The Place of Constantinople and the Straits in British Foreign Policy: 1890-1902

Abstract

When Salisbury and Rosebery directed Britain's foreign policy in the early 1890s they were convinced of the importance of defending the Straits against Russia and of maintaining a strong diplomatic position at Constantinople. As British power alone was no longer sufficient to counter Russian influence, Britain went into partnership with Germany and her Triple Alliance allies. Their collaboration was successful until the confidence of the three Continental Powers was undermined by the policy which Britain pursued in other parts of the world and then in the Near East itself - regarding the Armenian question .In spite of suspicions to the contrary, Salisbury in 1895 upheld his former views on the importance of maintaining the status quo at Constantinople. It was not until November, when the Cabinet refused permission to send the fleet through the Straits, that Salisbury had serious doubts about Britain's ability to defend them; but, even then, he continued publicly to adhere to his former policy, believing it essential to retain Austria-Hungary's friendship. Although the real turning point came in October 1897 when Salisbury privately acknowledged that Britain must gradually withdraw from her responsibilities at Constantinople and strengthen her position in Egypt - a decision made easier by the Austro-Russian agreement to maintain the status quo in the Near East, in 1901 Lansdowne attempted to recreate the old grouping of Powers in order to check Russian activities in the Straits; but it proved impossible to restore the confidence which had been the basis of the old relationship; Austria-Hungary now relied upon her agreement with Russia to maintain the status quo˙ The way was open for the Anglo-French agreement over Egypt.