through all mental life run these three elements, like three strands in a plait. They are the three fundamental ways in which consciousness is related to its object. Stout in the Manual says "(1) We have some kind of cognizance of the object, (2) we feel pleased or displeased with it, or otherwise emotionally affected towards it, (3) we experience a tendency avoiding gross classification becomes very soon apparent.

1. Foundations of Character. p. vii

tendency in some way to alter or transform it, either by bringing it more fully into consciousness or the reverse." Attempts have been made to simplify even further, and Stout in the Groundwork notices this. "Of late there has arisen a tendency to fall back upon a dual division, bringing feeling-attitude and conation under the same head." The dual division he gives thus -

Cognition

Interest

Simple Apprehension      Judgment      Conation      Feeling-attitude

Feeling-attitude and conation are run together under

the one heading "Interest." This seems to tend towards the concrete method, for if feeling-attitude seems too weak an element to stand alone, and is always very closely allied with conation, this really only leads one to see that in every separate moment of experience, all three elements are present, and to study moments of experience is to work by the concrete method.

If this tendency be followed one step further, the abstract method vanishes into the concrete. For this would be to run the three elements into one under one heading. For this heading the only possible name is Consciousness, and we must say of it that in every moment there are cognition, feeling-tone and conation. The difficulty in avoiding cross classification becomes very soon apparent.

First/

gent, and in both divisions we find the three characteristics.

This/

First we find the three mental processes like the three strands in a plait, the cognitive, the affective and the conative. In any one moment of consciousness all these three parts will be found, just as the three strands are found in any given centimetre of the plait. Next we meet with an attempt to run two of the strands together, feeling-attitude and conation are united. Again mental life may be differently described and we may say that any one moment of consciousness is a cognitive, an affective or a conative moment, according to whether it is primarily a moment of cognition, or of passive emotion or of striving. To take examples. You go to meet a friend at a station. You stand on the platform scanning the crowd. The moment when you recognize your friend is a cognitive one. Or there is a cry of "Fire!" and you have no hesitation in describing this moment of experience as affective, it was a moment of fear. Or you are running to catch a train. This moment of experience is one of striving. Yet in all these three experiences the three factors are present. Affective tone and conation were present in and can be found on analysis of the experience of meeting the friend. There were perception and conation in the moment of danger from fire. There were perception and affective tone in the striving to catch the train. Again, human activity may be divided into instinctive and intelligent, and in both divisions we find the three characteristics.

This/



This is the division made by Bergson. He tells us that the earlier view of evolution was of progress in a more or less direct line of which human life was the crisis or culminating point. In his view development has taken place along two distinct lines, instinct and intelligence, which have a common origin. In the development of intelligence instinct is not lost but has come to be of less account. For Bergson the difference between instinct and intelligence is that instinct continues the organisation of the creature itself confined to one line of activity, but intelligence understands the relations between objects and comprehends forms. The only interest of this view for our present purpose is to illustrate the different methods on which an analysis of consciousness can be based. Bergson's theory is so different from those of Stout and Shand that it need not be considered further here.

There is no doubt that both methods, inadequately described as abstract and concrete, have their uses. In the separate study of impulse, instinct, emotion and sentiments, it helps towards clearness to realise that cognition, affective tone and conation are present not only in the phenomenon under observation but also in any mental phenomenon whatsoever. However, the abstract method alone is not sufficient. Life as we live it is not abstract but concrete.

the points at which he differs from other psychologists.  
 We live through successive moments of experience, one flowing imperceptibly into the next. It is a very important truth that in any one of these moments will be found the three elements, cognition, feeling-attitude and conation. But a further advance is made by taking cross sections of mental life and separating as best we can one moment of experience from another. This is the concrete method which it will be more convenient to follow here.

Shand is the great exponent of the concrete method.

In the Foundations of Character he says that in analytic psychology "we are taken away from concrete and fruitful problems to follow others which are abstract and even artificial..... and meanwhile, pre-occupied with them lose sight of the concrete facts and the power of handling them. If on the other hand we start from a concrete and synthetic conception of character, we are in harmony with the point of view of all dramatists, historians, biographers and novelists, and can utilise their material. We avoid breaking up the forces of character into their elements and being driven to consider the abstract problem of their mutual relations."<sup>1</sup>

In an attempt to examine the nature of joy and to find its use and effect in human life it will be well to follow Shand as closely as possible, noticing where necessary

---

1. Op.cit. p. 83.



the points at which he differs from other psychologists.

Shand has made a great advance on previous work on emotion.

His most important contribution perhaps lies in emphasising that the first law of the mind is the law of organisations.

In order to understand the nature of Joy and its place in general psychology it will be necessary to study instinct, impulse, emotion and finally the sentiments with particular reference to the Foundations of Character.

A short review of recent theories on instinct must precede an examination of Shand's treatment of instinct and emotion, and the relations subsisting between them.

In Lloyd Morgan's Instinct and Experience we find instinct treated almost entirely as a fact of biology. He examines a moorhen's first experiences of pecking and scratching and comes to the conclusion that "from the biological and physiological point of view" instinctive behaviour is "nothing but a reflex." But from the psychological point of view he goes on to say it is always something more than a reflex in so far as it affords data to conscious experience. This something he describes vaguely as "a cortical spread." Having he does not admit past experience or intelligences as causal factors in instinct.

It is very important. The insistence on According/impulse/

1. Manual of Psychology, Third edition. pp 339, 340.
2. Op cit. p 343.
3. p. 346

Impulse According to Stout this description does not clearly include all the facts. He seems to agree in part with H. G. Lloyd Morgan but carries the treatment of instinct further. He says "It is in part possible to give an account of the facts relating to instinctive movements of animals without introducing psychological conditions at all. . . . Instinctive action considered in this light distinctively consists in a special pre-adaptation of the nervous system congenitally determined so as to give rise to special bodily actions in response to appropriate stimuli."<sup>1</sup> But this, he adds, is not enough, for it would include reflex actions. That is just what for Lloyd Morgan it does and must do. "Reflex action," says Stout, "is of a nature fundamentally different from instinctive conduct. The difference is that instinctive conduct does, and reflex action does not presuppose the cooperation of intelligence and attention." He points out that interest and attention are essential to instinctive behaviour and are not essential to reflex action, and tells us "What it (instinct) essentially involves is an impulse which requires for its satisfaction the doing of something in the sense of achieving a certain perceptible result."<sup>3</sup> This is a psychological factor which Lloyd Morgan almost overlooks, and there can be no doubt that it is very important. The insistence on this account/impulse/

1. Manual of Psychology, Third edition. pp 339, 340.

2. Op cit. p 343.

3. p. 346

impulse which requires satisfaction leads Stout to declare that "instinctive activity essentially involves intelligent consciousness."<sup>1</sup> Instinctive activity. Attention guides the animal in. If "a felt tendency to act without knowledge of the end" be taken at present as a definition of impulse we see that the difference between reflex and instinctive action is found in the absence or presence of impulse. Reflex action follows stimulus automatically without any felt tendency. Now Lloyd Morgan admits that intelligence may be present in behaviour loosely labelled "instinctive," but he contends that it is not essential to instinct, and supports this contention by trying to prove that intelligence is absent from the first performance of an instinctive act. Stout says that intelligence is present even in the first performance in that the animal, though it has not learnt, is learning by experience. For Stout instinct seems to be action in which the animal is driven by a conative impulse, but in which each step prepares the way for the next. Other writers argue that Stout reads too much into this conation, and Lloyd Morgan says we can see the end in view, but the animal does not know the end of its action. This may be so, but the important point is the felt tendency which acts as a driving force. Stout's account/

1. Manual of Psychology. Third Edition. p. 347. has at least as many instincts as the animals. He complains that psychologists/

1. Manual of Psychology Third Edition. p. 360.



account of instinct as action driven by a conative impulse  
psychologists overlook the threefold nature of instinct.  
seems to imply the continued presence of impulse during the  
instinct has, he says, as has every other mental process,  
whole course of instinctive activity. Attention guides the  
three aspects, the cognitive, the affective and the conative  
animal in sustained search for what it blindly wants, and  
aspects. He defines instinct as "an inherited or innate  
when it has obtained satisfaction the impulse dies away.  
psychological disposition which determines its possessor to  
The animal knows the difference between success and failure.  
perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class,

With regard to the question of human instincts,  
to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality.  
Stout stands between Lloyd Morgan and McDougall. Lloyd  
upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in  
Morgan restricts instincts to inherited coordinated movements,  
a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to  
and these are confined in human beings practically to sucking  
such action." Lloyd Morgan almost ignores the psychological  
and moving the legs when the body is held in position for walk-  
part of this description. He speaks of emotional excite-  
ing. Walking, holding, and other movements which are instinc-  
tive in animals have to be learnt by experience by every baby.  
not include either as a necessary part of instinct. He  
But instead of describing instinct as consisting of congen-  
ital aptitudes for executing movements, Stout would include  
instinct is a compound reflex, it is difficult to see how a  
"congenital dispositions leading to certain appropriate modes  
persistent striving can come in. Stout admits that  
of behaviour under certain special conditions."<sup>1</sup> Flight and  
concealment and other movements admittedly instinctive in  
animals can then also be included among human instincts,  
though the actual movements are acquired by experience.

by McDougall. He seems to regret extending so far the  
McDougall makes instinct the basis of all human  
activity. As intelligence increased with the evolution of  
man it controlled and modified the instincts but man has at  
least as many instincts as the animals. He complains that

1. Journal of Social Psychology, p. 29. McDougall/  
psychologists/  
1. Manual of Psychology, Third Edition. p. 360.

psychologists overlook the threefold nature of instinct. Instinct has, he says, as has every other mental process, three aspects, the cognitive, the affective and the conative aspects. He defines instinct as "an inherited or innate psychological disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action."<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Morgan almost ignores the psychical part of this description. He speaks of emotional excitement and does not deny the feeling of an impulse, but does not include either as a necessary part of instinct. He ignores the attention and interest claimed by Stout, and if instinct is a compound reflex, it is difficult to see how a persistent striving can come in. Stout admits that to include innate interests as part of instinct and not to insist on successful coordinated movement in response to stimuli opens the door to the string of instincts given by McDougall. He seems to regret extending so far the field covered by the term "instinct" but leaves the question open pending a more accurate analysis and examination than has yet been given.<sup>2</sup>

McDougall/

1. Social Psychology. p. 29.
2. Manual of Psychology. p 364.



McDougall says "It is doubtful whether the behaviour of any animal is wholly determined by instincts quite unmodified by experience,"<sup>1</sup> and adds that all the higher animals adapt their instincts to peculiar circumstances.<sup>2</sup> So thoroughly have they done this that it is difficult to see the likeness of the instinctive process in men and animals.

Intelligence modifies instinctive activity in four ways, viz:- perception of objects may be replaced by ideas of objects in stimulating instinctive behaviour; bodily movements may be greatly modified by experience; the presence of ideas may rouse several instincts simultaneously; intelligence causes instinctive tendencies to become more or less organised about certain objects.<sup>2</sup>

It is a far cry from Lloyd Morgan's chicken making its first peck to McDougall's instinct of self-abasement in which the movement varies in varying circumstances and is called up by varying stimuli.

Now that the outstanding views on instinct have been considered, it is necessary to examine first Shand's theory of instinct and impulse and then his views on emotion together with the views which conflict with them in order to

find/

1. Social Psychology. p. 31.
2. Op. cit. p. 31 et seq.
3. Philosophy and Psychology. p. 592.
4. Philosophy and Psychology.

Shand defines instinct as "an inherited disposition find the right place for Joy in general psychology.

both to be excited by certain stimuli and to respond with a specific kind of behaviour or expression to such stimuli." Shand says of emotion that it is "feeling with its impulse."<sup>1</sup> He offers no scientific definition of impulse

but describes it as "undifferentiated prospective emotion."<sup>2</sup> As we have seen, the word "instinct" is used in such widely differing ways by different psychologists that there is great

It has been defined as "action suffused with feeling." Ladd defines it as "a craving, in view of some object of sense

perception or imagination, with a tendency to discharge a perception or imagination, with a tendency to discharge a

complicated form of purposeful movement."<sup>3</sup> Baldwin says

of it "In general the activity of the lower animals is impulsive, for in them conative tendencies do not seem to

be coordinated and subordinated in an organised system of motives."<sup>4</sup> We find the three elements in impulse as in

everything else. There is cognition in the perception of an object of sense or of imagination, there is feeling in

relation to this object, and there is conation. The crucial point of impulse seems to be that it has no knowledge of its

end. This is borne out by Baldwin's definition and ~~fits in~~ <sup>accords</sup> with everything else which is said about impulse. Impulse

according to Shand is the smallest unit of organisation.

Impulse has been tentatively defined as a felt tendency to act without knowledge of an end.

Shand/ shows

1. Foundations of Character. p. 178.

2. Ibid. p. 459.

3. Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory. p. 592.

4. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.

in Shand defines instinct as "an inherited disposition both to be excited by certain stimuli and to respond with a specific kind of behaviour or expression to such stimuli."<sup>1</sup> As we have seen, the word "instinct" is used in such widely differing ways by different psychologists that there is great difficulty in finding out what is the right application of the name. Shand makes observations which help to keep the issues clear. He points out that biologists use the term for behaviour innately determined, but that the specific behaviour "we entitle instinctive is liable to be modified and Stout are all agreed on the presence of impulse in the course of the animal's life through experience. Instinctive behaviour then is of two kinds, that which is purely instinctive, and that in which some traits of the behaviour have been acquired by practice."<sup>2</sup> Shand also points out the incomplete or fragmentary nature of the human instincts. They all have to be supplemented by action acquired through imitation or experiment. He, however, does not deny instinct to human beings. On this point he writes as follows:-

"When the child is not able to attain its end by such incomplete instincts as still survive in it, then, so far as it is unassisted, it has to fall back on two is another and more general methods for attaining them: imitation or experimentation. In the first it shows felt itself capable of profiting by the experience of others; in/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 182.

2. Ibid p. 181



on the reception of the stimulus. It is called up by  
 in the second, of profiting by its own experience.  
 But how does it come to adopt these methods? It  
 does not acquire them through experience. When  
 therefore these methods are spoken of as 'instinctive'  
 and the dispositions from which they proceed as  
 'instincts,' what is meant is that they are hereditary:  
 that the child begins to imitate because the sight of  
 what others are doing is an innate stimulus to its  
 innate and imitative disposition; that it begins to  
 experiment because the failure to attain its ends acts  
 innately as a stimulus to vary its means, and to con-  
 tinue to vary them until it achieves success."<sup>1</sup>

For the purposes of this study, Lloyd Morgan's  
 views on instinct may be set aside since he writes almost  
 entirely from the biological standpoint. Shand, McDougall  
 and Stout are all agreed on the presence of impulse in  
 instinctive activity. Shand seems to take it for granted,  
 and does not labour to show that impulse must be present.  
 It is however implied in all that he says on instinct.  
 For Stout it is essential as is seen in the quotation  
 given above. McDougall quite definitely demands it,  
 the last words of his definition of instinct being "or  
 at least to experience an impulse to such action." It  
 seems as if the criterion of instinct is found here, and  
 that all action caused by a felt tendency to act without  
 knowledge of the end, that is action driven by impulse,  
 is instinctive. In reflex action there is no time for a  
 felt tendency to action. Action follows instantaneously  
 on/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 183.  
 the children of a house are always interfering  
 and playing with some very young kittens. The cat  
 hides the kittens. She may hide them in a different

on the reception of the stimulus. It is called up by  
place every day, she may wander round the house by  
physcial stimuli alone, and what psychological character it  
herself, looking for a safe place. She is receiving  
has must be of the nature of after effect, not ground or  
sense impressions all the time, but obviously they are  
cause. Intelligent action foresees and aims at an end near  
not enough to call forth the appropriate action. She  
or remote. But it seems there are degrees of intelligence,  
is driven either by blind impulse or by a train of  
and instinctive and intelligent activity shade into one  
thought. Our other knowledge of animal behaviour leads  
another so that in a given concrete example it may be diffi-  
us to believe that it is no train of reasoned thought  
cult to determine whether the action is instinctive or intelli-  
which guides her movement, but impulse. Her actions  
gent. The problem becomes much clearer if the presence or  
are partly intelligent no doubt, but the driving force  
absence of knowledge of the end be taken as the distinction  
behind her activity in hiding her kittens is impulse,  
between intelligent and instinctive activity. In intelli-  
i.e. a felt tendency to act without which there is  
gent action there may also be impulse at work in the course  
nothing to account for her action. This is what may  
of the activity, but it is subordinated to the end of the  
decide us to label this act or series of acts instinct  
whole intelligent process and is followed or suppressed  
in contradistinction to the peck of the chicken and to  
according to the end in view.  
the example which follows.

The following examples should make the distinction  
(3) A child of five wishes to hide a precious toy from  
clear.

a destructive baby brother. He is alone in the room.

(1) Lloyd Morgan's new born chicken receives visual  
He looks at the mantelpiece gravely. He pushes a chair  
stimulus from a grain of corn. By the physiological  
up to the fender and climbs laboriously on to it, the  
processes he so clearly analyses, the action of pecking  
toy in his hand. We need not follow all the movements.  
is called forth. If we are satisfied that the physical  
The chair may not be high enough and he may have to try  
stimulus is alone sufficient to call forth the response,  
many expedients before he succeeds in his design of  
the action is reflex.

hiding the toy behind the clock on the mantelpiece.

(2) The children of a house are always interfering  
He may even abandon this particular plan and hide the  
and playing with some very young kittens. The cat

hides the kittens. She may hide them in a different



place every day, she may wander round the house by  
toy somewhere else. But the driving force in all this  
herself, looking for a safe place. She is receiving  
is desire for a clearly conceived end. Sense impressions  
sense impressions all the time, but obviously they are  
and impulse to activity are there, but neither of these  
not enough to call forth the appropriate action. She  
is the determining factor and this behaviour is there-  
is driven either by blind impulse or by a train of  
fers either compound reflex or instinctive, but intelli-  
thought. Our other knowledge of animal behaviour leads  
gent.

us to believe that it is no train of reasoned thought  
Lloyd Morgan may be left out in considering this  
which guides her movement, but impulse. Her actions  
last example, for he would certainly agree that the child's  
are partly intelligent no doubt, but the driving force  
action is not instinctive. Stout, would most probably agree  
behind her activity in hiding her kittens is impulse,  
that the hiding of the toy is essentially intelligent.

i.e. a felt tendency to act without which there is  
McDougall would perhaps contend that the instinct of self  
nothing to account for her action. This is what may  
preservation (using the word "self" in the wider application  
decide us to label this act or series of acts instinct  
to include objects belonging to or closely related to the  
in contradistinction to the peck of the chicken and to  
self) was at the bottom of it. He might say the child's  
the example which follows.

(3) A child of five wishes to hide a precious toy from  
controlled and guided instinctive behaviour. But take an  
a destructive baby brother. He is alone in the room.  
instance of self preservation which really is instinctive  
He looks at the mantelpiece gravely. He pushes a chair  
and not intelligent. A bird cowers in the presence of a  
up to the fender and climbs laboriously on to it, the  
hawk. The difference between the bird and the child is  
toy in his hand. We need not follow all the movements.  
that the bird is driven by an impulse in this case coloured  
The chair may not be high enough and he may have to try  
by the special emotion of fear, to remain motionless. It,  
many expedients before he succeeds in his design of  
we may presume, does not know why. It merely is driven  
hiding the toy behind the clock on the mantelpiece.  
into quiescence because it is unable to do anything else.

He may even abandon this particular plan and hide the  
We can say the bird is afraid lest the hawk should kill it,

toy/  
but/

but though the bird feels fear, which we can prove by the toy somewhere else. But the driving force in all this physiological changes which take place, we have no right to suppose that the bird says to itself "I must be quiet so and impulse to activity are there, but neither of these that the hawk may not see me, for if it sees me it will kill me." The child when frightened by a loud noise might show before neither compound reflex nor instinctive, but intelligent behaviour which would be an exact parallel to the cowering of the bird, but in the instance I have imagined the child

Lloyd Morgan may be left out in considering this knows the end in view. He knows he wants his toy kept in last example, for he would certainly agree that the child's tact and he sees in his mind a path leading to that end, action is not instinctive. Stout, would most probably agree namely, the hiding of the toy. It is merely a confusion of terms to say that this series of acts is instinct.

McDougall would perhaps contend that the instinct of self preservation (using the word "self" in the wider application to its operation in instinctive activity. It may enter into to include objects belonging to or closely related to the any of the systems of character, instinct, emotion, desire, self) was at the bottom of it. He might say the child's sentiment. Whenever it occurs within a system it is subordinated to the end of that system. Its most important controlled and guided instinctive behaviour. But take an part is played in the system of instinct where it is the instance of self preservation which really is instinctive driving force of the activity. The following definition of

and not intelligent. A bird cowers in the presence of a instinct would perhaps include all the essential facts. hawk. The difference between the bird and the child is Instinct is an innate psychological disposition which causes that the bird is driven by an impulse in this case coloured an impulse to activity to arise on the perception or idea by the special emotion of fear, to remain motionless. It, of objects of a certain class. Activity called forth in we may presume, does not know why. It merely is driven this way is instinctive so long as it is independent of into quiescence because it is unable to do anything else. knowledge of the end.

We can say the bird is afraid lest the hawk should kill it,

but/

but though the bird feels fear, which we can prove by the physiological changes which take place, we have no right to suppose that the bird says to itself "I must be quiet so that the hawk may not see me, for if it sees me it will kill me." The child when frightened by a loud noise might show behaviour which would be an exact parallel to the cowering of the bird, but in the instance I have imagined the child knows the end in view. He knows he wants his toy kept intact and he sees in his mind a path leading to that end, namely, the hiding of the toy. It is merely a confusion of terms to say that this series of acts is instinct.

The working of impulse is, however, not confined to its operation in instinctive activity. It may enter into any of the systems of character, instinct, emotion, desire, sentiment. Whenever it occurs within a system it is subordinated to the end of that system. Its most important part is played in the system of instinct where it is the driving force of the activity. The following definition of instinct would perhaps include all the essential facts. Instinct is an innate psychological disposition which causes an impulse to activity to arise on the perception or idea of objects of a certain class. Activity called forth in this way is instinctive so long as it is independent of knowledge of the end.



It is now necessary to consider the nature of emotion. Our purpose determines the choice we have to make, the term to denote concrete facts, not abstract elements, such as everyone discerns fear and anger to be. 'Emotion' must be examined before we can clearly understand the part played in our lives by joy, feeling abstracted from impulse, but feeling with its impulse, and feeling which has essence. Though Shand's method is synthetic and his treatment of mental phenomena concrete, he does not seem to come into conflict with Stout, whose method is genetic and whose treatment of emotion generally abstract. As before we will take up the examination from the concrete point of view and see how far it is in line with the views of McDougall and Stout. He says, lower down, is a force. Shand speaks of emotions as Shand notices the difference in the use of the word "emotion" and the confusion which arises from this difference. His own words will be clearer than any summary of them. The organism, and the outward expression of behaviour, an "Emotion" is frequently used to signify the intense feelings, involving wide diffusion of nervous excitement and marked modification of the organic functions. Such a use excludes all the fainter degrees of anger and fear, joy and sorrow, which are still the same forces of character, though working at a lower degree of intensity or strength. 'Emotion' is also used in a very abstract sense to include the passive feelings of the mind, but to exclude ~~the~~ both the impulses combined with them and the cognitive element which is also an inseparable part of the same mental fact. 'Emotion' finally may be used to denote all those forces that are alternating in our minds with so little respite, as joy and sorrow, anger and fear, disgust and curiosity, hope and despondency, anxiety and disappointment, at all degrees of intensity at which they can be felt and recognized; for it is these that are collectively known as 'the Emotions.'

Our/

Our purpose determines the choice we have to make, and we select the third use of the term. We require the term to denote concrete facts, not abstract elements, facts which are at the same time forces of character, such as everyone discerns fear and danger to be. 'Emotion' for us will connote not feeling abstracted from impulse, but feeling with its impulse, and feeling which has essentially a cognitive attitude however vague, and frequently definite thoughts about its object. The thoughts of anger and fear are quite familiar to us: we have only to hear someone express them in order to know that he is angry or afraid.

This entire concrete fact, which we shall call the emotion, susceptible of varying degrees of intensity and strength, is a system; because it is penetrated throughout by an impulse that organises it, which accepts certain thoughts and rejects others, and directs them to its pre-determined end."<sup>1</sup>

Emotion, he says, lower down, is a force. Shand speaks of emotions as systems within the character and distinguishes three parts in these systems. These are the emotion itself which is present in consciousness, the process connected with it in the organism, and the outward expression or behaviour, and all these three parts belong together and form one system.

Stout instead of a specific definition gives a list of characteristics of emotion. They are its wide range, its birth under varying conditions, its dual source in objects or ideas or in organic change, the persistence of an emotional mood, the parasitical nature of emotion and the/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 178 et seq.



the necessary presence of organic change.<sup>1</sup> From this we may deduce that an emotion may be aroused by mental or physical events, that it is dependent on some other event or idea, and that it is always accompanied by organic change.

When Stout says in the Groundwork "The emotion of itself tends to call up the kind of ideas which are congruent with it, and afford it the appropriate field for its own development,"<sup>2</sup> he seems to be in sympathy with what Shand says of emotion as an organising factor in the mind. Stout continues "An emotional mood may become the centre and rallying point of a fixed circle of ideas which recur whenever it recurs."<sup>3</sup> He also says in the Groundwork "Every distinctive type of emotion has its own peculiar quality which is incapable of being further analysed..... This does not imply that emotions are absolutely simple states which do not at all admit of analytic description. It implies only that they can never be resolved without remainder into a combination of more elementary constituents otherwise known outside this combination. An emotion may include within its unity a complex of emotional states as its components."<sup>4</sup> This is in line with what Shand says of an emotion as a system and as a Hipp-chronoscope to record the different parts of the "self/

1. Op. cit. p. 405 et seq. 2. Groundwork of Psychology, p. 121  
3. Ibid. p. 121. and 4. Ibid. p. 188. there is the sight, full of meaning, of the warwig. The meaning enters into consciousness

1. Op. cit. p. 64.

1. Op. cit. p. 64.

ness and the emotion of disgust follows. Directly the "self or microcosm of the entire mind."<sup>1</sup> The chapter on emotion is in focus action begins, action transmuted by the emotion in the Groundwork was written by Shand and contains emotion with which it is impregnated. If the time could be measured it might be that there was a space of time in which the statement that emotions must be defined by their ends. The presence of this chapter in Stout's book is sufficient the subject was merely perceiving before the onset of emotion, guarantee of the agreement between the two writers on this and a space of time in which the subject was passive under point.

the assault of the emotion, then the subject became active by reason of the emotion. Thus cognition, feeling-attitude and yet at the same time it has a narrower range, for in and conation would be shown to be separate, yet the emotion every moment there is feeling-attitude and there may not influence both the cognition and the conation. We can hardly be emotion. Emotion cannot be restricted to the affective ly describe the emotion as being one strand in the plait and side of mental life, for before emotion can arise there must at the same time part of each of the other two strands. It be cognition of an object or idea, and there must also be will certainly not suffice in the plait theory of mental life reaction of some sort in relation to the object in connection to take emotion as the feeling-attitude strand. Conation may with which the emotion is experienced.

be present in cognition, and wherever present at all, is present also in conation.

An example may be of use.

I look up from my writing and see an earwig crawling along the table towards me. I flick it off the table with my ruler. In this section of experience there are the character. It is passive and it is active. If an incon- three strands of the plait, a perception, a feeling tone of ceivably minute analysis of the experience with the earwig disgust, and conation. Suppose it to be possible for a showed a very small interval of time between the beginning Hipp-chronoscope to record the different parts of the exper- of the perception of the earwig and the onset of the emotion ience. It would show us first that there is the sight, full of disgust, still the perception had not vanished when the of meaning, of the earwig. The meaning enters into conscious- emotion was first felt, but emotion suffused the perception. ness

1. Op. cit. p. 64.

ness and the emotion of disgust follows. Directly the emotion is in focus action begins, action transmuted by the emotion with which it is impregnated. Even if the time could be measured it might be that there was a space of time in which the subject was merely perceiving before the onset of emotion, and a space of time in which the subject was passive under the assault of the emotion, then the subject became active by reason of the emotion. Thus cognition, feeling-attitude and conation would be shown to be separate, yet the emotion influence both the cognition and the conation. We can hardly describe the emotion as being one strand in the plait and at the same time part of each of the other two strands. It will certainly not suffice in the plait theory of mental life to take emotion as the feeling-attitude strand. Emotion may be present in cognition, and wherever present at all, is present also, in conation. Emotion is closely related to cognition, feeling-attitude and conation. It seems that emotion has a two-fold character. It is passive and it is active. If an inconceivably minute analysis of the experience with the earwig showed a very small interval of time between the beginning of the perception of the earwig and the onset of the emotion of disgust, still the perception had not vanished when the emotion was first felt, but emotion suffused the perception.

Also the emotion might die away before the conation was over, though feeling-attitude would of course necessarily remain as an essential factor of conation. Even then we come up against absurdity in attempting this kind of analysis, for the perception also endured through the conation though it had changed its character. Emotion must be treated as an event, not as an abstraction. The unsatisfactory nature of the attempt to treat emotion as an abstraction further justifies Shand's concrete method of treating it as an event or moment of experience. Emotion, he says, is a force. Now a force is something which moves potentially or actually and no static definition of it can adequately describe it. By examining one photograph used in a cinematograph we cannot grasp the complete movement which the working cinematograph displays. We can, however, grasp something of the nature of the movement by such behaviour if we realise at the same time that we are neglecting what Bergson calls duration, and spreading out as time in space. An emotion consists of, or persists and endures through, many states of consciousness, and it is impossible to separate one state entirely from another. To attempt to do so may, however, throw certain light on the problem, provided we are conscious of our self-imposed limitations. It must be remembered that emotion, as Shand



says, is a force, not an object which will be passive under emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts. In one emotional moment we find, as Shand points out and as Stout agrees, the three aspects of instincts may be called a primary emotion.<sup>1</sup> McDougall mental life, cognition, affective tone and conation. There definitely states that every instinct has as its central must be perception of an object or idea and action of some sort in relation to the perception, but the fact which makes the experience has a definite quality. He makes us describe this moment of consciousness under survey as an emotion is the peculiar quality of its affective tone. ly independent of instinct is for him impossible.

The relation between instinct and emotion is clearly stated by Shand and there seems to be no reason to criticize it. He makes two important criticisms of McDougall's theory, first that several instincts may work together to

In this view Shand is in direct conflict with McDougall. He makes two important criticisms of McDougall's theory, first that several instincts may work together to organise impulses to serve their ends. Emotions serve the end of one specific emotion, and second, that one instinct may be connected with several emotions. With regard to the former proposition Shand has stated the position clearly enough. McDougall claims that every primary emotion must be connected with only one instinct. must be given here, since his theory particularly with regard to Joy conflicts with Shand's. McDougall defines emotion as a "mode of affective experience." Such a definition shows that he does not regard an emotion as an event but as an abstraction. Flight and concealment are two instincts, sometimes the fear-driven animal has recourse to the first, at other times to the second and at other times first to one and then the

A short examination of McDougall's view of emotion must be given here, since his theory particularly with regard to Joy conflicts with Shand's. McDougall defines emotion as a "mode of affective experience." Such a definition shows that he does not regard an emotion as an event but as an abstraction. Flight and concealment are two instincts, sometimes the fear-driven animal has recourse to the first, at other times to the second and at other times first to one and then the instincts conditions then some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; and the

other in either of the two possible orders. So there are emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion."<sup>1</sup> McDougall definitely states that every instinct has as its central part a specific emotion, that is, the affective aspect of the experience has a definite quality. He makes instinct the basis of all our activity and therefore emotion entirely independent of instinct is for him impossible.

In this view Shand is in direct conflict with McDougall. He makes two important criticisms of McDougall's theory, first that several instincts may work together to serve the end of one specific emotion, and second, that one instinct may be connected with several emotions. With regard to the former proposition Shand has stated the position clearly enough. McDougall claims that every primary emotion must be connected with only one instinct. Shand argues that it is forcing facts into his theory for McDougall to treat of the instincts of flight and concealment as one instinct at the root of the emotion of fear.<sup>2</sup> Flight and concealment are two instincts, sometimes the fear-driven animal has recourse to the first, at other times to the second and at other times first to one and then the other/

1. Social Psychology. p. 47.

2. Op.cit. p. 190.

other in either of the two possible orders. So there are criticism justified. Though in some instinctive acts the at least two instincts connected with one emotion and the affective side of the experience may be so definite as to description of the two as one chain-instinct is a forcing of merit a specific name, yet in others it may be an undifferentiated uneasiness, and to give each instinctive act a specific emotional label seems in the light of Shand's than one emotion. Shand argues that flight which is actuated by fear in birds, is also used by them in the joy of exercise.<sup>1</sup> Of course flight is the ordinary means of locomotion for birds, but the same thing may be true of a dog. The dog racing after a rabbit runs just as fast as the dog running from an angry master. McDougall would see that the former action was not flight in that the animal is running towards and not away from the object. However we find both flight, the instinctive activity at the root of fear, and attack, the instinctive activity at the root of anger at work not only in these emotions but also in the activity of play. McDougall does not deal satisfactorily with this. He treats play as an innate tendency which has no special instinct as its basis and whose chief characteristic is a desire to excel. This must be connected with the instinct of self display, but still the instincts of flight and pugnacity are seen to exist not only in the emotions of fear and anger, and to that extent at least is Shand's criticism

1. Op. cit. p. 191 the end is not clear or known to the consciousness.

criticism justified. Though in some instinctive acts the affective side of the experience may be so definite as to merit a specific name, yet in others it may be an undifferentiated uneasiness, and to give each instinctive act a specific emotional label seems in the light of Shand's remarks to go beyond the facts.

Again Shand points out that instinct can work without the presence of emotion. He instances the "fragmentary" instincts involved in standing, sitting, walking, running, sucking, licking, in which there need be no specific emotional experience.

Emotion may follow its end along the path of instinctive activity, or it may drive a human being along a path of intelligent activity the end of which he sees and at which he consciously aims. Whether all intelligent activity is caused by the arising in us of some emotion is another question altogether and one which need not be examined here. The point is whether emotion which directs instinctive activity is capable of more than this, has a wider range. Shand insists that every emotion has an end, and that an emotion has the power of organising instincts to subserve that end. His contention against McDougall that more than one instinct may be connected with any given emotion is the point here. When the end is not clear or known to the consciousness, /



works unchecked along the instinctive path, using the consciousness, the action which follows is instinctive; when the end is clear, the action is intelligent. Emotion, using the impulse and not repressing it, may be the driving force of instinct, but also it may subserve intelligence, and the difference between intelligent and instinctive activity lies in the consciousness or absence of consciousness of the end. We will leave out of the discussion any possible intelligent activity not caused by emotion, for if there be such, it can certainly in the light of what has been said above, contain nothing instinctive. When emotion subserves intelligent activity it may, as Shand shows, organise all the instincts connected with that emotion towards its own end. Intelligent action which springs from emotion controls and modifies the instincts. e.g. angry at something said, flushes, clenches his fist. A few examples may make the argument clearer.

We will take instances from the emotion of anger.

live A child of four snatches a toy from his brother of two. The baby may break into a sorrowful wail (which is outside our present example) or he may strike the offender. Let us suppose he does this. The cognition of the loss of his toy causes the emotion of anger to arise. This emotion sets the instinct of pugnacity to work. The impulse of this instinct is to injure or destroy. The baby cannot control his emotion. It

works unchecked along the instinctive path, using the appropriate impulse. The baby will go on striking his brother or some near object until his attention is diverted to something else, or till the emotion is spent. but instinct is controlled and modified by the

2. A man angry at something said, snatches a knife and stabs the offender. This act may be instinctive or intelligent, and only the man himself can tell us which it is. If he committed the deed "without thinking," he acted just as did the baby of two. If he foresaw the end and determined on the revengeful act, his deed was intelligent. His intelligence consciously and purposely allowed his emotion to express itself in the instinctive way.

3. A man, angry at something said, flushes, clenches his fist and responds with an angry word. This action is intelligent. He consciously inhibits the instinctive action and replaces it by action directed towards the end of the emotion in a way which seems to him more expedient. He may decide that his words will hurt more than a blow; he may be unwilling to take the consequences of allowing his instincts full play. He chooses and directs his action to the end of the emotion. Habit has so much influence in our lives that it is probable that he will never consider the possibility of a blow,

but will direct his action towards the ultimate end of the emotion, in this case injury, in a way not forbidden by habit. Instinctive behaviour is present in the clenching of the fist, and the bodily changes which occur, but instinct is controlled and modified by the emotion which is in this case subserving intelligence.

4. A man angry at something said, flushes, clenches his fist and makes no reply or a gentle one. Here he consciously inhibits the instinctive action by denying the end of the emotion aroused. This is a case in which emotion controls and modifies instinct, and intelligence working in a sentiment controls and modifies emotion. Instinctive activity is confined to bodily changes and the felt impulse to the forbidden action, and though latent for use if required, is not allowed to realise itself in action.

In some emotions it is difficult to find any trace of instinct at all. It seems that there are emotions which have not instincts at their command. A discussion of the distinction between primary and other emotions is not relevant to the question in hand, but it can be noticed that those emotions which Shand claims as primary always use and organise instincts to serve their ends and the remaining emotions, e.g., wonder, seem able to be experienced without exciting any particular instinct. Take the emotion of anxiety. McDougall

denies that it is an emotion at all. Shandy places it among the emotions in the system of desire, and Stout says of it, "If anxiety is not an emotion, I do not know what an emotion is." Anxiety might be described as a rapid alternation of hope and fear, but the alternation is so rapid that the experience is not twofold but unitary in character. The hope is overshadowed by the fear, and the fear brightened by the hope.<sup>1</sup> What instincts can this emotion have at its command? If there is a connection here between emotion and instinct, it is so slight as merely to add to our conviction that emotion has a wider range than instinct and is not dependent on it. to achieve their ends and the result is some-

The summary of the argument is this:—Instinct depends for its very life and existence on impulse, which in some cases may be coloured by a specific emotion. All the primary emotions are capable of controlling and modifying instinctive behaviour, and they do particularly when they are working within a sentiment and are subserving intelligence.

Shand tells us in his chapter on Stout's Groundwork to define emotions by their ends.<sup>1</sup> In the Foundations of Character he expands this advice. He says "The systems of the emotions are forces that enable us to perform the actions constituting the expression and behaviour characteristic of them./

---

1. Groundwork of Psychology, p. 199.

1. *Op. cit.* p. 197.



them. These actions partly through heredity and partly may have succeeded in escaping from the traumatic experience through individual experience have become organised to effect which caused its fear, but biologically the emotion has a certain result. It is because the emotional forces are so failed to achieve its end, and the result was different, organised that they constitute systems, and the result to from the real end of the emotion. Similar instances of which their actions are instrumental we shall call their 'ends.'

In this sense the discovery of the 'end' of an emotion or be found in the death from crushing which overtakes unfortunate people seized with panic at a fire in a theatre. of an instinct is that which alone enables us to interpret its system."<sup>1</sup> End, then, in this sense is the same as result. Only when emotion is successful in achieving its end are result. Whatever we observe to be result of an emotion is the terms end and result both applicable to the facts. the end of the emotion. It is perhaps a pity thus to make The difference between end and result is important not only the words "end" and result" synonyms. Emotion and instinct in emotion but in sentiment also. Shand's doctrine of sometimes fail to achieve their ends and the result is some- sentiments will receive consideration in a later part of this thing other than the end. A moth flies at a lamp and falls burnt and dying on the table. The moth was impelled by that the end of a sentiment, usually the preservation or welfare of some loved object, may have a result in sharp painful death? Is not this rather an instance of failure after different from the end? The instances of the moth of adaptation and the survival of an instinct which works and the horse are not instances of emotion working within directly against the preservation of the species? The butterfly flying in the sunlight comes to no harm, but good. below the level of development of sentiments. The senti- A runaway horse maddened by fear, runs down a steep hill and dashes into a river. The river is in spate and the horse is at a fire is that of self-love. The end of the sentiment drowned. The end of the emotion of fear is escape, but the result of this emotional experience was death. The horse

may/

1. Op. cit. p. 197.

may have succeeded in escaping from the traction engine which caused its fear, but biologically the emotion has failed to achieve its end, and the result was different from the real end of the emotion. Similar instances of the result of the emotion contradicting its true end may be found in the death from crushing which overtakes unfortunate people seized with panic at a fire in a theatre. Only when emotion is successful in achieving its end are the terms end and result both applicable to the facts. The difference between end and result is important not only in emotion but in sentiment also. Shand's doctrine of sentiments will receive consideration in a later part of this study, but here it is only necessary to point out that the end of a sentiment, usually the preservation or welfare of some loved object, may have a result in character different from the end. The instances of the moth and the horse are not instances of emotion working within a sentiment for they are examples of experiences of life below the level of development of sentiments. The sentiment dominating the minds of people overwhelmed with panic at a fire is that of self-love. The end of the sentiment is self-preservation. The emotion of fear working within

1. Op. cit. p. 198.

this sentiment has escape as its end. In such a case the emotion has as a result something which is in direct contradiction to the end of the emotion itself and the sentiment within which it works. Shand speaks of the power of emotions and sentiments to choose the means to their ends. When they do not choose rightly the result differs from any may defeat the end. When the result of an instinct is different from the end of the instinct, as in the case of the moth, the result is due to this lack of the power of choice and fore-sight.

Shand differentiates between proximate and final ends. He says "It is then of the first importance if we are to succeed in interpreting the primary emotions as root forces of character to study the types of each emotion from the point of view of the different instincts and other tendencies which are expressed in their behaviour directing them to different proximate results or ends, although the final end of the emotion may be the same in all."<sup>1</sup> Flight and immobility he instances as proximate ends to the final end of escape. This difference might perhaps be more conveniently expressed as a difference between means and end, and the usefulness of such a distinction will be of value in considering

---

1. Op. cit. p. 198.

We have now examined the different theories of considering joy. It is implied under the names of proximate ends in what Shand says of fear. "When the proximate result or end to which fear is directed in one animal is the different from that to which it is directed in another, the systems of fear in the two animals will be themselves partially different because they have to be adapted to different ends, though the cause of the fear may be the same."<sup>1</sup> If the suggested alteration in terminology be made, the sentence would read "When the means used by one animal in pursuit of the end of fear is different from that used by another, the systems of fear in the two animals will be themselves partially different because they have to employ different instincts as means to the same end of the emotion of fear." Shand instances eight varieties of fear, so far as it may be differently expressed, eight means by which the end, escape, may be achieved. They are flight, hiding, silence, clinging, shrinking, immobility, crying for help, and fighting when at bay. The emotion of fear organises for its use those of these instincts which will best serve its end of escape. Each instinct is worked by a different impulse, which impulses are expressed in the names given to these different means.

---

Though true in themselves, these laws are true

1. Ibid. p. 200. but of other emotions, and though they tell us

1. Op. cit. p. 285

2. Ibid. p. 285



We have now examined the different theories of impulse, instinct and emotion, and the relations subsisting between them. Every emotion has an end and varying means. The means by which an emotion works towards its end are the instincts and impulses which it can command. For instance, the end of the emotion of anger is some form of aggression. The means by which it works towards this end are different kinds of attack. These different kinds of attack are different kinds of instinctive behaviour such as biting or hitting. We now come to a particular examination of Shand's theory of Joy. It will be necessary to discuss the end of Joy as given by Shand and the means or instincts and impulses which Joy has at its command. In order to arrive at this the six laws of Joy given by Shand must be examined in detail.

From the laws Shand deduces the end of this emotion of Joy. "It is to maintain attention to the object of joy or the representation of this object, to maintain this object in the same relation to the self and in its present state. It is, in short, to produce no change in, but simply to conserve the existing situation." <sup>1</sup>

It would now be well to examine these laws in detail. Four of them are open to criticism on the same ground. Though true in themselves, these laws are true not only of joy but of other emotions, and though they tell us/

1. Op. cit. p. 285

2. Ibid. p. 281

us something of the nature of joy, they seem to fail to justify their author's claim to point out the distinctive characteristics of the emotion.

The first law of Joy is as follows: "Joy attracts attention and thought to its object and there tends to sustain them so long as the joy is felt."<sup>1</sup> Shand admits however that this is characteristic not of joy alone, but of other emotions. We might substitute in the above law the word "anger" or "fear" for "joy" and the statement is still true.

The second law of Joy is given thus: "Joy tends to maintain the self in its present relation to the object."<sup>2</sup> There are two reasons why this law does not advance our knowledge of joy. We may maintain the self in its present relation to the object when we are not swayed by joy, and we may be swayed by joy and consciously assist in altering the relation between the self and the object. A third objection might be made to the vagueness of the phrase. In a world of change nothing is the same for two minutes together. Sameness is relative, and remarks about it are always open to dispute. However, a typist copying a manuscript may be said to be in the same relation to the object as long as she continues her work, if we overlook the change in the object

---

1. Op. cit. p. 280.

2. Ibid. p. 281.

object as the work nears completion, the change in the hour of day and the worker's physical and mental sensations of increasing hunger, fatigue and boredom. She keeps herself in the same relation to the object because she must finish the work but this sameness may be very far from being the results of joy.

It is possible to take as an object of joy something which necessitates a continual change in the attitude of the subject. This necessity is probably due to the constantly changing character of the object, but the relationship alters its nature. Take the case of an artist seized suddenly with the desire to make a portrait sketch. The desire to make the sketch is immediately succeeded by joy, expressed probably in such words as "I could just catch that expression." The object of his attention and of his joy is the sketch he is about to make. The person to be portrayed is only the object in a secondary sense and is a means. As the sketch proceeds the subject changes from artist about to work, artist at work and artist surveying work done. The object changes from sketch about to be made, sketch in progress, sketch completed. If the sketch is successful the joy will persist throughout the experience which may be so brief that it is impossible to describe it as three separate experiences. The subject-  
in individuals. object/

The third law of Joy is "Joy tends to maintain object relation at the end is different from the subject-object relation at the beginning: subject and object have both undergone change. Yet the experience is sufficiently rapid is one experience which cannot reasonably be broken into parts.

A picture we thought so wonderful in our adolescent years has now ceased to delight us. The subject has altered his the beauty of the expression is the object of joy and that relation to the object and the joy has gone. Summer passes the making of the sketch is the means chosen to keep the self in the same relation to the object more completely than is possible by merely continuing to look at the person in question. That this would be the explanation of many instances of the painting of portraits and the taking of photographs is very probable, but this explanation may not be accurate for all cases such as the one described. The artist has a permanent disposition to feel joy when at work at his art. When an object of beauty arouses joy in him, the joy expresses itself in activity, and in the activity most closely related to his other sentiments. Someone who is not an artist would express the joy in exclamation, or in gazing at the object, and in the latter case mental activity is the outcome of the emotion of joy. In either case the maintenance of the relation is a means, not an end. The end is activity and the particular form of activity differs in individuals.



The third law of Joy is "Joy tends to maintain the object itself as it is."<sup>1</sup> This is not always true as we have seen in the case of an artist making a sketch, a case to which many parallels could be found. However there are objects of joy concerning which both these laws are true. A picture we thought so wonderful in our adolescent years has now ceased to delight us. The subject has altered his relation to the object and the joy has gone. Summer passes into autumn before our joy in summer dies; we would fain keep the sunshine and the long days, but autumn comes relentlessly with early twilight and cold winds. The object has changed and our joy has gone. Nevertheless so far as these laws fail in universality, so far do they lose their value.

In the fourth law of Joy, Shand considers opposition and the prominence of impulse in relation to joy. "Opposition to the impulse of joy tends to enlist in its service the anger which is caused by opposition, and has as its particular end the breaking down of opposition."<sup>2</sup> This again is true of other emotions as well as of joy. Instances might be quoted of the anger of a fugitive who turns at bay and fights. Fighting is the characteristic expression of impulse anger, not of fear pure and simple. Anger is called in

---

1. Op. cit. p. 281.

2. Op. cit. p. 203.

1. Tu n'es plus rien. René Boylesse. Revue de deux Mondes.

Sept. and Oct. 1916.

ness.<sup>1</sup> So it is also with anger. Even sorrow when wish or try to control our anger, checked in its outburst is transformed by anger. An example of this is found in Tu n'es plus rien by René Boylesue. Odette loses her husband in the early days of the war. Reference to this will be useful later in considering the loss of the object of the only sentiment in a life. Odette is overwhelmed with grief and is annoyed rather than sympathetic when many letters reach her telling of other deaths.

The next law concerning the impulse to more serious criticism. It reads: "Elle éprouvait une sorte de sombre rancœur contre ces sorts funestes qui venait, avec un acharnement impitoyable, troubler sa douleur, son incomparable douleur intime." The reason for this "sombre rancœur" is that "elle resolut d'aller pleurer Jean dans la solitude, de se retirer en un endroit où elle put ne penser qu'à Jean, vivre avec sa seule mémoire, s'étourdir de sa propre douleur, mais être au moins tout entière à cette douleur qu'un anéantissement au monde n'avait de droit de lui arracher."<sup>2</sup> That the checking of the joyful impulse results in anger does not help to distinguish joy from the other emotions. The same criticism applies to the next law.

"In proportion to the degree in which the impulse of joy is opposed, it is raised into prominence in consciousness!"

1. Op. cit. p. 283.

2. Tu n'es plus rien. René Boylesue. Revue de deux Mondes.

ness."<sup>1</sup> So it is also with anger and fear. If we do not wish or try to control our anger, and are thwarted in attempts to express our emotion, our anger increases until we may be entirely filled by the desire for revenge. If we see no hope of escape from danger, our fear is greatly intensified, and more passionately than ever is the impulse to escape present to our minds. In this law also, however true, joy is not made in any way distinctive.

The next law, concerning the impulse of Joy is open to more serious criticism. It reads: "In proportion to the degree in which the impulse of joy is prominent in consciousness is the end of the emotion of joy destroyed."<sup>2</sup> This brings us directly to the question, What is the impulse of joy? Shand tells us the end of joy is "to maintain the situation which is the cause of joy so long as the joy is felt."<sup>3</sup> He finds no instinct specially devoted to serve the end of joy, as the instinct of pugnacity directly serves the end of anger, but says that joy uses all the instincts for its own end and "impresses its peculiar character on all of them."<sup>3</sup> He gives no special impulse for joy, though the impulses at work in the different instincts subserve the end of joy. In Shand's view whatever may be the particular impulse at

work/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 283.      2. Ibid. p. 283.      3. Op. cit. p. 300

In Shand's treatment of Joy there seems to be some work in any experience of joy, it must have the character of tending to maintain the status quo, for otherwise it would not be an impulse subserving the end of joy. Shand says of joy as of other emotions that that which brings the impulse into prominence is opposition. We have seen that opposition to the impulses of anger and fear does not destroy but heightens the experience of the emotion. Shand does not admit this of joy. Joy, he says, is destroyed in so far as the impulse to joy is raised into prominence. Criticism of this must be preceded by criticism of Shand's theory of the end of joy.

To say that Shand has not set forth the true final end of joy is a very daring criticism to apply to such a valuable and illuminating book as the Foundations of Character. Yet to this conclusion the arguments which follow will inevitably lead. It appears that it is sometimes but not always true that joy tends to maintain the subject in the same relation to the object and to keep the object unchanged. This maintenance then can neither be the end of joy nor the only means to its end. This keeping the status quo is sometimes used as a means or proximate end. It may be possible to show that there are other means and that the end is something quite different.



In Shand's treatment of Joy there seems to be some confusion between the end and the behaviour of the emotion, a confusion which is not found in his treatment of other emotions. On page 300 he states the end of Joy clearly. "And this fundamental end is to maintain the situation which is the cause of joy so long as the joy in it is felt." He then notes that joy has an "astonishing variety of behaviour" and immediately describes as behaviour that which has just been described as end. The passage continues "Notwithstanding the astonishing variety of its behaviour, a general character pervades it. For whereas Anger is aggressive and Fear avoids aggression and both work to effect some change in the existing situation, Joy alone attends and behaves in such a way as to maintain it as it is." At the end of the previous chapter there is the same confusion. Shand is pointing out that Anger and Fear have each one end to which is related great variety of behaviour. Contrasting this with Joy he continues "Variety of particular end" (which we have in these pages called 'means') "determined by particular instincts that we have not yet found. Instead of a most complex body of behaviour here is at bottom a uniformity of behaviour arising out of the uniformity of tendency and end.

The difficulty about the impulse of joy and the For/  
confusion/

1. Op. cit. p. 286.

1. Op. cit. p. 286.

2. Troilus and Cressida. Act 1. Sc. 2.

confusion between end and behaviour point to the conclusion  
For notwithstanding the striking differences between the  
that Ehand has not found the true end of joy. In seeking  
joys of exercise and rest, the joys of the appetites and  
the true end a hint from Stout is useful. He does not  
the tender joys of affection, they are all doing the same  
indeed assign to joy a special end but points to one in  
thing, maintaining that state of the object and relation  
saying in the Groundwork "Joy involves what we may call  
to the self which already exist." Now if the end of joy  
expansive activity. It brings a heightened zest for such  
is really this maintenance of the status quo, opposition  
movements of attention and modes of behaviour as are not  
to the impulse of joy must necessarily destroy the emotion.  
intrinsically painful and do not involve strain and effort...  
For if the opposition is to be removed, change must occur,  
Movement in general is quick and vigorous. Laughter, clapping  
and joy is opposed to change. If the impulse of joy is to  
ing of hands, jumping up and down, singing and whistling are  
preserve the existing state unchanged, a situation in which  
characteristic expressions. There is a tendency to social  
change becomes necessary must defeat and destroy joy. But  
demonstrativeness and generosity. A man in a joyful mood  
if the end of joy is some form of activity, the impulse of  
may go out of his way to give sixpence to a beggar who would  
joy will also tend to activity and the prominence in conscious-  
not have extracted a penny from him had he been sorry or  
ness of the felt activity will not necessarily destroy the  
angry."

emotion. Wordsworth in his poem St. Bee's Head tells us

If we follow this hint that joy involves expansive  
no one plucks the rose

Whose proffered beauty in safe shelter blows

'Mid a trim garden's summer luxuries,

With joy like his who climbs, on hands and knees, names

For some rare plant, yon Headland of St. Bees.

to the different kinds. Thus anger involves a destructive

Here it is implied that the consciousness of

activity, whether the angry man kicks, hits or shoots, fear

activity actually enhances the emotion of joy. Shakespeare

involves an activity leading to escape whether the terrified

also has said "Joy's soul lies in the doing."<sup>2</sup>

man runs away or hides. Joy, according to Ehand is a con-

The difficulty about the impulse of joy and the

servative force. He says "Joy is essentially a conserva-

confusion/

tive system, which resists 'improvements' and 'progress.'

1. Op. cit. p. 286.

2. Troilus and Cressida. Act I.

Sc. 2.

because it does not discover defects, so long as enjoyment  
confusion between end and behaviour point to the conclusion  
that Shand has not found the true end of joy. In seeking  
the true end a hint from Stout is useful. He does not  
indeed assign to joy a special end but points to one in  
saying in the Groundwork "Joy involves what we may call  
expansive activity. It brings a heightened zest for such  
movements of attention and modes of behaviour as are not  
intrinsically painful and do not involve strain and effort...  
Movement in general is quick and vigorous. Laughter, clapp-  
ing of hands, jumping up and down, singing and whistling are  
characteristic expressions. There is a tendency to social  
demonstrativeness and generosity. A man in a joyful mood  
may go out of his way to give sixpence to a beggar who could  
not have extracted a penny from him had he been sorry or  
angry."<sup>1</sup>

If we follow this hint that joy involves expansive  
activity we may find the end of this emotion. Every emotion  
involves activity of some kind, and we give different names  
to the different kinds. Thus anger involves a destructive  
activity, whether the angry man kicks, hits or shoots, fear  
involves an activity leading to escape whether the terrified  
man runs away or hides. Joy, according to Shand is a con-  
servative force. He says "Joy is essentially a conserva-  
tive system, which resists 'improvements' and 'progress,'

because/

---

1. Groundwork of Psychology. p. 190.

because it does not discern defects, so long as enjoyment is complete." It is the only emotion which tends to keep the status quo. Anger tries to change the object, fear to remove the subject from the object, but joy tends to keep the self in the same relation to an unchanged object. It might rather be suggested that joy is a progressive, at times an almost revolutionary force. It involves activity, as we have seen. This however is no special distinction. Stout says it involves expansive activity. Here perhaps we have the key to the problem. So vague a phrase as "expansive activity" must be more closely defined. Let it be suggested that the end of joy is to seek new activity or to enhance old activity. Before considering this more closely it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the terms joy, happiness and pleasure. A few examples taken from Shakespeare alone will suffice to illustrate this variance.

"Of all said yet, I wish thee happiness."<sup>1</sup>

Happiness is equivalent to good fortune. "Happy" stands for "fortunate" in

Happy he whose cloak and cincture can  
Hold out this tempest.<sup>2</sup>

In Cymbeline "happiness" stands for an emotion. Cymbeline is rejoicing in victory and celebrating it by knighting Bellarius and Pisano when Cornelius enters.

To sour your happiness, I must report  
The Queen is dead.<sup>3</sup>

Joy/

1. Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act. I, Sc. 1.
2. King John, Act. IV, Sc. 3.
3. Cymbeline, Act V, Sc. 3.



Joy as distinct from happiness is the meaning in the follow-

ing:-

CHAPTER II

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JOY, HAPPINESS AND PLEASURE

Most psychological studies have to include a study of words. A study of joy will be no exception to this rule. Psychology is at a disadvantage when compared with other sciences since the terms which it must use are words common in everyday life, subject to fluctuations of meaning and misleading differences of interpretation. An examination of the nature of joy cannot succeed unless the distinction which must be made between joy, happiness and pleasure be clearly stated. There is much inconsistency in the everyday use of these words and their corresponding adjectives. A few examples taken from Shakespeare alone will suffice to illustrate this variance.

"Of all said yet, I wish thee happiness."<sup>1</sup>

Happiness is equivalent to good fortune. "Happy" stands for "fortunate" in

Happy he whose cloak and cincture can  
Hold out this tempest.<sup>2</sup>

In Cymbeline "happiness" stands for an emotion. Cymbeline is rejoicing in victory and celebrating it by knighting Bellarius and Pisano when Cornelius enters.

To sour your happiness, I must report  
The Queen is dead.<sup>3</sup>

Joy/

1. Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act. I. Sc. 1.
2. King John, Act. IV, Sc. 3.
3. Cymbeline, Act V, Sc. 5.

Joy as distinct from happiness is the meaning in the following:-

How pregnant sometimes his replies are! A

Unhappy were you, madam, were I came, on.<sup>1</sup>

But by my coming I have made you happy.<sup>1</sup>

Happiness is plainly here a lucky chance. Its adjective

Happiness is often used to express not an emotion but a con-

dition of mind comparatively stable and lasting.

The following quotations illustrate this use:-

What happy gale

ing quotations illustrate this use:-

Happy is What have you lost by losing of this day? Boister

All days of glory, joy, and happiness.<sup>2</sup>

is seeming to take the throne

where joy and happiness are made distinct.

I got and if you plead as well for them

Happiness as a background of the mind is expressed also

No doubt we'll bring it to a happy issue.<sup>3</sup>

in Measure for Measure

"Happy" can also be almost equivalent to "wigg." Benedick

Happy thou art not:

soliloquies For what thou hast not, still thou striv'st to get,

And what thou hast, forgets't.<sup>3</sup>

loves him says

"Happiness" appears to be <sup>/a</sup> synonym for behaviour or manner

in:- can He hath indeed a good outward happiness.<sup>4</sup>

It is perhaps used for pleasures of the world when the

Archbishop says, we happy few, we band of brothers<sup>5</sup>

it is also Nor do I, an enemy to peace, of the word is further

shown in Troop in the throngs of military men,

But rather show awhile a fearful war

To diet rank minds sick of happiness.<sup>5</sup>

And think our former state a happy dream<sup>6</sup>

It is an object of love or a cause of joy in

where "happy" might mean a permanent condition of mind or a

transient emotion.

Long live Queen Margaret, England's happiness!<sup>6</sup>

When Hamlet in his madness converses with Polonius, making

gildwandering/

1. Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act V, Sc. 4.

2. King John, Act. III, Sc. 4. Sc. 2.

3. Measure for Measure, Act. III, Sc. 1.

4. Much Ado About Nothing, Act. II, Sc. 3.

5. II Henry IV, Act. IV, Sc. 13.

6. II Henry VI, Act I, Sc. 1.

wandering yet strangely apt remarks Polonius says  
I were but little happy if I could say how much<sup>1</sup>  
How pregnant sometimes his replies are! A  
where joy and happiness that often madness hits on.<sup>1</sup>

Happiness is plainly here a lucky chance. Its adjective  
has the same meaning in such remarks as the use of the word  
"joy." Often it is used to express a happy gale emotional  
Blows you to Padua?<sup>2</sup>

experience, and many times it is used to express the more  
Happy is equivalent to successful when Richard of Gloster  
permanent and stable condition of mind for which "happiness"  
is scheming to take the throne  
is also used. The following quotation is an example of its

I go: and if you plead as well for them  
use as a god As I can say nay to thee for myself,  
No doubt we'll bring it to a happy issue.<sup>3</sup>  
O Helicanus, strike me, honoured sir,

"Happy" can also be almost equivalent to "wise." Benedick  
least this great sea of joys rushing on me  
soliloquising just after he has been told that Beatrice  
And drown me with their sweetness.<sup>4</sup>

loves him says  
In the following quotations "joy" seems to express not a  
Happy are they that hear their detractions and  
defiance can put them to mending.<sup>4</sup> the more permanent or stable

In Henry V's exhortation to his soldiers often described by the  
word "happy" We few, we happy few, we band of brothers<sup>5</sup>

it is almost "blessed." The ambiguity of the word is further  
shown in the following:-  
For here I hope begins our lasting joy<sup>6</sup>

And think our former state a happy dream<sup>6</sup>

where "happy" might mean a permanent condition of mind or a  
transient emotion.

He was not in Silence/  
1. Hamlet, Act II, Sc. 2. all them his remembrance lay  
2. Taming of the Shrew, Act I, Sc. 2.  
3. King Richard III, Act III, Sc. 7. The/  
4. Much Ado About Nothing, Act III, Sc. 3.  
5. King Henry V, Act IV, Sc. 3. V, Sc. 1.  
6. King Richard II, Act V, Sc. 1. King Richard III, Act I, Sc. 3.  
Antony and Cleopatra Act I, Sc. 1.

The word is often ambiguous and may be taken to denote either  
Silence is the perfectest herald of joy.  
a definite I were but little happy if I could say how much<sup>1</sup>  
where joy and happiness seem to be synonymous.

For in the shade of death, I shall find joy.<sup>1</sup>

The same confusion meets us in the use of the word  
"joy." Often it is used to express a definite emotional  
experience, and many times it is used to express the more  
permanent and stable condition of mind for which "happiness"  
is also used. The following quotation is an example of its  
use as a definite emotion. Merry; I am full of pleasure,

Let us be jocund.<sup>2</sup>  
O Helicanus, strike me, honoured sir,  
Give me a gash, put me to present pain,  
Lest this great sea of joys rushing on me  
O'erbear the shores of my mortality  
And drown me with their sweetness.<sup>2</sup>

No difference is implied here between the two words, the  
In the following quotations "joy" seems to express not a  
parallelism requires a synonym for joy. "Pleasure" is very  
definite emotional experience but the more permanent or stable  
commonly used to express desire or will. One example will  
condition of mind which we have seen is often described by the  
suffice:-  
word "happiness."

I'll whisper to the general and know his pleasure<sup>4</sup>  
Farewell, sour annoy!  
When Glest For here I hope begins our lasting joy<sup>3</sup>

I am determined to prove a villain  
Small joy have I in being England's queen<sup>4</sup>

"Joy" is used as is "happiness" also in some cases to denote  
the beloved. It gives pleasure. It stands for satisfaction in  
the/

1. II Henry VI, Act III, Sc. 2. He was not merry,
2. The Which seem'd to tell them his remembrance lay
3. All's In Egypt with his joy.<sup>5</sup> II, Sc. 4.
4. All's Well that Ends Well, Act IV, Sc. 3. The/
1. Much Ado About Nothing, Act III, Sc. 1.
2. Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act V, Sc. 1.
3. III Henry VI, Act V, Sc. 7
4. King Richard III, Act I, Sc. 3.
5. Antony and Cleopatra, Act I, Sc.



The word is often ambiguous and may be taken to denote either  
a definite but transient emotion or the more permanent con-  
dition of mind, as  
For in the shade of death, I shall find joy.<sup>1</sup>

"Pleasure" also has its varying uses, and is  
sometimes confused with joy and happiness. In the follow-  
ing quotations it denotes the definite emotion to which the  
word "joy" is commonly applied. Caliban says to Ariel

Thou mak'st me merry; I am full of pleasure,  
Let us be jocund.<sup>2</sup>

The great prerogative and rite of love  
To make the coming hour o'er flow with joy  
And pleasure drown the brim.<sup>3</sup>

No difference is implied here between the two words, the  
parallelism requires a synonym for joy. "Pleasure" is very  
commonly used to express desire or will. One example will  
suffice:-

I'll whisper to the general and know his pleasure<sup>4</sup>

When Gloster says  
I am determined to prove a villain  
And hate the idle pleasures of these days.<sup>5</sup>

"pleasures" seems to imply not a mental experience at all but  
objects which give pleasure. It stands for satisfaction in  
the/

1. II Henry VI, Act III, Sc. 2.
2. The Tempest, Act III, Sc. 2.
3. All's Well That Ends Well, Act II, Sc. 4.
4. All's Well that Ends Well, Act IV, Sc. 3.
5. King Richard III, Act I, Sc. 1.

the following It is clear that in a psychological study careful

discrimination must be made between, enough Patroclus,  
Or give me ribs of steel! I shall split all  
In pleasure of my spleen.<sup>1</sup> In the best literature

and for friendship when Portia asks in the following way:

To use the term Happiness to describe your good pleasure?<sup>2</sup>

It signifies good temper when Banquo speaking of Duncan says

He hath been in unusual pleasure on his character  
as a whole, taking into consideration all the content of his  
And sent forth great largesse to your offices.<sup>3</sup>

In the following quotation "pleasure" seems to denote the  
mind as far as it may be known. Happiness is not to be applied  
permanent background or condition of mind for which happiness  
to his state of mind in consequence of some event, but should  
is most commonly used.

Well, say there is no kingdom, then, for Richard,  
seen as What other pleasure can the world afford?<sup>4</sup> a mood.

In the examples which follow "pleasure" denotes a feeling-  
tone qualifying the experience or objects emotion, the specific  
end of which it is the subject of a chapter to define.

I'll well requite thy kindness  
For that it made my imprisonment a pleasure.<sup>5</sup>

It is now only necessary to distinguish it from happiness and  
pleasure.  
To hear an old man sing  
May to your wishes pleasure bring.<sup>6</sup>

The examples chosen are not taken from the more  
obscure or ambiguous passages of Shakespere but are examples  
of the modern uncertainty and divergence in the use of these  
certain experiences described as pleasant or agreeable and  
three terms.

should not be used to describe an experience or a quality/ of

1. Troilus and Cressida, Act I, Sc. 3.
2. Julius Caesar, Act II, Sc. 1.
3. Macbeth, Act II, Sc. 1.
4. III Henry VI, Act III, Sc. 2.
5. III Henry VI, Act IV, Sc. 6.
6. Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act I, line 14.

support from an appeal to ancient philosophy and modern ethics. It is clear that in a psychological study careful discrimination must be made between them.

The following quotations and remarks will serve to justify the use of the term "happiness" to denote a comparatively permanent and stable condition of mind. It seems in accordance with the best literature and philosophy to make the distinction in the following way: Aristotle uses happiness in this sense, though he recognises the existence of what modern psychology terms emotion. To use the term Happiness to denote not an emotion but a condition of mind comparatively stable and lasting. To say that a man is happy or unhappy is to remark on his character as a whole, taking into consideration all the content of his mind as far as it may be known. Happiness is not to be applied to his state of mind in consequence of some event, but should be used to describe him not in one of his moments but in all

"The happy man is he who manifests the highest seen as a whole. Happiness is not an emotion nor a mood. It is the quality of the whole character of the man. To use the term Joy to denote an emotion, the specific end of which it is the aim of the following chapter to define.

It is now only necessary to distinguish it from happiness and pleasure. In the following passage:-

To use the term Pleasure to denote not a condition of mind, nor an emotion, but a feeling tone which qualifies experience. Pleasure is part of the subjective character of certain experiences described as pleasant or agreeable and should not be used to describe an experience or a quality of character. These apparently arbitrary distinctions receive shall call the same man happy and miserable many times over, making the happy man a sort



support from an appeal to ancient philosophy and modern ethics. The following quotations and remarks will serve to justify the use of the term "happiness" to denote a comparatively permanent and stable condition of mind.

Aristotle uses happiness in this sense, though he recognises the existence of what modern psychology terms emotion. In Book I, chapters 4, 5 and 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics he examines various opinions on the nature of happiness. In chapters 7 - 10 he considers the nature of the good and its relation to happiness ending with the following definition of happiness:-

"The happy man is he who manifests the highest excellence or virtue in living energy, and is duly furnished with external goods, not for any chance period of time, but for a full term of years to which perhaps we should add 'who lives so throughout and dies as he has lived, for the future is veiled from us, but happiness we assume to be the end, and to be everywhere and in all things final and complete."

The relatively permanent nature of happiness is made clear also in the following passage:-

"The saying of Solon" (call no man happy till he is dead) "may mean that we ought to look for the end and then call a man happy, not because he now is but because he once was happy. But surely it is strange that when he is happy we should refuse to say what is true of him, because we do not like to apply the term to living men in view of the changes to which they are liable and because we hold happiness to be something that endures, and is little liable to change, while the fortunes of one and the same man often undergo many revolutions: for it is argued, it is plain that if we follow the changes of fortune we shall call the same man happy and miserable many times over, making the happy man a sort



of chameleon and one who rests on no sound foundation.....

"We reply that it cannot be right thus to follow fortune..... it is the excellent employment of his powers that constitutes his happiness.....

"The happy man then, as we define him, will have this required property of permanence..... and whatever his fortune be, he will take it in the noblest fashion and bear himself always and in all things suitably, since he is truly good and 'four-square without a flaw.'"<sup>1</sup>

The pages of Aristotle are full of this thought, that happiness is something permanent, something within a man's whole character, not a transient experience or the accompaniment of a colour of an experience. Two quotations from the Republic will serve for further illustration. The happy man cannot easily be cast down, he stands on a sure foundation, and the fluctuations of fortune, though they may shake him, cannot overthrow him.

"The best and justest is also the happiest, and he who is the most royal man and king over himself."<sup>2</sup>

The happy man, Aristotle tells us "is not unstable and lightly changed: he will not be moved from his happiness easily nor by any ordinary misfortunes, but only by many heavy ones; and after such he will not recover his happiness again in a short time."<sup>2</sup>

Plato, working along a different line of thought also shows happiness to be a condition or state. In <sup>the</sup> Gorgias, Socrates proves that a good rhetorician must understand the nature of justice and injustice. Polus's statement that an unjust and powerful man is the happiest draws from Socrates a question as to the nature of happiness. Socrates refutes

1. Nettleship. Philosophical Remains, p. 288.  
2. Polus's statement that the unjust man is the happy man because  
3. Ibid.  
1. Nicomachean Ethics I. X.  
2. Ibid. I. 14.

"I do not doubt that an important element of Socrates' argument establishes a close connection between virtue and happiness. The happiest man is he who has no evil in his soul; the next happiest is he who gets rid of it, that is, who is justly punished."<sup>1</sup>

In this, as in many other passages, Plato shows that happiness is something permanent, something within a man's whole character, not a transient experience or the accompaniment or colour of an experience. Two quotations from the Republic will serve for further illustration.

"The best and justest is also the happiest, and this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself."<sup>2</sup>

"The delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only."<sup>3</sup>

The Hedonists of modern time also in taking pleasure. But only too often is pleasure described as if it had happiness as the summum bonum did not pursue a transient emotion or a feeling-tone. Happiness whether of the individual or the community was for them something which endured. When the popular confusion between the terms is remembered it would be an easy solution of all difficulties to assert that wherever the ultimate end of existence is a proof that for them at least it had this character of comparative stability and permanence. Sidgwick remarks this in his Methods of Ethics. would imply an imputation against Aristotle and writers not

- "1/  
such/
1. Nettleship. Philosophical Remains, p. 288.
  2. Plato. Republic Ma IX. is of Ethics. 7th Edition, p. 136.
  3. Ibid.

such less "I do not doubt that an important element of happiness for all or most men is derived from the consciousness of possessing "relatively permanent" sources of pleasure - whether external as wealthy social position, family, friends; or internal as knowledge, culture, strong and lively interest in the well being of fairly prosperous persons or institutions." 1

To emphasize and make quite clear the permanent character of a state of mind which can be truly described as happiness, a consideration of the different directions in which men have sought happiness will be useful. But first a short summary of philosophical, ethical and psychological opinions on pleasure must be given to make clear the distinction between it and happiness.

In philosophical and psychological writing happiness is never described as an accompaniment, a reflex or a feeling-tone. But only too often is pleasure described as if it had this very characteristic of stability and permanence which is claimed here exclusively for happiness. When the popular confusion between the terms is remembered it would be an easy solution of all difficulties to assert that wherever "pleasure" is so used, the real meaning of the word is "happiness." But such a solution would beg the whole question and

would imply an imputation against Aristotle and writers not

1. Sidgwick. Methods of Ethics. 7th Edition, p. 135.

2. Ibid. p. 36.



borne out by modern psychology of sensation. He says "it  
is much less distinguished of not really meaning what they  
said or knowing what they meant."

Muirhead, in his book on Aristotle's ethics points  
out that Aristotle in Book VII of the Ethics describes the  
good as "a kind of pleasure" but concludes in Book X "that  
pleasure is not the good." He then shows that the difference  
"is resolvable into the different senses in which 'pleasure'  
is taken." In Book VII, he says, pleasure "is taken in its  
popular sense of a concrete thing or the actual exercise of  
a faculty; in Book X, the philosophical distinction is drawn  
between the activity itself and the pleasant feeling which  
is an attribute of it."<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the unimpeded exercise  
of faculty which Aristotle in Book VII describes as pleasure  
would in modern phraseology be termed "joy."

Muirhead  
points out that *εὐδαιμονία* indicates the feeling-accompany-  
ing whole, while *ἡδονή* indicates the feeling accompanying a  
momentary state.<sup>2</sup> Since in Greek there is choice between  
these two words only, *ἡδονή* has to stand for the emotion and  
the feeling-tone as well, both of which are transitory in  
character, leaving *εὐδαιμονία* for the permanent state.

For Aristotle the essential condition of pleasure  
is unimpeded activity. Muirhead says that this view is

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 198. borne/

1. Muirhead. Chapters from Aristotle's Ethics, p. 190.  
2. Ibid. p. 26.



borne out by modern psychology of sensation. He says "it is at any rate quite consistent with the modern physiological theory which represents organic pleasure as the accompaniment of increased excitability of sensory and motor areas, whether of the periphery or of the cerebral cortex."<sup>1</sup> An example of this might be the pleasure felt in taking a brisk walk on a cool fresh day. If the body is in good condition and the mind is at ease, the mechanical exercise of walking will be coloured by a feeling of pleasure attendant on the sense of unimpeded activity. Muirhead claims that Aristotle's formula only needs extension to be applicable also to the modern psychology of the emotions. He says "there is no difficulty in bringing 'emotional pleasure' under the Aristotelian formula. Let the sentiment be affection for a friend. The presence of the friend is in that case the stimulus under which the system or faculty acts. It calls forth all the pleasant associations of past intercourse - the old jokes, the common friends, the whole golden age of auld lang syne. We have literally here a flow of soul - an unimpeded activity."<sup>2</sup>

This claim seems open to question. Muirhead's example seems to be an example of the emotion of joy which in this case is accompanied by the feeling-tone of pleasure -

---

1. Ibid. p. 198.  
2. Muirhead. Op. cit. p. 199.

glovj  
 glovy in both its possible meanings. The distinction be-  
 hind acquired by the practice of virtue. The nature of  
 comes clearer in the rest of the passage. Muirhead continues -  
 pleasure, apart from its difference from happiness, is not  
 "Let it be, on the other hand, merely the idea of our friend  
 so easily determined. As before, happiness is eudaimonia,  
 that occurs, and with it the consciousness of some barrier to  
 and glovy has to cover emotion and feeling-tone. It is  
 the active exercise of the affection, e.g. distance or death,  
 always translated by the one word "pleasure." An examina-  
 tion of Plato's use of glovy, particularly in the distinction  
 outgoing energy of affection is the pain that comes from the  
 he draws between true and false pleasures would lead to the  
 hindrance that is imposed on it." <sup>1</sup> Such an experience seems  
 conclusion that true pleasure is emotion and therefore for  
 here to be misinterpreted and inaccurately described. At  
 the purpose of this study not pleasure at all, and false  
 the death or departure of a friend one experiences the emo-  
 pleasure is feeling-tone for which the term "pleasure"  
 tion of sorrow. Muirhead's example may be taken to suppose  
 should be retained.  
 the experience to be taking place some long time after the  
 death or departure of the friend. In the remembrance of a  
 valued friend there is the emotion of joy, the remembrance  
 pleasure and pain are according to Plato's view feelings  
 of the friend after death or at a distance may be suffused  
 which accompany the restoration and disintegration of the  
 with the feeling-tone of pain which does not destroy the char-  
 normal harmony or balance of the animal organism, - pleasure  
 acter of the emotion as the emotion of joy. Pleasure remains  
 is the sense of rising to a higher grade of vitality, pain  
 then as feeling-tone, distinct from happiness and joy, and  
 the sense of falling from grade to which we had risen."  
 "pleasure" in the last part of the quotation really stands for  
 And again, he is dealing with Plato's theory of mixed plea-  
 joy.

It is very clear that for Plato there is no confus-  
 jealousy and the like are pains of the soul, yet we find them  
 ion between happiness and pleasure. Happiness is a state of  
 often accompanied by great pleasures." All these exc<sup>mind</sup> love

1. Muirhead. Op. cit. p. 200  
 are emotions, and only in recent psychology has love been  
 raised from the level of emotion to that of sentiment.

1. Nettleship. Op. cit. p. 337

Nettleship

mind acquired by the practice of virtue. The nature of pleasure, apart from its difference from happiness, is not so easily determined. As before, happiness is *eudaimonia*, and *hēdonē* has to cover emotion and feeling-tone. It is always translated by the one word "pleasure." An examination of Plato's use of *hēdonē*, particularly in the distinction he draws between true and false pleasures would lead to the conclusion that true pleasure is emotion and therefore for the purpose of this study not pleasure at all, and false pleasure is feeling-tone for which the term "pleasure" should be retained.

Nettleship, analysing the Philebus in Plato's Conception of the Good, says, "The two feelings called pleasure and pain are according to Plato's view feelings which accompany the restoration and disintegration of the normal harmony or balance of the animal organism; pleasure is the sense of rising to a higher grade of vitality, pain the sense of falling from <sup>/a</sup> grade to which we had risen." <sup>1</sup> And again, he is dealing with Plato's theory of mixed pleasures and pains, "Anger, fear, regret, grief, love, envy, jealousy and the like are pains of the soul, yet we find them often accompanied by great pleasure." All these except love are emotions, and only in recent psychology has love been raised from the level of emotion to that of sentiment.

Nettleship/



Nettleship, following Plato calls them "pains of the soul."<sup>1</sup> Other emotions such as joy, hope, triumph would perhaps be described as "pleasures of the soul." The pleasure which is an "accompaniment" in the quotation can surely be nothing else than feeling-tone, and the pleasures of the soul which are correlate to its pains must be emotions. It is more than he was. It is important to consider the distinction drawn by Plato between true and false pleasures. According to Plato the most real and therefore the truest pleasures are those which result in the most permanent state of satisfaction. Those which produce only temporary satisfaction are unreal and false. Nettleship analysing the Philebus, says on this point, "Suppose a man, so far as it is possible, to live solely for the pleasure of eating. Eating sums up his life; his being is the consciousness of eating. He is perpetually coming to be and ceasing to be, the same thing; he ~~smiles~~ <sup>sinks</sup> and rises, wants and is satisfied, but he gets no further; each rise is the beginning of the old fall; each satisfaction passes into the old want."<sup>2</sup> The intellectual and æsthetic pleasures are the true, the pure, the real ones. Nettleship summarising Plato says of them "Here too, there must be to begin with, some unfulfilled capacity, but the sense of it is/

1. Nettleship Op. cit. p. 322. He as untrue are those which

2. Nettleship. Op. cit. p. 336.

are not properly within the control of the sentiments within

1. Ibid. p. 337.

2. Nettleship, Op. cit. p. 320.



is one of receptivity and expansiveness, not of a want to be which they work, but work by their own impulses against the got rid of. Nor does the pleasure cease with the satisfaction of the sentiment. These questions will be considered later. It is not, indeed, permanent, for continuous being is impossible to man; in Aristotle's words 'he gets tired,' but the satisfaction does not at once begin lapsing into dis-

satisfaction, it becomes a part of himself, he is more than he was, and permanently more; he does not have to go backwards again but starts next time from a higher level." 1  
Such pleasures are perhaps emotions with a feeling-tone of pleasure in the modern sense. That pleasure is used to denote emotion for lack of a distinguishing word is shown also in the following quotation from Nettleship. "If what is thus written in the soul represents the truth, the opinion is true, and if the pleasure as feeling-tone accompanying and colouring experience has comparatively only temporary effect. The pleasure of the opinion is true, the corresponding images are true. Now these psychical affections relate to future things as pleasant memory is the memory of a physical experience with well as to present and past..... a man, for instance, may enjoy the picture of himself enjoying a future pleasure.... if a man is good and beloved by the gods, his pictures are greater effect on character. In each case the feeling-tone probably true, if not, false. This, then, is one sense in which pleasure and pain (and similarly fear, anger and other feelings) though really felt may be untrue." 2

To relate this to modern psychological theory we may say that those emotions which Plato would describe as untrue are those which are not properly within the control of the sentiments within the enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains. Mill says "By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence which/when/

1. Ibid. p. 337.  
2. Nettleship, Op. cit. p. 320.

1. Mill. Utilitarianism, p. 10.

which they work, but work by their own impulses against the end of the sentiment. These questions will be considered later. It is to the point here merely to relate Plato's theory to the problem of modern psychology under investigation. This distinction of permanence seems to be in line with modern psychology. In the fourth chapter of this study this connection will appear more closely, for consideration will be given to psychological disposition and the after effect of emotion. Emotions have a permanent effect on character, and pleasure as feeling-tone accompanying and colouring experience has comparatively only temporary effect. The pleasure of a bath on a hot day though it may remain in the mind as a pleasant memory is the memory of a physical experience with a pleasant colouring. The experience of success in which the emotion was joy and the feeling-tone pleasure has much greater effect on character. In each case the feeling-tone was the same, the experiences which it accompanied were widely different.

The use of the word "pleasure" by the Hedonists is

bewildering. Bentham defines happiness as consisting of enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains. Mill says

"By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain."<sup>1</sup>

When/

---

1. Mill. Utilitarianism, p. 10.

flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of  
When Mill says "It is quite compatible with the principle  
this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the  
of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure  
end of life were as fully aware as those who lauded them,  
are more desirable and more valuable than others,"<sup>1</sup> the mean-  
The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture,  
ing of pleasure is obscure. That pleasure is a state of  
but moments of such in an existence made up of few and transi-  
feeling seems to be the idea underlying all that the Hedonists  
very pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided pre-  
say of it. But is a pleasure, a special variety of feeling?  
dominance of the active over the passive."<sup>2</sup> The "state  
Or should we say that pleasure is a generic term to cover  
of exalted pleasure," the "occasional brilliant flash of  
different feelings? If so it obviously cannot be applied to  
enjoyment" and "rapture" are expressions which describe the  
all feelings, to such as fear, disappointment, grief. Some  
emotion of joy accompanied by the feeling-tone of pleasure.  
feelings, then, have this common characteristic of pleasure.  
In this passage he really describes happiness as a permanent  
Pleasure as this common characteristic is a unity, represents  
and steady flame which leaps at intervals into brilliant  
one idea, even if it is only an abstraction. Different  
flashes (joy) and the greater number of whose moments are  
kinds of pleasure then must mean different feelings which  
felt as pleasurable or painless. The metaphor of the flame  
have the common characteristic of being pleasant. All this  
is inadequate and breaks down at the introduction of pleasure.  
points to the acceptance of the use of pleasure as feeling-  
tone. But it should be noticed that while in an earlier passage  
tone. But Mill's use of the word in another passage seems  
Mill defines happiness as pleasure, in this later chapter he  
to make pleasure equivalent to joy. "If by happiness be  
means to make a difference between happiness and pleasure  
meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitements, it is  
and certainly between either one of them and joy.  
evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted  
Sidgwick in the Methods of Ethics defines pleasure  
pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases and with some  
as "a kind of feeling which stimulates the will to actions  
intermission hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant  
leading to sustain or produce it."<sup>2</sup> "It stands for flash/ure,

1. Mill. Utilitarianism, p. 11.

and this definition is of little help because it contains  
within/

1. Mill, op. cit. p. 18.

2. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Edn. p. 42.



flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture, but moments of such in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive.<sup>1</sup> The "state of exalted pleasure," the "occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment" and "rapture" are expressions which describe the emotion of joy accompanied by the feeling-tone of pleasure. In this passage he really describes happiness as a permanent and steady flame which leaps at intervals into brilliant flashes (joy) and the greater number of whose moments are felt as pleasurable or painless. The metaphor of the flame is inadequate and breaks down at the introduction of pleasure. But it should be noticed that while in an earlier passage Mill defines happiness as pleasure, in this later chapter he seems to make a difference between happiness and pleasure and certainly between either one of them and joy,<sup>2</sup> and though Sidgwick in the Methods of Ethics defines pleasure as "a kind of feeling which stimulates the will to actions tending to sustain or produce it."<sup>3</sup> "It" stands for pleasure, and this definition is of little help because it contains within/

1. Mill. op. cit. p. 18.

2. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Edn. p. 42.



within itself the term which was to be defined. He defines it not happiness nor the emotion of joy, but feeling-tone, it more satisfactorily in the next book. "I propose therefore and Sidgwick leaves this aspect of pleasure unchanged. fore to define pleasure - when we are considering its 'strict

The use of "pleasure" to denote feeling-tone finds value' for purposes of quantitative comparison - as a feeling support also in Green. After he has demonstrated that the which when experienced by intelligent beings is at least object of desire is not pleasure but self satisfaction, he implicitly apprehended as desirable or - in cases of comparison - preferable." <sup>1</sup> Pleasure, then, is desirable feeling of desire there is pleasure, and thus pleasantness is ing. Feeling is still ambiguous, for it may include emotion. an object be a necessary incident of its being good. We

Sidgwick himself notices the ambiguity of the word, cannot think of an object as good, i.e. such as will satisfy showing that it has been used to cover voluntary choice, desire, without thinking of it as in consequence such as will desire, and stimulus to will. He labours to show that pleasure yield pleasure; but its pleasantness depends on its goodness, sure is not to be taken as equivalent to the end of desire, not its goodness upon the pleasure it conveys." <sup>1</sup>

for we desire not pleasure but the object which yields pleasure. <sup>2</sup> Pleasure when used concretely seems to denote emotion

and it is distinguished from the other use by the qualification "a" or "some." "Only if some pleasure is the object of sense perception or rational activity has its correspondent desire does the anticipation of the satisfaction of the pleasure, and brings it in line with Hamilton's theory that desire yield the idea of the pleasure as a good." For "some "Pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded pleasure" or "a particular pleasure" cannot be substituted exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious," <sup>3</sup> "some feeling-tone" or "a particular feeling-tone;" pleasure and though he criticizes both as incomplete and not accounting sure here stands either for an emotion or for an occasion in for all the facts, each theory seems to imply that pleasure which an emotion is liable to be produced. But this use is/

1. Sidgwick, Op. cit. p. 127.

2. Ibid. p. 44. distinct and does not affect its more common use

3. Ibid. p. 180.

1. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 194.

is not happiness nor the emotion of joy, but feeling-tone, and Sidgwick leaves this aspect of pleasure unchanged.

The use of "pleasure" to denote feeling-tone finds support also in Green. After he has demonstrated that the object of desire is not pleasure but self satisfaction, he assigns to pleasure its place as follows. "In all satisfaction of desire there is pleasure, and thus pleasantness is an object's a necessary incident of its being good. We cannot think of an object as good, i. e. such as will satisfy desire, without thinking of it as in consequence such as will yield pleasure; but its pleasantness depends on its goodness, not its goodness upon the pleasure it conveys." "The quality of the absolutely desirable life which renders it such in and it is distinguished from the other use by the qualification "a" or "some." "Only if some pleasure is the object of such realization it is in no way distinctive of it being usually incidental to any univocal activity, to the exercise of merely animal functions no less than those that are properly human." Support from psychologists for the use of pleasure to denote feeling-tone is all that is now needed to set the seal on what has already been said. Such support is not lacking. It can be found in Marshall, who has given

---

1. Green. Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 194.

most of his attention to the problems of pleasure and pain, to denote feeling-tone. This latter use is particularly justified in Green's criticism of the false notion of a sum of pleasures. "A sum of pleasure is not a pleasure.... However numerous the sources of a state of pleasant feeling, it is one and is over before another can be enjoyed.... We are confusing a sum of pleasures as counted or combined in thought with a sum of pleasures as felt or enjoyed which is a nonentity." The difference between happiness the permanent state which Green finds in self realisation, and pleasure the accompaniment or, in psychological phraseology, feeling-tone is shown clearly in Green's statement of his view of the Good. "The view for which we plead is that the quality of the absolutely desirable life which renders it such in man's thoughts is that it shall be the full realisation of his capacities, that although pleasure must be incidental to such realisation, it is in no way distinctive of it, being equally incidental to any unimpeded activity, to the exercise of merely animal functions no less than those that are properly human."

Support from psychologists for the use of pleasure to denote feeling-tone is all that is now needed to set the seal on what has already been said. Such support is not lacking. It can be found in Marshall, who has given

most



most of his attention to the problems of pleasure and pain, and in Stout.

Marshall in Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics sets out to find a place for pleasure and pain in the psychological system. He refuses to class them as sensations for the following reasons. Only a few pains and no pleasures are experienced as disparate mental states.<sup>1</sup> The lack of locus of pain and pleasure as such is enough to exclude them from the class of sensations.<sup>2</sup> The existence of special pain nerves is very doubtful and none have been discovered for pleasure. Pleasure and pain have no special means of production as have the sensations. Sensations can themselves be described as pleasurable or painful. Emotion and intelligence have pleasant and painful characteristics. Finally, pleasure fades into pain, and pain into pleasure in a way in which sensations do not fade one into another. The conclusion is that pleasure and pain have not the essential characteristics of sensation but are closely connected with it.

He refuses to class pleasure and pain as emotions pointing out that sensations are often experienced without

- 
1. Marshall. Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics. p. 15.
  2. Ibid, p. 23.

- 
1. Marshall. Op. cit. p. 32.
  2. Ibid. p. 35.
  3. Ibid p. 36



pleasure and pain, emotions never.<sup>1</sup> If pleasure and pain are emotions how can pleasurable and painful sensations be described? Again, pleasure and pain can be aroused by any sensation but this is not true of emotions. Every emotion has an object. This is not necessarily true of pleasure and pain. And finally pleasure fades into pain and pain into pleasure in a way in which emotions do not fade one into another.

The conclusion is "Pleasure-pain, then, is not Sensation and yet is closely bound up with Sensation; it is not Emotion, but is closely bound up with Emotion also."<sup>2</sup>

Marshall enumerates three possible hypotheses for the explanation of pleasure and pain. They are best given in his own words.

"A. Pleasure-pain modes may be the fundamental - the original - elements, the basis of all psychic life, from which other forms arise by development or transformation.

B. Pleasure-pain modes may be psychic elements simpliciter brought into consciousness indirectly by the efficiency of sensation, emotion and intellection.

C. Pleasure-pain modes may be quales - which may arise with all psychic elements - special qualities common to all mental phenomena."<sup>3</sup>

1. Marshall. Op. cit. p. 32.  
2. Ibid. p. 35.  
3. Ibid. p. 36

He/

He rejects A because if it were true there should be, as there are not, two distinct lines of development along So, fear is constantly disagreeable. But other emotions paths of pleasure and pain. 1 may be either pleasant or unpleasant according to circumstances.

He rejects B on the ground that "thinkers of highest ability" are opposed to it, and also that it demands a tax on Pleasure and Pain is "Some psychological processes are physical concomitant to pleasure and pain which is not found pleasantly toned, others unpleasantly tone, and yet others to exist. 2 almost if not quite indifferent. . . . Roughly speaking,

He accepts C on the grounds that it agrees with the agreeable feeling is attached to processes which conduce to everyday use of terms, it brings pleasure and pain into the welfare of the organism, and disagreeable feeling to unity with other mental phenomena and that there is no ground those which are injurious." for demanding a separate activity for pleasure-pain. 3

Pleasure, then, is definitely established here as feeling-tone. Stout describes this feeling-tone as consisting in smooth and prosperous progress towards attainment. 3 This is in line with Aristotle's account of it as must belong to each psychic element which is differentiable. 4 unimpeded activity. Stout accounts for all kinds of pain He says further that "the laws of pleasure and pain which we are able to trace in one special class of mental states should be discernible in all." Very clearly does it appear that is the acting of a stimulus independent of previous pain, a pleasure is not a condition or state of mind nor an emotion, stimulus which arouses a mental tendency and opens the way to but can be described as feeling-tone. its gratification. Stout instances the inheritance of a fortune. Belonging to the latter class there are also the many pleasures of indolence and aesthetic pleasures.

Stout in the Manual writing of emotion shows that it may be accompanied by feeling-tone pleasant or unpleasant. "Some emotions are invariably pleasant and others unpleasant; All these are the description of the conditions in grief/

1. Ibid. p. 37.  
2. Ibid. p. 43. Anal. 3rd Edition. p. 417.  
3. Ibid. p. 46. Analytic Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 268  
4. Stout. Analytic Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 271.

experience is pleasantly toned. grief for instance is always disagreeable and joy agreeable. Now that Stout's account of pleasure has been stated, it would be well to return to Marshall's view, for So, fear is constantly disagreeable. But other emotions may be either pleasant or unpleasant according to circumstances.<sup>1</sup> In his article, "Stout's Algedonic Theory" published in Kind In the Analytic Psychology the opening sentence of the chapter on Pleasure and Pain is "Some psychological processes are to Stout's close alliance of pleasure and pain with free and pleasantly toned, others unpleasantly tone, and yet others impeded progress for two reasons: viz. there is practically almost if not quite indifferent..... Roughly speaking, no such thing as unimpeded activity, and increase of intensity agreeable feeling is attached to processes which conduce to of activity produces pain, not increase of pleasure. He the welfare of the organism, and disagreeable feeling to claims that Stout agrees with him in the following points: those which are injurious."<sup>2</sup>

Pleasure-indifference-pain are qualities of mental states. Pleasure, then, is definitely established here as not special mental modes. Pleasure and pain are not directly feeling-tone. Stout describes this feeling-tone as con- related to the welfare or disaster of the organism. Pleasure sisting in smooth and prosperous progress towards attain- and pain are related to the efficiency or non-efficiency of ment.<sup>3</sup> This is in line with Aristotle's account of it as mental elements, and of the action of neural elements coin- unimpeded activity. Stout accounts for all kinds of pain identially active. Pleasure-indifference-pain are qualities under the head of thwarted activity. There are two possible one of which must and any of which may belong to any separ- causes of pleasure. One is relief from hindrance, the other able elements of consciousness. Indifference is rarely is the acting of a stimulus independent of previous pain, a experienced. It is a point of passage between pleasure and stimulus which arouses a mental tendency and opens the way to pain. its gratification. Stout instances the inheritance of a fortune. Earlier in the article is a remark which should be Belonging to the latter class there are also quoted for its clear description of pleasure and pain as feel- the many pleasures of indolence and aesthetic pleasures. ing tone.

All these are the description of the conditions in which experience/

1. Stout. Manual. 3rd Edition. p. 417.
2. Stout. Analytic Psychology, Vo. 2, p. 268
3. Stout. Analytic Psychology. Vol. 2, p. 271.



experience is pleasantly toned.

Now that Stout's account of pleasure has been stated, it would be well to return to Marshall's view, for his article, "Stout's Algedonic Theory" published in Mind 1898 contains some criticisms of Stout's account. He objects to Stout's close alliance of pleasure and pain with free and

impeded progress for two reasons: viz. there is practically no such thing as unimpeded activity, and increase of intensity of activity produces pain, not increase of pleasure. He claims that Stout agrees with him in the following points: Pleasure-indifference-pain are qualities of mental states,

Having attempted to establish the use of the term not special mental modes. Pleasure and pain are not directly "pleasure" to denote feeling-tone and the term "joy" to denote emotion, it is now necessary to give some further consideration to the nature of happiness. Aristotle describes mental elements, and of the action of neural elements coincidentally active. Pleasure-indifference-pain are qualities indeed when we consider the diverse directions in which men one of which must and any of which may belong to any separable elements of consciousness. Indifference is rarely experienced. It is a point of passage between pleasure and pain.

Earlier in the article is a remark which should be quoted for its clear description of pleasure and pain as feeling tone.

happiness is found in the speculative life. He li "But/irtue and happiness closely together. To obtain happiness, a man must pursue virtue. The greatest virtue and the highest



happiness "But just here let us note that the difficulty above spoken of disappears if we hold as I hold, that the emotions on the one hand are the psychic coincidents of, instinct actions, are what I have called 'instinct-feelings' to which pleasures and pains attach as they attach to all forms of sentience."

In spite of Marshall's criticisms of Stout, these two psychologists are united on the point at issue in this study, namely that pleasure is feeling-tone which accompanies or colours experiences of a certain sort. Having attempted to establish the use of the term "pleasure" to denote feeling-tone and the term "joy" to denote emotion, it is now necessary to give some further consideration to the nature of happiness. Aristotle describes happiness as "the most desirable thing in the world," and indeed when we consider the diverse directions in which men have sought it, how innumerable are the ideas and objects with which it has been identified and the pains men have taken to teach it to others, this description of Aristotle's seems very true. Aristotle, having examined many possible sources of happiness, comes to the conclusion that the greatest happiness is found in the speculative life. He links virtue and happiness closely together. To obtain happiness, a man must pursue virtue. The greatest virtue and the highest

happiness/

Dr. Henry More makes it very clear.

happiness he finds in the contemplative life.

Plato's view is somewhat akin to Aristotle's. Noticeably was this so in the case of Blake. He finds a link between those who love art for its own sake and those whose happiness lies in God, for Art and God were for Blake where virtue is justice taken in its widest sense. The argument in Book III proves that the just man lives well and that he who lives well is blessed and happy. In Book V Plato shows that the most just man is the man who possesses the greatest knowledge, i.e. the philosopher, for only he who has power within himself to overcome ignorance can be truly just and, so, truly happy.

Many men in all ages have very clearly announced that in God alone lay their happiness. The psalms are full of expressions of this fact. See particularly XVI 9-12; XX 7,8; XXIII 4-6; XXXIV 10; XXXVII 24; XLVI 1,2,7; LXII 2; CXLVI 4 (P.B.V.) S. Francis of Assisi was perhaps one of the happiest men the world has ever seen. The object of his happiness was God. His vivid, vigorous personal love of God was the warp and woof of his life. He could not be made unhappy. He could laugh at discomfort and pain. He even rejoiced in poverty and he "went to meet death singing." Thomas Traherne and Dr. Henry More, XVII Century philosophers are two among many Englishmen who base all their happiness in God. Nearly every page of Traherne's Centuries of Meditation shows this, and Richard Ward's Life of the Learned and Pious

Dr. Henry More makes it very clear.

Art may be the ideal identified with happiness. Noticeably was this so in the case of Blake. He forms a link between those who love art for its own sake and those whose happiness lies in God, for Art and God were for Blake if not synonymous, very nearly so. He lived always and consciously in the presence of God, who, he averred spoke with him through the medium of his art.

Work for its own sake, for the sake of felt activity is another possible condition of happiness. Some people, cannot be happy except when strenuously at work. The work for the sake of work is even more important than the result to be obtained from it. An example of this is Kostanholo in Gogol's novel Dead Souls.

Power was happiness for Alexander, who wished there were more worlds that he might conquer them. Perhaps also this was so for Napoleon, at least in the latter years of his campaigns.

It is possible also to seek happiness not in God, nor in abstract ideas or ideals but in particular persons and concrete things. To name the self as the particular person in whom any man may place all his happiness is to encounter danger. For all possible sources of happiness are

Balsac's Pere Goriot may be quoted as an instance of a man who placed all his happiness in particular persons, in this case his two daughters. Many other instances could

related/

be/



be given of love for another person swamping all other related to the self, and so far as that relation is concerned, are brought within the compass of the self.

Instances of seeking happiness in a concrete thing are harder to find. Aristotle and Plato found happiness in so far as they were able to achieve their ideals. S. Francis and Thomas Traherne rejoiced in the personal communion they held with God. It is true that men have lived who have willingly accepted a miser is perhaps the clearest example which can be given of a man who really does place all his happiness in a concrete thing. They would say with S. Francis that happiness for

men in general was to be found in God, but just because they could be found. Is there no ground of agreement in this difference, no unity underlying this diversity? Some seek to them, they were not happy. A man who cannot be happy unless at work would clearly not find happiness in idly contemplating labour all around him. Surely if a man declares himself to be happy we have no right to contradict him. But the happy people themselves offer us ten kinds of happiness at once. Which are we to choose? How decide on thing which though transcending the self was at the same time the ultimate nature of happiness. What point of agreement within it. But the man who may be described as finding his happiness within himself is in Shand's phraseology one who possesses one sentiment only, and that one self love. Such a man is Sir Willoughby Patterne in Meredith's novel The Egoist.

Balzac's Pere Goriot may be quoted as an instance of a man who placed all his happiness in particular persons, in this case his two daughters. Many other instances could



being given of love for another person swamping all other interests if it give him what he asks.

Instances of seeking happiness in a concrete thing are harder to find. Many people have very precious possessions which, though they may occupy a large share of attention and time, are not the basic condition of happiness. The miser is perhaps the clearest example which can be given of a man who really does place all his happiness in a concrete thing.

No doubt a greater number of sources of happiness could be found. Is there no ground of agreement in this difference, no unity underlying this diversity? Some seek happiness in almost furious effort, others hope to find it by following the line of least resistance. Surely if a man declares himself to be happy we have no right to contradict him. But the happy people themselves offer us ten kinds of happiness at once. Which are we to choose? How decide on the ultimate nature of happiness.<sup>2</sup> What point of agreement is there in the happiness of Aristotle, Alexander, Blake and Silas Marner? Perhaps the point of agreement may be found in the following definition. Happiness is a condition of harmony within the field of interest. A happy man is in harmony with the universe as it interests him. The difference is that our universes are all of different sizes according to our circumstances and our will. It does not matter how

much/

much or how little life gives to a man but it matters all the world if it give him what he asks.

It is now time to return to the particular consideration of Joy. The aim of the next chapter is to show that joy is rightly classed with the emotions, to consider its impulse, behaviour and end.

In the first chapter of this study to show that the characteristic emotion of joy was due to difficulties. In that chapter the inclusion of joy among the emotions was taken for granted. McDougall's theory of joy must now be considered, for he does not allow that joy is an emotion at all. In one place he seems to identify joy with pleasure. In Chapter V of Social Psychology he says "We are now in a position to inquire into the nature of sorrow and joy which we have rejected from our list of primary emotions, because, as was said, they are algedonic or pleasure-pain qualifications of emotional states rather than emotions capable of standing alone."

Yet he says definitely that joy is not the same thing as pleasure, and after an analysis of a mother's joy in her child he concludes "Joy is always, as in this instance, a complex emotional state in which one or more of the primary emotions developed within the system of a strong sentiment plays an essential part. We ought then properly to speak not of joy but of joyous emotion." Either joy is an emotion or it is not. McDougall says it is not. Yet he describes joy as a complex emotional state. An emotional state must be

### CHAPTER III

a state of which emotion is at least a part, and McDougall's  
**THE EMOTION OF JOY, ITS IMPULSE, BEHAVIOUR AND END.**  
contention is apparently that the emotion is always something

In the first chapter of this study, some attempt was made to show that the characteristic assigned by Shand to the emotion of joy gave rise to difficulties. In that chapter the inclusion of joy among the emotions was taken for granted. McDougall's theory of joy must now be considered, for he does not allow that joy is an emotion at all. In one place he seems to identify joy with pleasure. In Chapter V of Social Psychology he says "We are now in a position to inquire into the nature of sorrow and joy which we have rejected from our list of primary emotions, because, as was said, they are algedonic or pleasure-pain qualifications of emotional states rather than emotions capable of standing alone." Yet he says definitely that joy is not the same thing as pleasure, and after an analysis of a mother's joy in her child he concludes "Joy is always, as in this instance, a complex emotional state in which one or more of the primary emotions developed within the system of a strong sentiment plays an essential part. We ought then properly to speak not of joy but of joyous emotion." Either joy is an emotion or it is not. McDougall says it is not. Yet he describes joy as a complex emotional state. An emotional state must be which organises instincts to serve its end is the more nearly  
a/  
fundamental/

a state of which emotion is at least a part, and McDougall's contention is apparently that the emotion is always something which is not joy, such as tender emotion or positive self feeling, or both. The pleasant feeling-tone which is also part of the state is "pleasure of a high type." If this is so, it is difficult to see any real difference between joy and pleasure and yet McDougall insists that a difference exists. If it could be established that joy has a special instinct at its command, it is probable in the light of what McDougall says in the chapter on "Instinct and Emotion" in his Social Psychology that he would agree to accept joy as an emotion. He refuses to recognize it as such chiefly for lack of this special instinct, and, as we have seen, regards joy as a quality of several emotions which quality in accordance with the description given in the last chapter is perhaps more accurately described as the feeling tone of pleasure. McDougall bases all human activity upon instinct. Shand bases all human activity upon emotion and treats that as the fundamental element in character. If any objection should at any future time be made by any psychologist against Shand on the ground of incompleteness, still more must such objection be made against McDougall. Nowhere does McDougall give a satisfactory answer to Shand's claim that emotion which organises instincts to serve its end is the more nearly



fundamental element in human life and unless and until McDougall can overthrow Shand's account of joy as such a factor in character, his reasons for the exclusion of joy from emotion must be regarded as insufficient. Shand does not claim for joy the service of any particular instinct because in his view any emotion can organise instincts and impulses to serve its end. This view has already been examined. Shand, however, demands a specific tendency as the mark of each emotion though he does not agree with McDougall that specific tendency must be an instinct. This specific tendency was examined in the first chapter and it was suggested that it was not accurately or completely described in the case of joy. In its place expansive activity was proposed as the special characteristic of joy, a view for which support was found in the passage in Stout's Groundwork already quoted.<sup>1</sup> It is now necessary to examine more carefully the conception of activity. In Analytic Psychology, Book II, Chapter I, Stout notices the ambiguity attaching to the term. He accepts Bradley's statement that succession and change are essential elements in activity and announces his intention of using the term in reference to "a process in time if and so far as the process possesses a certain characteristic." He examines the idea of activity with

the/

---

1. Groundwork of Psychology. P. 190.

the object of finding this characteristic and the place of such a conception in psychology. He points out that in two popular use activity is roughly coincident with cause. But cause may be immanent or transitive. When it is immanent it gives rise to effects which fall within its own being, when transitive to effects which lie outside its own being. Stout applies the term activity to the former kind of cause and quotes Bradley who says "Activity seems to be self-caused change." Immanent causality is self-determined causality, so mental activity is "some kind of self-determination." Self-determination must by its definition be in part immanent i.e. its effects must fall within its own being. Mental processes must result in mental change. Stout attempts to find a parallel between physical and mental self-determination. He finds it in the law of inertia. The position of a falling body at one moment is the direct, self-determined or immanent cause of its position at the next moment, and thus far the analogy is established. "Mental activity exists when and so far as process in consciousness is the direct outcome of previous process in consciousness." But there are three points of contrast. In the physical event there is uniform persistence of rate and direction of movement, no direction towards an end, purely immanent self-determination. In every process in consciousness must be felt, for it mental/ it is not a process of consciousness at all. From this important/

mental activity there are transition from one state to another, direction towards an end, self determination of two degrees of felt activity. He takes us up a scale of kinds, immanent and transitive.

The last is the most important point. Mental activity must result in mental change but it can never do so without producing effects in the extra-mental world. These effects themselves react on the mind and the excursion into the physical world forms a re-entrant series. Stout does not give a concrete example. Perhaps the following one would fit the case. A man sees a letter has dropped on the floor of cephalic movements does not coincide with direction of activity and complexity of mental process is often accompanied by simplicity of physical process. Finally, it is incompatible with James' own theory of attention.

The letter is restored to the table and in perceiving this there is mental change which is the result of the previous perception. The mental activity involved in the desire and its psychological consequences is self-determined, and is both direct and indirect.

When comparison between mental and physical activity has been carried as far as possible, there is still an irreconcilable difference between them. This difference is that mental activity must be and physical activity cannot be felt.

Continuing his analysis of mental activity, Stout states his activity. The falling stone does not experience change, but

1. Stout. *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I. p. 163 et seq.  
3. *Ibid.* p. 129  
it is not a process of consciousness at all. From this

important/



important point Stout leads on to a consideration of the view as follows:- "According to the view which we have degrees of felt activity. He takes us up a scale of expounded, to be mentally active is identical with being increasing feeling in the activity felt in a warm bath, idle mentally alive or awake. According to this view, therefore, gazing, reverie, mechanical task, easy problem, difficult there can be no such thing as purely passive consciousness.<sup>1</sup> problem, vital decision. He overthrows James' theory that if to be mentally active is identical with being mentally the feeling of activity consists only in muscular sensations alive or awake, to claim that mental activity is the characteristic of joy would seem to state nothing of joy which from the process which is active;<sup>1</sup> the degree of felt activity could not be equally well stated of any other psychological does not coincide with intensity of sensation; the direction experience. Yet this consideration of mental activity will of cephalic movements does not coincide with direction of prove to be useful in a further examination of joy. activity and complexity of mental process is often accompanied

Shand states that the special characteristic of the by simplicity of physical process. Finally, it is incompatible emotion of joy is the maintenance of the status quo, and if with James' own theory of attention.<sup>2</sup> in place of this, "activity" is offered as the special characteristic,

The next point to notice is the relation between pleasure and activity. Here Stout is at one with Aristotle. defence against the charge which would at once be made quite

"In general, the thwarting of activity is felt as pain and its furtherance as pleasure."<sup>3</sup> The pleasure of inaction is appeal to Stout's statement "Joy involves what we may call no exception to this statement for Stout shows that "inaction expansive activity" improves the situation very little. is relative, there is always some degree of attention."

But if it could be established that the tendency of joy is This means that there is always some degree of activity for always and necessarily to increase the degree of felt activity Stout says of attention "It is also a mental activity."<sup>4</sup>

the special characteristic offered would lose its vagueness. Continuing his analysis of mental activity, Stout states his Subject to further examination, the hypothesis then is view/

1. Stout. Analytic Psychology, Vol. I. p. 163 et seq.
2. Ibid. p. 168.
3. Ibid. p. 123



suggested that the special characteristic of the emotion of view as follows:- "According to the view which we have expounded, to be mentally active is identical with being mentally alive or awake. According to this view, therefore, there can be no such thing as purely passive consciousness."<sup>1</sup> If to be mentally active is identical with being mentally alive or awake, to claim that mental activity is the characteristic of joy would seem to state nothing of joy which could not be equally well stated of any other psychological experience. Yet this consideration of mental activity will prove to be useful in a further examination of joy.

Shand states that the special characteristic of the emotion of joy is the maintenance of the status quo, and if in place of this, "activity" is offered as the special characteristic, in view of what has been said above, there is no defence against the charge which would at once be made quite justly of vagueness to the point of uselessness. Even an appeal to Stout's statement "Joy involves what we may call expansive activity" improves the situation very little. But if it could be established that the tendency of joy is always and necessarily to increase the degree of felt activity the special characteristic offered would lose its vagueness. Subject to further examination, the hypothesis then is here suggested/

---

1. Analytic Psychology. Vol. I, p. 168.

suggested that the special characteristic of the emotion of joy is an increase in the degree of activity felt. The mind when infused with joy becomes more fully conscious of the flow of the stream, and conscious also that the stream is flowing more strongly. This is to refer to two aspects of the same event, for the mind is the stream. The heightening of the felt activity which is direct self determination also produces indirect self determination in an activity which forms a re-entrant series, having a further heightening of the degree of feeling as result - mental change working partly through physical change results finally in mental change. But if this heightening of activity is not found to be peculiar to joy, the special characteristic has not been found and further analysis is necessary. This heightening of activity cannot be claimed as a characteristic of most other emotions; fear and sorrow tend to lower physical and mental vitality; extreme fear and extreme sorrow are known to result in a kind of paralysis. But in anger there is little room for doubt that the degree of felt activity is increased during the experience of the emotion. If this is so, a characteristic has been found which is common to anger and joy and to these emotions alone. But anger and joy are ening of activity together with tendency to change). very/  
special characteristic of fear is a tendency to escape and

very different emotions. Psychologists seem to be agreed of sorrow to restore the object to its previous condition (that the characteristic of anger is a tendency to destruction, tendency to change without heightening of activity). In joy and and to be agreed also that this is not a characteristic of in joy alone we have a heightening of activity without tendency joy. To attempt to destroy anything is to attempt to change to change, i.e. a heightening of activity together with a the existing condition. Sorrow and fear also tend to change tendency to continue the activity as it is. the existing condition. In sorrow the tendency is to change

The chief criticism applied to Shand's theory was the object. We try to mend a broken bowl; a mother tries to that it was not distinctive of joy. The particular criticism change the character of her child when that character causes applied to his sixth law was that the impulse and the end of her sorrow. Sorrow reaches its zenith when it is impossible joy are not really those which are given by Shand. His to change the object; we cannot call back the dead, yet the neglect to observe heightening of activity as the essential tendency of the emotion still works in our minds. In fear characteristic of joy seems to account for the inadequacy of the tendency is to change either the object or its relation his theory and the particular differences involved in the to the subject or both. We try to put out a fire or to sixth law. His theory also appears not to take sufficient escape from it. But in joy, according to Shand, we try to notice of the danger concealed in the term "change." Change-avoid change of the object or its relation to the subject. lessness is relative. However we may try to keep an object

The theory of joy may be made clear by a summary of and its relation to the self unchanged, the self at least the facts elicited from these two ideas of heightened activity must change senselessly. Bergson in Creative Evolution and change applied to the four emotions designated by Shand makes this clear.

as primary, viz. anger, fear, joy and sorrow. In joy and "Let us take the most stable of internal states, anger there is heightening of felt activity. In anger, the visual perception of a motionless external object. The fear and sorrow there is tendency to change. The special object may remain the same. I may look at it from the same characteristic of anger is a tendency to destruction (heightening of activity together with tendency to change). The vision I have of it differs from that which I have just had special characteristic of fear is a tendency to escape and



of sorrow to restore the object to its previous condition (tendency to change without heightening of activity). In joy and in joy alone we have a heightening of activity without tendency to change, i.e. a heightening of activity together with a tendency to continue the activity as it is. <sup>ively so quiescent</sup>

<sup>state</sup> The chief criticism applied to Shand's theory was that it was not distinctive of joy. The particular criticism applied to his sixth law was that the impulse and the end of joy are not really those which are given by Shand. His neglect to observe heightening of activity as the essential characteristic of joy seems to account for the inadequacy of his theory and the particular differences involved in the sixth law. His theory also appears not to take sufficient notice of the danger concealed in the term "change." Changelessness is relative. However we may try to keep an object and its relation to the self unchanged, the self at least <sup>activity</sup> must change ceaselessly. Bergson in Creative Evolution it makes this clear. <sup>character and becoming another activity</sup>

<sup>may meet</sup> "Let us take the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless external object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same <sup>make</sup> side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the vision I have of it differs from that which I have just had



joy can be found in literature. The instances given below even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there which conveys something of the shall be classified as follows:-

A. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-past into the present..... The truth is that we change

flows in expression of expansive movements of body without ceasing and that the state itself is nothing but

B. Records where felt tendency to activity is felt as change."1 If this is true of a comparatively so quiescent expanded mental flow.

state as the visual perception of a motionless external

C. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-object, it must be even more true of a state so active as flows in purposive bodily activity.

rejoicing in success or a state of attempting to make a

D. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-vital decision. Yet relatively the self in the former flows in purposive mental activity.

state is unchanging. Shand however seems to attach too

much importance to the unchanging character of the self-

flows in expression of expansive movements of body:-

in joy. The idea of an unchanging self and an unchanging

objects leads him too far, so that his theory does not apply

to cases in where change is noticeable. To say that joy

tends to keep the status quo is to say that it tends to per-

form the impossible. The theory that joy heightens activity

and tends also to preserve that activity and to prevent it

from changing its character and becoming another activity

may meet all the difficulties indicated metaphorically in

the change It is now necessary to attempt to substantiate

3. this alteration in amplification of Shand's theory. To make

this attempt by an appeal to literature is to follow the

method advocated by Shand himself. Numberless records of

joy/  
1. Bergson. Creative Evolution. Translated by A. Mitchell.

2. Dante. Paradise V 92.

3. Ibid. 102.

4. Her joy is like an instinct, joy  
joy can be found in literature. The instances given below  
shall be classified as follows:-

5. A. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-  
flows in expression of expansive movements of body. uttering word

B. Records where <sup>the</sup> felt tendency to activity is felt as  
expanded mental flow.

7. C. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-  
flows in purposive bodily activity.

D. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-  
flows in purposive mental activity.

9. A. Records where the felt tendency to activity over-  
flows in expression of expansive movements of body:-

10. 1. ....still back while,  
Upon their top the feathered choristers  
Applied their wonted art, and with full joy  
Welcomed those hours of prime, and warbled shrill  
Amid the leaves, that to their jocund lays  
Kept tenour.<sup>1</sup>

2. There I beheld  
The dame, so joyous, enter, that the orb  
Grew brighter at her smiles; and, if the star  
Were moved to gladness, what then was my cheer  
Whom nature hath made apt for every change!<sup>2</sup>

Here the expansive movement is indicated metaphorically in  
the change in the star.

3. "Resolution and Independence" Lol! one arrived  
To multiply our loves! and as each came,  
The shadow, streaming forth effulgence new,  
Witnessed augmented joy.<sup>3</sup>

Her/

1. Dante. Purgatory XXVIII 15-19. Carey's Translation.  
2. Dante. Paradise V 92.  
3. Ibid. 102.

4. Her joy is like an instinct, joy  
Of kitten, bird or summer fly;  
She dances, runs without an aim,  
She chatters in her ecstasy.<sup>1</sup>
5. One, who daily on the pier  
Watched for tidings from the East, beheld his Lord, saying  
Fell down and clasped his knees for joy, not uttering word  
Mutual was the sudden transport;  
Breathless questions followed fast.....<sup>2</sup>
6. I saw the hare that race about with joy<sup>3</sup>
7. And in the general joy of heart  
The blind Boy's little dog took part;  
He leapt about and oft did kiss  
His master's hands in sign of bliss.<sup>4</sup>
8. Now who is he that bounds with joy  
On Carrock's side, a Shepherd boy?<sup>5</sup>
9. .... when, from excess  
Of happiness, my blood appeared to flow  
For its own pleasure and I breathed with joy.<sup>6</sup>
10. .... she drew back awhile,  
Then, yielding to the irresistible joy,  
With frantic gesture and short breathless cry  
Folded his frame in her dissolving arms.<sup>7</sup>
11. Albeit usually grave and judicious, he came near  
executing a leap like a goat, which, as it is well  
known, men only execute in the most powerful out-  
bursts of joy.<sup>8</sup>
12. Today I went hopping and skipping to the office, for  
my heart was under your influence, and my soul was  
keeping holiday, as it were<sup>9</sup>

How/

- 
1. Wordsworth. The Mother's Return, verse 6. "I was so  
2. " Armenian Lady, l. 102.  
3. " Resolution and Independence, l. 16. 'oy stick' and  
4. " Highland Boy, l. 226.  
5. " Feast at Brougham Castle, l. 72. showed my signal to  
6. " Prelude II, l. 186.  
7. Shelley. Alastor, l. 185  
8. Gogol. Dead Souls. Translated by Stephen Graham, p. 35.  
9. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk (Everyman Edition) p. 10.



13. How I would embrace the old woman in transports of joy!.... she could scarcely keep pace with me on the way home, so full was I of chatter and tales about one thing and another! 1.

when it might be thought he had had enough of activity for a time, his emotion expressed itself in this violent way. Many thousands of similar examples of joy expressing itself in some form of physical activity could be found. That B. Records where the felt tendency to activity is Shand has not chosen this physical activity as the characteristic tendency of joy is probably because other instances may be found in which the emotion does not express itself in this way. Examples 1, 7 and 9 are organic or not self-conscious expressions of the emotion. Perhaps Nos. 4 and 8 are impulsive expressions behind which there is no conscious will.

16. By degrees he was becoming calm, was finding in the We have here an approximation to the instinctive activity which McDougall demands at the base of an emotion. In this division of the records of joy might also be placed Wordsworth's description of his youthful joy in skating (Prelude I 428 et seq.) and his account of the joy of a riding expedition (Ibid II, 128 et seq.)

14. 19. S. Francis' glorious Canticle of the Sun given by Sabatier is itself an expression of joy, that peculiar joy an account of an interview with Lieutenant Robinson after his which is also gratitude and expresses itself in a physical successful encounter with a Zeppelin. In this interview Lt. Robinson described his joy in his success thus. "I was so pleased that in my excitement I pulled the 'joy stick' and looped the loop several times. Then I showed my signal to the Sky and the first part of it describes a mood of des-

15. To come to our own day, the Daily Chronicle published Sabatier is itself an expression of joy, that peculiar joy an account of an interview with Lieutenant Robinson after his which is also gratitude and expresses itself in a physical successful encounter with a Zeppelin. In this interview Lt. Robinson described his joy in his success thus. "I was so pleased that in my excitement I pulled the 'joy stick' and looped the loop several times. Then I showed my signal to the Sky and the first part of it describes a mood of des-

16. Robinson described his joy in his success thus. "I was so pleased that in my excitement I pulled the 'joy stick' and looped the loop several times. Then I showed my signal to the Sky and the first part of it describes a mood of des-

---

1. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 24. And/  
1. Sabatier. S. Francis of Assisi, p. 58.  
2. Ibid, p. 24  
3. Sabatier. op. cit. p. 305.



stop firing and came back." He did not keep the object of joy - the burning Zeppelin - before his eyes but at a moment when it might be thought he had had enough of activity for a time, his emotion expressed itself in this violent way.

B. Records where the felt tendency to activity is felt as expanded mental flow.

17. In Sabatier's life of S. Francis of Assisi there are many instances of joy. In the following quotation joy is seen to spur on the saint in the face of difficulty.

"Notwithstanding his fears he had an infinite joy at heart, and at no price would he have turned back."<sup>1</sup>

18. By degrees he was becoming calm, was finding in the contemplation of nature joys which up to this time he had sipped but hastily, almost unconsciously and of which he was now learning to relish the flavour. He drew from them not simply soothing; in his heart he felt new compassions springing into life, and with these the desire to act, to give himself, to cry aloud to these cities perched upon the hill-tops threatening as warriors who eye one another before the fray, that they should be reconciled and love one another.<sup>2</sup>

19. S. Francis' glorious Canticle of the Sun given by Sabatier is itself an expression of joy, that peculiar joy which is also gratitude and expresses itself in a physical or mental act of praise.<sup>3</sup>

20. A poem by Rupert Brooke gives an instance of joy resulting in a renewed wish to live. It is Pine Trees and the Sky and the first part of it describes a mood of despondency, almost despair:-

And/

---

1. Sabatier. S. Francis of Assisi, p. 58.

2. Ibid, p. 24

3. Sabatier. op. cit. p. 305.

And I was sorry and sick and wished to die.

But the beauty, which lies before him arouses joy.

Then from the sad west turning wearily,  
I saw the pines against the white north sky,  
Very beautiful, and still, and bending over  
Their sharp black heads against a quiet sky.

And there was peace in them; and I  
Was happy, and forgot to play the lover,  
And laughed and did no longer wish to die;

Being glad of you, O pine trees and the sky! <sup>1</sup>

And dead still water lay upon my mind

21. Soon as his feet desisted (slackening pace)

From haste, that mars all decency of act,  
My mind, that in itself before was wrapp'd,  
Its thought expanded, as with joy restored. <sup>2</sup>

22. Up one obstruction more, And of such bond methinks I saw

The universal form; for that when'er  
I do but speak of it, my soul dilates  
Beyond her proper self; and till I speak,  
One moment seems a longer lethargy vexed - content,  
Than five and twenty ages had appeared  
To that emprise.....<sup>3</sup>

To break, some new enlargement to entreat;  
The sphere though larger is not more complete.

23. And I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy

Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime

Of something far more deeply interfused,

Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

And the round ocean and the living air,

And the blue sky and in the mind of man:

A motion and a spirit, that impels

All thinking things, all objects of all thought

And rolls through all things. <sup>4</sup>

1. Rupert Brooke. Poems.

2. Dante. Purgatory III, 1. 10.

3. Ibid. XXXIII, 85.

4. Wordsworth. Tintern Abbey, 1. 93.

Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 32.

James Stephen's Prelude and Sonnet is that serene and blessed mood,

24. In which the affections gently lead us on, -  
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame  
And even the motion of our human blood  
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep  
In body, and become a living soul:  
While with an eye made quiet by the power  
Of Harmony, and the deep power of joy,  
We see into the life of things. <sup>1</sup>

25. And dead still water lay upon my mind  
Even with a weight of pleasure, and the sky  
Never before so beautiful, sank down  
Into my heart, and held me like a dream!  
Thus were my sympathies enlarged... <sup>2</sup>

26. Must evil stay: for, what is joy? - to heaven  
Up one obstruction more, and common leave  
What was peculiar, by such act destroy  
Itself; a partial death is every joy;  
The sensible escape, enfranchisement  
Of a sphere's essence: once the vexed - content,  
The cramped - at large, the growing circle - round,  
All's to begin again - some novel bound  
To break, some new enlargement to entreat;  
The sphere though larger is not more complete. <sup>3</sup>

27. On the other hand, whenever the son received his father  
civilly the old man would be struck dumb with joy.  
Satisfaction would beam in his face, in his every  
gesture, in his every movement. And if the son  
in halldigned to engage in conversation with him, the old man  
always rose a little from his chair, and answered  
softly, sympathetically, with something like reverence,  
while strenuously endeavouring to make use of the most  
recherche (that is to say, the most ridiculous) expressions. <sup>4</sup>

side the sphere of either theory of joy. It certainly would  
James/

1. Wordsworth. Tintern Abbey, l. 43. is possible to argue

2. Wordsworth. Prelude II. 170. that/

3. Browning. Sordello, p. 125.

4. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 32.



James Stephen's Prelude and Song is illuminating. In this we have not only joy expressed in activity of mind and body but a direct admission that ecstasy is exhausting - joy so active that exhaustion follows. This seems a very strong point in favour of the intimate and necessary connection between joy and activity. The result of this is that Dostoevsky is not a man to whom one naturally turns for joy. Yet his little story Poor Folk will again be useful. In the letter in which is described the successful issue of Gorshkov's law suit, he is absolved from all guilt and is authorised to recover a large sum of money. His joy expresses itself in "looking as white as a sheet and his lips were quivering. . . . he seemed to have grown taller and straighter." Then follows an account of extreme physical restlessness, mainly aimless actions. Then "How he did talk - yes, and weep too!" Then more restlessness. His wife expressed her joy in ordering a richer and more delicate meal than usual (they could now afford it) and in decking the room in holiday guise. Gorshkov is persuaded to rest and an hour later is found dead.<sup>1</sup> Whatever physiological or psychological account would be given of this phenomenon seems to lie outside the sphere of either the theory of joy. It certainly would not fit into Shand's theory whereas it is possible to argue that/

1. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 125. Man Edition. Vol. 2, p. 33



that the activity resulting from the joy was greater than the body could endure.

30. In Tolstoi's War and Peace there is one instance of joy. Prince Andre<sup>w</sup> falls in love with Natacha. "He looked at Natacha, and a sudden flash of joy and happiness seemed to burst into being within him." The result of this is that he is unable to sleep but walks up and down his room. He makes all sorts of plans for the future. "Why should I bruise myself in this narrow sphere when all existence lies before me with its many joys?"

31. The "enlarging of the sympathies" which we found in Wordsworth as a result of joy is aptly illustrated by Tolstoi in Anna Karenin. In Part IV, Chapter 14 Tolstoi shows Levin in his joy at his betrothal to Kitty. The first sentence seems to support Shand.

32. When Kitty had gone and Levin was left alone he felt such uneasiness without her, and such an impatient longing to get as quickly, as quickly as possible to tomorrow morning when he would see her again and be plighted to her for ever, that he felt afraid as though of death, of those fourteen hours that he had to get through without her. But the whole chapter shows how active was his mind in connection with the self, but he does not mention this as an outcome sequence of his joy. He sought the company of his brother-in-law and together they went to a meeting. Levin must have been fatigued and discomforted because of his joy.

1. Tolstoi. War and Peace. Everyman Edition. Vol. 2. p. 60

"What/

33. In S. Matthew's account of the Transfiguration (XVII.14) Peter "What is the matter with you today?" joy must have been of the degree which is better called ecstasy, and here too He cannot bear ordinary words of congratulation for something it tries to express itself in action. special is necessary to the occasion. At the meeting Levin Sabatier recording the life of St. Francis found goodness and kindness in all present even in the men disputing somewhat angrily about the misappropriation of money and the laying of certain pipes. Levin meets an old enemy and cannot imagine why he had ever disliked him. He bored his hostesses with much conversation at evening tea afterwards. Left to himself in his hotel he enters into conversation with the night attendant. He spent hours at open window, insufficiently clad, in winter, lost in dreams of joy. He never noticed that he had been many hours without food. All this proves that his mind was keyed up to an exceptionally high degree of activity as the result of his joy. But it should be noticed that they first propose to do some- C. Records where the felt tendency to activity overflows in purposive bodily activity.
32. In Genesis XIV, 28 we read that Jacob on hearing that Joseph still lived, determined on a journey into Egypt. In Shand's phraseology this is to bring the object into closer relation with the self, but he does not mention this as an outcome of joy. Joy put new life into the old limbs, overthrew the conservative habits of age and sent the old man forth despising fatigue and discomfort because of his joy.

33. In S. Matthew's account of the Transfiguration (XVII.14) Peter wished to build a tabernacle. His joy must have been of the degree which is better called ecstasy, and here too it tries to express itself in action.
35. Sabatier recording the life of St. Francis bears out this interpretation. He says
- Francis is of the race of mystics, for no intermediary comes between God and his soul; but his mysticism is that of Jesus leading his disciples to the Tabernacle of contemplation; but when, overflowed with joy, they long to build tabernacles that they may remain on the heights and satiate themselves with the raptures of ecstasy, "Fools" he says to them "ye know not what ye ask" and directing their gaze to the crowds wandering like sheep having no shepherd he leads them back to the plain, to the midst of those who moan, who suffer, who blaspheme."<sup>1</sup>
- Perhaps supporters of Shand's theory would claim this to prove that the disciples wanted the tabernacles in order to keep the subject-object relation of joy unchanged. But it should be noticed that they first propose to do something, and the life of rapture they contemplate is a life of mental activity at its very highest. The maintenance of the relation seems especially here not to be vital but an assistant and subsidiary fact.
34. In the Acts of the Apostles (XII.14) is the account of Peter's return. Rhoda went to the gate and when she saw who it was

---

1. Sabatier Op.cit, p. 144.

2. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 63

3. Sabatier. p. 67.

4. Ibid. p. 105.

5. Ibid. p. 105.



that knocked, she ran to tell of Peter's arrival, instead of continuing on her previous line of action which would have led to her opening the gate. Her joy expressed itself in impulsive activity and her reason was overwhelmed.

35. In Dostoevsky's Poor Folk, the writer of half the letters of which the tale is composed says in one of them'

This is a long epistle that I am sending you, but the reason is that today I feel in good spirits after dining at Rataziaev's.<sup>1</sup>

D. Records where the felt tendency to activity overflows in purposive mental activity.

36. He had been aided by all people of good will setting the example of work and above all of joy, cheering everybody by his songs and his projects for the future.<sup>2</sup>

37. St. Francis and his followers found joy in Rome. "Pains, fatigues, fears, disquietude, hesitations were all forgotten... they ..... promised themselves to make ever new efforts to follow the Rule with fidelity."<sup>3</sup> Again joy causes mental activity, in this case resolutions for the future.

38. "While some of the brethren hastened to the city to beg for food, the others remained in this solitude enjoying the happiness of being together, forming a thousand plans."<sup>4</sup>

39. At the beginning of the Prelude, Wordsworth's joy in escaping from the city and going to live in the country is an active joy. This appears particularly in Prelude I, 14-20 and in lines 107-123 where his joy results in this-

---

1. Dostoevsky. Poor Folk, p. 63

2. Sabatier. p. 67.

3. Ibid. p. 103.

4. Ibid. p. 105.

1. Op. cit. p. 42.

But/

Soma/



But speedily an earnest longing rose  
To brace myself to some determined aim.

40. Wordsworth's poem To a Skylark directly implies that joy leads to activity, and it ends in these lines:-

And hearing thee, or others of thy kind,  
As full of gladness and as free of heaven,  
I, with my fate contented, will plod on,  
And hope for higher raptures when life's day is done.

41. Keats found joy in poetry. The poem Sleep and Poetry taken as a whole bears out our theory and ends:-

And up I rose refresh'd and glad and gay  
Resolving to begin that very day  
In These lines.

42. Browning, shortly after the passage in Sordello already quoted speaks of:-

43. In His time of action..... Beauty Shelley shows a twofold Gigantic with its power of joy.

Another quotation may be made from Dostoevsky's

Poor Folk. The pathetic old man Pokrovski expresses in different activities of mind and body his joy in his son on that son's birthday.

46. There are two of the parables of Christ which support our

One day the elder Pokrovski came to see us, and chattered in a brisk, cheerful, garrulous sort of way. He laughed, launched out into witticisms, and finally resolved the riddle of his transports by informing us that in a week's time it would be his Petiuka's birthday, when in honour of the occasion he (the father) meant to don a new jacket (as well as new shoes which his wife was going to buy for him) and to come and pay a visit to his son. In short the old man was perfectly happy and gossiped about whatever first entered his head. 1

1. Op. cit. p. 42.

Some/ osive bodily activity, the running to fetch the neighbours, the

Some records can be found in which joy expresses itself in more than one of the four ways described above.

44. C The following quotation from Tennyson's Gardener's Daughter belongs to divisions A. and B.

47. Finally the Peales contain many expressions of joy. In

So home I went, but could not sleep for joy,  
Reading her perfect features in the gloom,  
Kissing the rose she gave me o'er and o'er,  
And shaping faithful record of the glance  
That graced the giving - such a noise of life  
Swarm'd in the golden present, such a voice  
Call'd to me from the years to come, and such  
A length of bright horizon rimm'd the dark.

In this instance of joy the lover expresses his emotion in expansive movements of body, kissing the rose being the only one actually recorded and the expanded mental flow appears clearly also.

A. LXV. 13. XXXII. 11.

45. In the Hymn to Intellectual Beauty Shelley shows a twofold expression of joy belonging to divisions A and D.

C. XIX. 6. I shriek'd, and clasped my hands in ecstasy!  
And.....

A or C. X. I vowed that I would dedicate my powers  
To thee and thine.

C or B. CVII. 22.

46. There are two of the parables of Christ which support our theory. The woman who, having swept the house diligently, finds her lost silver, and the shepherd who finds the lost sheep (S. Luke XV, 6,8) do not remain in contemplation of the object of joy, they call upon their neighbours to rejoice with them. The act of rejoicing may be described as purposive mental activity, but it also involves purposive bodily activity, the running to fetch the neighbours, the

exclamations/

trative of the theory of joy advocated in these pages. In exclamations and smiles. These instances belong to divisions C and D. examined separately. Law 51 "Joy tends to maintain

47. Finally the Psalms contain many expressions of joy. In criticised as making a statement which is not applicable many cases praise (definite mental activity) is exhorted or exclusively to joy - we may keep this relation without exp- announced as the result of joy. Singing, dancing, shouting iencing the emotion. Shand's example which illustrates this are repeatedly mentioned as the natural outcome of joy. The law is of the movement of our eyes to keep an object of joy metaphorical nature of the language of the Psalms makes it within sight. It is necessary to notice that we not only difficult to decide into which division each instance should tend in such cases to maintain the relation unchanged between properly go. The following references are only a few among the self and the object but our joy in the flight of a bird many possible ones and they are given with tentative sugges- or the notion of water both instanced by Shand leads us to tions as to where each should be placed.

- A. LXV. 13. XXXII. 11.
  - B. V. 11. XXX. 11. LXVII. XCV. 1.2. CXVI. 2. CXXXII.9, 16.
  - C. XIX. 5.
- future occasions. If you find joy in hazel catkins, the result of the emotion is more complex than the mere looking
- use on the tree before you. You pick them to take
- some XCVIII. 4,6,8. of the relation but activity nevertheless).
- CVII. 22. next law, 52, states "Joy tends to maintain

the object. Strong support will be found for our theory in a consideration of the after effects of joy. At present attention must be confined to its immediate effects in order to settle the question of the nature of the specific characteristic of the emotion. An attempt has been made to show that heightened activity is an essential part of this character- 2. Op. cit. p. 281. istic. It is now necessary to examine the instances of joy offered by Shand in order to show that they are equally illus-

trative/

trative of the theory of joy advocated in these pages. In the first chapter of this study all the laws of joy given by Shand are examined separately. Law 51 "Joy tends to maintain the self in its present relation to the object." <sup>1</sup> was there criticised as making a statement which is not applicable exclusively to joy - we may keep this relation without experiencing the emotion. Shand's example which illustrates this law is of the movement of our eyes to keep an object of joy within sight. It is necessary to notice that we not only tend in such cases to maintain the relation unchanged between the self and the object but our joy in the flight of a bird or the motion of water both instanced by Shand leads us to expend at least our physical energies at the time and on future occasions. If you find joy in hazel catkins, the result of the emotion is more complex than the mere looking at those on the tree before you. You pick them to take home (maintenance of the relation but activity nevertheless).

The next law, 52, states "Joy tends to maintain the object itself as it is." <sup>2</sup> The criticism applied to this was that the object never can remain the same. But waiving this at present, let us examine the examples.

"When enjoying rest, we tend to maintain the state of rest and not alter the position of our body." <sup>3</sup> It may seem paradoxical/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 281.

2. Op. cit. p. 281.

3. Ibid.

1. Op. cit. p. 281.



paradoxical to assert that activity is the characteristic of the emotion of rest. But rest is an ambiguous term. If I work in the garden till fatigue makes further work impossible there is great pleasure in sinking into a comfortable chair. If I go to sleep at once the rest is physical and contains no joy but only high degree of the feeling-tone of pleasure in the few conscious moments of rest. If I do not go to sleep my mind is active. Work has caused a desire for rest to arise coupled with a satisfactory feeling that after such work the desire is a reasonable and right one. The satisfaction of the desire produces the emotion of joy which at once becomes active. For if I do not go to sleep my mind is active at one of the levels of activity quoted by Stout when he takes us through all the degrees of activity from the experience of a warm bath to the making of a vital decision. The probable levels in this case are idle reverie or effortless dreaming of the future, but in any case there is activity. Shand continues "When enjoying exercise we tend to maintain that state of exercise and to avoid changing it for some other kind of exercise." <sup>1</sup> He gives other similar examples of the enjoyment of a game and a dance. Further reference will be made later to these examples: at present it is sufficient to notice that though they bear

out/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 281.

*They do not imply contradiction of the theory*

out Shand's theory that joy is characterised by a feeling of heightened activity. Indeed they show that the less is activity hindered the greater is the joy. Shand next instances a man's annoyance if any alteration is made in his garden or in the arrangement of the furniture in his room or at the intrusion of a railway through a loved and familiar landscape. "Thus do we tend" he says "to maintain the object of joy as it is and oppose any alteration of it." <sup>1</sup> The reason for this may very well be the desire to avoid hindrance in the activity which is characteristic of the emotion. Aesthetic joy is hindered if the garden is altered, for even if the new arrangement is an aesthetic improvement, the old activity is hindered and adjustment has to be made to the new. It is the same with the alteration of the furniture and the coming of the railway. It is not suggested that this law of joy states anything necessarily false, although it would seem that cases could be found where it would not apply. It is rather that the statement pays attention to an accidental and unessential fact and obscures a necessary truth.

The examples given by Shand to illustrate the use of joy makes of anger (which we saw served other emotions too) to

---

1. Ibid. p. 282.

2. Op. cit. p. 290.

behaviour of joy and especially of that mood of joy which wells up in us from good health." Good health, then, tends to produce joy and it is beyond dispute that in good health we tend at bedtime may scream or kick or burst into angry tears.

The girl who is called upon to leave a dance too early may plead for delay or argue or disappear in a passage." <sup>1</sup> Joy issued in activity and now the activity is checked. The end of joy itself it apt to escape our notice because there is nothing in this end which still remains to be accomplished; loss of joy.

Shand's theory of joy does not seem to account for the self and its object and to maintain the object as it is all his own examples quite satisfactorily. In the chapter taken to be so long as the joy is felt." He tells us also in which he deals with play he notices "the joy of bodily activity of animals and children let loose out of doors after they have long been shut up - a joy which is at first satisfied by rushing about without aim or direction." <sup>2</sup> The object of joy in such a case is presumably freedom or relief or activity which always presses forward to something else. This joy does not "maintain attention to the object of joy" nor "maintain this object in the same relation to the self in its present state." This joy immediately expresses itself in activity, activity which is always restless seeking new forms of expression. The connection between joy and activity is implicitly stated in the very next sentence. "Let us then assume that play is a characteristic

1. Ibid.  
2. Op. cit. p. 292  
behaviour/  
1. Op. cit. p. 282  
2. Op. cit. p. 290.

behaviour of joy and especially of that mood of joy which wells up in us from good health."<sup>1</sup> Good health, then, tends to preserve the activity.

Shand notes the joy which occurs in play in perceiving the weakness of an opponent. The reverse side of this is the power or strength of the attacker and this is a to be more active.

In his theory of play Shand says "Now joy explains joy which may be found outside the sphere of play without the apparent fact that play has no serious end. For the either the sentiment of hate or of self-love. He quotes end of joy itself it apt to escape our notice because there is nothing in this end which still remains to be accomplished; a dreadful but undeniable fact that there are people who for joy tends merely to maintain the present relation between the self and its object and to maintain the object as it is object unchanged. The object is made to pass from one state taken to be so long as the joy is felt."<sup>2</sup> He tells us also of suffering to another in torture of some sort which falls that play has no end beyond playing and distinguishes "serious activity" from play. It may be tentatively suggested his object of joy. Shand accounts for it as play which at this point that the end of joy in play is activity for its has playing as its only end, but something more seems necessary to account for the finding of joy in the suffering of or activity which always presses forward to something else. someone else. Activity serves again. Nero must have had

That we repeat over and over again the songs and an abnormally developed sentiment of self love or an abnormally poems which have given us joy which is another example Shand developed sentiment of hate or both together with an abnormally gives of keeping the object unchanged in a proof that joy complete absence of the sentiment of regard for others. If leads to activity and this is the essential fact. If this this were so, he and all others who take delight in cruelty activity sometimes leads to an attempt to avoid change of would find the greatest joy in exercise of his own activity object or its relation to the subject it does so in order to wherever he could most clearly perceive it. The preserve/

1. Ibid.

2. Op. cit. p. 292 would form a contrast so vivid as to

heighten his sense of activity and therefore his joy. In

this/



this connection too it may be noticed that in the case of  
preserve the activity. seems explicable as enjoyment of a

Shand notes the joy which occurs in play in per-  
ceiving the weakness of an opponent. The reverse side of

true that an appeal to literature however exhaustive can never  
this is the power or strength of the attacker and this is a  
joy which may be found outside the sphere of play within

one instance could be found of joy which resulted in no in-  
either the sentiment of hate or of self-love. He quotes  
Seneca who noted the joy men could find in cruelty. It is

be discovered. In the search for instances of joy several  
a dreadful but undeniable fact that there are people who  
may be found which seem to support Shand's theory rather than  
find joy in cruelty. There is here no attempt to keep the

that adopted here. It will be well to examine these as  
object unchanged. The object is made to pass from one state  
of suffering to another in torture of some sort which falls

49. just short of death, for death would deprive the subject of  
his object of joy. Shand accounts for it as play which

has playing as its only end, but something more seems necess-  
ary to account for the finding of joy in the suffering of

tells us that "By Leah is understood the active life as Rachel  
someone else. Activity serves again. Nero must have had  
figures the contemplative. The next note explains the passage

an abnormally developed sentiment of self love or an abnormally  
developed sentiment of hate or both together with an abnormally

the Supreme Being, the light, or knowledge that He vouchsafes  
complete absence of the sentiment of regard for others. If

her." Here what Shand says of joy must surely be true. The  
this were so, he and all others who take delight in cruelty  
object of joy is God. Rachel wishes to keep herself in the  
would find the greatest joy in exercise of his own activity

same relation to God as she avoids change. But it is even  
wherever he could most clearly perceive it. The helpless-  
ness of his victims would form a contrast so vivid as to  
heighten his sense of activity and therefore his joy. In  
this/

this connection too it may be noticed that in the case of more true to say that joy leads in such a case to mental children, cruelty often seems explicable as enjoyment of a sense of power. Contemplation and activity

far from Examples might be multiplied indefinitely. It is true that an appeal to literature however exhaustive can never be final proof. The theory upheld would be overthrown if one instance could be found of joy which resulted in no increase of activity of mind or body. Such an instance may yet be discovered. In the search for instances of joy several may be found which seem to support Shand's theory rather than that adopted here. It will be well to examine these as crucial instances. to stay for the future in England - to keep

49. himself in the same relation. But my sister Rachel, she love. Before her glass abides the livelong day, Her radiant eyes beholding, charmed no less, Than with this delightful task. Her joy In contemplation, as in labour mine. To preserve that activ-

ity in The note on this passage in Carey's translation tells us that "By Leah is understood the active life as Rachel figures the contemplative. The next note explains the passage thus. "Her delight is in admiring in her mirror, that is in the Supreme Being, the light, or knowledge that He vouchsafes her." Here what Shand says of joy must surely be true. The object of joy is God. Rachel wishes to keep herself in the same relation to God as she avoids change. But it is even it with him on many voyages but

more/

1. Dante. Purgatory. XXVII. 105. From beatings, as might be, that hung upon his mind.

more true to say that joy leads in such a case to mental activity of the highest kind. Contemplation and activity far from being mutually exclusive terms, are closely related, for contemplation is one form of mental activity. It should be noted further in this case that there may not even be an attempt to keep the same relation, but a constant endeavour to make the relation closer. Rachel, in common with others whose object of joy is God, may be supposed to wish the communication with God to increase in fulness and nearness. Shand's

50

laws apply. Wordsworth in "I travelled among unknown men" expresses a desire to stay for the future in England - to keep himself in the same relation to the object. But his love for England with which is incorporated his love for Lucy and his joy in that love cause him to wish to preserve that activity in relation to the object of his joy.

51.

The same interpretation may be given to St. Catherine of Ledbury. "The old way, no longer writes to him or order the home

52.

The Sailor's Mother might well be claimed by Shand as an instance which bears out his theory. Her son is dead, an

inst. And I have travelled weary miles to see  
If aught which he had owned might still remain for me.  
For her thoughts and by helping to shut out intruding events  
She gains possession of his bird in its cage. He had taken  
or thoughts which might lessen or check this activity.  
it with him on many voyages but

53.

There is a passage in the Prelude (VIII 572-576) which  
When last he sailed, he left the bird behind;  
From bodings, as might be, that hung upon his mind.

So deprived of her son, the object of her joy she attempts to keep herself as far as is now possible in the same relation to him; she spends much time in thinking of him and in order to keep this relation and to preserve unchanged the object of joy (now only the thought not the reality of her son), she treasures his little singing bird. It is true that joy is here a conservative force opposed to change. But to avoid change is not at all the same thing as to avoid activity. It seems that this is one of the many cases to which Shand's

54. laws apply but as accidental and not as essential. The essential fact is that the mother's joy in her son resulted in mental activity involved in loving him, in caring for him, praying for him, writing to him, keeping a home for him, tidying up the home for his return and thinking constantly about him. Now he is dead and many of her activities or ways of expressing her joy must cease. She can no longer care for him in the old way, no longer write to him or order the home for him, but she can still love him, pray for him and think about him and the possession of his little singing bird is an instrument which assists her activity by giving her a focus for her thoughts and by helping to shut out intruding events or thoughts which might lessen or check this activity.

53. There is a passage in the Prelude (VIII 572-675) which seems to be exactly in line with Shand's view.

They ask

The/

Is/



The soul when smitten thus  
By a sublime idea, whence so'er  
Vouchsafed for union or communion, feeds  
On the pure bliss, and takes her rest with God.

They say

We have had occasion before to notice that rest does not exclude activity. The soul "smitten thus by a sublime idea" may be conscious of a new harmony or harmony re-established. The passage does not contradict but by implication supports the theory of heightened mental activity as well as it supports Shand's theory of the maintenance of the status quo.

54. The status quo seems to be expressed in the following lines from Shelley (Prometheus Unbound IV 575)

Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;  
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be  
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;  
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory.

Rest  
of someone who rests after hard physical toil - also the exam-  
ple given on page 118. Their minds set free from fatiguing  
and disagreeable toil are active in contemplation of the  
beauty of their surroundings and in thinking of a life before  
them different and more pleasing than the life behind them.  
Most of the examples of joy given have one example  
of the emotion aroused within the sentiment of love. Instances  
of joy within the sentiment of hate should also be considered.

55. At the first reading Tennyson's Lotus-Eaters pre-  
sents some difficulty. The mariners reflect

There is no joy but calm!

They ask

Count/

Is/

55

Count Cenci (Act IV, 1-55) Is there any peace fates for  
In ever climbing up the climbing wave?

his children says  
They say

When all is done, out in the wide Campagna  
We have had enough of faction and my gold;  
My costly robes, paintings and tapestries;  
and My parchments and all records of my wealth,  
And make a bonfire in my joy and leave  
Surely, surely, slumber is more sweet than toil.

It might be argued that the Lotus-Eaters were within the realm  
of magic and so do not come into discussion of the states  
of mind of ordinary humanity. If it is objected that this  
legend is but an allegory which describes a real and possible  
psychological condition, it may perhaps be explained thus. The  
The mariners have obviously not found joy in their journey,  
and all the activities belonging to it. They desire rest.  
Rest is their object of joy and they are in the same position  
of someone who rests after hard physical toil - see the exam-  
ple given on page 110. Their minds set free from fatiguing  
and disagreeable toil are active in contemplation of the Joy in  
beauty of their surroundings and in thinking of a life before  
them different and more pleasing than the life behind them.

Most of the examples of joy given here are examples  
of the emotion aroused within the sentiment of love. Instances  
of joy within the sentiment of hate should also be considered.  
Shelley gives three cases, consistency may occur is shown in this

example. Count/ In/

56 Count Cenci (Act IV, 1-55) planning terrible fates for  
his children says

57 When all is done, out in the wide Campagna  
I will pile up my silver and my gold;  
58 My costly robes, paintings and tapestries;  
My parchments and all records of my wealth,  
And make a bonfire in my joy and leave  
Of my possessions nothing but my name;  
Which shall be an inheritance to strip  
Its wearer bare as infamy.

(469) in joy at the prospect of the blinding wishes to express  
He looks forward to the time when, his evil plans accom-  
plished, he will experience joy. This joy will express  
itself in activity, in destructive activity which will further  
the end of the emotion within the sentiment of hate. The  
end of joy given by Shand cannot be found in this example.  
There is no attempt contemplated to keep the status quo.  
The end of activity subordinated to the sentiment of hate  
is in this case allied to the end of anger which is destruction,  
for hate works for the evil fortune and overthrow of the object  
just as love works for its welfare and preservation. Joy in  
the sentiment of love has as its end some activity which  
assists in the welfare or preservation of the object of the  
sentiment. Joy in the sentiment of hate has a contrary end.  
In the theory of joy advocated here, there is no inconsistency  
with regard to the ends of joy in love and hate. That in  
Shand's theory such inconsistency may occur is shown in this  
example.

1. Paradise. XXI. 17.
2. Dante. Paradise. XXIV. 18.
3. Milton. Paradise Lost. II. 492.

In/

57 In Queen Mab (III 180) we read

62. When Nero,<sup>1</sup>  
High over flaming Rome, with savage joy  
Lowered like a fiend, drank with enraptured ear  
The shrieks of agonising death, beheld  
The frightful desolation spread, and felt  
63. A new-created sense within his soul, that be Joy!  
Thrill to the sight, and vibrate to the sound;.....  
Smoothly skins the meadows wide...<sup>2</sup>

58 The Chorus in Shelley's translation of The Cyclops  
(469) in joy at the prospect of the blinding wishes to express

64. this joy in activity.  
Whose proffer'd beauty in safe shelter blows  
May I, as in libations to a God,  
Share in the blinding him with the red brand?  
I would have some communion in his death.<sup>3</sup>

65. From the examples which follow it is not possible  
to prove that activity is the outcome of joy, but as in them  
joy and activity are so closely connected, they add support  
to the theory of the necessary connection here maintained.

59. He walks about..... what joy  
A: To to the bidding of my heavenly guide.  
It will be such joy to see them disappear.<sup>4</sup>

60 E'en thus their carols weaving variously,  
67. They, by the measure paced, or swift or slow,  
Made me to rate the riches of their joy.<sup>2</sup>  
And not to lose the good of life.<sup>5</sup>

Here the degree of activity is indicative of the degree of joy.

68. Beauty and life and motions as of joy.<sup>7</sup>  
61 If chance the radiant sun, with farewell sweet,  
Extend his evening beam, the fields revive, Anger and the  
The birds their notes renew, and bleating herds  
Attest their joy, that hill and valley rings.<sup>3</sup>

1. Sabatier. Op.cit. p. 18. 5. Wordsworth. Ibid. XI. 151.  
2. Wordsworth. Pass of Kirkstons. l. 60. 6. Wordsworth. Francis/ of Aar. 11  
3. Worslow. Dante. Paradise. XXI. 17 7. Tennyson. Two Voices. v. 44.  
4. 2. Dante. Paradise. XXIV. 18.  
3. Milton. Paradise Lost. II. 492.



treatment of Joy given by Shand may bear out the suggestion

62. that Francis' heart bounded with joy.... His departure was decided upon, and he gave himself up, without reserve, to his joy.<sup>1</sup>

The spontaneous physical expressions of Anger

63. Can that be Joy!  
Who, with a sunbeam for her guide  
Smoothly skims the meadows wide...<sup>2</sup>  
Joy personified, is described as active.

64. .... no one plucks the rose  
Whose proffer'd beauty in safe shelter blows  
Mid a trim garden's summer luxuries,  
With joy like his who climbs, on hands and knees,  
For some rare plant, yon Headland of St. Bees.<sup>3</sup>

65. Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,  
to But to be young was very Heaven!<sup>4</sup>

The reason for this must be that youth gives a greater chance for activity. than the sentiment of love. The spontaneous

66. He walks about.... of Joy mentioned by Shand do not at all  
And is half pleased with things that are amiss  
'Twill be such joy to see them disappear.<sup>5</sup>

67. Waiting to strive a happy strife,  
To wars with falsehood to the knives to arouse joy.<sup>6</sup>  
And not to lose the good of life.<sup>6</sup>

68. Beauty and life and motions as of joy.<sup>7</sup> also "there is a joy

A comparison between the treatment of Anger and the

all its sensations are pleasant..... but sense treatment/

1. Sabatier. Op.cit. p. 18. 5. Wordsworth. Ibid. XI. 151.  
2. Wordsworth. Pass of Kirkstone, l. 80 6. Wordsworth. Fall of Aar. 11  
3. Wordsworth. S. Bee's Head. 7. Temyson. Two Voices. v. 44.  
4. " Prelude XI. 108.

1. Op.cit. p. 274.

treatment of Joy given by Shand may bear out the suggestion  
ditions or constituents." The physical aspect of joy is  
that the latter theory is incomplete and may add support to  
mentioned again in the next paragraph in which Shand is con-  
amplifications of it suggested here.

considering further varieties of Joy, "some being the mere out-  
burst of health and good spirits." In this section of the  
mentioned by Shand are cries, rapid aimless movements, stiff-  
chapter on Joy there is one mention of physical expressions of  
ening of muscles, biting, throwing things to the ground. Then  
the emotion: "Intense joy thrills us, and this thrill is a  
he gives six ends of anger involving all or some of the physic-  
pleasant sensation." This, being involuntary, indeed,  
al expressions and introducing new activity in addition.  
a reflex, as it must be, is not comparable with the hitting  
The ends are destruction of opponent, overcoming obstruction,  
and striking which are two of the modes of physical expression  
which may fall short of destruction, prevention of attack,  
possible to Anger. In this section Shand makes two important  
infliction of punishment for past offence, reduction of others  
admissions and apparently does not observe how important they  
to subordination to the self, and finally, preservation of  
are. In substantiating his law that pleasant and painful  
others, which last is disinterested anger and appears in  
emotions tend to attract attention more to their objects than  
human life within the sentiment of love. The spontaneous  
themselves; he says "even if the emotion have for a time no  
physical expressions of Joy mentioned by Shand do not at all  
such object, it still makes us project our thought beyond  
correspond in amount or degree with those which belong to  
itself until we have found something to which it may be  
Anger. He says "the vague and diffused bodily pleasure that  
referred." We find a similar statement by Stout with  
accompanies states of good health tends to arouse joy." <sup>1</sup>  
regard to emotional moods. It is undoubtedly true of all  
This is a condition of body which tends to arouse the emotion  
emotions but is inconsistent with the conservative character  
and is not a consequence of it. He says also "there is a joy  
of Joy. Again Shand says "Yet Joy seems to be an emotion  
in physical rest, when the body feels warm and at ease and  
and no abstraction. It is held to be one that stimulates  
all its sensations are pleasant..... but sensations however  
functional activity, and at least many of its varieties have  
pleasant do not constitute joy and are at most among its con-

1. Ibid. p. 277.

2. Ibid. p. 278.

3. Op. cit. p. 274.

1. Op. cit. p. 274.

ditions or constituents."<sup>1</sup> The physical aspect of joy is mentioned again in the next paragraph in which Shand is considering further varieties of Joy, "some being the mere outburst of health and good spirits."<sup>2</sup> In this section of the chapter on Joy there is one mention of physical expression of the emotion. "Intense joy thrills ~~us~~, and this thrill is a pleasant sensation."<sup>3</sup> This, being involuntary, indeed, a reflex, as it must be, is not comparable with the hitting and striking which are two of the modes of physical expression possible to Anger. In this section Shand makes two important admissions and apparently does not observe how important they are. In substantiating his law that pleasant and painful emotions tend to attract attention more to their objects than themselves, he says "even if the emotion have for a time no such object, it still makes us project our thought beyond itself until we have found something to which it may be referred."<sup>3</sup> We find a similar statement by Stout with regard to emotional moods. It is undoubtedly true of all emotions but is inconsistent with the conservative character of Joy. Again Shand says "Yet Joy seems to be an emotion and no abstraction. It is held to be one that stimulates functional activity, and at least many of its varieties have this/

1. Ibid. p. 277.

2. Ibid. p. 278.

3. Op. cit. p. 274.

4. Op. cit. p. 30.

this effect." In this sentence Shand approaches the theory set forth in these pages. Stout has noted the spontaneous physical expressions of Joy and they have often been referred to here; many examples of them have been given under the heading Records A. They are laughter, clapping hands, shouting, whistling, rapid aimless movements such as running about and jumping up and down. Heightened activity and "expansive activity" were the most definite phrases which could be found descriptive of the nature of joy. It is now possible to suggest a further distinction. Corresponding to the six possible ends of anger are two possible ends of joy, viz. to reinforce an old and to embark on a new activity. Both ends may be connected with desire. This connection will be more fully considered in the next chapter where an attempt will be made to show that joy attends success in the progress towards the end of desire and that joy tends to awaken desire. This latter suggestion is hinted at by Shand who says "We attend to some stimulus perhaps accidentally, or because of its unusual intensity, but if it gives us joy or delight, we continue to attend to it."<sup>1</sup> In considering the common varieties of joy Shand speaks of joys which are primary and others

1. Ibid. p. 278

1. Op. cit. p. 30.

which/



which "are late products of evolution."<sup>1</sup> He continues "Hence the joys which depend on these new activities are themselves new varieties." So joy for him on occasion seeks new activity but not quite in the sense of the second end of joy just suggested. An accidental experience of joy causes us according to Shand to continue the activity. According to the present theory in addition to this joy actually seeks a new activity in which up to the present joy has not been found. It has been seen that the theory advocated here is to a great extent but not entirely in line with Shand's psychology as a whole. Modern psychology owes much to Shand for his emphasis of the law of organisation of the mind as exemplified in the relation between the system of impulses, instincts and emotions. Of all of this much use has been made here. This study diverges from Shand on the questions of the impulse and end of joy. The difficulties involved in Shand's theories of these will lead to the discovery that the present theory of joy is incompatible with Shand's view of emotion as the sole basis of human life. In the next chapter Shand's theories of sentiment and desire must be considered in order to complete our theory of joy

and/

---

1. Ibid. p. 278

and its difference from Shand's, but certain points in which the present theory seems the more satisfactory one may now be noted.

It is suggested that a wider and more comprehensive theory of joy than Shand's is given here, one which will include Shand's theory and account as well for certain aspects of the subject which that seems unable to cover. The theory of heightened activity explains those instances of joy which occur in creatures not endowed with self consciousness, (Exs. 1, 4, 6, 7) and those instances of uncontrolled physical expression of which No. 9 is given as an example. An explanation of these examples by Shand's theory of the status quo seems forced and artificial compared with an explanation based on the present theory. In example 1 the subject of the emotion is the birds and the object presumably "those hours of prime." To say that the birds experienced joy in the existing situation and that this joy resulted in a felt increase of activity which expressed itself in song seems a much simpler, more natural and more probable explanation of the facts than to say that the joy of the birds resulted in an attempt to maintain the relation between themselves and the prominent characteristic. Shand's theory of the status quo can be read into them, but, as has been said before, it seems to be of a secondary character. Particularly in this

so in examples 21, 23, 25, 35, 36, 39, 45, 56. Shand's theory applies to some instances of joy and the dawn. The latter fact may be true but does not seem sufficient to account for the singing. The birds could have kept the dawn before them without breaking into song. The singing is an expulsive expression of activity for which on Shand's theory there was no need.

In example 6 the object of joy is not stated, but here again activity is recorded as the characteristic of joy. "forming a thousand plans" in example 35.

Example 7 is an instance of imitative emotion. The dog caught the general excitement and behaved in a manner characteristic of joy. The object of joy for the dog must have been the general excitement of his human companions, and it was not possible for him to know the cause of the excitement. In so far as the dog did not disappear from the company but stayed and barked and jumped round his people, he kept the subject-object relation unchanged, but here again the most prominent characteristic of his emotion was an increase of activity.

In example 9 Wordsworth records the psychological effect of joy which certainly entails increase of felt activity.

Heightened activity seems in so many examples to be the prominent characteristic. Shand's theory of the status quo can be read into them, but, as has been said before, it seems to be of a secondary character. Particularly is this

so in examples 21, 23, 25, 35, 36, 39, 45, 56. Shand's theory applies to some instances of joy. It applies to all those given by himself and to the additional examples 49-58 inclusive. It gives a special rather than a general law. It fails to account for the expulsive movements noticed by Stout as characteristic expressions and exemplified here under the heading "Records A." The "projects for the future" in example 36 do not come within Shand's theory, nor does the "forming a thousand plans" in example 35. It fails to account particularly for examples 39, 41. The theory of activity seems to give a more satisfactory explanation too of examples 64, 65 and 67.

Further attention will be given to some of these examples later. Before we can proceed further it will be necessary to give some account of Shand's theories of sentiment and desire.

A sentiment is a system and a more complex system than that of an instinct or emotion. It organises emotions, instincts and impulses to serve its end. There are two main classes of sentiments Love and Hate. A sentiment is not a real experience but an abstraction. Emotions, instincts and impulses become clustered round one idea - the love of something or the hate of something, and their behaviour is organised to serve that idea. Shand does not explain the process by

which/



which an idea becomes the object of a sentiment though some  
guide to this is given in his chapter on the interaction  
JOY AND THE FORMATION OF SENTIMENTS IN RELATION TO CHARACTER.  
between the primary emotions. He disposes of the old belief

In the first chapter of this study an account was given of  
Shand's theories of impulse, instinct and emotion. It was  
there seen that the keynote of his psychology is the power of  
organisation. The working of this law is shown in the power  
of instincts to organise impulses to serve their ends and in  
the power of emotions to organise instincts and impulses to  
serve the ends of emotions. Every emotion has an impulse  
and an end and judged by this test joy is included by Shand  
among the emotions. It is now necessary to continue the  
account of Shand's psychology with reference to his theories  
of sentiment and desire. Here also we find the law of organ-  
isation at work. A sentiment is a system and a more complex system  
than that of an instinct or emotion. It organises emotions,  
instincts and impulses to serve its end. There are two main  
classes of sentiments Love and Hate. A sentiment is not a  
real experience but an abstraction. Emotions, instincts and  
impulses become clustered round one idea - the love of some-  
thing or the hate of something and their behaviour is organis-  
ed to serve that idea. Shand does not explain the process by

which/

Chapter IV

JOY AND THE FORMATION OF SENTIMENTS IN RELATION TO CHARACTER.

In the first chapter of this study an account was given of Shand's theories of impulse, instinct and emotion. It was there seen that the keynote of his psychology is the law of organisation. The working of this law is shown in the power of instincts to organise impulses to serve their ends and in the power of emotions to organise instincts and impulses to serve the ends of emotions. Every emotion has an impulse and an end and judged by this test joy is included by Shand among the emotions. It is now necessary to continue the account of Shand's psychology with reference to his theories of sentiment and desire. Here also we find the law of organisation at work.

A sentiment is a system and a more complex system than that of an instinct or emotion. It organises emotions, instincts and impulses to serve its end. There are two main classes of sentiments Love and Hate. A sentiment is not a real experience but an abstraction. Emotions, instincts and impulses become clustered round one idea - the love of something or the hate of something and their behaviour is organised to serve that idea. Shand does not explain the process by

which/

which an idea becomes the object of a sentiment though some guide to this is given in his chapter on the interaction between the primary emotions. He disposes of the old belief that Love and Hate are emotions on the ground of their power to select and organise emotions. Perhaps a criticism may be made here. Undoubtedly Love and Hate have the power of selection and organisation claimed for them by Shand and are to be regarded as sentiments. Shand argues from this that there are no emotions of Love and Hate. But the constant difficulty of using as scientific terms words in common use in ordinary language in this case may have obscured the double meaning of these terms. It might be argued that Love has two meanings, that the word stands for two separate facts. Love may be not only a sentiment but also an emotion. Love as a factor in human character generally or love for various persons within a man's own life is admittedly one of the strongest forces in character. It seems possible therefore and reasonable to argue that Love is not only an abstraction but also an emotion and may be used in both senses though never in both simultaneously. Exactly similar remarks may be applied to Hate. Love and Hate must stand together and are accepted here as sentiments. The question whether they are

terms which also are the names of emotions may be left on one

2. Ibid p. 460.

5. Ibid p. 484

3. Ibid p. 38.

That it springs from emotion seems to be true and true also side. Shand tells us that self-love is the earliest sentiment to be developed. In every animal is found the instinct of self-preservation. Some animals and all human beings are liable to experience Anger when activity is obstructed and Fear when life is threatened. Human beings become conscious of the sentiment of self-love through the working of emotion. Shand speaks of a desire for self-preservation. Desire does not arise till the subject is capable of apprehending an idea, for Shand tells us that the function of a sentiment is "to organise certain of the lesser systems of emotions by imposing on them a common end and subjecting them to a common cause."<sup>1</sup> This common cause can only be apprehended as an idea and the idea is the end of the sentiment. All sentiments have desires. Desire is impulse become conscious of its end.<sup>2</sup> How it becomes conscious is suggested by Shand's interrelation of the primary emotions. That this connection is innate he concludes from the fact that if the conditions of an emotion are operative, the emotion is inevitably evoked.<sup>3</sup> He postulates an innate physiological basis for organisation of this connection in the nervous system.<sup>4</sup> Shand tells us that desire is never an independent force but springs from emotions and sentiments.<sup>5</sup>

1. Op. cit. p. 49.

2. Ibid p. 460.

3. Ibid p. 38.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid p. 464



That it springs from emotion seems to be true and true also  
sentiment at any moment, nor at any moment do we experience  
that it may arise within a sentiment but the position of  
the complex system of desire. We experience this as that  
desire in his theory is not immediately easy to determine.  
emotion as a result of past and present experiences, which  
Shand tells us that "Impulse develops into desire in two  
experience may be summed up and classified by an intellectual  
ways; viz by foreseeing the end and by meeting with destruc-  
act and described by a name. This seems to be Shand's theory.  
tion.<sup>1</sup> Desire is distinguished from impulse by the capaci-  
Whether desire is an abstraction in the same sense as that in  
ties of its system which are elicited through delay. It is  
which a sentiment is an abstraction seems open to question  
then a very complex emotional system which includes actually  
As usual in psychological study there is difficulty  
or potentially the six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety,  
the ambiguity of words. It was suggested that Love, Disap-  
Disappointment, Despondency, Confidence and Despair." Yet  
psychological meanings and to also love desire to be  
in spite of this power of organising emotions, desire is not  
two distinct meanings, and this fact is to be regarded as  
a sentiment, but is an integral part of a sentiment and is  
treatment of the term. His description of desire as  
itself organised to serve the end of the sentiment within own  
ten organising emotions within itself in relation to  
which it occurs. "And thus Desire, being as we shall see  
end is clear so long as the system is not separate from the  
hereafter, itself an abstraction subserves..... the senti-  
rest of Shand's psychology. Its relation to the system  
ments of which it becomes a part. For the sentiments organise  
as a whole is not so clear. Desire as a system is  
both desires and emotions in their systems."<sup>2</sup>

Shand then describes desire as "a complex emotional  
tama of desire to serve their ends. It is a system which  
system" and "an abstraction." An emotion in his view is  
seems to occupy an intermediate position. The six emotions  
not an abstraction, it is an event, an experience. A com-  
of desire are gathered together into the system of desire  
plex emotional system is an abstraction in the same sense in  
because these six emotions cannot exist except in relation  
which a sentiment is an abstraction. We do not experience a  
/// some object of desire. The other emotions may be related  
sentiment/

1. Ibid. p. 460.

2. Op. cit. p. 490. exist independently, for they can arise at

low levels of development, whereas desire and therefore its sentiment at any moment, nor at any moment do we experience emotions cannot arise below a stage of development at which the complex system of desire. We experience this or that thought of an end is possible. As described as a restless emotion as a result of past and present experiences, which There seems no reason to dispute Shand's treatment experience may be summed up and classified by an intellectual of desire as an abstraction, as the name for the complex system of the six prospective emotions. This theory is not however incompatible with the idea of desire as an experience, which a sentiment is an abstraction seems open to question. As before in the treatment of Love and Hate, Shand seems to have tacitly concluded that because desire is an abstraction the ambiguity of words. It was suggested that Love has two it is therefore not an experience and in spite of his psychological meanings and so also does desire seem to have notion of a certain difficulty. In his preliminary definition of the system of desire he says "The attempt to describe the unique nature of desire by some other term than 'desire' itself has led us into these difficulties." It is desire end is clear so long as the system is held separate from the rest of Shand's psychology. Its relation to his psychology Locke's term fits certain of its states, it cannot be applied as a whole is not so clear. Desire as a system is not tantamount to a sentiment, for sentiments themselves organise systems of desire to serve their ends. It is a system which in which desire seems to be described clearly as an experience. seems to occupy an intermediate position. The six emotions In the chapter in which he treats of the antagonism between desire and joy, Shand says "There is generally felt to be some antagonism between desire and joy. Not only does the to some object of desire. The other emotions may be related to desire, but can exist independently, for they can arise at

low levels of development, whereas desire and therefore its emotions cannot arise below a stage of development at which thought of an end is possible. be described as a "restless state." There seems no reason to dispute Shand's treatment of desire as an abstraction, as the name for the complex system of the six prospective emotions. This theory is not however incompatible with the idea of desire as an experience. As before, in the treatment of Love and Hate, Shand seems to have tacitly concluded that because desire is an abstraction it is therefore not an experience and in spite of his recognition of a certain difficulty. In his preliminary examination of the system of desire he says "The attempt to describe the unique nature of desire by some other term than 'desire' itself has led us into these difficulties. It is desire and itself that persists through its several emotions and though Locke's term fits certain of its states, it cannot be applied without strain to all."<sup>1</sup> This it appears that desire is an

experience. There are passages in the "Foundations of Character" in which desire seems to be described clearly as an experience. In the chapter in which he treats of the antagonism between desire and joy, Shand says "There is generally felt to be some antagonism between desire and joy. Not only does then the

---

1. Op. cit. p. 463. descriptive and explanatory, pp. 301-303. restless/

restless state of desire exclude joy, but joy the contemplative emotion excludes desire." A complex emotional system of an abstraction can hardly be described as a "restless state." Desire is here implicitly treated as an experience. A similar criticism can be made to his laws 141 and 142 - (141) "When Desire is active, the intrusion of Joy suspends or deranges its activity." (142) "When Joy is present the intrusion of Desire tends to destroy it." Yet Shand does not regard desire an experience. Other psychologists hold the opposite view. For Baldwin desire is one of the higher stages of conative development.<sup>1</sup> Desire becomes possible as soon as the stage of intellectual development had been reached. Conation begins with impulse, develops through appetite up to a striving with consciousness of object and this stage is the stage of desire. It is mental striving and its physiological concomitant is "the brewing of a motor storm." From this it appears that desire is an experience but not an emotion. It is an experience on the conative side of life and the feeling-tone is unpleasant. Baldwin says "Desire is always painful." Ladd bears out these statements.<sup>2</sup> He also refuses to recognise desire below the level of intelligence. In the

---

1. Feeling and Will, pp. 220-230.

2. Psychology. Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 601-608.



second paragraph of his description of the nature of desire one painful sensation and preventative movements arise.

he distinguishes it from feeling. There is no desire with- Pleasurable objects perceived produce movements toward them.

out feeling and yet desire is not feeling. Emotions feed At this stage action is determined by percepts. Pleasurable

desires. Again it appears that desire is an experience but objects perceived in idea produce movements towards them.

not an emotion. Ladd speaks of the "dynamic element" in

At this stage we have desire. Desire depends not on present

desire. This may be related to his own reference to circumstances but on sensory and imagination.

Hartsen in whose view desire is a force. (It is useful

Ward also describes desire as an essentially pain- here to remember that Shand speaks of emotion as a force, and

ful experience and insists that there must be an interval emotion is essentially an experience). Ladd ends his des-

of time between the conception of the idea and its fulfill- cription of desire with a remark which will be useful in con-

ment. When action is consummated at once desire ends when sidering the formation of sentiments. "The very individual-

it begets." The interval of time must be filled with ity of every individual consists largely in the character and

experience, therefore quite clearly for Ward desire is an number of his dominant desires."

experience. Nothing he says supports the idea that it is an emotion. It is a conative experience. he says, the

same lines in his analysis of the connection between pleasure, source of desire lies in excess of active reaction above the

pain and movement.<sup>1</sup> The stages are as follows:- Experience intensity of the representation.

of pleasure causes movements which result in further plea- In Stout's Psychology too desire is a conative

sure. One of these movements causes pain and is therefore experience. In the Manual where he writes of the ascending

arrested. Among many movements in an attempt to relieve level of conative development he first men ions impulses.

pain, one is entirely successful. Attention focuses on this He continues "But we reach a distinctly higher plane when

movement and an association is built up between it and the ideas become sufficiently self-sustaining to form trains that

removal of pain. One movement is definitely associated with are not wholly shaped by the circumstances of the present one/...

1. Article in Encyclopaedia Britannica.

2. Op. cit.

3. Ibid. which is evidently frustrated at the end of the

one painful sensation and preventative movements arise.

Pleasurable objects perceived produce movements toward them.

At this stage action is determined by percepts. Pleasurable

objects perceived in idea produce movements towards them.

At this stage we have desire. Desire depends not on present circumstances but on memory and imagination.

Ward also describes desire as an essentially painful experience and insists that there must be an interval of time between the conception of the idea and its fulfillment. When action is consummated at once desire ends where it begins." <sup>1</sup> The interval of time must be filled with experience, therefore quite clearly for Ward desire is an experience. Nothing he says supports the idea that it is an emotion. It is a conative experience. He says "The source of desire lies in excess of active reaction above the intensity of the representation."<sup>2</sup>

In Stout's Psychology too desire is a conative experience. In the Manual where he writes of the ascending level of conative development he first mentions impulse. He continues "But we reach a distinctly higher plane when ideas become 'sufficiently self-sustaining to form trains that are not wholly shaped by the circumstances of the present'....

---

1. Op. cit.

2. Ibid.

value our expectation. According to Shand surprise is  
The mere ideal representation of an end may be the primary  
starting point of an activity directed to its realisation;  
and this activity may itself partly or wholly take the form  
of trains of ideas. It is at this stage that the word  
desire has its most appropriate application."

Certain passages in Shand's book wherein desire  
seems in spite of the author to be described as an experience  
together with the weight of opinion quoted above point strongly  
to the conclusion that there is an experience which must  
be described by the term desire. Shand himself describes  
desire as impulse grown to foresight of its end. Impulse  
is an experience and desire is a development of impulse.  
The six emotions of desire essentially contain thoughts  
relating to the object of desire. In hope we believe in  
the possibility, and in confidence in the certainty, of  
achieving our desire. In anxiety we are torn between the  
belief that the object may be achieved and the contrary  
belief that it may not. In despondency we realise that  
the end is postponed, in despair we believe it impossible  
of achievement. Shand does not admit a state of desiring  
per se. He would probably agree that in anxiety and dis-  
appointment we come closest to such a state. In disappoint-  
ment expectation is suddenly frustrated or the end falls

below/

below our expectation.<sup>1</sup> According to Shand surprise is always an element of disappointment. In anxiety we are torn between two conflicting thoughts. But there does not seem sufficient justification for denying a state of mind which could only be described as desire. Such a state as Fatima's in the struggle which took place in her mind before she opened the forbidden closet. Such a state also was Pandora's before she opened the forbidden box. Curiosity was the starting point of both these experiences. Curiosity in Shand's view is not an emotion but an impulse.<sup>2</sup> In and these two cases impulse became conscious of its end and was therefore transmuted into desire and in these two cases we have examples of desire as experience of great intensity.

Shand does not admit desire as an emotion. According to his theory it would have to have an impulse and an end. It has no specific end, only some end, the end of the sentiment in which it occurs or of the emotion with which it is allied. It cannot have an impulse of its own, since, according to Shand, desire is impulse developed to the stage of foresight of end. The difficulty of admitting desire as an experience seems due to Shand's insistence on the emotional basis/

1. Op. cit. p. 467. there is a weight of authority for admitting

2. Op. cit. p. 441.

it as a real experience. Now Shand accepts the tripartite

division of experience and is careful to state that an

emotion does not consist only of an affective element but

contains/



basis of character. Every moment of experience must be contains always and necessarily perceptive and conative within the universal category of emotion. There are few elements as well. The great service he has rendered

isolated impulses in human life and these few may at any psychology seems to consist in the interrelation of diff-

appropriate change of circumstances become incorporated erent discrete psychological facts through the law of organ-

in the system of an instinct or emotion or sentiment. feation. But he himself describes his own work as tentative

There are no impulses which could not in any circumstances in character and necessarily incorporated. May there not be

be so incorporated. Instincts as we have seen are incor- moments of experience which have yet to be related to him

porated in systems of emotions and must always be so incor- whole system? If desire is admitted, we should admit it, as

porated in human life since we possess only fragmentary the development of impulse which is an experience the systematic

instincts not sufficient in themselves to achieve an end. is treatment of psychology is not complete. Shand himself

Sentiments cannot exist apart from emotions or these refuses to admit surprise and curiosity among emotions and

accessories of emotions. ~~ex-these-accessories-of-emotions~~ can does not deny that they are forces of character because they

Shand bases all human life on emotion just as McDougall are impulses which are organized by emotions. So desire

bases it on instinct. Shand pointed out clearly enough which is impulse with foresight of end is a force of character

that McDougall's base was too narrow, perhaps the same because it is organized by sentiments.

criticism is to a lesser extent true of Shand. For apart

from those experiences of impulse which at the time of

It is clear at first sight that of the six experience may not be a constituent of an emotional system emotions which occur within the system of desire, only two

such as the impulse to rest when the impulse is not obstruct- are in any way connected with the emotion of joy. These two

ed, there is this question of desire as an experience. The are hope and confidence.

ground on which Shand could not admit it as an emotion has of hope, Shand says "now hope has not the essential

been shown. Yet there is a weight of authority for admitting tendency of joy. That tendency we have already considered:

it as a real experience. Now Shand accepts the tripartite it is directed to maintain the situation in which the joy is

division of experience and is careful to state that an

I. Op. cit. pp. 437, 441.

emotion does not consist only of an affective element but

contains/

felt. Such a tendency in the system of desire would arrest its progress and detain it at the stage at which the joy was elements as well. The great service he has rendered is felt; - if hope were joy. Hope on the contrary, has the eager- psychology seems to consist in his interrelation of different elements of desire itself, for the goal, because it belongs to different discrete psychological facts through the law of organization. If heightened activity is the real end of joy, the connection between hope and joy is closer than Shand allows in character and necessarily incomplete. May there not be a link to be? If joy spurs one on to "fresh woods and pastures new," it has this spurring to activity in common with hope of whole system? If desire is admitted, as Shand admits it, as which "has the eagerness of desire itself for the goal." In the development of impulse which is an experience the systematic Nevertheless it remains true that hope is not joy, for hope treatment of psychology is not destroyed. Shand himself looks forward to the future, and in so far as it is hope, is refuses to admit surprise and curiosity among emotions<sup>1</sup> and dissatisfied with the present. Joy, though it may and often does not deny that they are forces of character because they does result in looking to the future is always in some way are impulses which are organised by emotions. So desire is satisfied with the present. The object of hope must lie which is impulse with foresight of end is a force of character in the future; the object of joy must lie in the present, because it is organised by sentiments. Shand can be in the future or the past in imagination only.

Shand distinguishes between confidence in oneself It is clear at first sight that of the six as a general quality of character and confidence in the emotions which occur within the system of desire, only two accomplishment of a particular desire. The latter is an are in any way connected with the emotion of joy. These two emotion which he says is dangerous to the end of desire are hope and confidence.

because its effect is to relax effort. He also notices the Of hope, Shand says "Now Hope has not the essential danger of excessive confidence as a quality of character tendency of joy. That tendency we have already considered: though he quotes from philosophy and literature to show that it is directed to maintain the situation in which the joy is felt/

---

1. Op. cit. pp. 437, 441.

If the applicant is summoned to a second interview he may feel

felt. Such a tendency in the system of desire would arrest its progress and detain it at the stage at which the joy was felt; - if hope were joy. Hope, on the contrary, has the eagerness of desire itself, for the goal, because it belongs to desire." If heightened activity is the real end of joy, the connection between hope and joy is closer than Shand allows it to be. If joy spurs one on to "fresh woods and pastures new," it has this spurring to activity in common with hope which "has the eagerness of desire itself for the goal." Nevertheless it remains true that hope is not joy, for hope looks forward to the future, and in so far as it is hope, is dissatisfied with the present. Joy, though it may and often does result in looking to the future is always in some way satisfied with the present. The object of hope must lie in the future; the object of joy must lie in the present, and can be in the future or the past in imagination only. Shand distinguishes between confidence in oneself as a general quality of character and confidence in the accomplishment of a particular desire. The latter is an emotion which he says is dangerous to the end of desire because its effect is to relax effort. He also notices the danger of excessive confidence as a quality of character though he quotes from philosophy and literature to show that reasonably/

---

th. Op. cit. p. 470. to be the appointment to a certain post. If the applicant is summoned to a second interview he may feel

confident/

reasonably restrained confidence in oneself is a quality which confident that his desire is about to be accomplished. makes for success. It appears from Shand's remarks that He will then feel joy. He may waste time in anticipating confidence in oneself is not an emotion. It is a quality the pleasant life he imagines is now to be opened to him and of character arising from a habit of mind and is on a level so miss the train and ruin his chance of success. In this with courage, timidity, good and bad temper, placidity, case confidence has had the effect of defeating the end of impetuosity and many others. Confidence in the accomplishment of a particular desire is an emotion. From a consideration of the disastrous effect of carelessness may avert this and of Shand's own examples and many others which he does not hurry him to the station twenty minutes too early. Or it give, and from introspection Shand seems quite justified in may be that his joy in the prospect of success which must his remarks on the danger to the end of desire from the re-express itself in activity, does express itself in activity relaxation of effort in which confidence results. That confidence useful to the end in view. It does this in the case of a child who wants to put on her party frock directly after breakfast that she may be ready in good time for the desired were defeated through relaxation of effort following upon event. So experience and joy both outweigh the ill effects confidence. It may also be accounted for in another way, which might result from confidence. If joy were not essential it seems probable that the emotion of confidence usually, usually active this would not be true. if not always, causes the emotion of joy to arise. If the

It has already been noted that Shand apparently joy results in day-dreaming there is damage to the end of unconsciously uses desire to denote experience in writing desire as we have noticed before. But if the activity of the antagonism between desire and joy. But apart from the resulting from an experience of joy related to a desire ambiguity attaching to the term "desire" the antagonism within a sentiment is a special-activity towards the end of between desire and joy remains. If joy has for its end the desire this activity outweighs the relaxation due to lightening of activity the antagonism seems to disappear. confidence and the end is achieved. For instance suppose

But/  
the object of desire to be the appointment to a certain post.

If the applicant is summoned to a second interview he may feel

confident/



confident that his desire is about to be accomplished. He will then feel joy. He may waste time in anticipating the pleasant life he imagines is now to be opened to him and so miss the train and ruin his chance of success. In this case confidence has had the effect of defeating the end of desire as Shand says it tends to do. But previous experience of the disastrous effect of carelessness may avert this and hurry him to the station twenty minutes too early. Or it may be that his joy in the prospect of success which must express itself in activity, does express itself in activity useful to the end in view. It does this in the case of a child who wants to put on her party frock directly after breakfast that she may be ready in good time for the desired event. So experience and joy both outweigh the ill effects which might result from confidence. If joy were not essentially active this would not be true.

It has already been noted that Shand apparently unconsciously uses desire to denote experience in writing of the antagonism between desire and joy. But apart from the ambiguity attaching to the term "desire" the antagonism between desire and joy remains. If joy has for its end weightening of activity the antagonism seems to disappear.

joy we are contemplating a result in the present even though

But/

it/

it be in the imagination. All progress therefore arises from desire<sup>1</sup> and the implication is that progress arises from joy. It would be foolish to deny that we cannot at that moment experience joy. When we experience joy we cannot at that moment be conscious of a want. That we pass immediately to a state of activity as a result of the joy it is the whole purpose of this study to prove, but though desire may be one form of mental activity in which their lives are purposeless and ineffectual, joy may result, joy and desire cannot coexist at the same moment in the same mind.

In writing of the antagonism between desire and activity which has another end. So if there is a course of some activity we allow ourselves to wander along a bypath of mental play, we shall not arrive at our goal. However, the joy of attainment, and retrospect.

The joy of day-dreaming which is one form of the joy of anticipation is convicted by Shand of being as dangerous to desire as is the emotion of confidence, and for the same reason, that it relaxes effort. He quotes fables of which "exemplify the effect of day-dreaming or of the joy in imagining that our desire is fulfilled on the process of freshing and amuse us on to our tasks with added vigor or to derange its process so that we fail in attaining our end...

In Desire we are striving after a result in the future; in joy we are contemplating a result in the present even though

1. Op. cit. p. 510.

it be in the imagination. All progress therefore arises from the joy of the beauty of our immediate surroundings but from desire<sup>1</sup> and the implication is that no progress arises also in anticipation of the view we are going to see. To stay thus employed till darkness falls would defeat our end. It would be foolish to deny the truth of much of this. But the problem may appear in a clearer light if it is suggested that the joy of anticipation is mental play and tackling the rest of the hot, steep climb with freshened vigour of body due to the physical rest and of mind due to the physical life by children's games and adult recreations.

If children or adults spend too much time in play their lives are purposeless and ineffectual, and play must not be abused. Shand makes an important admission with regard to the joy of attainment. "The joy of attainment is a very evanescent emotion and soon gives place to new desires." It was said before that joy in play leads to activity for its own sake, and joy not in play leads to activity which has another end. So if in the course of some relation between the joy of attainment and the formation of new desires, we allow ourselves to wander along a bypath of mental play, we shall not arrive at our goal. Nevertheless the joy bear this interpretation. (Nos. 26, 30, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45)

Shand does not imply and probably would not admit a causal which expresses itself in day-dreaming expresses itself in a form of mental activity even if it is a mental activity which desires" unless desire is an experience, and on Shand's theory, an emotional experience. And even though the joy of anticipation is mental play, this play not carried to excess results in further activity, for it is recreative and refreshes the joy of retrospect. "Our desire is interrupted; we stop to look round and rejoice at the progress we have made. We take good heart from it and with renewed vigour start simple example of this may be taken from mountain-climbing. Half way up in our ascent we may rest and indulge not only in refreshment. Here a causal relation between the joy of the

anticipation is mental play, this play not carried to excess results in further activity, for it is recreative and refreshes the joy of retrospect. "Our desire is interrupted; we stop to look round and rejoice at the progress we have made. We take good heart from it and with renewed vigour start simple example of this may be taken from mountain-climbing. Half way up in our ascent we may rest and indulge not only in refreshment. Here a causal relation between the joy of the

1. Op. cit. p. 510. spect and the renewed vigour is clearly stated, and Shand himself/

1. Op. cit. p. 511. as an actual experience of joy. The joy of the experience of joy and the experience of hope

self had admitted that joy results in activity, will not allow the joy of the beauty of our immediate surroundings but also in anticipation of the view we are going to see. To a more superficial fact than the connection between them. stay thus employed till darkness falls would defeat our end. In the first chapter it was suggested that there are at least two ends of joy, viz. to reinforce an old and to embark on a new activity, and that both ends were connected with desire. Joy attends success or partial success in the progress towards the anticipation.

Shand makes an important admission with regard to desire. This becomes clear if attention is directed to the joy of attainment. "The joy of attainment is a very after effect of joy. But first two examples which seemed evanescent emotion and soon gives places to new desires." <sup>1</sup> incompatible with Shand's theory must be considered in the light of the above examination of Shand's treatment of relation between the joy of attainment and the formation of

new desires. But several of the examples quoted would bear this interpretation. (Nos. 26, 30, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45) Also it is difficult to see how joy can "give place to new desires" unless desire is an experience, and on Shand's theory, an emotional experience. <sup>1</sup>

He makes a similar admission also with regard to the joy of retrospect. "Our desire is interrupted; we stop to look round and rejoice at the progress we have made. We take good heart from it and with renewed vigour start afresh." Here a causal relation between the joy of retrospect and the renewed vigour is clearly stated, and Shand him-

self/  
l. Op. cit. p. 511. ion and no real experience at all. The gap between the experience of joy and the experience of hope



self has admitted that joy results in activity. will not allow it to be. The antagonism between joy and desire seems to be a more superficial fact than the connection between them. In the first chapter it was suggested that there are at least two ends of joy, viz. to reinforce an old and to embark on a new activity, and that both ends were connected with desire. Joy attends success or partial success in the progress towards the end of desire. Joy, however it arises, tends to awaken desire. This becomes clear if attention is directed to the after effect of joy. But first two examples which seemed incompatible with Shand's theory must be considered in the light of the above examination of Shand's treatment of the desire-joy connection between his theory of joy and the one offered here. Reference It was said in an earlier part of this study that examples 39 and 41 in particular could not be fitted into Shand's theory. Example 39 was from Wordsworth: "I've emotion and But speedily an earnest longing rose To brace myself to some determined aim." The emotion at the base of this state of longing we may suppose is hope. Shand would presumably not quarrel with an example of joy resulting hope. But in actual experience there is a gap. Wordsworth's account would lead us to suppose that joy caused desire to arise and in relation to the desire he experienced hope. But desire, according to Shand is an abstraction and no real experience at all. The gap between the experience of joy and the experience of hope

is unfilled according to Shand's theory for he will not allow it to be filled with an experience which is not an emotion, for instance with a desire which he does not admit as an emotion. According to our theory the joy resulted in a heightened feeling of activity, which activity seeking for expression conceived intellectually an object of desire. This object once ideally perceived can become the centre point of emotions but in the case here quoted joy resulted in an experience to which no emotional label allowed by Shand would apply. Exactly similar to this is example 41. It is this insistence of Shand's on colouring the whole map of human activity with some kind of emotion which accounts for the discrepancy between his theory of joy and the one offered here. Reference to Shand's theory of impulse shows the point of departure. He takes us up the scale of impulse, appetite and emotion. Impulse is undifferentiated, prospective emotion and is organised within emotions. Appetites though different from emotions come under the same universal heading "emotion" because they also are organised within sentiments, and they also when impeded become violent.<sup>1</sup> The difference between appetite and emotion seems to him not sufficiently important to justify the admission of appetite as a class of experience apart from and outside emotion. Appetites, he

1. Ibid. p. 28.

1. Op. cit. p. 458. *ogy*, 3rd Edition, Book IV Ch. 10.

3. Ibid. p. 704.

says/

says, are chiefly conative, are usually initiated within the application." <sup>1</sup> A higher development of ideational thought body and are regularly recurrent. Emotions are chiefly impulsive, are usually initiated outside the body and appear affective, are usually initiated outside the body and appear particular result. This ideational thought produces a higher irregularly. But appetites and emotions are in the same form of desire, of which the ends may be described as ideals, class. <sup>2</sup> Had Shand not been concerned to base all human activity on emotion, to make emotion the universal category, this development of desire is not divorced from emotion but may be independent of it. In so far as Stout treats desire as an impulse conscious of its end, he is in agreement with Shand, he might have allowed a conative development side by side with an affective development, starting from impulse, developing through appetite and finally into conscious willed action but in so far as cognition and conation which are not necessarily emotional, he has gone further than Shand could go. The field of Stout's psychology is wider than Shand's, and certain facts and experiences will be accounted for by Shand. Desire as a development of cognition is one of these facts. Stout gives different levels of conative development. <sup>2</sup> At the lowest stage in human life is perceptual impulse which includes instinctive impulse. "Its general characteristic is that the activity involved in it finds immediate expression in bodily movements guided by external impressions." <sup>3</sup> When we reach a level of development at which ideas are self sustaining, when prolonged or often repeated will tend to elicit conscious- there can be ideal representation of an end. "It is at this stage that the word 'desire' has its most appropriate application."/

1. Ibid. p. 28. sudden anger quickly passed may not have the  
2. Manual of Psychology, 3rd Edition, Book IV Ch.10.  
3. Ibid. p. 704.  
1. Ibid. p. 700.

application."1 A higher development of ideational thought to elicit desire. Anger hindered in achieving its end enbailes us to aim at a general rule of conduct instead of one becomes conscious of desire to achieve the end. Anger particular result. This ideational thought produces a higher directed frequently to the same object gives rise to a sustained form of desire, of which the ends may be described as ideals. This development of desire is not divorced from emotion but fear elicits no conscious desire. Fear hindered in achieving its end becomes conscious of a desire to escape. The memory as impulse conscious of its end, he is in agreement with Shand, of an experience of anger causes a recrudescence of the emotion, but in so far as cognition and conation which are not necessarily emotion cause development of ideals, he has gone further than Shand could go. The field of Stout's psychology is wider than Shand's, and certain facts and experiences will accord with Stout's general theory which cannot without forcing of some kind. An example of this will be examined in detail later and an attempt will be made to show that joy often is one of these facts.

related to the same object can give rise to a sustained desire, which may form the basis of a sentiment. Stout, in noticing experience which may be uncoloured by emotion, there would seem to be a close connection between emotion and desire. He says "The anger produced in a dog by taking away its bone presupposes the specific appetite for food." If emotion end. Every emotion has an impulse and an end. An emotion presupposes appetites and, as we have seen, also presupposes when prolonged or often repeated will tend to elicit conscious-impulse it seems reasonable to suppose that emotion also presupposes latent desire. The impulse under certain conditions conscious of its end is desire within emotion related to the end becomes desire, desire intimately connected with emotion. of emotion. A sudden anger quickly passed may not have time

1. Manual of Psychology, 3rd edition, p. 408.  
1. Ibid. p. 705.



This account of the relation between emotion and to elicit desire. Anger hindered in achieving its end becomes conscious of desire to achieve the end. Anger directed frequently to the same object gives rise to a sustained desire related to the end of the emotion. A momentary fear elicits no conscious desire. Fear hindered in achieving its end becomes conscious of a desire to escape. The memory of an experience of anger causes a recrudescence of the emotion. This desire may be new or a recrudescence of the desire experienced at the time. Joy at the time of experience may follow the laws given by Shand and attempt to keep the status quo, but the memory of the joy will probably elicit a desire of some kind. An example of this will be examined in detail later and an attempt will be made to show that joy often related to the same object can give rise to a sustained desire, which may <sup>or</sup> be the basis of a sentiment. Stout, in noticing the parasitic nature of emotion, relates emotion to desire. He says "The anger produced in a dog by taking away its bone presupposes the specific appetite for food." <sup>1</sup> If emotion presupposes appetites and, as we have seen, also presupposes impulse it seems reasonable to suppose that emotion also presupposes latent desire. The impulse under certain conditions becomes desire, desire intimately connected with emotion.

1. Groundwork of Psychology, 3rd edition, p. 408. This/

This account of the relation between emotion and desire will be of use in considering the after-effect of emotion. In seeking the special characteristic of an emotion the psychologist does only half his work if he observes the present and immediate tendency and does not examine the effect of the emotion on future behaviour. Shand gives no separate consideration to the after-effect of any emotion. This after-effect can be related to Stout's doctrine of psychological dispositions. Stout ~~shows~~ how a psychological disposition can be built up from one incident and that incident not necessarily one of emotional experience but it may be founded upon an accumulation of experiences. He says "Again, what are called in ordinary language friendship and enmity are acquired dispositions of a complex character rather than actual psychological processes. Friendship involves such actual psychological processes as being glad at a person's prosperity, grieved at his misfortune, rejoiced to meet him, sorry to part from him and so on. But these psychological states are merely partial and transient manifestations of the permanent friendly disposition."<sup>1</sup> Here is an instance of psychological disposition founded on many experiences. He also says "I recognise a man to-day because I met him yesterday although I may not have thought of him in the interval. This can only be because my experience/

1. Groundwork of Psychology, p. 7.

The explanation of a man's undue horror at

experience of yesterday has left behind an after-effect which at a lighted match dropping on to his coat may be that once he was badly burnt as a child. He may be a man who fears my present experience." <sup>1</sup> The disposition in this case is but slight, it is built up on one incident. A psychical disposition aspect of the after-effect of emotion Shand's theory is justified. If we have found joy in an object we tend to seek that object again at a later time. We reread favourite books, go to picture galleries to look again and again at certain favourite pictures, we revisit old holiday haunts or places of an acquaintance he could say "The thought of a man angers me because I was angry with him at our last meeting." The specific tendency of the emotion of anger is aggression and this tendency remains and is revived when the thought of the object of anger brings about a recrudescence of the emotion unless intervening emotional experiences have swamped and nullified the past anger. A man is angered one day by a colleague in his office. The next day he feels angry again when his opponent enters the room - before the opponent has had time to commit any further offence. The disposition to anger has persisted through the intervening hours; just as the memory of the acquaintance instances by Stout persisted, and the after-effect of the emotion has the same tendency as the emotion itself at the time of experience. It is the same with fear. Many cases could be quoted of one instance of fear breeding a disposition to fear with regard to one particular object. The explanation of a man's undue horror

Corresponding to Stout's instance of recognition of an acquaintance he could say "The thought of a man angers me because I was angry with him at our last meeting." The specific tendency of the emotion of anger is aggression and this tendency remains and is revived when the thought of the object of anger brings about a recrudescence of the emotion unless intervening emotional experiences have swamped and nullified the past anger. A man is angered one day by a colleague in his office. The next day he feels angry again when his opponent enters the room - before the opponent has had time to commit any further offence. The disposition to anger has persisted through the intervening hours; just as the memory of the acquaintance instances by Stout persisted, and the after-effect of the emotion has the same tendency as the emotion itself at the time of experience. It is the same with fear. Many cases could be quoted of one instance of fear breeding a disposition to fear with regard to one particular object. The explanation of a man's undue horror

---

1. Ibid.

at a lighted match dropping on to his coat may be that once he was badly burnt as a child. He may be a man who fears nothing but fire. The case is the same with joy and in this aspect of the after-effect of emotion Shand's theory is justified. If we have found joy in an object we tend to seek that object again at a later time. We reread favourite books, go to picture galleries to look again and again at certain favourite pictures, we revisit old holiday haunts or places where we have lived in happiness. In Shand's language we tend to preserve the relation between ourselves and the objects of joy. If anger does further suggest the possibility of friendly But this is not all. If we lose sight of the real tendency of joy which is here claimed to be a heightening of activity we shall be at least to account for the action of joy in building the stronger and more permanent psychical dispositions. This will be made clearer by appealing as before to anger and fear. The instance of a man being angry with a colleague on one occasion is not a case of the building of a permanent disposition to anger. To be constantly angry with the same person builds up in us a permanent disposition to anger with regard to that one person and to be made constantly angry by different persons and in different circumstances builds up in us a permanent disposition of bad temper which is liable to be exhibited towards any person and in any circumstances./



The after-effect of fear has the same tendency as circumstances. We all know cases of many small annoyances the immediate experience of the emotion. The tendency of endured silently, breaking at last into an explosion of anger fear is to escape. After many experiences of fear a child more fierce than is warranted by the particular occasion of or animal accustomed to ill treatment goes about with oringing, its outburst. Someone fails to keep an appointment or to shlinking movements, starts at noises and is at any moment post a letter and our anger bursts into a flame though the ready to flee or to ward off attack. The psychological disposi- same offence committed by someone else who is very seldom in- tion to fear has grown so strong as to alter the whole charac- considerate or careless would be easily forgiven. So the ter. In the case of a human being the effect is not confined after-effect of anger has the same aggressive tendency as the to physical movements.

emotion at the time of its experience. There will be a ten- dency to angry speech, possibly to unfriendly acts, and every we ought to find the conservative forced at work in the after- experience of anger does further injury to the possibility of effect of joy. But a person who has had emotion-at-the so friendly relation between subject and object. The after- many experiences of joy that the after effect of joy has built effect of anger tends to build up a disposition to anger with up a psychological disposition almost equivalent to temperament one person or with a particular class of persons, or if our is not usually a person of particular conservative habits. experience is unfortunate and our self control weak, with any Shand's theory does not account for certain instances which person. This is the origin of many of the prejudiced state- can be found in which the disposition remaining after even ments we hear. Psychological disposition to anger causes us to one experience is a disposition to activity. Such an example generalise unreasonably. "Just like the British workman." is given by Wordsworth who tells us in the *Preludes* (V 460-490) "Just like the idle rich." "Just like a Jew," are resentful of his joy in discovering the Arabian Nights. But only one remarks constantly heard based on a few instances of anger volume was in his possession. The joy in this discovery was against individuals.

not confined to reading and rereading the one volume. The Le Bourru Bienfaisant, the hero of Goldoni's after-effect of joy led the boy and his friends to plan to save comedy gives an excellent example of a man who had a permanent their pocket money to buy the other three volumes. That the disposition to anger.

The after-effect of fear has the same tendency as the immediate experience of the emotion. The tendency of fear is to escape. After many experiences of fear a child or animal accustomed to ill treatment goes about with cringing, shrinking movements, starts at noises and is at any moment ready to flee or to ward off attack. The psychological disposition to fear has grown so strong as to alter the whole character. In the case of a human being the effect is not confined to physical movements, clearly a weakening of activity,

If Shand's theory of joy were entirely satisfactory we ought to find the conservative force at work in the after-effect of joy. But a person who has had ecstatic-at-the-so many experiences of joy that the after effect of joy has built up a psychological disposition almost equivalent to temperament is not usually a person of particularly conservative habits. Shand's theory does not account for certain instances which can be found in which the disposition remaining after even one experience is a disposition to activity. Such an example is given by Wordsworth who tells us in the Prelude (V 460-490) of his joy in discovering the Arabian Nights. But only one volume was in his possession. The joy in this discovery was not confined to reading and rereading the one volume. The after-effect of joy led the boy and his friends to plan to save their pocket money to buy the other three volumes. That the

spur to new endeavour. The poem ends  
Come friend! We travel on  
(That one brief vision gone)  
Bravely, like men who see beyond the skies. plan/

The last three examples show the building of a plan was not actually carried into effect does not affect the psychical disposition to activity and increased heightening of theory.

70

A passage in Wordsworth's Excursion (IV 112-138) large part is a man of greater activity, greater readiness describes the poet's youthful joy in nature. for new and heightened experiences than is a man whose character is by the sense of ..... then, my spirit was entranced  
With joy exalted to beatitude;  
The measure of my soul was filled with bliss,  
And holiest love; seas, earth, sea, air, with light,  
With pomp, with glory, with magnificence.

supports this theory of the after-effect of the emotion. Then the after effect is clearly a heightening of activity, He says "When enjoying a game, we tend to continue playing not merely an attempt to get back the status quo.

the same game: for the game is the object." This is true. Those fervent raptures are for ever flown;  
But it is also true that boy ..... in one game or  
Yet cease I not to struggle and aspire  
one Heavenward exercise is more likely to try his abilities in

71

another In Prelude II (302-328) he describes a storm in the mountain and his joy in it. dancing joy in his exercise is both to And deem not profitless these fleeting moods  
Of shadowy exultation.....

likely to go to the winter sports in the soul and where he Remembering how she felt .....  
will be introduced retains an obscure sense exercise than is  
Of possible sublimity whereto  
With growing faculties she doth aspire, activities is  
With faculties still growing, feeling still  
That whatsoever point they gain; they yet, for skaters  
Have something to pursue.

admit that they are never satisfied with what they can Here clearly the after-effect of joy is a heightening of already do, but are continually trying new figures and activity.

72

new forms of the activity. That old joys tend to lead us James Elroy Flecker's Dulce Lumen describes joy and to new ones strengthens and supports the theory that the the passing of joy and finally the lasting effect of joy as a special tendency of joy is a heightening of felt activity. spur to new endeavour. The poem ends

Come friend! We travel on  
(That one brief vision gone)  
Bravely, like men who see beyond the skies.

The last three examples show the building of a  
Were Shand's theory of the status quo the fundamental explana-  
psychical disposition to activity and increased heightening of  
tion of joy, we should surely tend only to repeat one joyous  
felt experience. The man in whose character joy plays a  
experience and should not go exploring. If one book gives  
large part is a man of greater activity, greater readiness  
us joy we not only reread it but also tend to read other  
for new and heightened experience than is a man whose char-  
books by the same author. A student who finds joy in master-  
acter is dominated by some other emotion.

ing one language not only wishes to deepen his knowledge of  
Reference to some of Shand's examples of joy  
the same language but also is pleased if occasion offers for  
supports this theory of the after-effect of the emotion.  
him to learn another. To see one beautiful place makes us  
He says "When enjoying a game, we tend to continue playing  
long not only to revisit it but to see other beautiful places  
the same game: for the game is the object." This is true.  
too; These tendencies can surely not be denied. Shand's  
But it is also true that a boy who finds joy in one game or  
theory of joy does not explain them: the theory advocated  
one form of exercise is more likely to try his abilities in  
here does explain them. Joy heightens the feeling of  
another than is a boy who never takes any exercise if he can  
activity. The circumstances of our life in conjunction with  
avoid it. A skater experiencing joy in his exercise is loth  
our will determine the directions the heightened activity  
to stop. A man who has experienced joy in skating is more  
shall take.  
likely to go to the winter sports in Switzerland where he  
will be introduced to many other forms of exercise than is  
if the theory of joy and activity is true it should  
a man whose hatred of winter and all its activities is  
follow that joy is the most potent emotional factor in the  
implacable. Skating is a fortunate example, for skaters  
formation of sentiments and in fact a consideration of the  
admit that they are never satisfied with what they can  
building of sentiments does lead to this conclusion. We do  
already do, but are continually trying new figures and  
Of the four primary emotions it was said in the last chapter  
new forms of the activity. That old joys tend to lead us  
that fear and sorrow do not and anger and joy do heighten the  
to new ones strengthens and supports the theory that the  
feeling/  
special tendency of joy is a heightening of felt activity.



feeling of activity. Of anger and joy it was said that the  
were Shand's theory of the status quo the fundamental explana-  
tion of joy, we should surely tend only to repeat one joyous  
experience and should not go exploring. If one book gives  
us joy we not only reread it but also tend to read other  
books by the same author. A student who finds joy in master-  
ing one language not only wishes to deepen his knowledge of  
the same language but also is pleased if occasion offers for  
him to learn another. To see one beautiful place makes us  
long not only to revisit it but to see other beautiful places  
too; these tendencies can surely not be denied. Shand's  
theory of joy does not explain them: the theory advocated  
here does explain them. Joy heightens the feeling of  
activity. These circumstances of our life in conjunction with  
ours will determine the directions the heightened activity  
shall take. In chapter he says "But notwithstanding the  
great part which our desires play in making our characters  
what they are if the theory of joy and activity is true it should  
follow that joy is the most potent emotional factor in the  
formation of sentiments and in fact a consideration of the  
building of sentiments does lead to this conclusion. Of the  
four primary emotions it was said in the last chapter  
that fear and sorrow do not and anger and joy do heighten the

1. Ladd. Op. cit. p. 2.

2. Shand. Op. cit. p. 519.

3. Op. cit. p. 518.

feeling of activity. Of anger and joy it was said that the heightening of activity experienced in anger has a destructive tendency and that experienced in joy has a preservative or constructive tendency. In Chapter IV he takes us at a leap to "The formation of sentiments" is intimately connected with the experience of desire. Ladd writing of "desire" says "The very individuality of every individual consists largely in the character and number of his dominant or subordinate desire."<sup>1</sup> Shand on the other hand says "We cannot take desire as the base of a scientific study of character."<sup>2</sup> The purpose of the whole of Shand's book apparently is to show the importance for character of the sentiments and their formation. Yet he allows desire no part in their formation. He derives desire from emotions and from sentiments, desire cannot be for him any part of the origin of a sentiment. In his concluding chapter he says "But notwithstanding the great part which our desires play in making our characters what they are known to be, yet they are never independent forces: they spring originally from our primary emotions and impulses and have a second and most prolific source in our sentiments."<sup>3</sup> If Shand had given as much consideration to the after-effect of the emotions as he has to their immediate tendencies perhaps he would have felt obliged to give desire

1. Ladd. Op. cit. p. 2.

2. Shand. Op. cit. p. 519.

3. Op. cit. p. 518. cry of "Well, I'll take all his soldiers and throw them away." An example of this in adult life can be

a place in the formation of sentiments. In Book I Chapter II he puts points out the existence of the law of organisation. In Chapter III he shows how emotions organise instincts and impulses to serve their ends. In Chapter IV he takes us at a leap to a higher stage and shows how sentiments organise emotions and their systems to serve the ends of sentiments. But he does not show us the development of a sentiment in character. He presents us with ready formed sentiments and breaks them up into their elements. We must attempt to show the building of a sentiment with the object of showing the importance of the after-effect of emotion and the place of desire. Reference has been made to Shand's account of the interaction of emotions within a sentiment. It seems that this interaction is what causes the consciousness of a sentiment to develop. Shand however does not relate this interaction to the consciousness of desire. Yet an examination of examples seems to show that the inter/interaction of emotions causes impulse to become conscious of its end.

Let us suppose that one child takes a toy from another. The aggrieved child strikes out but misses his aim. So far the action belongs to the emotion of anger which uses the instinct of pugnacity. But if the mother seizes the angry child to restrain him, he becomes more angry and conscious of desire for his childish revenge. He may express this in a tearful cry of "Well, I'll take all his soldiers and throw them away." An example of this in adult life can be

found in the passionate desire of exploration and adventure. In the 19th Century for revenge upon their Austrian oppressors. Their inability to sweep give effective expression to their anger made them more deeply conscious of their desire to do so and strengthened their desire for freedom which desire was the basis of their anger. If a child be interrupted in some absorbing pursuit he becomes angry; if taken right away from it he shows signs of sorrow, expressed in tears or pleading. Whereas five minutes earlier he was enjoying the making of a fort without knowing that he wanted to make it, the desire is now clear to his own mind and desire has arisen from the interaction of emotions. Examples from childhood may show the interaction between the emotions and the birth of desire but little children are not capable of ideas sufficiently deep or sustained for the formation of sentiments. on an allied subject, e.g. that of foreign travel. This way Let us suppose then a boy finds joy in reading a book of adventure. His joy results in his desiring to read more books of the same kind. As he fills his mind with images and fancies of foreign places he lays the foundation for a sentiment for travel. If he is taken abroad on a holiday and finds joy in the experience this joy links itself on to his previous joy in reading books of travel and has as its own result a desire for further travel. When he becomes a bank clerk in his own town \* slightly different comes/  
case/



comes home he reads more books of exploration and adventure. The interaction of emotions could be easily seen in such a case. The boy deep in a book of adventure is angry when called away from it by a summons to school work or the visit of one of his mother's friends. If he reads persistently late at nights and is punished by being deprived of his book he experiences first anger and then sorrow, sorrow when he sees no hope of getting his book back for a considerable time. If he is reading at a forbidden hour he feels fear at an approaching footstep. These many experiences make him very clearly conscious of his desire to read a certain book or books of a certain class. Once the desire is clear to him he is liable to experience all the emotions of the system of desire. The numerous experiences bound up with the reading of books of imaginary adventure may cause the boy to desire to read books on an allied subject, e.g. that of foreign travel. This may help to build up in him a sentiment for travel or more particularly for exploration. The subconscious working of all this experience in his mind may have an important effect on his career. If he is free to choose, he will probably choose some work abroad unless there is within him some stronger sentiment which conflicts with that under consideration. Had the books and his holidays abroad not given him joy and the desire for such a life, he might have become a bank clerk in his own town. A slightly different

Love/  
case/

case of a sentiment being formed from joy may now be examined. A woman whose emotions are usually particularly strong once quoted to me Rossetti's lines:-

She had three lilies in her hand  
And the stars in her hair were seven

"When I first met that" she said to me "I was drunk with the joy of it for days afterwards." Here is an experience of

joy, sudden and unexpected. The emotion worked at first in Shand's way - it caused her to keep herself in constant rela-

tion to the object of joy; she went about for days repeating those lines and enjoying them again and again. I asked her

recently to tell me more of this experience. Her reply bears out the present theory "It was a moment of intense experience.

The lines lived in me." In psychological language this was an experience of heightened feeling of activity. The after-

effect of the emotion bears this out. The subject of the experience hastened to read all Rossetti's poems and to

commit the one containing those lines to memory. The after-effect of the emotion was to sustain the heightening of activ-

ity which expended itself along the lines of the current interest. It caused desire to arise for further knowledge of

the object and it ended in forming a sentiment of love for Rossetti as a poet. The work of joy was twofold, it caused

a strengthening of an old activity and an embarkation on a new.

The words "old" and "new" have only relative significance.

Love of poetry was an old sentiment in this subject and reading poetry an old activity. The exploration of Rossetti's poem was a new activity within the old sentiment and is only new in the sense that this particular poem had not been read before. Joy did not in this case form a sentiment of love for poetry. It strengthened that sentiment as a whole and enlarged it by the addition of new and correlate experience. When it is claimed for joy that it can form new sentiments the term "new" is always relative. All our experience can be related in some way to previous experience. But if Shand's theory of joy were adequate it is difficult to see in the case just quoted why the subject was not satisfied with those particular lines which caused the joy, or at most with the whole poem in which they occur. Joy caused activity which was not confined to repetition of experience. Mere repetition of experience could only strengthen, not form, a sentiment. a sequence of

emotions. If joy did not result in activity it would be difficult to account for the instances in which joy passes over into gratitude. Such an instance is found in Naaman who on recovering from leprosy offers presents to Elisha.<sup>1</sup> The object of Naaman's joy was his recovered health. From the nature of the case this object was constantly with him and we may suppose he took care to keep himself in health in the/

---

1. I Kings V. his sentiments. He says farther that joy influences/



fluency the stability of sentiments. Joy in the object the future. But Shand's theory does not seem to account for involves a sentiment for that object. Joy in everything an instance such as this. It is clear that Naaman was full leaves choice of sentiments open. Joy often makes the first of mental activity as a result of his joy and he attempted to connection between the object of Love and the sentiment of Love express that activity in offering presents. The joy in his His next statement is very important for our theory. Joy health was transferred to joy in the giver of his health. rouses a wave of emotion which awakens the whole system to The joy was transformed into love for the giver and a desire activity and connects it with a particular object. Here his to express his love in action. ~~The desire to express his~~ Joy results, if not immediately, at any rate later in activity ~~love in action.~~ The desire to express love because of gifts activity is shown to be an important result of Joy. He states received is gratitude. In this case joy built up a sentiment as a law (22) that sensibility to Joy makes the sentiment of of love for Elisha the prophet and the God whom he served. Love unstable, and more generally (23) that sensibility to Jewish history is full of incidents of this kind. The Joy produces instability of sentiments.<sup>2</sup> But he admits that relation between joy and gratitude is shown many times in the the error of the popular doctrine of the sanguine temperament exhortations of Moses and David who unstill in the minds of the was to attribute instability too widely. people the love of God Who led them through the wilderness and delivered them from their enemies. A true account of in connection with the present theory. The present theory Naaman's experience seems to be that it was a sequence of would seem to establish such a connection more readily than emotional experiences, joy in his health, love for the giver, Shand's. For according to Shand Joy is a conservative force, gratitude to the giver. All three summed up are found to be and a conservative force which tends to keep the status quo a sentiment of love of which joy was the starting point. should less easily result in instability than a force which tends to heighten activity. If a broad sensibility to Joy sentiments attention must also be given to Shand's doctrine really does result in instability of sentiments and therefore of temperament. Shand points out that the kind of joy of instability of character the usefulness of Joy in character a man is very important in his character because it indicates

1. Ibid. p. 158.

2. The line of his sentiments.<sup>1</sup> He says farther that Joy influences/

1. Op. cit. p. 157.



fluences the stability of sentiments. Joy in the object will be hard to defend. Shand traces the connection by involving a sentiment for that object. Joy in everything pointing out that sensibility to Joy raises the threshold of leaves choice of sentiments open. Joy often makes the first sensibility to sorrow, despondency and despair and lowers it connection between the object of Love and the sentiment of Love. to Joy, hope and confidence (law 17).<sup>1</sup> Broad sensibility His next statement is very important for our theory. Joy to Joy then results in experience of Joy from so many objects rouses a wave of emotion which awakens the whole system to that constancy or stability becomes impossible. Constancy activity and connects it with a particular object.<sup>1</sup> Here or stability might be said to become equally impossible on Joy results, if not immediately, at any rate later, in activity - the theory of heightened activity, for broad sensibility to Joy activity is shown to be an important result of Joy. He states would tend to lead us along so many paths of activity accord- as a law (22) that sensibility to Joy makes the sentiment of ing to the varying experiences of Joy that it would be impos- Love unstable, and more generally (23) that sensibility to ible to follow any one with sufficient constancy to gain any Joy produces instability of sentiments.<sup>2</sup> But he admits that appreciable result. Broad sensibility to Joy would lead us the error of the popular doctrine of the sanguine temperament to be Jacks of all trades and masters of none. If the connec- was to attribute instability too widely.

tion between Joy and instability of character can be estab-  
The laws concerning Joy and instability are important  
lished on either theory of Joy we might suppose that Joy is  
in connection with the present theory. The present theory  
a dangerous and disadvantageous element in character. But  
would seem to establish such a connection more readily than  
this conclusion is directly opposed to the ordinary opinion  
Shand's. For according to Shand Joy is a conservative force,  
on the subject and the stern moralists who oppose joy do so  
and a conservative force which tends to keep the status quo  
probably on other grounds. Let it be granted that joy does  
should less easily result in instability than a force which  
tend to the formation of many sentiments. Is it necessarily  
tends to heighten activity. If a broad sensibility to Joy  
true that a man of many sentiments is a man of unstable char-  
really does result in instability of sentiments and therefore  
super? Rather is it true that such a man is attaining fulness  
instability of character, the usefulness of Joy in character  
of life. The question of instability leads to the will/ion

1. Ibid. p. 158.

2. Ibid. p. 162.

in even the simplest natures there is constant  
conflict between sentiments, constant need for choice. The  
power/

will be hard to defend. Shand traces the connection by pointing out that sensibility to Joy raises the threshold of sensibility to sorrow, despondency and despair and lowers it to joy, hope and confidence (law 17).<sup>1</sup> Broad sensibility to Joy then results in experience of Joy from so many objects that constancy or stability becomes impossible. Constancy or stability might be said to become equally impossible on the theory of heightened activity, for broad sensibility to Joy would tend to lead us along so many paths of activity according to the varying experiences of Joy that it would be impossible to follow any one with sufficient constancy to gain any appreciable result. Broad sensibility to Joy would lead us to be Jacks of all trades and masters of none. If the connection between Joy and instability of character can be established on either theory of Joy, we might suppose that Joy is a dangerous and disadvantageous element in character. But this conclusion is directly opposed to the ordinary opinion on the subject and the stern moralists who oppose joy do so probably on other grounds. Let it be granted that joy does tend to the formation of many sentiments. Is it necessarily true that a man of many sentiments is a man of unstable character? Rather is it true that such a man is attaining fulness of life. The question of instability leads to the question of choice. In even the simplest natures there is constant conflict between sentiments, constant need for choice. The power/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 154.

include joy. Eyes Hate has its distorted joy. The conflict between sentiments is often, though not always, the conflict between joy. Now if it is as it certainly seems to be, that a broad sensibility leads to the formation of many sentiments, it may also be true that this broad sensibility to joy, which excludes tendencies to instability of sentiment, is the stability of a sensibility to joy but to the strength of conscience which directs the will and the power to make clear-sighted decisions. Shand states definitely that he does not intend to give an account of conscience. However it is clear from his remarks about it that it is a factor in character superior to the sentiment. Every sentiment has its own particular conscience derived from the special duties of the sentiment. Superior to this is the "Conscience." Shand notes the difference when he says the relative ethics of a certain class of sentiments which have been studying in the chapter must be distinguished from the general ethics of the Conscience. For while the former is inevitably partial to the particular object, the latter unites among all sentiments, is not possessed by any particular object, is not urged to partiality on that account. How ever narrow and unenlightened, however hardened by a great grief, however unyielding, however ungenerous, however

power to make clear decisions, to estimate value determines the question of instability. This power is a quality of character similar to courage, cowardice, good and bad temper and others instanced by Shand. Shand tells us that will is conation acting with foresight.<sup>1</sup> Ideals of sentiments are conceived from qualities found in sentiments.<sup>2</sup> Ideals create duties. The qualities of a sentiment when possessed are virtues, when aspired to are ideals and when commanded, are duties. In connection with the duties of a sentiment conscience arises. When action conflicts with the end of a sentiment the ideas of duty are called forth. These ideas of duty arouse the will to action. Presumably they do this by arousing the conscience which determines the will to a certain line of action. Shand definitely states that he does not intend in the Foundations of Character to examine the relation between the ethics of a sentiment and the conscience. But in conflict between sentiments it seems that conscience is at work though sometimes blindly and sometimes unsuccessfully. Now we must return to the question of conflict of sentiments. It seems true that every sentiment not only has the power of organising emotions to serve its end but also that every sentiment does include joy in its system. It seems impossible to imagine a sentiment which could not

include/

<sup>1</sup> 2. Op. cit. p. 102.

<sup>2</sup> 3. Ibid. p. 113.



include joy. Even Hate has its distorted joy. The conflict between sentiments is often, though not always the conflict between joys. Now if it is <sup>true</sup> ~~true~~, as it certainly seems to be, that a broad sensibility to Joy leads to the formation of many sentiments, it may also be true that this broad sensibility to Joy, other facts excluded, tends to instability of character. But the stability or instability must not be attributed to the width or narrowness of a sensibility to Joy, but to the strength of conscience which directs the will and the power to make clear-sighted decisions. Shand states definitely that he does not intend to give an account of conscience. However it is clear from his remarks about it that it is a factor in character superior to the sentiments. Every 2 sentiment has its own particular conscience arising from the special duties of the sentiment.<sup>1</sup> Superior to this is "the Conscience." Shand notes the difference when he says "the relative ethics of a certain class of sentiments which we have been studying in this chapter must be distinguished from the general ethics of the Conscience. For while the former is inevitably partial to its particular object, the latter, unique among all sentiments in not possessing any private object, is not urged to partiality on that account. However narrow and unenlightened, however hardened by a man's vices, or rendered sensitive through his goodness and virtues,

1. Op. cit. p. 114.



when it acts, it acts, within its purview, without prejudice. And as it has not private object, so has it no private end; its end being to superintend and regulate other systems, to encourage some, to forbid others, to temper all, to disapprove or disapprove of their actions." <sup>1</sup> Whether conscience be one sentiment among many which may be found in men, or sentiment of superior strength found in every man, or a quality of character superior to all sentiment, need not be decided here. That Shand remarks of conscience that it has no private end points to conscience being something other than and superior to sentiment, ~~and~~ quality which may be strengthened by the sentiment mentioned by Shand of "respect for conscience" which, he tells us is "very imperfectly developed in most men." <sup>2</sup> However it remains true that stability or instability of sentiments depends not on the breadth of sensibility to Joy but on the strength of conscience and the power of making clear-sighted decisions. Of two men of broad sensibility to joy, one may be unstable and the other constant. The latter though possessing many sentiments does not allow his activity to be ineffectual. He chooses clearly and abides by his choice. Children as they develop new powers and meet with new experiences are constantly experiencing new joys and forming new interests. Many wise remarks are made by adults on the evanescence of the passing/

1. Op. cit., p. 119. the subject has developed himself a

2. Ibid. p. 58.

of clear-sighted choice, he makes ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> main ~~business/~~

passing craze," and growing boys and girls are often reproved for so frequently changing their interests and doing nothing thoroughly. This is because they young are full of new joys which they want to explore and because they have not made choice among their sentiments. This is a natural phase in the development of youth. If it lasts into adult years when we expect firm purpose and constant behaviour, the offenders are described as "rolling stones." Francis Thompson's father waited very patiently for his son to "settle down" but tried to build up in that son at least two sentiments which the poet could not develop in himself. Throughout life there is constant conflict and competition between sentiments but in late adolescence this conflict and competition is most frequent and most violent. A fellow student of mine, than aged twenty, expressed this clearly enough. "I should like to be like a cat," she said "and have nine lives. I should spend them in being a doctor, an artist, a musician (I should have a glorious voice), a gipsy, a mother with a very large family, a great traveller, a scientist and I should discover something, and then there would be plenty left to do with the other lives. And there isn't time for everything in one life." As a new sentiment round some other object there must be a broad sensibility to joy works out in adult life in two ways. If the subject has developed within himself a power of clear-sighted choice, he makes one sentiment the main business/

Odette in *Tu n'est plus rien*, quoted in the first chapter. business of his life, the many others fit in to his leisure Shand tells us (law 77) that sorrow destroys the value of hours as circumstances may permit. If he has not developed objects of other sentiments and we know that when the object of this power he lives as an undeveloped child, following the of one sentiment is injured or destroyed our interests i.e. impulse or desire or emotion which possesses him at the our tendency to joy, in other objects is diminished. But moment, and of him it may well be said "Unstable as water thou if the sentiment which has been withdrawn is not the only one, shalt not excel." Both may find great joy in life but the the subject has something left to give him a certain mental. former will be a man whose life is of much greater use in his support, something to distract his attention and fill his days generation than that of the other. not too inadequately. So a man whose wife has died goes

There would seem then to be a distinct advantage travelling. He encourages the further development of in having a broad sensibility to Joy. If a man finds joy in another sentiment to fill the gap however badly. A man one object alone he is a man of one sentiment; a very rare of many sentiments in such a case is less unfortunate than a phenomenon. If circumstances permit him to spend all his man who has lost his one and only source of joy. thinking life on this one object he will have much joy. A

The conclusion of this argument is twofold. There doctor with high enthusiasm for his science may be so busy is no real connection between a broad sensibility to joy and that there is no time left for pursuing any other sentiment stability of character either on Shand's theory or this. however many he might possess. But a man who finds joy in Stability of character may or may not exist with or without outdoor life alone and is yet forced to spend all his working a broad sensibility to joy.

time in an office or factory will have little joy if he can

A broad sensibility to joy causes the formation find none in the work he is bound to do. Again if the of many sentiments. This gives fulness of life, a richer object of the single sentiment is withdrawn the subject has content of experience which must be an advantage to those who nothing on which he can fall back and even if at a later love life.

time he builds a new sentiment round some other object there

This study may be brought to a close by a brief must be a gap of desolation. This happened to Silas consideration of the relation between Happiness and the Marnier when his gold was stolen. It happened also to l. Op. cit. p. 352.

Odette/

Odette in *Tu n'est plus rien*, quoted in the first chapter. An attempt was made in the second chapter to establish the use of the objects of other sentiments<sup>1</sup> and we know that when the object of one sentiment is injured or destroyed our interests i.e. our tendency to joy, in other objects is diminished. But if the sentiment which has been withdrawn is not the only one, the subject has something left to give him a certain mental support, something to distract his attention and fill his days not too inadequately. So a man whose wife has died goes travelling. He encourages the further development of another sentiment to fill the gap however badly. A man of many sentiments in such a case is less unfortunate than a man who has lost his one and only source of joy.

The conclusion of this argument is twofold. There is no real connection between a broad sensibility to joy and stability of character either on Shand's theory or this. Stability of character may or may not exist with or without a broad sensibility to joy.

A broad sensibility to joy causes the formation of many sentiments. This gives fulness of life, a richer content of experience which must be an advantage to those who love life.

This study may be brought to a close by a brief consideration of the relation between Happiness and the

1. Op. cit. p. 352.



sentiments. An attempt was made in the second chapter to establish the use of the term Happiness to denote a condition of mind relatively permanent and the difference between this and the experience of the emotion of joy and the abstraction of the feeling tone of pleasure was there shown. Shand gives a list of the sentiments most commonly found among men. Having overthrown the theory that love and hate are emotions and placed them among the sentiments, he puts self-love or the self-regarding sentiment as pre-eminent. It may include "not merely emotions but even sentiments - as pride and vanity, avarice or the love of riches, sensuality or the love of sensual pleasures; of these the self-love of any particular man probably contains several."<sup>1</sup> He next mentions disinterested sentiments - "conjugal and parental love, filial affection, friendship, the sentiment for some game or sport.... patriotism and the love for life in some science or art." Then he remarks on the sentiment of "respect for conscience," which, he says, is "very imperfectly developed in most men." Finally he speaks of the sentiments of self-respect and respect for others, but does not explain what difference there is between the sentiments of self-love and self-respect. In ordinary speech these are some of the interests a man may have. The term "sentiment" is/

---

1. Op. cit. p. 57. in all the strata he is happy indeed.

The lowest stratum is the most important. A man may have is better adapted to psychological use as presenting less all that fortune can give him, all, it may be said that any ambiguity. "Interest" may be equivalent to "sentiment," man can desire, wealth, health, success, loyal friends, a but it may also be a minor factor within a sentiment, as a deserved self-approval, and yet if he finds no order in the man's interest in the stamps which he collects to add to universe as known to him, or an order and scheme to which he his boy's collection. The suggested definition of happiness is antagonistic, he must be described as an unhappy man. demands that we should consider for a moment the interests This description of the layers of interest is a man may have, interests in the popular use of the word. neither complete nor accurate. There are many people whose Among them we shall be able to distinguish those which are lives are so full of interest that they would insert more sentiments, and the definition of happiness as a condition interests among those here set forth. Others would not of harmony within the field of interest will be farther explain- own to as many as are given here. Others again would ed and perhaps justified. object to the order of arrangement of the strata. Not Comparatively few men consciously set their what has been said will serve well enough for illustration. happiness in one object and one alone, whether that object. Among the interests of the imaginary man given as an example be God or gold. Most men depend for their happiness on it is necessary to enquire which are sentiments and which several things. Their interests are in layers. If not are merely subsidiary interests. Interest in the immediate pressed too far a metaphor from geology is useful. Life is environment is surely subsidiary. It is probably a subsid- found in strata. The top stratum is that of the immediate lary interest within the self-regarding sentiment. It environment and affairs of the moment. Below come more might be subsidiary within the sentiment for work - an lasting interests, hobbies, acquaintances. Lower still are artist must have a north light, a munition worker must friends and the work of one's life and hopes for the future. live where a very early breakfast is possible. But Lower still is a man's idea of himself, his self-respect. interest in the immediate environment cannot be a sentiment. Lowest of all is the private metaphysic of a man, his philoso- Interest in acquaintances for whom there is felt no affection phy and religious belief, his theory of why and wherefore. but indifference or merely a slightly friendly feeling is not If a man is happy in all the strata he is happy indeed. a sentiment. This interest is difficult to place. It does not fit into any sentiment. But in neither The/ night/

The lowest stratum is the most important. A man may have might be argued that to apply the term "interest" to an all that fortune can give him, all, it may be said that any acquaintances for whom one feels mere indifference, i.e. with man can desire, wealth, health, success, loyal friends, a regard to whom one has no feeling at all is to make a contra-deserved self-approval, and yet if he finds no order in the diction in terms. Yet if a man hears that a rare acquaintance universe as known to him, or an order and scheme to which he once has won the military cross, he is "interested." He is is antagonistic, he must be described as an unhappy man. probably conscious of feeling pleased. In many cases the

This description of the layers of interest is interest would be correctly placed within the sentiment of self neither complete nor accurate. There are many people whose love. The man who hears the news backs in the reflected lives are so full of interest that they would insert more glory of the distinction. He tells everyone he meets. interests among those here set forth. Others would not "Did you see X has won the military cross? I knew him slightly, own to as many as are given here. Others again would years ago." The point of the story lies in the latter sent-object to the order of arrangement of the strata. But since which some would tender "I knew him well" unconsciously what has been said will serve well enough for illustration. trying to bring the fact into closer relation to the self. Among the interests of the imaginary man given as an example This might also explain the interest if the acquaintance has it is necessary to enquire which are sentiments and which merely died in the ordinary unromantic way. Still the men are merely subsidiary interests. Interest in the immediate is "interested" in the news as something affecting himself. environment is surely subsidiary. It is probably a subsid- Perhaps the fact serves as an unpleasant reminder that the iary interest within the self-regarding sentiment. It final hour awaits the hearer also and his train of thought might be subsidiary within the sentiment for work - an would be "X dead? How time flies! And I'm getting no artist must have a north light, a munition worker must younger." But the interest in acquaintances is often sub-live where a very early breakfast is possible. But iary to the sentiment which Spand calls "respect for interest in the immediate environment cannot be a sentiment. others." A man in whom this interest is strong will rejoice Interest in acquaintances for whom there is felt no affection when he hears that good fortune has befallen a perfect stranger, but indifference or merely a slightly friendly feeling is not and his regret at the death of the nearest acquaintance will a sentiment. This interest is difficult to place. It come within this sentiment also. But in neither case is the

might/

interest/

might be argued that to apply the term "interest" to an acquaintance for whom one feels mere indifference, i.e. with regard to whom one has no feeling at all is to make a contradiction in terms. Yet if a man hears that a mere acquaintance has won the military cross, he is "interested." He is probably conscious of feeling pleased. In many cases the interest would be correctly placed within the sentiment of self love. The man who hears the news basks in the reflected glory of the distinction. He tells everyone he meets. "Did you see X has won the military cross? I knew him slightly, years ago." The point of the story lies in the latter sentence which some would render "I knew him well" unconsciously trying to bring the fact into closer relation to the self. This might also explain the interest if the acquaintance has merely died in the ordinary unromantic way. Still the man is "interested" in the news as something affecting himself. Perhaps the fact serves as an unpleasant reminder that the final hour awaits the hearer also and his train of thought would be "X dead? How time flies! And I'm getting no younger." But the interest in acquaintances is often subsidiary to the sentiment which Shand calls "respect for others." A man in whom this interest is strong will rejoice when he hears that good fortune has befallen a perfect stranger, and his regret at the death of the merest acquaintance will come within this sentiment also. But in neither case is the



failure, disappointment or even sorrow. His feeling for interest in acquaintance by itself equivalent to a sentiment, photography is capable of organising emotions to serve its end. It is, then, a sentiment. It must therefore be an object desired for its own sake, i.e. an end, not a means.

It is Shand who has given the criterion of a sentiment as that which is capable of organising within itself the sentiment of self-love. A sentiment within a sentiment emotions, instincts and impulses. He has very clearly proved is then seen to be both end and means. It is something that love, whether of wife, child, parent or friend has this which is desired for its own sake but which also serves the power and is a sentiment. Stout in the Groundwork says "all sentiments..... involved the valuing of an object <sup>for</sup> of its own sake in the case of a doctor whose love for his profession in peace time was enthusiastic, and who is now giving his services to the army. The sentiment for his profession should be of value in considering the layers of interest. The distinction is seen in the interest in the immediate to be a sentiment, become subservient to the higher sentiment environment, which is an interest subsidiary usually to the self-regarding sentiment. A woman who buys a hat is interested in the purchase, but the interest is subsidiary most probably to her self-love, and in any case it is not a sentiment for the hat qua hat - it is only a means to an end. The distinction is not so clear in considering the sentiment for a hobby, such as photography. The interest taken in the kind of printing paper, or the complete darkness of the dark room is a state of mind which is not an emotion, for it is more enduring than emotion and must contain a greater amount of intelligence than an emotion need have. It is the knowledge towards the intruder and fear lest his negatives should be spoiled; if his photographs are successful he feels joy, if a

a failure, disappointment or even sorrow. His feeling for a photograph is capable of organising emotions to serve its end. It is, then, a sentiment. It must therefore be an object desired for its own sake, i.e. an end, not a means. It includes the sentiment "for some game or sport" within the sentiment of self-love. A sentiment within a sentiment is then seen to be both end and means. It is something which is desired for its own sake but which also serves the end of a higher sentiment. That this is possible may be seen in the case of a doctor whose love for his profession in peace time was enthusiastic, and who is now giving his services to the army. The sentiment for his profession before being the dominating one in his life has, without ceasing to be a sentiment, become subservient to the higher sentiment of patriotism. only source of happiness. After a time of utter and if happiness is harmony within the field of interest, it follows that a man has as many sources of happiness as he has sentiments. An experience can be accompanied by the feeling-tone of pleasure; the emotion of joy can serve the end of any sentiment; and a sentiment within which there is no discord is characterised by happiness. of Happiness, then, is a state of mind which is not an emotion, for it is more enduring than emotion and must contain a greater amount of intelligence than an emotion need have. It is the knowledge that all is well or is going to be well within the particular field of interest, or with regard to the object of the particular

cular/

cular sentiment; this knowledge is always pleasurable and is at times joyful, but in essence it is consciousness of harmony. When there is discord within the field of interest, there is unhappiness within that field. A man engaged in uncongenial work is, within the sentiment of work, unhappy. He may be happy within other sentiments, e.g. his home life and his hobbies. Some men allow one sentiment to grow to such strength that others do not exist or have but a faint and barely recognised existence. Such a man is a "man of one idea," all he has is placed on one stake. Many instances could be found in history and literature of the breakdown of this isolated and unique happiness. Reference may again be made to Silas Marner and the loss of his hoard of gold. With its disappearance there vanished the object of his only sentiment, his only source of happiness. After a time of utter and complete desolation, a sentiment grew up in him of love for the little waif who had strayed in at his door. He found happiness at last in another layer or stratum in his mind.

We have reached the conclusion that pleasure is a feeling-tone which may accompany any kind of mental experience, that joy is an emotion, and that happiness is a state of mind which consists in the consciousness of harmony in the relation of the self to the object of a sentiment.

Finally it may be remarked that considerable support is found for the present theory of the nature of joy

in the fact that if the theory is a true one, joy fulfils a great function in the development of man. It is a force which adds to the fulness of life's content. Its opposite is sorrow which restricts the personality by causing it to shrink from objects which give it pain and, after much sorrowful experience, to distrust anything new lest it should give pain. Curiosity, and a thirst for knowledge drive a man onward to fresh woods, and pastures new, while fear hangs on to him, dragging him back to keep him from harm. So from a slightly different point of view, joy leads a man to try new paths for success or to go further along old paths for further success, while sorrow makes him shrink from new endeavour and bids him "leave things be in a black world."

If the end of joy is expansive activity, it will tend to impel a man along the nearest path which claims his interested attention. Previously formed interests and sentiments will enable him to choose the path to follow. Joy sets many doors ajar. The joyful man can only enter one at a time and must choose. A knowledge of men's private interests, particularly of their hobbies will be of the greatest value in showing the effect of joy in their lives. In the behaviour of an angry artist and an angry dustman we may find common ground. The behaviour of a joyful artist and a joyful dustman may be so different in external details that knowledge of

their/



their respective interests is necessary before we can see that the same law of psychology is at work in both of them. The function of joy is development. The expansive activity claimed in these pages as the end of joy serves to keep man's mind from dying of inanition for lack of new interests as appetite serves to keep his body from dying for lack of food.