The French popular front and the Franco-Soviet pact 1935 - 1938

Abstract

The Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance, signed by the Flandin-Laval government in May 1935, was never complemented by the conclusion of a military accord, as the Russians hoped. This study comprises an analysis of the value of the Pact in these circumstances, and an examination of why and how the French Popular Front Government allowed the Pact with the USSR to deteriorate beyond repair. Thus the numerous adverse pressures on the Government are evaluated: fear of alienating France's allies, particularly Great Britain, as well as the desire not to antagonise Germany further; and fear of domestic opposition, both in parliament and from the military leaders. This study suggests that the single most important factor linking these considerations was dislike of communism; the attitudes of France's allies towards the Soviet Pact were predominantly coloured by fear of bolshevism; the conservative tendencies of the General Staff clouded its judgement of Soviet military usefulness; the Popular Front Government itself was primarily concerned with the activities of the French Communist Party; while, ironically, its own association with the communists made any Popular Front attempt to extend the Pact subject to vociferous domestic opposition. In effect, the Franco-Soviet Pact was unlikely ever to be reinforced as long as fear of communism remained stronger than fear of German fascism. Thus it may be said that the failure to consolidate the Pact represents the broader French unwillingness to recognise the true nature of Hitlerism, and so to defy British reticence and take an effective lead in the struggle against fascism. In this way, an analysis of Popular Front policy towards the Soviet Pact can be seen as an integral part of an understanding of the whole of French foreign policy during the later 1930's.