Categorical imperitives

Abstract

A distinction between two types of person reflecting two ways in which morality impinges upon life is sought, provisionally designated as a distinction between moralist and amoralist. The distinction is not easily characterised by way of action, emotion, motive, or verbal behaviour, and is not related to any egoistic/altruistic distinctions. The distinction is finally presented as that between believer and non-believer in the existence of intrinsic reasons for actions. The problem of applying the distinctior is seen as a problem concerning the vagueness of the expression 'believer in intrinsic reasons'. Three ways in which vagueness could enter this expression are isolated.Of these it is argued that only self-deception does in fact provide a source of vagueness, though it will be minimal and for the purposes of the remainder of the enquiry may be removed by stipulation.The presence of a belief in the existence of intrinsic reasons is manifest in the use of categorical imperatives. Thus the distinction may also be presented as that between user and non-user of categorical imperatives. An analysis of the term 'categorical imperative' is then undertaken and a definition based on intrinsic reasons is shown to be equivalent to one based on the conditions under which such judgements are withdrawn. An investigation of the variety of practical judgements that can occur as categorical imperatives follows, along with an investigation of the variety of reasons for action.The question of the extent to which there are people who use only hypothetical imperatives in. making their moral judgements, and the role of empirical evidence in settling this question, is then discussed. A sketch of the difference in moral life between user and non-user of categorical imperatives is offered. Finally, some ways of justifying the use (or non-use) of categorical imperatives are considered.