Concerning propositions and their truth

Abstract

My thesis is concerned with the question of propositions and truth. It is said usually (1) that propositions are true (2) only propositions are true (3) that it is facts that make propositions true. We all understand what is meant when we say "propositions are that of which true and false are predicated and it is facts which make propositions true or false." My first question is to give an answer to the question "What is it that makes propositions true or false?" I give therefore an answer to the question "What Is a fact?"I then raise the question whether there are particular kinds of facts called negative facts which make negative propositions true, I am led to suppose that there is no particular kind of fact such as this. The facts which make propositions containing no negation true make also propositions containing negations true. I am led then to suggest a view of the relation between true proposition and fact. The relation of true proposition to fact Is the formal one of entailing and determinate communication: The relation of false proposition to fact follows. I suggest that the relation of false proposition to fact is that relation which is the relative product of the relations 'contrary or contradictory of', 'entailing', and 'determinate communication'. I proceed to discuss Judgements; thence to the question "What are propositions?" This last question resolves Into the question "how do we use the word 'a proposition'." Finally I discuss 'propositions of Logic' and what it means to say that these propositions are true. In the course of my thesis I expoundor criticise certain views held fey Prof. Whitehead, Mr. Russell, Prof. Moore, Dr. Wittgenstein, Mr. Ryle, and others in order to help me in my exposition.