Chris J. Mitchell (1989) Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. Electronics Letters, 25 (17).
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We consider two basic versions of the challenge-response authentication protocol, and exhibit both a method of attack and a simple modification preventing such attacks. We go on to consider three variants of the basic protocols and show that one of them is completely insecure.
This is a Published version This version's date is: 08/1989 This item is peer reviewed
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Deposited by () on 23-Dec-2009 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 21-May-2010
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